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ABSTRACT 
The Raising Rivals' Costs theory is the newest and most important theory 
of non price predation. This dissertation assesses its ramifications for s. 36 of the 
Commerce Act 1986. Chapter I introduces the topic. Chapter II deals with 
non price predation and shows how it is an attractive strategy for dominant firms. 
Chapter III discusses the RRC model in depth. Chapter IV critiques it. Chapter 
V deals with the constituent elements of s. 36. Chapters VI to XIV deal with 
examples of prohibited conduct under s. 36. In each chapter I analyse whether 
the theory helps explain the cases, adds anything new and is relevant. I discuss 
U.S., Australian and New Zealand cases. 
Chapter XV concludes that the theory is relevant and useful under s. 36. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
One. of the primary concerns of antitrust law is prohibiting firms with 
market power from using that power to eliminate rivals or protect themselves 
from competition. Every system of antitrust law has misuSe of market power 
provisions. Commentators and courts have come up with a variety of terms to 
describe such misuse of market power. These include "predation", "exclusionary 
behaviour", "abuse. of market power", "foreclosure", "unfair competition":, 
"anticompetitive behaviour", "erecting barriers to entry" and ''banning access", I 
shall use the term predation to describe such behaviour. However, it 
encompasses all the above terms. 
Two concerns have presented themselves about predation. First, courts 
and commentators have until recently limited themselves to price predation when 
dealing with predation. Two fundamental premises of recent antitrust law have 
been that a) firms behave rationaI+y and b) because predation is irrational, firms 
will not engage in it. New theories have arisen which show that premise b) is 
not necessarily correct. 
These new theories argue that predation can be a plausible and rational 
business strategy and thus, merits antitrust attention. 
The second concern over predation is how to distinguish it from normal 
business behaviour. It has become axiomatic over the world that antitrust laws 
protect competition not competitors. In New Zealand the High Court has said: 
"Such provisions [Sections 27 and 36 Commerce Act 1986] are 
directed at the protection of the concept of competition as such. 
They are not directed at the protection of individual competitors, 
except in so far as the latter may promote the former".l 
Similarly Barker J. stated: 
"The test of competition is not concerned with the economic fate 
of individual competitors ... ".2 
2 
The same is true in Australia In Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v 
The Broken Hill Proprietary Co. Ltd3 Mason C.J. and Wilson J. 
observed: 
"the objective of s. 46 is to protect the interests of consumers, the 
operation of the section being predicated on the assumption that 
competition is a means to that end".4 
Subsequent Australian courts have interpreted Queensland Wire to mean 
the goal of s. 46 is to protect consumers not competitors.5 
The same is 'also true in the United States. The Supreme Court in Brown 
Shoe Co. v U.S.6 held: "It is competition, not competitors, which the [Sherman] 
1 Union Shipping Ltd v Port' Nelson Ltd [1990] 2 NZLR 662, 700. 
2 Auckland Regional Authority v Mutual Rental Cars (Auckland) 
Airport) Ltd [1987] 2 NZLR 647, 653. 
3 (1989) ATPR para 40-925. 
4 Id. at 50,010. Similarly, Deane J. held in the same case at 50,011: 
"the essential notions with which s. 46 is concerned 
and the object which the section is designed to 
achieve are economic and not moral ones. The 
notions are those of markets, market power, 
competitive environment and competitive conduct 
" 
5 Dowling v Dalgety Australia Ltd (1992) ATPR para 41-165; ASX 
Operations Pty Ltd v Pont Data Australia Pty Ltd (1991) ATPR para 41-
069. 
6 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
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Act protects".7 
The importance of distinguishing between predation and normal business 
behaviour is that "[a]ll lawful competition aims to defeat and drive out 
competitors".8 Former Judge and Professor Robert Bork has noted:9 
" ... the essential mechanism of competition and its prime virtue [is] 
that more efficient firms take business away from the less efficient. 
Some businesses will shrink and some will disappear. Competition 
is an evolutionary process. Evolution requires the ~xtinction of 
some species as well as the survival of others. The business 
equivalent of the dodos, the dinosaurs, and the great ground sloths 
are in for a bad time - and they should be". 
Thus, competition law should protect competition - not preserve 
competitors from their more energetic rivals. 
Judge Frank Easterbrook has well summed up the dilemma of 
distinguishing between predation and healthy competitive behaviour:10 
"Aggressive, competitive conduct by a monopolist is highly 
beneficial to consumers. Courts should prize and encourage it 
under the antitrust laws. Aggressive exclusionary conduct by a 
monopolist is deleterious to consumers. Courts should condemn 
it under the antitrust laws. There is only one problem: 
competitive and exclusionary behaviour look alike", 
7 rd. at 334. 
8 Great Escape, In. v Union Body Co., 791 F. 2d 532,541 (7th Gr. 
1986); The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has observed: n[l]ively 
legal competition will result in the efficient and shrewd 
businessman -routing the inefficient and imprudent from the field". 
Richter Concrete Corp. v Hilltop Concrete Corp., 691 F. 2d 818, 
823 (6th Cir. 1982); See, also, Olympia Equipment Leasing Co. v 
Western Union Tel. Co., 797 F. 2d 370, 379 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 480 U.S. 934 (1987). 
9 Bork, Bowman, Blake and Jones, The Goals of Anti-trust: A 
Dialogue on Policy, 3 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363, 375 (1965). 
10 Easterbroo~ On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 972, 972 (1986). 
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Thus, in deciding whether behaviour is predatory, courts must not only 
consider its effect on competitors, they must also consider its effect on 
consumers. Commentators and courts have devised various tests for 
distinguishing predatory and competitive behaviour. 
Bork has defined predation as a "firm's deliberate aggression against one 
or more rivals through the employment of business practices that would not be 
considered profit maximing" except for two expectations:11 Either the conduct 
will drive competitors from the market, which would give the predator a 
sufficient market share to command monopoly profits, or the competitors will, 
through fear or a renewed spirit of cooperation, "abandon competitive behaviour 
the predators finds inconvenient or threatening".12 In short, Bork defines 
predation as "attempting to exclude rivals on some basis other than 
efficiency".13 The United States Supreme Court has expressly adopted Bork's 
definition as have some CircuitS.14 
Professors Phillip Areeda and Donald Turner have defined predation:15 
" ... [EJxc1usionary comprehends at the most behavipur that not 
only (1) intends to impair the opportunities of rivals, but also (2) 
either does not further competition on the merits or does so in an 
unnecessarily restrictive wat. 
11 R. BORK, tHE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POllCY AT 
WAR WITH ITSELF 144 (2d ed. 1993). 
12 Ibid. 
13 Id. at 138. 
14 Aspen Skiing Co. v Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 
605 (1985). 
15 ill P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 78 (1978). 
Professor Lawrence Sullivan has added his thoughts:16 
"By contrast [with competitive conduct], the predator seeks not to 
win the field by greater efficiency, better services or lower prices 
reflective of cost savings or modest profits. The predatory firm 
tries to inhibit others in ways independent of the predator'S own 
ability to perform effectively in the market". 
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A predator can engage in predation on three interrelated fronts. First, 
it can act so as to deter potential rivals. Such deterrence strategies need not 
harm the predator's existing rivals. Second, it can act so as to disadvantage 
existing rivals. It may not eliminate its rivals, but it may reduce the competitive 
restraint the rivals exercise over it. Third, it can act so as to eliminate its rivals. 
All the acts may substantially deter potential rivals. They may only be 
rational if they have this effect. Indeed, Judge Richard Posner believes a firm's 
reputation for predatory behaviour can be an effective entry barrier.17 
While these definitions have all received judicial approval, they, with 
respect, suffer from not being sufficiently able to take account of strategic 
behaviour. This is predatory conduct designed to decrease the attractiveness of 
the offers against which the predator must compete. IS Professor Oliver 
16 L. SUlLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 
ill (1977). 
17 R. POSNER, ANTIIRUST LAW : AN ECONOMIC 
PERSPECTIVE 184-187 (1976). 
18 Markovits, The Limits to Simplying Antitrust: A Reply to 
Professor Easterbrook, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 41, 44 (1984); 
Markovits, Some Preliminary Notes on the American Antitrust 
Laws' Economic Tests of Legality. 27 STAN. L. REV. 841 (1975); 
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy after Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 
213, 260 (1985). 
Williamson defines strategic behaviour as:19 
"[ e ]fforts by established firms to take up advance positions and 
respond contingently to rivalry in ways that discipline actual and 
discourage potential competition". 
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A firm acts strategically when it takes into account its rivals' reactions 
before acting. A predator engages in strategic behaviour to influence or 
constrain a competitor's market choices. In this way it can be a form of 
predation. No one disputes that firms can do it. The problem is that it makes 
the analysis more complex and correspondingly makes it more difficult to 
distinguish predation from normal'competitive behaviour. The complexity arises 
from assuming (correctly) that firms operate in uncertain environments. The 
uncertainty results from asymmetric information among firms. Strategic 
behaviour scholars also assume bounded rationality or at least costs of learning. 
Williamson refers to these factors as transaction costs.20 Transaction costs 
complicate the identification of conditions under which a firm's actions benefit 
competition. This is seen best with vertical restraints. Traditional Chicago 
School scholars argue that vertical restraints are seldom anticompetitive.21 
They are only so, if they have a horizontal impact. Williamson argues that 
transaction costs can cause vertical restraints to be anti competitive as a firm may 
19 Williamson, Antitrust Enforcement: Where It's Been. Where It's 
Going, 27 ST. LOlJIS U. L. J. 289, 289 (1983). 
20 Ibid.; Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions : 
Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction Cost Approach, 127 U. 
PA L. REV. 953, 954 (1979). 
21 BORK, supra, note 11; Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust 
Analysis, 127 U. PA L. REV. 925, 927 (1979); Posner, The Next 
Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se 
Legality, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 6 (1983). 
7 
choose to impose a vertical restraint to increase a rival's costs and thereby cause 
anticompetitive harm. This is to be contrasted with the Chicago School view 
that a firm only imposes a vertical restraint to reduce its own transaction costs 
and thereby increase its own efficiency. This argument may be correct in certain 
circumstances, for example, if the transaction costs of a scheme whereby all 
suppliers distribute their products through all distributors are very high due to 
transportation or negotiation costs, a vertical restraint may be efficient and thus 
pro competitive. 
This shows the difficulty in distinguishing predation via strategic behaviour 
and normal business practice. Indeed, Professor William Baxter freely admits 
harmful strategic behaviour exists but argues courts cannot understand it and 
thus, should ignore it.22 That a predator can use vertical restraints to harm 
competition shows predation does not just have to be price predation. 
Predation takes two forms, price or nonprice. With price predation, a 
predator sells its products at a loss so as to drive its victims from the market, 
then increases prices to recoup its losses and reap monopoly profits. 
Nonprice predation involves a predator acting so as to raise its rivals' or 
potential rivals' costs. This forces the rivals to raise their price. Such action 
enables the predator to do likewise and make a profit. As mentioned above, 
until recently commentators and courts have focused mainly on price predation. 
This is changing as scholars, enforcement agencies and private plaintiffs realise 
that nonprice predation is a more attractive strategy and this more likely to 
22 Baxter, Reflections Upon Professor Williamson's Comments. 27 
ST. WUIS U. L. J. 315, 316 (1983). 
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Various theories of nonprice predation have emerged. I will focus on 
one; viz, Professors Steven Salop, Thomas Krattenmaker and David Scheffman's 
model of Raising Rivals' Costs. I will assess whether it is relevant to New 
Zealand competition law. To do so entails examining whether it takes account 
of strategic predatory behaviour and enables courts to do so. Chapter IT will 
introduce and discuss the concept of nonprice predation and how it is an 
effective anticompetitive theory. It will compare non price predation with price 
predation and show how it is a much more plausible strategy. 
Chapter ill will discuss the Raising Rivals' Costs Model. Chapter IV 
critiques the model. Chapter V will analyse the constituent elements of Section 
36 Commerce Act 1986. Section 36 is New Zealand's predation section. I will 
argue that it can and does enable courts to distinguish between predatory and 
normal business behaviour. To assess whether the Raising Rivals' Costs model 
is relevant to New Zealand I will examine whether it fits in with existing case 
law under section 36 and whether it is useful in deciding section 36 cases. To 
that end Chapter VI will discuss price squeezes and the model. Chapter vn will 
discuss refusals to deal and the model. Chapter vm will deal with overbuying 
and capacity expansion. Chapter IX will deal with predatory innovation. 
Chapter X will examine predatory hiring. Chapter XI will deal with predatory 
23 See Calvani & Averitt, Nonprice Predation: An Introduction, 16 
J. REPRINTS FOR ANTITRUST L. & ECON., No.2 (1986); Its 
importance is recognised by the Antitrust Section of the American 
Bar Association having published a monograph on the subject: 
ABA ANTITRUST SECTION: MONOGRAPH NO. 18, 
NONPRICE PREDATION UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE 
SHERMAN ACT (1991). 
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advertising. Chapter XII will examine predatory litigation which is a paradign 
RaiSing Rivals' Costs scenario. Chapter XIII deals with a possible future 
application of the model in the United States. Chapter XIV analyses exclusive 
dealing and the model. Chapter XV concludes that the model is relevant in 
assessing predation under the Commerce Act. 
As New Zealand's competition law is still in its infancy I will refer to 
overseas authority and commentary. 
I assume a number of things for the purpose of the dissertation. 
I assume the goal of antitrust is to enhance efficiency. Krattenmaker and 
Salop assume this, so any assessment of their model must share their assumption. 
The assumption is controversial. .I believe it is justifiable. 
Efficiency has three components. 
(1) Productive or X Efficiency24 
This occurs when it is impossible to produce more of at least one product, 
without simultaneously producing less of another product. It simply means that 
an individual firm is making the most effective use of its resources (Le. it cannot 
make the product any cheaper). 
(2) Allocative Efficiencr 
This occurs when products are allocated in such a way that no other 
combination of products would enhance the well-being of one consumer without 
24 See, R. BLAIR & D. KASSERMAN, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 
24 (1985); E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: TIlEORY & 
APPUCATIONS (4th ed. 1982); D. McCWSKEY, TIlE 
APPLIED THEORY OF PRICE (1982); G. STIGLER, TIlE 
TIlEORY OF PRICE (3d ed. 1966). 
25 Ibid. 
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affecting another consumer. In economic terms an industry obtains allocative 
efficiency if output· is at the level where price equals the marginal cost of 
production. 
(3) Dynamic or Intertemporal Efficien~ 
This refers to the degree to which society is finding the optimal balance 
between satisfying current and future wants through savings and investment or 
innovation. Proponents of dynamic efficiency argue it is the most important 
aspect of efficiency.27 
When I refer to consumer welfare in this dissertation I mean allocative 
efficiency. As Bork notes:28 
"Consumer welfare is maximised when society's economic 
resources are allocated so that consumer wants are satisfied as 
fully as technological constraints permit. Simply put, consumer 
welfare is the measure of a nation's wealth". 
He argues:29 
liThe whole task of antitrust can be summed up as the effort to 
improve allocative efficiency without impairing productive 
efficiency so greatly as to produce either no gain or net loss in 
consumer welfare". 
26 Ibid. 
27 J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND 
DEMOCRACY, 81-106 (1942); F. SCHERER, INNOVATION 
AND GROWTH: SCHUMPETERIAN PERSPECTIVES (1984); 
M. PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 
(1990); Scherer, Antitrust, 'Efficiency and Progress, 62 N.Y.U.L. 
REV. 998, 1010-1012 (1987); Markham, Concentration : A 
Stimulant or Retardant to Innovation?, in INDUSTRIAL 
CONCENTRATION : THE NEW LEARNING 247 (H. 
Goldschmid, H. Mann & J. Weston eds. 1974). 
28 BORK, supra, note 11 at 91. 
29 Id. at 90. 
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Productive and allocative efficiency are static elements. They are part of 
a market at one point in time. Efficiency, as mentioned above, has a third 
component, viz; dynamic efficiency. Consumer welfare antitrust analysis ignores 
dynamic efficiency. Its arguments and models are based on static efficiencies 
alone. 
The Consumer Welfare School is not the only antitrust school. Many 
models exist. However, I condense them into four. I shall examine each. 
1. Structuralist Model 
This model has the objective of maximising consumer .welfare. It assumes 
that one can identify conduct which harms competition by examining the mark,et 
structure in which the conduct occurs. It has as its key model the structure-
conduct-performance paradigm.3Q This paradigm holds that ultimately market 
structure affects consumer welfare.31 The argument runs as follows - structure 
induces conduct that determines performance; i.e. a low concentration market 
structure with many firms induces competition with the lowest prices. Low prices 
mean that consumer welfare is at its maximum, as the market produces an 
efficient amount without monopoly profits. Conversely, a high concentration of 
firms leads to a decrease in output and a raising of prices causing monopoly 
profits and a supply of less than optimal amount and a decrease in consumer 
30 See, Carstensen, Antitrust Law and the Paradigm of Industrial 
Organisation. 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV., 487 (1983); Weiss, The 
Structure -Conduct-Performance Paradigm and Antitrust, 127 U. 
PA L. REV .. , 1104 (1979). 
31 F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 3-6 (2d ed. 1980). 
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welfare. 
Thus, the structuralist model aims to reduce market concentration and 
maintain numerous firms or an atomistic market. In short, it tries to obtain a 
situation as close to, perfect competition as possible. 
This leads to concern about the number of competitors in a market. The 
more, the better. A dominant firm's conduct which eliminates or forecloses 
rivals and thus, increases concentration will be illegal. A court need not assess 
the impact of conduct on price or output or production efficiency, as structure 
determines performance. Williamson terms the model the "inhospitability 
tradition",32 as it views all conduct which forecloses rivals as anticompetitive 
and illegal per se, without requiring a plaintiff to show that conduct is 
anticompetitive. 
Critics claim the model is too simplistic.33 No proof exists that structure 
causes conduct which determines performance. Professors Howard Demse~ 
and Yale Brozen35 argue no empirical evidence supports a causal connection 
between concentration and profitability. A concentrated market be highly 
competitive, for example, two firms, Coke and Pepsi dominate the soft drink 
market and no one suggests that the market is not highly competitive. 
32 Williamson, supra, note 20, at 989. 
33 Carstensen, supra, note 30, at 501-504. 
34 Demsetz, Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy, 16 
J.L. & ECON., 1 (1973). 
35 Y. BROZEN, CONCENTRATION, MERGERS AND PUBliC 
POliCY (1982); Brozen, Bain's Concentration and Rates of 
Return Revisited, 14 J.L. & ECON" 351 (1971). 
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Conversely, a market with numerous firms may not be highly competitive in the 
sense of low prices. Numerous real estate agent firms exist in New Zealand yet 
one is hard pressed to find wide varieties in the percentages these firms charge 
as commissions. If the structural model was correct one would not expect to find 
thiS.36 Indeed some commentators argue that the paradigm should flow the 
other way:37 
''[Exceptional] performance and competitive condu~t lead to a 
concentrated structure. Structure is a result not the cause". 
Similarly, that highly concentrated industries are profitable is not 
determinative. The profitability may be due to such things as economics of sale, 
innovation, cost reduction through production efficiencies and the like.38 
The structuralist model does not apply to New Zealand. The Commerce 
Act does not attack size alone. It does not condemn a dominant firm for its 
dominance - it condemns it for its conduct and its purpose. Similarly, the merger 
provisions do not condemn a merger solely for its size or market share. The Act 
allows the Commerce Commission to take efficiencies into account. It allows a 
merger where the efficiency gains offset any lowering of competition. 
36 The possibility remains that the various real estate agent firms 
have formed a cartel. 
37 BROZEN, supra, note 35, at 118; see also D. ARMENTANO, 
ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY: ANATOMY OF A POllCY 
FAILURE 40 (1981). 
38 Werden, Can the Concentration-Collusion Hypothesis be Refuted 
Empirically?, U.S. Department of Justice, Economic Policy Office, 
84-11. (1984). 
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2. Deconcentration Model: 
This model encompasses political goals, such as the preservation of small 
businesses, decentralisation of political power, fairness in the market place and 
increasing consumer choice. Americans call this Jeffersonian protection of small 
businesses. It also has the goal of maximising consumer welfare. It recognises 
that the political goals and consumer welfare goals may conflict. For example, 
a merger or economies of scale may increase concentration but create 
efficiencies which make the consumer better off in terms of lower prices than 
with a less concentrated market. Proponents of the model would be willing to 
offset the efficiency increases for a market structure in which political and 
economic power does not rest with a few large corporations. Professor Robert 
Pitofsky argues that excessive concentration will lead to antidemocratic political 
pressures and will decrease individual and business freedoms by broadening the 
range within which private decisions by a few in the economic sphere control the 
welfare of all.39 Wh~n antitrust goals conflict, decentralisation of economic and 
political power prevails. Pitofsky states:40 
"[T]he matter of efficiencies is not dispositive, and ... an occasional 
loss of efficiency as a result of antitrust enforcement can be 
tolerated and is to be expected if antitrust is to serve other 
legitimate values". 
Proponents argue in most cases courts will not have to offset efficiency 
39 Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. FA L. REV., 
1051 (1979). 
40 Id. at 1074. 
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for de concentration as economies of scale are not substantial.41 They do not 
beli,eve one can quantify efficiencies. This uncertainty and the belief that entry 
barriers are large and that pricing above marginal costs occurs at relatively low 
concentration level~ implies that antitrust should maintain low concentration 
levels unless one can show efficiencies.42 
Preserving or increasing consumer choices is also a goal of antitrust. 
Proponents criticise exclusive dealing, for example, as reducing the price/quality 
options for consumers.43 
This model leads to a bewildering number of reasons for antitrust 
decisions. The U.S. Supreme Court, particularly under Chief Justice Earl 
Warren, held mergers might be ilJegal because:-
1. ' it would require moving a corporation's headquarters from a small town 
to a large city,44 
2. it is part of a trend lessening the number of single-store groceries,45 
3. it may eliminate a potential rival which every fum in the market 
ignored,46 
41 SULLIVAN, supra, note 16, at 447-448; Bain, Economies of Scale, 
and the Conditions of Entry in Twenty Manufacturing Industries, 
44 AM. ECON. REV., 15 (1954). 
42 Hovenkamp, supra, note 18, at 218. 
43 Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New EquilibriUl1L 66 
CORNELL L. REV., 1140 (1981); Fox, Cons1Jmer Beware 
Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV., 1714 (1986). 
44 U.S. v Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 541-42 (1973) 
(Douglas J., concurring). 
45 U.S. v Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 278 (1966). 
46 Supra, note 44, at 537. 
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4. it may eliminate competition among certain firms that mayor may not 
compete in the relevant market.47 
On the other hand, the Court allowed mergers or agreements among 
rivals to restrict output because:-
1. it permitted a dying industry to keep up its profits until it expired,48 
2. it enabled firms to decrease their work day,49 
3. it enabled firms who did not want to compete not to compete.50 
The problem with the model is that it does not allow a rational analysis 
of antitrust cases. The law becomes unpredictable. An absurd example is s. 7 
of the Clayton Act. A senator, when speaking on a proposed amendment, spoke 
of child mortality being higher in cities with high levels of industrial 
concentration. This leads to the possibility of opposing a merger on the basis of 
it increasing child· mortality.51 This is not rational - it is as Bork says 
"intellectual mush".52 
47 U.S. v Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 549 (1966). 
48 National Association of Window Glass Manufacturers v U.S., 263 
U.S. 403, 412 (1923). 
49 Chicago Board of Trade v U.S., 246 U.S. 231,241 (1918). 
50 Appalachian Coals v U.S., 288 U.S. 344, 376-377 (1933). 
51 Barnett, Bork, Joffe, Axinn, Kantor, Panel Discussion: Merger 
Enforcement and Practice, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 233,238 (1981). 
52 Ibid. Easterbrook argues "a multiple-goal antitrust policy is 
unpredictable and unprincipled", see Easterbrook,. Is There a 
Rachet in Antitrust Law? 60 TEX. L. REV., 705, 716 (1982). 
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3. Chicago Sc~ool or Consumer Welfare Model 
The Chicago School model condemns only those practices which confer 
power to reduce output and increase price. Its primary goal is to maximise 
consumer welfare by maximising productive efficiency and leading to lower 
prices for consumers.53 Indeed, Judge Easterbrook claims that U[t]he principal 
purpose of the antitrust laws is to prevent overcharges to consumersu.54 
Highly concentrated markets are not necessarily anticompetitive.55 They 
do not necessarily confer power over price as they may be highly competitive. 
Similarly, increased concentration may also result in efficiencies which benefit 
consumers by leading to lower prices or better products or services. Thus, one 
must analyse each practice which leads to higher concentration and determine 
whether it is anticompetitive. Antitrust protects competition not competitors. 
That a practice harms a competitor is not determinative. It is the nature of 
competition that some firms will eliminate other less efficient firms.56 The 
other two models state that antitrust protects the process of rivalry. The Chicago 
School interprets competition as a process of rivalry, not a state at a slice of 
53 See, supra, note 21; See also R. POSNER, ANTITRUST IAW : 
AN ECONONIIC PERSPECTIVE (1976); H. HOVENKAMP, 
ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST IA W (1985); 
Hovenkamp, supra, note 18,226-233. 
54 Premier Electrical Const. Co. v National Electrical Contractors 
Ass'n. Inc .. 814 F. 2d 358, 368 (7th Cir. 1987). 
55 BORK, supra, note 11, at 179-191; Y.· BROZEN, 
CONCENTRATIONMER;GERSANDPUBUCPOUCY (1982); 
J. McGEE, IN DEFENCE OF INDUSTRIAL 
CONCENTRATION (1971). 
56 Easterbrook, supra, note 10 at 973; Bork, supra, note 9. 
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time. A firm may create a superior product. It thus, obtains greater sales and 
profits. However, as the firm does not own its customers the fact that the firm 
has a large share of today's sales does not imply injury. The firm may be doing 
the thing that benefits consumers - making its product more efficiently and 
selling at lower prices. The only antitrust concern is if the firm does something 
which prevents new entrants similarly innovating and growing. 
The Chicago School only condemns dominant firm behaviour which gives 
the dominant firm the power to reduce output and raise prices. Similarly, the 
Chicago School argues barriers to entry are not prevalent. Professor George 
Stigler defines them as "additional long-run costs that must be incurred by an 
entrant relative to the long-run costs, faced by incumbent firms".57 Thus, if the 
incumbent firm had to meet the same cost that an entrant does it is not an entry 
barrier. For example, if entrants could compete in a market by building a 
factory and investing in personnel, the fact the incumbent has a factory and has 
invested in personnel is not an entry barrier. 
An example of the difference between the Chicago School and the other 
models is marked over vertical restraints. The Chicago School assumes they are 
seldom anticompetitive.58 Critics dispute the Chicago School's assumptions that 
the private interests of the firms entering into vertical restraint agreements (such 
as exclusive dealing) and the public interests of the consumer always coincide. 
57 G. STIGLER, THE ORGANISATION OF INDUS1RY 67 
(1968); The U.S. Federal Trade Commission adopted this 
definition in Echlin Manufacturing Co., 105 F.T.C. 410, 485 (1985). 
58 See, supra, note 21; Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the 
Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J., 135, 168 (1984) "Vertical 
arrangements almost never threaten competition". 
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They also note the School virtually ignores the degree to which vertical restraints 
reduce price/qualify options.59 
Efficiencies are determinative for Chicagoans. If the conduct leads to 
efficiencies, courts should allow it. Pitofsky, on the other hand, only allows 
efficiencies ''when the likelihood of competitive injury was slight, the predicted 
efficiencies were capable of clear demonstration in court, and there was some 
likelihood that the efficiencies would be converted into significant competitive 
effects".60 The Chicago School believes that efficient conduct is probable and 
argues that efficiencies or at least no anticompetitive effect should be presumed 
if the conduct does not confer power over price. 
4. Strategic Behaviour Model or Post Chicago School 
This model, like the Consumer Welfare Model also has the principal 
concern of preventing overcharging to consumers. Efficiency, is the goal of the 
antitrust laws. However, unlike the Consumer Welfare Model it does not 
assume that such things as vertical restraints are efficient or neutral. Adherents 
argue antitrust should take account of strategic behaviour which has the aim of 
imposing costs on rivals.61 As mentioned above, a firm engages in strategic 
behaviour to influence or constrain a competitor's market choices. The 
Consumer Welfare Model downplays and often ignores the strategic dimension 
of firm behaviour. As such, it contrasts with modem industrial economics where 
59 See, Fox, supra, note 43. 
60 Pitofsky, supra, note 39, af 1075. 
61 See, Williamson, supra, notes 19 and 20. 
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theoretical progress in the understanding of strategic behaviour has displaced the 
uncritical application of standard static micro economic models. Adherents argue 
things the Consumer Welfare School regard as efficient or neutral can actually 
harm consumer welfare as they impose costs on rivals. This may give the 
strategic firm the power over price which will prevent price falling. 
Thu~, a key difference between the Consumer Welfare and Strategic 
Behaviour models is the role of intent. Consumer Welfare proponents eschew 
the relevance of intent in antitrust. Professor Harold Demsetz has argued: 
"much would be gained and little lost if evidence on 'intent' ceased to be thought 
relevant".62 
However, strategic model adherents think differently:63 
"Lawrence Sullivan, for example, argues that we should look to 
purpose or intent in any examination of the antitrust consequences 
of particular events. While emphasizing that lawyers, judges and 
juries deal competently with such concerns, he writes that: 
"purpose may be the last factor about which an economist would 
ask when analyzing market conduct". While this statement may be 
correct when economic analysis is limited to standard price theory, 
it is hardly so when the broader concerns of strategic behavior are 
taken into "account. Purpose and intent become important 
elements in determining the competitive consequences of various 
strategic actions. A major implication of the recent emphasis on 
strategic behavior may be a new acceptance of the role of these 
considerations in antitrust analysis II. 
The Consumer Welfare School also emphasises elimination of rivals. The 
Strategic Behaviour Model emphasises that exclusion need not be total to have 
62 Demsetz, Barriers to Bntry.. 72 AM. BCON. REV., 45, 49 (1982). 
63 Comanor & Frech ill, Strategic Behaviour and Antitrust Analysis, 
74 AM. BCON. REV., 372, 378 (1984). 
21 
a potentially negative effect on consumer welfare.64 Krattenmaker and Salop's 
RRC model is part of the Strategic Behaviour Model. 
The above discussions are necessarily brief outlines of the above models. 
One must ask what model does the Commerce Act adopt. I have already argued 
it does not incorporate the Structuralist Model. 
Despite the U.S. Supreme Court, in Reiter v Sonotone,65 having held 
that the goal of the antitrust laws is to enhance consumer welfare, a long and 
vigorous debate rages in the U.S. over the goals of antitrust.66 Much of this 
turns over the legislature's intention in enacting the Shermap. Act. Bork argued 
the legislature's sole purpose was- the forwarding of consumer welfare.67 This 
produced a flurry of articles arguing the opposite. Professor Richard Hofstadter 
claimed one of the goals was avoidance of concentrated economic power as a 
threat to democratic government.68 Professors Blake and Jones argue that in 
addition to economic efficiency, the Sherman Act was intended to promote the 
political goals of self-policing markets and protecting individual freedom and 
64 Ordover & Saloner, Predation. Monopolisation.. and Antitrust in 
IIANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION 537-96 (R. 
Schmalensec & R. Willig eds. 1989). 
65 442 U.S. 330 (1979). 
66 For a review of shifting ecoilomic and political ideologies over the 
history of the Sherman Act, see generally E. SULUV AN, THE 
POUTICAL ECONOMY OF THE SHERMAN ACT ; THE 
FIRST ONE HUNDRED YEARS (1990). 
67 Bork, Legislative Intent and the Poli<;y of the Sherman Act. 9 J.L. 
& ECON., 7 (1966); BORK, supra, note 11, at 50-71. 
68 R. HOFSTADTER, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, 
in THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLmCS AND 
OTHER ESSAYS 199-200 (1965). 
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economic opportunity.69 Professor Herbert Hovenkamp 70 and Professor 
Robert Lande 71 argue Congress' overriding concern was protecting consumers 
from wealth transfers. Pitofsky claims political values as well as economic ones 
influenced the Congress.72 No one will ever resolve the debate.73 
The Australian Parliament expressed concerns about protecting small 
businesses. On the Second Reading Speech explaining the 1986 amendments to 
s. 46, Attorney-General Bowen said: 74 
"A competitive economy requires an appropriate mix of efficient 
businesses, both large and small. Whilst large enterprises may 
frequently have advantages of economies of scales there are many 
occasions when large size does not of itself mean greater 
efficiency. However a large enterprise may be able to exercise 
enormous market power, either as a buyer or seller, to the 
detriment of its competitors and the competit~ve process. 
Accordingly, an effective provision controlling misuse of market 
power is most important to. ensure that small businesses are given 
a measure of protection from the predatory actions of powerful 
competitors". 
The Whitlam Labour Government enacted the Trade Practices Act. 
69 Blake & Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional Antitrust Poli(!y, 65 
COLUM. L. REV. 422, 425-36 (1965). 
70 Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEO. 
WASH. L. Rev. 1 (1982); Hovenkamp, Well-Being and Public 
Choice; 57 U. cm. L. REV., 63, 74-94 (1990). 
71 Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primaty Concern of 
Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 
HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982). 
72 Pitofsky, supra, note 39; see also Schwartz, "Justice" and Other 
Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA L. REV., 1076 
(1979). 
73 Bork, has published a rejoinder to his critics in the new edition of 
the Antitrust Paradox, BaRK, supra, note 11, at 426-429. 
74 Second Reading Speech, Australian Federal Parliament 1986. 
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Given that Government's record, protection of small businesses must have been 
one of its goals. 
The fourth Labour Government enacted the Commerce Act in totally 
different circumstances. It radically reformed New Zealand's economy and 
previously regulated and protectionist structures. It proceeded on the philosophy 
that it had to restrUcture New Zealand's economy and industry to make it more 
efficient. By making it more efficient, New Zealand industry would become 
more competitive. High local costs due to inefficient, import-protected and 
heavily subsidised local supplies were hindering New Zealand's international 
competitiveness. Thus, New Zealand industry had to become more efficient. 
Consequently, the Government abolished import licensing tariffs, progressively 
removed subsidies, reduced direct income tax, relaxed rules on foreign 
investment, floated the dollar and abolished runs on foreign currency coming 
into New Zealand. It privatised State-owned monopolies and sold some to 
overseas owners. It also enacted the Commerce Act. It intended the Commerce 
Act to be the sole regulator of market behaviour. No more government 
regulation, just the Commerce Act. The Parliamentary .Debates reveal no 
concern about the fate of small businesses, centralisation of political power a:t;ld 
"small dealers and worthy men"?5 The key phrase was efficiency. Lindsay 
Hampton shows how Parliament changed the wording of s. 36 to prevent it from 
condemning a "highly efficient market-dominant firm from competing 
aggressively or from taking advantage of its economies of scale, its new product 
75 Chicago Board of Trade v U.S., 246 U.S. 231, 239 (1918). 
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development or exclusive distribution arrangements".16 Parliament did not 
discuss political goals for the Commerce Act, so one cml: assume it did not 
intend the Act to have them. Efflciency is the goal. This is not to suggest that 
political goals are irrelevant to New Zealand antitrust. They are relevant. 
However, they should not override the efficiency goal. By focusing on efficiency 
antitrust will also achieve complementary political goals.77 By preventing a 
dominant firm from using its dominant position for anticompetitive purposes s. 
36 achieves the necessary result of protecting smaller firms and increasing their 
economic opportunity. The Act's history offers no support for courts choosing 
non-efficieD:CY politj.cal goals over efficiency goals. The whole idea of that goes 
against the theme of light-handed regulation. Courts cannot use the Commerce 
Act to achieve political goals when the whole scheme of refotm was light-handed 
regulation. The Government indicated it wanted to get out of the market place. 
Courts cannot use the Commerce Act to impose judicial legislation to further 
what they view as justifiable political goals. If they did it would be a naked 
judicial usurpation of Parliament's role. 
Case law on the Commerce Act indicates that efficiency is the goal. 
Richardson J. in Tru Tone v Festival Records78 observed: 
76 Hampton, Section 36(1) of the Commerce Act 1986: An Analysis 
of its Constituent Elements, in COMPETITION lAW AND 
POLICY IN NEW ZEAlAND 179, 194,200 (R. Ah4ar ed. 1991). 
77 BORK., supra, note 11, at. 428-429; Brunt, Australian and New 
Zealand Competition Law and Policy, in 1992 FORDHAM 
CORPORATElA WINSTITUTEPROCEEDINGS, 131, 164-167 
(1993). 
78 [1988] 2 NZLR 352. 
"In terms of the long title the Commerce Act is an act to promote 
competition in markets in New Zealand. It is based on the 
premise that societies' resources are best allocated in a 
competitive market where rivalry between firms ensures maximum 
efficiency in the use of resources".79 
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Indeed the Court of Appeal's judgment indicates they do not view rivalry 
as simply large numbers of firms competing. It views it as a process of rivalry -
not as a state at a slice in time. The case involved maximum resale price fixing. 
The defendant sought to fix maxinium retail prices for its records, as a condition 
of supplying them to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were retail outlets for albums. 
They brought action under s. 36 and s. 27. The s. 36 case turned on market 
definition. The plaintiffs argued a single album definition of the market. Each 
album was a single market and the defendant as sole supplier was dominant in 
that market. Both the High Court and Court of Appeal refuted this. Richardson 
J. observed:80 
"Viewed in· relation to product and time the single album 
definition of market ignores commercial realities. It focuses on 
short run phenomenon. It represents a snapshot rather than a 
moving picture of commercial reality". 
The same criticism applies to those who say competition is large numbers 
of rivals. A market may have few or one fum. This may be due to that firm 
being the best and most efficient competitor. It may be the most innovative and 
efficient. Its products may be cheaper and better than others. If so, it will 
necessarily eliminate rivals. Every successful competitive practice has victims. 
The more efficient the fum, the more victims it has. Joseph Schumpeter called 
79 Id. at 358. 
80 Id. at 360. 
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competition a "gale of creative destruction".81 The competition gale destroys 
the inefficient~ the non-innovative, the fat and lazy firms. Courts should not be 
concerned at the elhnination of such firms. It is the natural law of competition. 
Yet those who view competition as requiring numerous rivals are. Their attitude 
is akin to a conservation attempt for inefficient firms - Bork~s dinosaurs, giant 
sloth bears and dodos.82 By stressing market definition is not a short run 
phenomenon, the Court of Appeal is emphasising that the number of rivals 
existing at anyone time is not determinative. 
Other New Zealand court's have also stressed that competition destroys 
and Courts should not be solely concerned with the fate of individual firms. 
Barker J. and Mr R.G. Blunt commented in Union Shipping v Port 
Nelson:83 
"Such provisions [Section 27 and 36] are directed at the protection 
of the concept of competition as such. They are not directed at 
the protection of individual competitors, except in so far as the 
latter may promote the former".84 
Tipping J. in Magic Millions Ltd v Wrightson Bloodstock Ltd85 observed: 
"I would venture the following proposition. It is not a breach of 
s.36 if a person, albeit with a dominant position, simply acts in a 
competitive manner. It would be an irony if such conduct could 
be attacked because it is competition which the Act is designed to 
81 J. SCHUMPETER, CAN CAPITALISM SURVIVE? 24 (1978). 
J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND 
DEMOCRACY 82 (1942). 
82 Bork, supra,. note 9, at 375. 
83 [1990] 2 NZLR 662. 
84 Id. at 700. 
85 [1990] 1 NZLR 731. 
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promote".86 
If a person acts in a competitive manner it will eliminate, injure or 
destroy some rivals. Other New Zealand courts have made similar comments.87 
Even proponents of the deconcentration school accept antitrust cannot 
protect small, inefficient firms.88 Pitofsky states he advocates the protection not 
of "small inefficient competitorsll but of competition.89 Small competitors are 
only protected against unfair tactics, unrelated to superior skill or efficiency. 
One can only show that protecting small inefficient firms is harmful by looking 
at antitrust through the use of price theory, i.e. the Chicago methodology. One 
can show this graphically.90 
86 Id. at 761. 
87 Hyde v Topmilk Limited. Unreported H.C., Whangarei, C.P. 
52192,50; Byers v Northland Dairy Products Limited, Unreported 
H.C. Whangarei, c.P. 65192, 24. 
88 Scherer, supra, note 27, at 1016. 
89 Pitofsky, supra, note 39 at 1059. 
90 This is based on R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN 
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 243 (1976). 
28 
Graph 1 
Price 
Marginal Revenue 
This shows the welfare loss from monopoly and inefficient production. 
The monopolist can manufacture goods at price AC1, while firms in a 
competitive market cannot make it at price less than A~. The loss from 
monopoly is the inability of consumers who value the product at more than pc, 
the competitive price, but at less than pm, the monopoly price to buy the 
product. (This is the shaded triangle.) The productive loss from competition is 
the greater cost of producing goods at A~ rather than AC1, times qm (the 
quantity of goods the monopolist produces). (This is the shaded rectangle.) 
Professor George Hay argued that protecting inefficient rivals can benefit 
society.91 However, not for political reasons. He argued eliminating inefficient 
rivals can harm productive efficiency. From the graph, if society has to choose 
91 Hay, A Confused Lawyer's Guide to the Predatory Pricing 
Literature, in STRATEGIC PREDATION AND ANTIIRUST 
ANALYSIS (S. Salop ed. 1981). 
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between allocative inefficiency and productive inefficiency - it compares the two 
losses. H the triangle is smaller than the rectangle society should prefer the 
monopolist· with efficient production. If the triangle is larger society would 
prefer inefficient production for the sake of efficient allocation.92 Hay argued 
that eliminating less efficient firms forces society to choose. If inefficient firms 
enter they may cause the monopolist to do nothing - thus, maintaining the 
allocative loss. They may cause the monopolist to reduce price thus, eliminating 
the allocative loss yet cause a loss in productive efficiency. If the monopolist 
eliminates the new comers by reducing price it perpetuates the allocative loss. 
Thus, Hay concludes antitrust should prevent dominant firms eliminating less 
efficient firms where it would lead to perpetuating an allocative inefficiency 
greater than productive inefficiency from tolerating the less efficient rivals. 
However, the argument is not compelling. If a fum develops a new 
technology which it enables it to produce at far less cost it, will be able to make 
products cheaper than its rivals. It will price at less than its rivals' marginal 
costs, but higher than its own costs. This will eliminate its rivals, as they can't 
sell at the market price unless they too can reduce costs. Once the fum has 
eliminated its rivals it could raise its price to monopoly levels. However, the 
process of innovation is beneficial. No one wants to stop an innovative firm 
92 For a discussion on the tradeoff between allocative efficiency and 
productive (X) efficiency see Uebenstein Allocative Efficiency vs. 
!IX Efficiency", 56 AM. EeON. REV. 392 (1966); Stigler, The 
Xistence of X-efficiency, 66 AM. EeON. REV. 213 (1976); 
Liebenstein, X-efficiency Xists - Reply on an Xorcist 68 AM. 
EeON. REV. 203 (1978); Williamson, Economics as an Antitrust 
Defence: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. EeON. REV. 18 (1968); 
Williamson, Economics as an Antitrust Defence Revisited, 125 U. 
PA L. Rev. 699 (1977). 
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from growing at the expense of its rivals. Stopping such. growth reduces or 
eliminates the incentive for decreasing costs in the first place, as the innovative 
firm will not be able to achieve the full gains of innovation. This shows the 
misplaced logic of those who argue that antitrust should ensure a number of 
firms in any given market in order to encourage innovation.93 If antitrust does 
this, it will discourage the very innovation it seeks to encourage. Why innovate 
if antitrust will penalise you for having done so and eliminated your rivals? 
Innovation which eliminates inefficient rivals, also benefits society as the low cost 
method of production is applied to the largest share of production. 
Similarly, antitrust cannot force the successful innovator to tolerate less 
efficient new rivals who enter after the innovator has ellininated its original 
rivals. Again, this will reduce the incentive to innovate. To protect inefficient 
rivals is to harm competition. Granted, the successful innovator will be able to 
monopoly price. These prices will attract new entrants who will only succeed if 
they are more efficient than the original innovator. Eventually, they will. 
However, it may take a long time. Antitrust should only concern itself with 
behaviour by the monopolist which eliminates rivals on some basis other than 
efficiency. 
While the structural model and Chicago School differ - the differences are 
not as marked as they once were.94 Noone argues an antitrust claim on the 
basis of political non-efficiency goals any more. It is all economic analysis. The 
93 See SCHUMPETER, supra, note 27 (3d ed); He argues dynamic 
efficiency is improved through rapid technological change which 
is most likely with a structure of loose oligopoly. 
94 Posner, supra, note 21, 925. 
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U.S. Supreme Court has not decided on political non-efficieI?-CY goals since 1977. 
By treating efficiency as the goal of antitrust courts make the law more certain 
and' intellectually respectable. Thus, efficiency should be and is the goal of 
antitrust. 
Commentators have raised a number of objections to this. I deal with 
each in turn. 
Ahdar argues the Commerce Act's goal cannot be efficiency as the New 
Zealand Parliament rejected a Business Roundtable submission to change the 
long title of the Act from promotion of competition in markets to the promotion 
of efficiency.95 By doing so Parliament, presumably, was saying efficiency was 
not the goal. However, as I argued above, the New Zealand· Parliament showed 
no interest in non-efficiency, political goals in enacting the Commerce Act. No 
cases have expressed non-efficiency, political goals. It was unnecessary to 
expressly say efficiency is the goal. It already is. 
Another criticism is that the consumer welfare model is based on static 
efficiency and takes no account of dynamic efficiency. The idea of dynamic 
efficiency derives from the work of Professor Joseph Schumpeter.96 He was 
concerned with innovation in products and techniques, rather than static 
allocative efficiencY. What was important was ensuring that antitrust maintained 
the best environment for innovation. Professor Michael Porter has developed 
the idea by arguing antitrust should advance consumer welfare by focusing on 
95 Ahdar. Exclusive Dealing and the Fisher & Paykel Saga 15 
NZULR 1, 43 (1992). 
96 SCHUMPETER, supra, notes 27 and 93. 
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long-term dynamic efficiencies. He argues society is better off with firms that 
are bringing new and better products to the market. Thus, antitrust should 
ensure the market maximises the likelihood of continuing technological 
innovation, even at the cost of higher short term production costs.97 
The necessary result of this, is to ensure the maximum number of possible 
firms in a market. In 1975 Schuri:lpeter argued that near atomistic markets (a 
loose oligopoly) encourage innovation.98 Monopoly does not lead to 
innovation. This is in line with Judge Learned Hand's view in::u.s.. v Aluminium 
Co. of America99 (Alcoa). Judge Hand observed:loo 
U[M]any people believe that possession of unchallenged economic 
power deadens initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy 
, that immunity from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry is a 
stimulant, to industrial progress; that the spur of constant stress 
is necessary to counteract an inevitable disposition to let well 
enough alone". 
Whether Judge Hand is correct is unclear. No rigorous economic theory 
exists that correlates innovation with the number of competing firms. Indeed, 
a number of problems exist with the idea of encouraging dynamic efficiency by 
ensuring numerous rivals. First, to do so will be to protect inefficient rivals. Not 
even dynamic efficiency proponents such as Professor Frederic Scherer argue 
that antitrust should do that.lOl As I have argued above, protecting inefficient 
97 PORTER, supra, note 27. 
98 SCHUMPETER, supra, note 93. 
99 148 F. 2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
100 Id. at 427. 
101 Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act : A Comment. 89, 
HARV. L. REV., 869 (1976). 
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rivals reduces the incentive to innovate. The incentive to innovate is to crush 
one's rivals, dominate the market and reap monopoly profits. An antitrust policy 
which meant one could not dominate the market, reduces the incentive to 
innovate. It encourages innovation to a certain success level and then yells stop. 
Second, the dynamic efficiency premise is based on the premise that 
innovation is due to serendipity - from a large number- of firms trying to 
innovate. That is true in some markets. The personal computer and computer 
software industry show this. Many of the advances came from small firms 
working in Silicon Valley.l02 However, it is not true in other markets. Some 
innovation results from heavy investment in research and development -
something only a large dominant firm can afford. Indeed, Schumpeter originally 
argued that large, dynamic firms were the causative impetus required to maintain 
dynamic competition. Small firms, in Schumpeter's view, lacked the resources 
to innovate:103 One can see that large size is needed to innovate by the U.S. 
cases, where plaintiffs alleged that the defendants breached the antitrust laws by 
innovating and thus, injuring the smaller non-innovative firms.104 Indeed, 
102 HOVENKAMP, supra, note 53 at 23. 
103 SCHUMPETER, supra, note 27 at 81. 
104 See, for example, Berkey Photo. Inc. v Eastman Kodak Co., 603 
F. 2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093; California 
Computer Prods .. Inc. v IBM Corp., 613 F. 2d 727 (9th CiT. 1979); 
In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litigation. 481 F. 
Supp. 965, 1002-1008 (N.D. CaL 1979), affd sub nom. 
Transamerica Computer Corp. v IBM Corp., 698 F. 2d 1377 (9th 
CiT.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 955 (1983); ILC Peripherals Leasing 
Corp. v IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978), affd sub 
nom. Memorex Corp. v IBM Corp., 636 F. 29 1188 (9th Cir. 1980), 
cert denied, 452 U.S. 972 (1981). 
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Professors Jansuz Ordover and Robert Willig have developed a model of 
predatory product innovation. !Os Other commentators have argued that unduly 
restrictive U.S. antitrust policies have contributed to the ability of Japanese 
(particularly) and European companies to take the lead in pursuing a variety of 
critical technologies.106 
Thus, Professors Thomas Jorde and David Tecce argue, rather than 
allowing numerous small firms to encourage innovation, antitrust policy should 
err on the side of preserving incentives to innovate by taking a tolerant view of 
single-firm conduct- designed to enable companies to appropriate the returns to 
their innovative activity.l07 
Third, history teaches that firms that do not innovate die. Leaner and 
hungrier small firms will destroy them. For example, American Viscose had 100 
per cent of the U.S. rayon market in 1920 when its patent expired. In 1929 it 
had 50 per cent. Today it no longer exists. lOS 
The idea that numerous firms result in greater dynamic efficiency rests 
on an unprovable assumption. It is also highly controversial. No one has yet 
developed a rigorous economic theory of optimal production of innovation and 
a generally accepted connection between structure, number of firms and 
105 Ordover & Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing 
and Product Innovation. 91 YALE L.J., 8 (1981). 
106 L. THUROW, THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY 3-25, 146-50 (1980); 
Baldridge, Luncheon Address, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 397 (1984). 
107 Jorde & Teece, Innovation. Cooperation and Antitrust 4 HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 1 (1989). 
108 J. MARKHAM, COMPETITION IN THE RAYON INDUSTRY 
46-47 (1952). 
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innovation. 109 To base antitrust policy on an unverifiable theory would cause 
considerable harm. Thus, one should ignore it. On the other hand, the static 
model is predictable. The dynamic model is not. To use the dynamic model is, 
ultimately, to eschew the relevance of economics to antitrust. No one in any 
school of antitrust analysis, apart from the static model, argues this is a good 
thing. 
Bernard Hill. and Thomas Weston appear to argue that simply being 
concerned with efficiency is outdatedYo They base this on the U.S. Supreme 
Court's decision in. Eastman Kodak Co. v Image Technical Services. Inc.111 
Kodak manufactured high-volume photocopiers and micrographic equipment. 
It refused to sell or allow the sale of spare parts to owners of Kodak machines 
except on the condition the purchaser accepted service from Kodak. This 
excluded independent service organisations from the market. They sued alleging 
an illegal tie-in-sale. Kodak moved for summary judgment, arguing it lacked 
market power in the spare parts market.1l2 The Supreme Court held there 
109' Posner admits that: " ... as a matter of common sense, one might 
believe that innovation is increased by having more firms". 
However, he is unpersuaded because of the lack of economic 
proof. Ross, Interview with Judge Richard Posner, ANTITRUST, 
4, 7 (Spring 1992). 
110 Hill & Weston, Monopolisation and Telecommunications Markets 
in New Zealand, 15, unpublished seminar paper (1993). 
111 S. Ct. 2072 (1992) (Scalia, O'Connor and Thomas J.J. dissenting). 
112 Weston & Hill are incorrect in saying Kodak sought to strike out 
an antitrust claim. Supra, note 110, at 15. U.S. Summary 
Judgment is. not an attempt to strike out a claim. It is a seeking 
of judgment by the court on limited discovery and without a trial. 
In essence, an applicant claims it does not need to call evidence, 
either because the facts are undisputed or the respondent's case 
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was sufficient evidence not to grant summary judgment. It remanded the case 
for trial. One of the main reasons was that the independent service 
organisations presented an economic model which showed Kodak's tie-in could 
harm consumers. Thus, the Court decided the case on efficiency. It did not 
mention non-efficiency, political reasons. There was evidence that Kodak's 
practice led to higher prices. Although, some commentators claim the decision 
is the death of the .Chicago School and efficiency, they are being premature.U3 
There is no guarantee the independent service organisations will win at full trial. 
That Kodak could ask for summary judgment is a tying case is a victory for 
Chi~ago. Previous case law held tie-ins were per se illegal, irrespective of 
market power.l14 Indeed, the case is really just about tying. It does not sound 
the death knell for Chicago and efficiency. The very next term the Supreme 
Court held predatory pricing is irrational and unlikely to occur.llS It quoted 
Robert Bork and Frank Easterbrook. Rather, than playing the death march for 
the Chicago School, one should play U.2's "Alive and Kicking". Indeed, 
Professor Stephen Calkins writes: 
has no economic foundation. See, Schwarzer & Hirsh, Summary 
Judgment After Eastman Kodak, 61 HASTINGS L.J., 1 (1993). 
113 See, e.g. Lande, Chicago takes it on the Chin: Imperfect 
Information could playa crucial role in the post-Kodak World, 62 
ANTITRUST L.J., 193 (1993); Spivack & Ellis, Kodak: 
Enlightened Antitrust Analysis and Traditional Tying Law, 62 
ANTITRUST L.J., 203 (1993). 
114 International Salt Co. v U.S., 332 U.S. 392 (1947). 
115 Brooke Group Ltd v Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 
S. Ct. 2578 (1993); The Court confirmed its decision in Matsushita 
Electrical Industries Co. v Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 
(1986). 
"Brooke Group serves as a rejoinder to commentators who thought 
Kodak marked the end of Chicago-School dominance of the 
Supreme Court and the dawning of the "post-Chicago" era. If 
Brooke Group is any indication, the Court is firmly in the Chicago 
School".116 
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My final assUmption is that firms act as profit maximisers. They aim to 
achieve the maximum revenue possible. This too, is controversial but all the 
economic models depend on it.117 
116 Calkins, The October 1992 Supreme Court Term and Antitrust More 
Objectivity than Ever, 62 ANTITRUST L. J., 327, 394 (1992). 
117 Holmstron argues firms may have other objectives such as revenue 
maximisation, sales maximisation or satisficing. Holmstron, 
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION, Chapter 9 
(R. Schmalensee and R. Willig eds. 1989). The weaknesses in this 
argument are that we live in the age of corporate raiders. If a 
firm does not profit maximise a raider will take it over. 
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CHAPTER II 
NONPRICE PREDATION 
As mentioned in Chapter I, predation takes two forms Price or 
Nonprice.1 Both forms operate on the principle that a firm with market power 
can act-in such a way to increase its market power. However, a firm can achieve 
that result by simply acting in a normal competitive manner. Antitrust should 
value and encourage it. On the other hand some actions will. be anticompetitive. 
This is predation. A firm can act. anticompetitively on three interrelated ways. 
First - it can act so as to deter potential entrants. This may not harm the firm's 
existing rivals. Second - it can act so as to disadvantage rivals without 
necessarily causing them to exit. Third - it can actually cause existing rival(s) to 
leave. They will seriously deter potential rivals. All three categories of conduct 
can disadvantage potential and actual rivals. 
Nonprice predation involves a predator acting so as to raise its rivals' or 
potential rivals' costS.2 This forces the rivals to raise their price. Such action 
enables the predator to do likewise and market a profit. Under certain 
1 Supra, Chapter I, at note 23. 
2 Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs 
to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J., 209 (1986); Krattenmaker 
& Salop, Exclusion and Antitrust. 11 Regulation, 29 (1987); Krattenmaker 
& Salop, Competition and Co-operation in the Market for Exclusionary 
Rights, 76 A.M. ECON. REV., 109 (1986); Krattenmaker & Salop, 
Analysing Anticompetitive Exclusiolb 56 ANTIlRUST L.J., 71 (1987); 
Salop & Scheffman, Cost Raising Strategies, 36 J. INDUS. ECON. 19 
(1987); Ordover, Saloner & Salop, Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure, 80 
AM. ECON. REV., 127 (1990). 
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circumstances the predator can gain "exclusionary market" power and thus 
indirectly power over price. This creates inefficiencies and reduces consumer 
welfare. Until recently commentators and courts have focused mainly on price 
predation. This is changing as scholars, enforcement agencies and private 
plaintiffs realise that nonprice pr~dation is a more attractive strategy and thus 
more likely to occur? 
It is a form of strategic behaviour. The theory works as follows: the 
predator raises its victims' costs by any number of a variety of means. These 
include increasing the price of a critical input of its victims, by gaining exclusive 
control of the input or limiting access to it. The predator can do so by exclusive 
dealing, exclusive licensing, tying, refusing to deal, overbuying and vertical 
mergers. The predator can also raise costs by product promotion, brand 
proliferation, product differentiation, capacity expansion, innovation, burning 
down a rival's plant or cutting transmission lines.4 This causes the victim to 
decrease its output. The predator raises the victim's costs above market price, 
so making its business unprofitable.s 
3 Calvani & Averitt, N onprice Predation : An Introduction, 16 J. 
REPRINTS FOR ANTITRUST L. & ECON., No. 2 (1986); ABA 
ANTITRUST SECTION: MONOGRAPH NO. 18, NONPRICE 
PREDATION UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT (1992). 
4 Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 263 U981); Tharp, Raising Rivals' Costs: Of Bottlenecks, Bottled 
Wine, and Bottled Soda, 84 NW. U.L. REV. 321 (1989). 
5 Salop, Strategy, Predation and Antitrust Analysis: An Introduction, 17 J. 
REPRINTS FOR ANTITRUST L. & ECON., No. 2"(1987); Salop, New 
Economic Theories of Anticompetitive Exclusion, 56 ANTITRUST L. J., 
57 (1987). . 
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The tactic can succeed even if the predator does not eliminate its rival.6 
Generally, a firm's output decreases when its marginal cost increases. If a 
predator increases the marginal costs of all or most of its rivals, the decrease of 
the rival's supply will decrease, thus raising the market price. This gives the 
predator three choices. It could 
a) keep its output consistent and thus enjoy a higher market price. 
b) Expand its output to make up for the rival's decreased output and thus, 
enjoy a greater market share of the market at the original market price. 
c) Make up some, but not all, of the rival's reduced output and thus, enjoy 
a greater share of a somewhat smaller market, at a somewhat increased 
pnce. 
One can graphically demonstrate the theory as follows: 7 
Graph 2 
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6 ABA Monograph, supra, note 2, at 9. 
QuantIty 
7 This derives from Scheffman, The Application of Raising Rivals' Costs 
Theory to Antitmst, 37 ANTITRUST BUll., 187, 191(1992). 
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Graph 2 shows a competitive industry with a supply curve made up of 
three line segments, 11, 12 and M and demand curve D. 11, is the supply curve 
for producers that have constant average marginal costs of C1 to an output of 0 1• 
This is the absolute capacity limit for 11 producers. 12 is the supply curve for 
producers which have constant average and marginal costs of ~ up to an 
absolute capacity level of O2-01• M is the supply curve of producers which have 
constant average and marginal costs of Cm. M producers have no capacity 
limitations. The competitive price is Cm and the competitive output is 0*. At 
price em, the 11 and 12 producers are infra-marginal, i:e. although acting 
competitively, price is above their average costs. Now assume an episode of 
RRC raised the unit costs of the M producers to C1 m, but left the unit costs of 
the 11 and 12 producers unchanged. This shifts M producers' supply curve up to 
Ml - resulting in an increase in the market price to C1m and a decrease in 
industry output to 0**. 
This shows that prices in competitive markets are determined by industry 
marginal costs (and demand), so that prices increase with increases in industry 
marginal costs, so Ipng as demand is not highly elastic. An increase in the 11 or 
12 producers' costs will not raise industry marginal costs and price, unless the cost 
increase made their unit costs greater than Clm. Thus, niising a rival's costs 
does not necessarily.raise industry marginal cost and price. Only cost increases 
that raise industry marginal costs, translate into price increases. The 11 and 12 
producers' outputs ~o not increase as a result of the increases in M producers' 
costs. The 11 and 12 producers remain producing at their capacity and their share 
of the reduced industry sales increases because of the decrease in the M 
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producers' sales. Thus, as with predatory pricing, RRC results in an increased 
market share for the predator. Unlike predatory pricing, the RRC predator does 
not have to be able to eventually raise the market price by restricting its own 
input. The increase in price arising from a RRC strategy results from a 
restriction in the victim's output which occurs when the victim reacts to the 
increase in costs. 
The above example shows a predator using RRC to raise the market 
price. A predator can use it to prevent price from falling. For example, the 
development of new products or technology may threaten a current producer. 
The new product or technology would decrease the demand for the current 
producer's product, thereby effectively lowering the market price for their 
product. An RRC strategy would involve raising the costs of reaching the 
market for the new product or technology thus, stabilising price. 
A predator could do so by filing judicial, administrative or Resource 
Management proceedings to prevent, delay or raise the costs of the new product 
or technology entering the market.8 It could increase advertising which forces 
the new firm to match or exceed it. It could lobby government or regulatory 
agencies to establish a mandatory product standard. It could attempt to secure 
an increase in industry wide wage increase through negotiations with unions.9 
An example is Allied Tube. Inc. & Conduit Corp. v Indian Head Inc.lO 
8 Scott, Abuse of Judicial and Administrative Processes - An Antitrust 
Violation?, 21 ABlR, 389 (1993). 
9 Williamson, Wage Rates as a Barrier to Bntry : The Pennington Case in 
Perspective, 82 Q. J. BCON., 85, 90-101 (1968). 
10 108 S. Ct. 1,' 931 (1988); Scheffman, supra, note 7, at 194. 
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The plaintiff manufactured plastic electrical conduit which was cheaper than the 
metal electrical conduit the defendants produced. The plaintiffs alleged the 
defendants manipulated the NatiGnal Fire Protection Association standard for 
electrical conduit to decrease the use of the cheaper plastic conduit. Returning 
to Graph 2. The Demand Curve is the demand for conduit where metal and 
plastic are perfect substitutes. Assume the plaintiff had just invented plastic 
conduit. The preplastic market would consist of M producers (i.e. no 11 or 12 
producers). If one assumes plastic conduit producers face no capacity 
constraints, plastic conduit will gain all the sales for which plastic and metal are 
good substitutes. Market price will be C;. Metal conduit producers will lose Q* 
in sales. 
Metal conduit producers thus have the incentive to prevent plastic conduit 
entering the market. If the National Fire Protection Association needs to certify 
that plastic conduit meets the required standard to sell, the metal conduit 
producers will benefit, if they can manipulate the standard to discourage use of 
plastic conduit. If the manipulated standard prevents plastic conduit entering, 
the metal conduit producers could prevent their price and market share from 
falling. 
Thus, because non price predation can lead to market prices raising or 
staying stable where they would otherwise fall, it merits antitrust concern. 
It especially merits concern as it is a more plausible strategy than price 
predation and thus more likely to occur. 
Price Predation (or Predatory Pricing as it is better known as) involves a 
predator selling its product at a loss so as to drive its rivals from the market. 
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The predator then increases prices to recoup its losses and reap monopoly 
profits.ll To succeed predator pricing requires certain conditions. A predator 
must be able to eliminate its victims quickly. Selling below cost is expensive. 
Not even the most well financed predator can sell below cost indefinitely. 
Predatory pricing is necessarily a temporary tactic.12 The victim must not have 
counterstrategies wliich enable it to survive the predatory pricingP Conditions 
of entry and re-entry into the market must be high as once the predator has 
eliminated its victim and started monopoly pricing, new entrants cannot be able 
to enter quickly. Monopoly pricing plus the victim's salvage assets at distress 
prices, resulting from successful predation will attract new entrants.14 
Consumer demand must generally be somewhat inelastic. 
Some Chicago School scholars15 and indeed the United States Supreme 
Court16 have been extremely sceptical as to whether predatory pricing actually 
11 Hay, Predatory Pricing, 58 ANTITRUST L. J., 913 (1990); Elzinga & 
Mills, Testing for Predation: Is Recoupment Feasible?, 34 ANTITRUST 
BULL. 869 (1989). 
12 R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POllCY AT WAR 
WITH ITSELF 149-155 (2d ed. 1993). 
13 Easterbrook, supra, note 4. 
14 Id. at 279. 
15 BORK, supra, note 12, at 149-155; Easterbrook, supra note 4; McGee, 
Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (NJ.) Case, 1 J.L. & ECON. 
137 (1968); Telser, Cutthroat Competition and the Long Purse, 99 J.L & 
ECON., 259 (1966). 
16 Matsushita Electrical Industries Co. v Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 
(1986); Brooke Group Ltd v Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 
S. Ct. 2578 (1993); For a summary of authority on U.S. predatory pricing 
see Austin, Predatory Pricing Law Since Matsushita. 58 ANTITRUST L. 
J. 895 (1990). 
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exists. They argue it is not rational behaviour for a dominant firm. In theory, 
predatory pricing requires the predator to incur losses that are much larger than 
those it inflicts on its victims. As the predator already has a proportionately 
larger market share, it will incur proportionately larger losses because of its 
predation. The longer the predation lasts, the larger the losses for the victim. 
These scholars also argue the strategy is extremely speculativeP The predator 
expects-to recoup its losses by monopoly pricing once it has elimjnated its victim. 
As those anticipated profits are future and uncertain, they must be discounted 
in value. Another problem, is that once the predator has eliminated its victim, 
the predator's monopoly pricing and victim's assets at salvage price will attract 
new entry. This may well occur before the predator has recouped its losses. The 
predator's anticipated monopoly profits are uncertain and speculative. Judge 
Frank Easterbrook notes that the victim may have countersttategies to enable 
it to survive the predatory pricing which must necessarily be temporary.1S 
These counterstrategies include entering into long term contracts with its 
customers, obtaining financing to endure the predatory pricing or cutting 
production or even ceasing business until prices rise again. ~9 
This view of predatory pricing is not unanimous. Professor George Hay 
has written "Among economists, however, it is generally agreed that the 
argument that [price] predation is impossible is incorrect, at least as a matter of 
17 See, supra, note 15. 
18 Easterbrook, supra, note 4. 
19 Ibid at 289. 
46 
economic theory".20 
Professor John Baker argues that predatory pricing can be a successful 
strategy to "discipline" a market.21 He bases this on the work of Judge Richard 
Posner,22 Professor Oliver Williamson23 and Professor Frederic Scherer.24 
These commentators base their theory on imperfect information which exists in 
multi-market firms. They argue t1:rat a firm's reputation for predation if credible 
can '-deter entry into markets, beside those in which the actual predation 
occurS.25 A victim of predation in one market, can be a chilling example to 
prospective entrants and challengers in all the predator's market. Reputation 
can spread to different geographic markets, different product markets and later 
time periods. For example, if a firm is deciding which of two markets to enter, 
and the dominant firm in one has a credible reputation for predation the entrant 
may well decide to enter the other market. The entrant will know that predatory 
battles are expensive and that it is not worth going to war. Thus, a single 
20. Hay, supra, note 11, at 913. 
21 Baker, Recent Developments in Economics that Challenge Chicago 
School Views, 58 ANTITRUST L. J., 645, 648-649 (1989), (predatory 
pricing can b.e a successful strategy to discipline a market). 
22 R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW : AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 
191-193. 
23 Williamson, Predatory Pricing : A Strategic and Welfare Analysis. 87 
YALE L. J. 284 (1977). 
24 Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARV. 
L. REV. 869 (1976); Scherer, Some Last Words on Predatory Pricing. 89 
HARV. L. REV. (901) (1976). 
25 POSNER, supra, note 22 at 184-187. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL 
MARKET S1RUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 599-560 
(2d ed. 1980). 
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predatory incident may give a double benefit: even if predation in one market 
may not pay acceptable returns from that market alone, the effects of a general 
reputation for toughness may provide ample benefits across several markets.26 
Other commentators have developed signalling theories of predatory 
pricing. Here, the predator's motive is to induce exit rather than deter entry. 
The predator by cutting price falsely signals a cost advantage. That causes the 
victim to leave the' market and also may persuade potential entrants not to 
enter.27 These models all depend on game theory.28 While they are 
economically sound they are difficult for courts to implement.29 
Whatever one's view of price predation, non price predation is a more 
attractive, plausible and rational strategy. 
Nonprice predation does not involve the predator suffering significant 
short term losses in the hope of gaining long term speculative and indeterminate 
profits. It is far cheaper for the predator than price predator. The strategy may 
inflict losses on the predator. These are likely to be small in comparison to the 
costs the victim must face. This is especially so, where a predator misuses 
judicial and administrative processes to raise rivals' costs.30 Predators may be 
able to join forces and share costs. A predator may also be able to persuade a 
26 Fudenberg & Tirole, A Signal-Jamming Theol)' of Predation, 17 RAND 
J. ECON. 366 (Autumn 1986). 
27 Id, at 372. 
28 See, Fisher, Games Economists Play A Non-cooperative View. 20 
RAND J. ECON. 113 (Spring 1989). 
29 Id, at 117; Hay, supra, note 11. 
30 Scott, supra, note 8, at 391. 
48 
third party, such as the Commerce Commission, to bear the costs.31 
The success of the strategy does not depend on the predator eHminating 
its rivals. A higher cost rival has to reduce output, allowing the predator to raise 
price or market share immediately. Thus, unlike price predation, a nonprice 
predator does not have an extended waiting period or the uncertainty involved 
in price predation?2 In any event, a firm would prefer to compete against high 
cost'rivals rather than low cost rivals. 
Nonprice predation has fewer legal risks than price predation. As 
mentioned above, a predator can use a wide range of mechairisms to raise rivals' 
cos~s. These include normal business arrangements. Thus, the predator's 
anticompetitive purpose may be harder to detect and prove. This will especially 
be so with alleged misuse of judicial and administrative processes. 
A predator can use nonprice predation in a wide variety of circumstances. 
As it is cheaper than price predation, it can be effective in a large number of 
markets. A predator can, in some circumstances, permanently raise rivals' costs. 
For example, by obtaining an injunction or regulatory protection such as a 
mandatory product standard. 
However, as with predatory pricing, nonprice predation will be ineffective 
if market entry is easy. If supra~ompetitive prices induce entry, the predator 
cannot expect to earn long term supracompetitive profits. But, as mentioned 
above, the predator can use nonprice predation against prospective entrants. 
31 
32 Salop, Strategy.. Predation and Antitrust Analysis : An Introduction, 17 J. 
REPRINTS FOR ANTITRUST L. BCON., No.2, at 13w 15 (1987). 
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This may prevent or deter entry. Even jf entry occurs, it will disadvantage the 
entrants. Thus, a predator has every incentive to raise rivals' costs. It is a 
plausible and rational strategy. Antitrust law should prohibit it. 
In imposing liability for nonprice predation one must. be careful. Not all 
conduct which raises rivals' costs is anticompetitive. It may be extremely 
procompetitive. For example, Fisher and Paykel may develop a wonder oven 
which enables duffers to cook meals worthy of Anton Mosimann. This will 
inevitably raise the costs of rival manufacturers who will have to spend 
signllicant amounts to develop a similar oven. They will probably also have to 
undertake extensive advertising and distribution programmes to sell their now 
outdated models. The new oven would give Fisher and Paykel power over price 
in the sense it could sell the oven above marginal costs. Not even an antitrust 
law would condemn this behaviour despite it having raised rivals' costs. 
Much normal competitive behaviour will raise rivals' costs. For example, 
bidding for the services of a key employee will inevitably raise the costs of a rival 
who also wants the employee.33 Normal advertising will cause rivals to spend 
more on their own advertising to maintain sales, thus increasing costs. Normal 
price cutting will often require rivals to spend more on product improvements 
to increase sales. Property rights, in all forms, tend to raise the costs of those 
who do not own the property. As Professor Wesley Uebeler notes: "General 
Motors presumably increases Ford's costs by denying it the use of General 
33 ABA Monograph, supra, note 2, at 8-10. 
so 
Motors plant".34 Antitrust low cannot condemn the above behaviour. 
Similarly, a dominant firm may use litigation to raise rivals' costs. The 
mere fact that the litigation raises costs is not enough to make it anticompetitive. 
Dominant firms must be able to go to court. 
Normal rivalry demands that a firm keep its costs low. One way of doing 
this, is to acquire exclusive commitments from the lowest-cost suppliers. By 
excluding rivals from these suppliers, the firm has raised rivals' costs. In certain, 
but not all, circumstances this merits antitrust concern. To condemn such 
behaviour for simply raising rivals' costs would be to condemn normal business 
behp.viour. It would ,also ignore the efficiency enhancing benefits of actions th'at 
raise rivals' costs. 
Thus, before, imposing liability for raising rivals' costs, certain criteria 
must be met. Any model which condemns raising rivals' costs must distinguish 
between normal behaviour that unobjectionably raises rivals' costs and behaviour 
which antitrust should outlaw. It must explain how a predator raises rivals' costs. 
It must only impose liability when rivals' costs are raised for a significant time. 
The model should take account of any efficiency explanation for actions that 
raise rivals' costs. In short, it must only condemn predators'. actions which raise 
rivals' costs where those actions h.arm competition, not simply competitors. 
Commentators have developed such models. Professor Thomas Campbell 
has developed a model of spatial oligopoly.35 Professors Janusz Ordover and 
34 Liebeler, Exclusion and Efficiency, AEI REG. J., 34, 38 (Nos. 3 & 4 
1987). 
35 Campbell, Predation and Competition in Antitrust : The Case of 
Nonfungible Goods, 87 COLUMBo L REV., 1625 (1987). 
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Robert Willig have developed a theory of predatory product innovation. 36 
However, I will only deal with Professors Thomas Krattenmaker and Steven 
Salop's model of Raising Rivals' Costs (RRC).37 They claim it meets the above 
criteria. 
36 Ordover & Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation : Pricing and 
Product Innovation, 91 YALE L.J. 8 (1981). 
37 See, generally Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Rising 
Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986). 
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CHAPTER III 
THE RAISING RIVALS' COSTS MODEL 
Professors Thomas Krattenmaker and Steven Salop, in a seminal Yale 
Law Journal article, developed a model of Raising Rivals' Costs (RRC) for 
courts to use.1 They developed earlier work of Salop and Professor DaVid 
Scheffmann who argued a firm could more effectively and credibly prey on rivals 
by raising their costs, than by predatory pricing.2 Krattenmaker and Salop argue 
that courts should analyse virtually all types of exclusionary (predatory) conduct 
using a RRC concept? They argue that U.S. courts' traditional analysis of tying 
arrangements, exclusive dealing, refusals to deal, group boycotts, vertical mergers 
and other exclusionary activities is economically incoherent and in disarray.4 
They argue that a lack of a coherent economic model of anticompetitive 
exclusion has prevented the courts from developing sound legal rules.5 The 
existing legal rules do not enable. courts to distinguish between predation and 
vigorous competition. They give the example of the United States Supreme 
1 Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion : Rising Rivals' Costs 
to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YAlE L. J. 209 (1986). 
2 Salop & Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 AM. BCON. REV. 267, 268 
(1983) ("These elements combine to make cost-increasing strategies more 
credible than predatory pricing"). 
3 Krattenmaker & Salop, supra, note 1, at 211. 
4 Id, at 222. 
5 Ibid. 
Court in v Here, a majority of the 
Supreme Court held that Standard Oirs exclusive dealing contracts with petrol 
stations breached the antitrust laws because they involved a substantial portion 
of commerce and they right therefore foreclose competing suppliers. The court 
emphasised a plaintiff need not show "that competitive activity actually 
diminished or probably will diminish".? Krattenmaker and Salop note Standard 
Oil -had Dot prevented competing suppliers from attracting petrol stations by 
offering them better terms. Unless Standard Oil contracted with so 
stations that it gained monopoly power petrol selling. it could only 
petrol 
from 
exclusive dealing if it was more than alternative distribution methods. 
Krattenmaker and Salop conclude the court held the only possible antitrust 
concern (the impact on competition) was irrelevant, ignored a procompetitive 
reason for the exclusive dealing (efficiency) and focused -on a competitively 
neutral fact substantial amount of commerce involved).s 
They argue this is a result of the inherent weakness of the traditional 
model of foreclosure. According to this model, a firm that contracts with a 
supplier for requirements of inputs, forecloses its rivals from the inputs it 
purchases. Since supply decreases, price increases. 
One can graphically show the 9 
6 337 U.S. 
7 Id. at 318. 
8 
9 This is taken from, Krattenmaker & Salop, supra, note 1, at 
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Assume this involves an exclusive dealing agreement between Input Seller 
and Buyer B. The contract denies A's production to D's rivals. Before the 
contract B and its rivals pay price W for the input which A and its rivals supply. 
Price W is determined by the interaclion of the buyer's demand (D) and the 
seller's supply (S). 
After the contract A's inputs are no longer available. This tn 
supply (S') drives the price to B's rivals to the higher price Wi, 
The flaw in this argument, is that price does not The reuuction 
in available supply is exactly offset by the reduction in demand that is satisfied 
by the contractual purchases. Graphically this goes as follows: 10 
10 lu. at 233. 
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If inputs are no longer available to B's rivaJs, B will no longer be 
adding to the demand for inputs from A's rivals. The exclusive dealing contract 
simply realigns purchase patterns. In graph 4 the price remains the same, as the 
loss of supply (shift from S to SI) is cancelled by the loss of B's demand 
(shift from D to Dl). only effect, is to remove from the market an amount 
of Inputs (R-Rl), equivalent to the amount A supplies to B. This has probably 
no anticompetitive effect. 
This discredited theory has prevented courts developing coherent rules. 
It led Krattenmaker and Salop to develop their RRC model. They argue that 
RRC provides the proper underpinning analysing all the various, potentially, 
predatory practices. They argue courts should anaJyse all the practices using the 
one model, RRC. This involves courts applying a two stage analysis. This 
analysis will permit courts to devise that allow competition which benefits 
consumers, while deterring strategic behaviour which consumers. First, 
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one asks does the conduct unavoidably and significantly rivals~ costs. 
Second, if so, do the rivals' raised costs allow the predator to exercise 
market power, Le. raise prices above the competitive level,u Thus, the model 
inquires not only into injury to competitors (first step), but also into injury to 
competition (second step). 
Krattenmaker and Salop say courts should view all types of exclusionary 
conduct as means of purchasing exclusionary rights (ER). An is the right to 
exclude equal access to inputs to the production or marketing 
processes. For under an exclusive dealing agreement, a retailer that 
contracts to be the exclusive outlet for a manufacturer, has purchased the right 
to exclude competing retailers. When a particular retailer agrees to carry only 
one manufacturer's product, that manufacturer has purcbased the right to 
exclude competing manufacturers. Thus, the purchaser of the 
buyer or seiler in the underlying transaction. 
may be the 
The model requires analysis of two markets. the input market. 
One must examine this to determine if the predator's purchase of will 
significantly raise rivals' costs. 
Second, one must examine the output market to determine where the 
rivals' raised costs enable the predator to raise or maintain its price above the 
competitive leveL 
The analytic framework is shown in 1. 
11 Id, at 240. 
FIGURE 1: BASIC ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK I2 
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Here, the ERe has removed the restrained suppliers (ERC sellers) as a 
source of input to the rivals of the firm that purchased the exclusive rights. 
Whether this has significantly rais~d rivals' costs requires a court to consider: the 
cost and availability of the input from the unrestrained suppliers and potential 
entrants and tbe availability of substitute input products. court, then considers 
how significant the input is in the rivals' overall cost structure. court decides 
whether a rivals' costs have significantly and substantially increased. It 
ignores those practices which only negligibly raise costs. 
If a courl decides that rivals' costs are substantially increased, it then 
examines output market to determine whether the predator can price above 
the competitive level. To do this, a court considers the extent of competition 
12 Id. at 226. 
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from: excluded and unexcluded actual and potential rivals and from the 
producers of substitute products. 
The model posruhues four ways in which the purchase of exclusive rights 
can raise COS~, 
1 Boltleneck:u 
A predator can raise rivals' costs purchasing rights to all or most of the 
supply of a critical production unit Ie unil.5 are more nsivc. or 
less efficient. rivals ""ill incur h.igher production costs. This gives nse to a 
'"bonleneck" or an essential Given Ihat a rival hac, [0 huy more 
expensive substitutes. e court can directly meL~urc Ihe amount rivals' cosu. arc 
raised. IS 
Graph 5 shows the Iloulencck 
13 Id. at 234. 
14 See, mfril, Chapler VII. 
15 Kraltcnmak<:r & lup. ),upra, nule I, al 
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Before the predator obtains exclusionary rights to an input, supply (S) and 
demand (D) give a price of W. 
The predator's purchase of rights to exclude rivals from all the low-cost 
supply of the input reduces supply to Sl. only high cost sellers can meet the 
remaining rivals' demand (D), price increases to WI and quantity falls from R 
to R1. 
A predator need not use the input itself. It may simply pay input 
suppliers not to supply its rivals. Krattenmaker and Salop the example of 
U,S I V ~~=-=~~~,-==-=--,-,,-~~.16 Alcoa allegedly contracted with 
a Dumber of electric utilities for the utilities not to provide power to rival 
aluminium producers. Alcoa did not buy power from the utilities. It bought the 
right to exclude its rivals from the electricity from the utilities. Kratlenmaker 
and Salop term this a "naked" exclusionary right. Graph 5 shows this situation. 
16 44 Supp.97, 122-141 (S.D.N.Y., 1941), afrd in part and rev'd in part. 
148 F. 20 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
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the predator used the input, demand would shift back. The demand curve 
would shift to the left, but the input price would still rise to Wi. 
2 Real Foredosille:17 
A predator may foreclose its rivals' access to an input by purchasing such 
a large portion of the total supply that it forces rivals to bid up the price of the 
remaining supply, Commentators cali this a "supply or IIquantitative 
foreclosure", because the emphasis is on 
foreclosed. 
A predator can limit supply by two ways: 
sheer amount the input 
a) obtaining an from suppliers not to supply rivals (naked 
exclusion), or 
b) overbuying, buying more than it needs. 
Graphically the tvlo methods are as follows. is 
Naked Exclusion: 
17 Krattenmaker & Salop, supra, note 1, at 236. 
18 Id, at 
Naked Exclusion: 
Graph 6 
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Before the predator obtains the naked exclusionary right, price is W 
(intersection of S and D). The naked exclusionary right reduces the supply 
available to rivals with no reduction in demand. Price increases to WI, 
Overbuying: 19 
Graph 7 
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Before the overbuying, price is W (intersection of S and D). Overbuying 
t)le market where the predator's rivals buy. removes more supply (shift in 
supply from S to 5 l ) than the predator absorbs own use (shift in demand 
from D to DI). Price, therefore, increases to WI (intersection of and Dl). 
This is so, even though suppliers are sufficiently numerous that no single seller 
has market power. 
The predator and its rivals both pay the higher price. However, the 
predator may still benefit, even though its own costs are raised. The rivals' cost 
increases may be larger, if the predator uses tbe input less intensively, if it is 
vertically integrated or protected by superior bargaining ability or a long term 
supply contract. 
Krattenmaker and Salop distinguish the Real Foreclosure scenario from 
19 Ibid. 
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limited availability of the input.20 Bottleneck forces rivals to substitute for the 
desired input, whereas Real Foreclosure gives rivals the extra option of paying 
a bigher price for the originally desired input. 
However, this distinction does not seem valid. In both cases, tbe rivals 
pay higher prices to buy an input. Whether the input is the one originally 
or a substitute, the cost of production still increases. (In the latter case 
because substitute is less efficient.) The nature of the input only affects 
amount of the price increase. Thus, Bottleneck is just a special case of 
foreclosure. 21 
To assess the likely impact of Real Foreclosure on input price 
Krattenmaker and Salop suggest courts ..... ""<l.J...LULLI the "foreclosure ratio". IS 
the of the market supply previously available to rivals, that the 
predator'S exclusionary contracts have denied to them. The higher the 
foreclosure -ratio, the greater the increase in rivals' costs. However, the actual 
cost increase depends on more than the foreclosure ratio. It depends on 
elasticity of demand. conditions in the output market and other factors. 
20 Id, at 236. 
Tha~,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
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3 Cartel Ringmaster:2.2 
Some exclusionary rights may enable the predator to orchestrate cartel~ 
like' behaviour by its' suppliers against its rivals. The suppliers will decrease the 
supply of an input - thus ........ 'LUF. costs. The premise behind tbe scenario is that 
the predator may be better able to organise a cartel, than the suppliers 
themselves. If a market contains many suppliers, a large purcbaser may be able 
to coordinate the suppliers against the purchaser's rivals. 
Again there are two methods of achieving this scenario. Graphically one 
can show them as follows: 
a) Purchase 
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initially supply (S) and demand (D) give a price Wand quantity R. 
22 Krattenmaker & Salop. supra, note 1, at 238. 
23 Id, at 239. 
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A vertical restraint (such as exclusive dealing) removes the predator's demand 
from the market. This shifts the demand D to Dl, It causes a corresponding 
decrease in supply from S to SI, The vertical restraint directs suppliers to 
decrease or eliminate their competition in selling the remaining output to the 
predator's The suppliers can monopoly price, reducing output to point R \ 
where marginal revenue (MR) equals the cost of supply (51), This enables the 
suppliers to charge a higher price, WI, 
b) Naked Exclusion:24 
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This is similar to Graph 8, except it involves a naked exclusionary right. 
This means there is no change in the supply aIld demaIld curves - but price still 
mcreases. 
The problem of cheating remains as with any cartel. Thus, Krattenmaker 
24 Ibid. 
and Salop borrow from the U.S. Department of 1984 Antitrust Merger 
Guidelines to determine whether an effective cartel is possible in a particular 
fact situation. The Guidelines (and Krattenmaker and Salop) say an em:~cm 
cartel is possible in the hypothetical market consisting only of restrained 
only if its HHI index exceeds 1000 or (1800),25 If this is the case, a court 
should assess the effect of coordination among the restrained firms on the 
market- as a whole, by treating the exclusionary contracts as a merger of all the 
restrained firms. Thus a court would compare the model's original HIll with the 
"postmerger" HHI which a court would treat all restrained firms as a 
single firm. The HHI calculations are not determinative by themselves. A court 
has to analyse several other factors - especially ease of entry.26 
4 Frankenstein Monster:27 
The predator by removing restrained suppliers from the market may leave 
a concentrated market of unrestrained suppliers. remaining unrestrained 
suppliers may able to collude and fix prices. TWs ........ "' ... " rivals' costs. The 
predator does not orchestrate carteL It creates an environment where the 
25· U.S. Dept of Justice, Antitrust Div., 1984 Guidelines, 49 Fed. 
Reg. 26, 283 (1984) (Merger Guidelines). The Merger Guidelines 
provide that a merger among nondominant rivals will be challenged 
the postmerger HHl is over 1000 and the increase due to merger 
over 100, or where the post-merger HHI increased more than 50 to over 
1800. Although Krattenmaker and Salop adopt the framework of the 
Merger Guidelines. their raising rivals' costs analysis can employ whatever 
technique of analysis the court favours. Krattenmaker & 
Salop, supra, Dote 1, at 256 n. 146. 
26 Krattenmaker & Salop, supra, note 1, at 256-257, 262. 
27 Id. at 240. 
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uruestrained suppliers are likely to form and operate a of their own 
accord. 
One can show 
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Before the restraint, supply (S) and demand (D) give a price W and 
quantity R. The restraint removes the predator's demand (shift from D to D1) 
and the restrained supplier's supply (shift from S to Sl) from the market. This 
total market to R I while price stays at W. If the predator creates 
a Frankenstein Monster, so that the remaining suppliers can collude and 
coordinate pricing they would only supply quantity Ril, i.e. where Marginal 
Revenue (MR I) equals the cost of supply (Sl) giving a price of WI!, Again 
Krattenmaker and Salop borrow from the Merger Guidelines to assess whether 
a cartel is likely. The same analysis as for Cartel RingMaster, occurs with 
Frankenstein Monster. 
28 Id. at 242. 
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Under the Cartel RingMaster and Frankenstein Monster scenarios, 
suppliers increase the price as an exercise of market power. Under Bottleneck 
and Real Foreclosure the predator's purchases cause the price of the input to 
rise. even though suppliers are sufficiently numerous that no single supplier can 
exercise market power. 
STAGE TWO - MARKET POWER: 
A predator attracts no antitrust liability if it simply raises rivals' costs by 
any of the above four techniques. The cost _v.~ strategy must give the 
predator power to ralse its own price above the competitive level. court must 
assess the in cost of the input has any effect on the cost of the 
output. 
Krattenmaker and Salop identify key structural reqtPrements that must 
before the above four techniques 
price.29 
purchaser of ER power over 
(1) The input market must be a significant portion of the final product. If 
not, an increase the price of the input is unlikely to lead to an increase in the 
price of the final product. For example, a huge increase in the price of paper 
clips which General Motors purchase is not going to affect the price of cars, 
whereas a smaller increase in the price of sheet metal J...I..Uta.\L. 
(2) Competition from unexc1uded rivals or potential entrants willing to supply 
additional quantities of their products cannot constrain the predator's power over 
It is not enough for a predator to the cost of a few of its rivals. 
29 Id. at 242-247. 
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There still may be numerous unaffected rivals who prevent the predator pricing 
supracompetitively. For example, a farmer who increases t4e costs of ten of his 
rivals will be unable to exercise. market power because he faces lots more 
competition. Krattenmaker and Salop borrow from the Merger Guidelines to 
assess the likely effects on the output market of the increase in rivals' output 
costs. They would compare the original HHI of the output with HID 
of a" postexclusionary market that omits all whose costs have been 
significantly increased.30 They also argue courts should not separately analyse 
power and the predator's conduct. If a predator, by raising rivals' costs, 
prevents prices from falling, when they otherwise would then that conduct is the 
primary focus of the analysis. A court cannot evaluate such conduct by itself. 
The conduct creates the power w not the other around. Similarly, 
market is useful in the analysis. The bigger difference in market 
between the RRC predator and its the bigger the profits for gaining a 
bigher price for its output. Such a predator will want and be able to spend more 
on an RRC strategy. Thus, market share is a helpful indication - but it is not 
determinative by itself. 
If barriers to entry are low, the predator will not be able to pnce 
supracompetitively, because supracompetative prices will attract new entry. 
Similarly, readily available substitutes cannot exist as will prevent the 
predator pricing supracompetatively. 
The second stage of the ~C model is to 
has been hanned in output market. This is a 
30 Id. at 265~266. 
whether competition 
of market power. 
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~C(mo[]]!S1S define market power as the ability of a firm or group of 
to price profitably above marginal cost.31 In technical it to 
the ability to price above competitive levels. United U~Q.~ .... " antitrust law has 
distjnguished betwe~n "market power" and "monopoly power". Supreme 
Court has 'U,,",'..LU'-'''' "market power" as lithe ability to prices above those that 
would be charged a competitive market"?2 It has defined "monopoly power" 
as "the"power to control prices or exclude competitionu•33 Krattenmaker, Salop 
and I:"rClresisor Robert Lande say distinction must eliminated for the 
purposes of the RRC modeL34 They would L.I-llJ;I.U.".LI between two methods 
exercising market power. a may price by decreasing 
output - it control ......... ,"' .... market power). Chicago Scbool 
commentators have usually focused on ability of a to control by 
restricting its own 35 Hen~e, Krattenmaker, Salop and Lande term this 
"claSsical" or "Stiglenan" market power.36 
for example, HOVEMKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL 
ANTITRUST LAW 55 (1985); POSNE~ supra, ANTITRUST LAW : 
AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976); POSNER & 
EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES AND 
OTIfER 34 (2d ed. 
~~ v Board of Regents of Oklahoma. 468 U.S. 109 n. 38 (1984). 
~~~~~~~~~ 351 U.S. 377, (1956). 
34 Lande & Salop, Monopoly Power and Market Power in 
76 1. 
35 BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: POLICY AT WAR WI1H 
116-134 (2d ed. 1993); Hovenkamp, 
~~~ 84 MICH. L. REY., 213, 260-283. 
36 . Lande Salop, supra, note 34, at 249. term it 
"Stigleriantl as George Stigler extensively analysed it in 
STIGLER, TIIE ORGANlSATION OF INDUSTRY (1968). 
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Second, a fum may raise price above competitive level or prevent it 
falling to a lower competitive level, by raising its rivals' costs and thus causing 
them to restrain their output. They term this "exclusionary" or "Bainian" market 
power.37 
Both, practic~s lead to decreases in consumer welfare. Restricting output 
below the efficient competitive level denies consumers goods they value in excess 
of the marginal cost. Thus, allocative efficiency is reduced .. Similarly both 
......... ,~_. wealth from consumers to manufacturers. 
uwu...u"UJ. market power production efficiency. The two types of 
power can occur alone or together. 
Stigierian or classical market power can be shown graphically as 
follows:38 
37 Krattenmaker, Lande & Salop, supra, note 34, at 249. They term it 
"Bainian" as Professor Joe Bain extensively analysed the concept in J. 
BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION 324-330. also recognised 
that a firm could gain market power by rivals' costs by disturbing 
optimal of distribution; BORK, note at 156. 
38 This. is derived from Krattenmaker, Lande & Salop, supra, note 34, at 
266. 
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S is the marginal cost CUIVe for a monopolist in an industry. D is the 
monopolists' demand curve. The monopolist has a constant marginal cost up to 
its production capacity, K. monopolist does not produce the competitive 
amount Qc at tbe competitive price, Pc, where price equals marginal cost. The 
monopolist sets a higher price, Pm, and decreases its output to Qm, i.e. the point 
where marginal revenue equals marginal cost. The triangle ABC is the 
deadweigbt efficien<;y loss or the loss in consumer welfare. The rectangle Pm-A-
B-Pc represents the transfer of wealth from the consumer to monopolist. 
Bainian or exclusionary market power can be graphically shown as 
fOUOWS: 39 
39' Id. at 268. 
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S is the competitive supply curve of a market which produces two 
separate products X and These are the only substitutes for each other. KG 
is total capacity of producers. The total capacity of X producers and 
producers is K The increase the cost of X is shown by the upward shift the 
supply curve from S to Sl, Even if competition maintains a price where demand 
equals marginal cost, the price rises PI to P2 while quantity decreases from 
01 to 
The loss is not only. triangle ABC, but the loss in 
production efficiency, the increased of producing the remaining output, 
shown rectangle 
Krattenmaker and Salop that classical market power does 
exp~ain RRC and the consumer welfare effects of RRC If a predator can keep 
prices level when otherwise they would fall classical market power will exist, 
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yet consumer welfare will suffer because the predator power over price.4tl 
There are considerable consumer welfare effects if a predator has raised 
rivals' costs and consequently achieved the ability to price supracompetitively. 
If the predator can retain the ER that raises rivals' input costs, production 
inefficiency will result. The current suppliers of the input will have reduced their 
production of the input resulting in higher prices the input market. If no 
alternative sources of supply are available, production of needed input may 
be reduced with consequent higher prices and reductions in production 
efficiency. Resources previously used to make the needed input will be directed 
elsewhere. resulting less than optimal allocation of production resources.41 
Consumers ultimate product will pay higher prices. Some 
consumers will not buy product and buy less satisfactory substitutes. 
Consumers that buy the product will pay a bigher and hence, have 
money to other inputs they might otherwise acquire. 
Thus, a successful RRC strategy will result in In the 
allocation of resources at the production stage and inefficiencies the allocation 
of resources at the consumption stage.42 This is why Krattenmaker and Salop 
argue market power is necessary for liability. 
40 Krattenmaker Salop, supra, note 1 at 262-265. 
41 ABA ANTITRUST : MONOGRAPH NO. 18 NONPRICE 
PREDATION UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 19 
(1991). 
42 Ibid. 
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Possible Efficiency Defence:43 
Once a .... ~"' ................. has established the two elements the predatory conduct 
is illegal - subject to a possible efficiency defence. Krattenmaker and Salop do 
not take a position on this, as it is unclear whether United States courts allow 
it. a court permitted such a defence, it would ask ''wbether the conduct 
generated any significant offsetting efficiency benefits or cost savings that can 
only-be- achieved by permitting exclusionary [predatory] practice".44 If 
a court would not condemn the predator. 
Krattenmaker Salop's luke warm reaction to an efficiency defence is 
partly due the difficulty discovering measuring the efficiency of a cost 
raising device. No one has ever done so. Thus, they place the burden 
the cost raising strategy had overwhelming efficiencies on the predator. 
They suggest such a predator should~ 
a) develop standards estimating the size of claimed emLCH:;nClles, 
b) show it could not obtain the efficiencies by anticompetitive .......... ~. 
c) distinguish between pecuniary economies and efficiencies and count 
only the latter, 
d) establish standards for distinguishing among effectiv~ exclusion resulting 
price increases that: 
i) only transfer wealth from consumers to stockholders, 
activities that siphon wealth from consumers to 
43 Krattenmaker Salop. supra, note 1, at 277-282. 
44 Krattenmaker & Salop, 
ANTITRUST J., 71, 76 
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nonproductive entities, 
ill) provide incentives for wealth - increasing innovation. 4S 
Summary of the RRC Analysis 
1. Is there an exclusionary right which enables the predator to exclude its 
rivals an input? 
2. Did the exclusion enable the predator to significantly.raise its rivals' costs 
by one or more of the four postulated scenarios? did the predator 
harm rival? (harm to a competitor). 
3. If so, did the predator gain power over price in the output market? (harm 
to competition). 
Did the conduct any overriding efficiencies that justify despite it 
baving raised rivals' costs? 
45 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CRITIQUE OF RRC MODEL 
INTRODUCTION: 
The . RRC model has received world wide academic acclaim.' Three 
United Circuit Courts of Appeal have cited the mode1.2 Of those three 
two have expressly applied it? Other courts have applied an RRC type analysis 
without expressly citing the model.4 Numerous commentators have examined 
the model and pointed out weakness. I now outline and discuss these criticisms. 
1 MacCrimmon and Sadanand, J.:!ll~~~~!i\..!..!.:~J,!,!j~~~<.l:.!..l!!.!Lll...!::!:!c!!. 
2 
3 
4 
Osgoode Hall LJ. 709 (1989) (arguing Canadian 
Courts should use RRC model to analyse Exclusive Dealing under s. 
77 Competition Act): VAUTIER, FARMER and BAXT, AND 
BUSINESS COMPETITION-AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND IN 
103 (1990); FRASCO. 
DEALING, A COl'VfPREHENSlVE STUDY 18-23 (1981); Pathat. 
ECLR 74 (1989) (arguing European courts should use the RRC model 
to cases under Articles 85 and 86 of the'Treaty of Rome); 
Easterbrook., 61 ANTITRUST 
L.J., 99, 107 (1 two methods of predation is 
raising rivals' costs). 
Premier Electrical and .......... ~-'-'-'-"='-'-"'~~ supra, note 2, 
e.g. v .!.lil!~~~..I-!-Y-~~~~.!L.!~~ 334 F. 2d 951 
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. 
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1 The model does add anything new 
Commentators, such as Professor Timothy that the model 
is redundant because existing antitrust law already prohibits conduct which the 
model identifies as anticompetitive.5 model does not add anything new. 
'-'.LU ............. notes: "[the model] offers virtually nothing as an antitrust theory that 
is not already subsumed in current theories".6 
Judge Frank Easterbook notes: "[T]he inquiry into rivals' costs simply 
repackages questions"? Ironically, Judge Easterbrook is one of only two 
judges who has cited and applied the concept.s Indeed, he has favourably 
commented on the model in his academic writings.9 Accordingly Professor 
Wayne Calkins, after noting: "one is hard-pressed to identify many 
where one could find a violation for "raising rivals' costs" but not under 
conventional [antitrust] law", characterises the theory as "old wine in new 
bottles".lO 
Witb respect, this criticism is not valid. Krattenmaker and Salop have 
never claimed that purpose of the model was to revolutionise or extend the 
5 ANTITRUST BULL., 
6 Id. at 103. 
7 Easterbrook, .£:M.!.~U!;!;.!.Q....L:lb!.!.!:.!.~~~~~~~..!..£:!;~ 76 OED. L. J., 
305, 314-3 
8 See note He applied the concept on -"-'--"~""-'-~='-=::.!.. 
9 Easterbrook, supra, note 1; Easterbrook, The Inevitability of Law and 
~t!lQIlJ..licl. 1 EDUCATION REV., 3, 17 (1989). 
10 56 
boundaries of 
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antitrust law. Their purpose is lito provide a unified 
analysisllll of potentially predatory practices such as tying arrangements. 
exclusive dealing, refusals to deal and the Similarly their goal is to provide 
an understandable and applicable model to assess strategic behaviour. As 
mentioned, earlier predators can use such practices as exclusive as 
strategic devices to decrease competition. No one disputes this. One of 
problems with assessing behaviour that prices may change. 
Traditional Chicago School analysis does not capture instances. Judge 
Richard Posner notes static classical economic assumptions have meant the 
Chicago School has.not taken much notice of strategic behaviour: "Since classical 
... economics contains no generally accepted theory of strategic behaviour, it 
not that the Chicago School should not have been particularly 
concerned with predatory pricingH • 12 The same must be true of nonprice 
predation - the form of strategic behaviour. 
The RRC m<?del enables courts to condemn strategic predation 
as it recognises that a predator may keeping prices falling. 
That the model does not extend conventional law does not mean 
it fails. The test whether it provides a unified analysis of the potentially 
predatory practices and whether it addresses nonprice behaviour. 
both cases answer is It offers a fresh and easily understood perspective. 
11 
~~~~~~'-"""--"-"=:.= 96 YALE L.l. 209, 214 (1986). 
12 PA. REV., 
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It uses classical price theory13 and models to point out why how nonprice 
strategic behaviour antioompetitive. As Calkins notes "[1]t reflects some 
rigorous thinking about strategic behaviour thinking that may supply the theory 
behind a monopoliZation case ... ".14 The model may be "old wine new 
bottles", but as Calkins notes "If it is good wine and will attract customers after 
rebottling, so much the better".15 
2 The model does not distinguish clearly between competitive and 
antioompetitive behaviour 
This criticism applies to every theory of predation. As mentioned 
any predation theory must distinguish between predation and normal methods 
of competition which antitrust should encourage - not condemn. model 
clearly identifies harmful business practice - raising rivals I costs. The issue 
is whether it has established criteria by which courts can condemn harmful 
behaviour without condemning desirable business behaviour. In the words of 
Judge Easterbrook, does it cause too many IIfalse positives".16 A positive 
is a beneficial business practice whicb courts falsely condemn as anticompetitive. 
mentioned above, this can be particularly difficult the context of 
nonprice predation and raising rivals' costs. Professors Thomas Sullivan 
The model is similar to Ar.eeda 
that both use static classical 
Turner's test for predatory pricing in 
theory to explain behaviour. 
Areeda & Tu roer, ~~~.J...A....L!.l:~f,.--fH.!Y.J~!.a!!~L!.l;!u...u~'-"L~~~.!:ll!!:! 
14 Calkins, supra, note 10, at 69. 
15 Id. at 65. 
16 Easterbrook, ~~~~~~~~ 63 REV., 1 (1984). 
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John note: 
" Many activities cause the costs of competitors to 
increase are simply the side of "competition on the merits." 
Others may be specifically designed to competitors without 
benefiting consumers. The mere fact that an action raises the 
costs of does not mean one can escape issue that plagues 
monopolization law: when tbe activity ultimately and 
when is its primary purpose the exclusion or hampering of 
others?"17 
In shon critics doubt the model provides adequate guidelines to 
distinguish between predation competition on merits. IS courts use 
the model it will condemn much beneficial behaviour. It will spread liability too 
widely. Consequently it may discourage innovation, rivalry other 
of procompetitive behaviour. 
The critics perceive the problem with the model is that normal 
competitive behaviour raises rivals' costs. There are numerous examples. Salop 
and Scheffmann argue a predator cao use advertising to 'raise rivals' costS.19 
Existing and potential market entrants will to respond to the 
predator's Such firms will be smaller lhan the predator, so the 
advertising will cost them proportionately more. A predator can increase its 
rivals' costs even if in comparative advertising which criticises its 
products. The rivals will probably have to do more advertising than the 
predator to offset the predator's advertising. Yet advertising is simply normal 
17 T. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST 
AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICA nONS 239-240 (1988). 
18 
19 
See, Marvel, 
ORGANISATION, 
8 REVIEW OF INDUSTRlAL 
Salop & Scheffman, .::....:.==~:..:...:..:o::c=-..;==.. 73 AM. ECON. REV., 267, 
268 (1983). 
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competitive behaviour. A has to advertise to survive. The predator's 
comparative advertising may be true. No liability can attach. 
Property rights can raise the costs of rivals who do not own the property. 
Professor Wesley Liebeler notes "General Motors presumably 
Ford's costs by denying it the use of General Motors' plant".2o 
Normal competitive bidding inputs will rivals' costs. firm who 
offers-employment to a rival's key employee will raise the rival's costs if the rival 
bas.to offer a salary to keep the employee.21 
An innovative which introduces a new product will raise its rivals' 
costs. Rivals will have to spend significant amounts to develop a similar product. 
They will to undertake extensive advertising and distribution programmes 
to their now outdated products. economy encourages, and rewards such 
innovation. innovator's purpose was to innovate and make more money. 
That it rivals' costs was ancillary to its purpose. model's critks 
that the model will condemn such behaviour.2.2 I disagree. The model does not 
impose liability for simply raising rivals' costs. The predator must gain market 
power in the sense of being able ,to price supracompetitively. may be by 
increasing prices or preventing them &om falling. It is unlikely the advertising 
property rights or bidding for rivals' employees scenarios will do this. However, 
it may be true in the case of product innovation. producer of a new superior 
20 J., 38 (1987). 
21 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION: MONOGRAPH NO. 18 NONPRICE 
PREDA nON UNDER SECfION 2 OF THE SHERMAN 9 
(1991). 
Marvel, supra, note 17 at 9. 
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product will able to charge above cost for some time period. 
However, the innovator should still not liable under the model. 
Krattenmaker and Salop devised the model for courts to use under Section 2 
Sherman Act. It does not replace traditional Section 2 analysis. It is an adjunct 
to it. The innovator would not be liable as it is doubtful it had any purpose to 
create or a monopoly. Certainly the innovator would not be liable 
under section 36 Act 1986. I will explain why in the next chapter, 
The model's critics next objection is that it does not distinguish clearly 
between enhancing arrangements wIDch rivals' costs and 
anticompetitive arrangements which also raise rivals' costs.23 Normal rivalry 
that a fum keep its costs low. One way of doing this is to acquire 
exc~usive commitments from the lowest cost suppliers. This may save significant 
amounts in transaction costs. By excluding rivals from suppliers the 
has raised rivals' costs. This strategy is Krattenmaker and Salop's Bottleneck or 
Real Foreclosure scenario. The argue to condemn such behaviour would 
be to condemn an LU"'I' .... .LH firm.24 Professor Oliver Williamson has argued 
such commitments are efficiency enhancing as they help the reduce its own 
25 
Similarly commitments may not only reduce transaction costs they 
may prevent by rivals. This too enhances efficiency. Similarly, 
23 
.=.x..::..=...;;::;.=.== 84 NW. U.L. REV. 321, 343 (1989). 
24 Tharp, ibid. 
25 O. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND IDERARCI-llES ANALYSIS 
AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975). 
Professor Herbert Hoverkamp argues that the model 
proper balancing of pro and anti-competitive effects.26 
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not undertake a 
notes the model 
seeks to identify conduct that significantly and unavoidably raises rivals' costs, 
but adopts structural tests to determine whether such a test is likely. tests 
only identify the plausibility not likelihood of rivals' costs just as weather 
conducive to a tornado only suggests that a tornado is plausible not 50 per cent 
likely?'Z argues antitrust should not condemn a on a plausibility, 
He argues that the model by inferring anticompetitive behaviour from 
market structure but demanding empirical proof of efficiencies is flawed. He 
argues there is no basis for assuming that exclusive dealing and the like 
motivated by predatory rather than efficiency concerns. To do so, as model 
does, will result in courts condemning all such While such 
arrangements will raise rivals' costs more when a large uses them - the cost 
savings flowing from them will be greater as well. Thus, he argues the model 
does not take sufficient account of efficiencies.28 The critics argue tbat tbe 
model understates the efficiency enhancing benefits of actions that 
costs?9 
However the model postulates an efficiency defence. The who 
claims efficiency ""~L''''''''''''' must prove The criticis'rn is relevant to a 
26 
~~~~~.!:>Z,j 71 MINN. L. REV. 1293, 1304 (1987). 
rd. at 1304. 
28 Id. at 1311-13 
29 Marvel, supra, note 17) 14; Tharp, supra, note 
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Sherman Act Section 1 claim courts undertake a rule of reason analysis, 
Le. courts assess and tbe pro and anticompetitive effects of an 
arrangement. The ~ame is true of '-'~'~""',",'~ 27 of the Commerce Act. Whether 
courts can undertake such an analysis under Section 36 is still uncertain.30 
Thus. the model may be correct not expressly and definitively incorporating 
an efficiency defence. 
The model is a model for a;)>:>I;;~~ predation claims. Thus, under Section 
36 a predat'or must have a dominant position in the appropriate market. 
will decrease the danger of false positives. I further analyse this in Chapter V 
I discuss the constituent elep1ents of Section 36 and its applicability to the 
model. 
3 Simply raising rivals' costs enough for liability 
The model requires two steps : first raising rivals' costs and second the 
increased costs must give the predator the power to raise or stabilise market 
price.31 The criticism is tbat to raise rivals> costs a predator requires control 
over the input market, Le. the predator must have market power over the input 
market. This power is enough for liability. 
However. to the case of single firm behaviour, simply baving 
power is no breach of tbe antitTust laws. Simply monopoly pricing attracts no 
liability. It is different if two or more forms collude to gain market power. 
30 See Chapter V. 
31 Krattenmaker & Salop, 
ANTITRUST LJ. 71, 
56 
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Krattenmaker and Salop argue the second step is necessary because firms 
usually have no to raise rivals' costs unJess they also achieve power 
over price. As men.tioned above, an action which raises rivals' costs have 
significant efficiency justifications. Allowing firms simply to complain only about 
the first step, would be to allow firms to complain about (and thus, deter) 
efficient behaviour. This would place too heavy a burden of self-restraint on 
32. 
4 Raising rivals' costs strategies are so rare as to be insignificant 
Hovenkamp the model is at its best when the exclusionary right 
involves naked exclusionary behaviour.3') Kratte.nmaker and Salop give the 
example of Alcoa paying electricity suppliers not to supply Alcoa's 
competitors.34 Apart. from abuse of judicial and administrative processes, this 
is the only example of a naked exclusionary right tbey can identify.35 Professor 
John Lopatka and Doctor Paul Godek bave pOlated out Alcoa entered into no 
such contracts.36 Analysing coun testimony. they say Alcoa never 
contracted with ut~ties for the utilities to withbold power from rivals that were 
unattached to power or incipient power purchasers. They the contracts 
32· Id. 
Hovenkamp, supra, note at 1304. 
34 Kratte.nmaker & Salop, supra note 10, at 215-217. 
Ibid. 
36 
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were simple exclusive dealing contracts. The only occasions where Alcoa did not 
use power, were for shon periods when it was constructing facilities next to the 
utilities. In any event. Alcoa so little of the electric power market 
that it could not raise rivals' costsY This however does not weaken the model. 
Krattenmaker and Salop only give Alcoa's contracts as a potential example of 
a naked exclusionary right. They apply the RRC analysis to Alcoa. They do not 
say Alcoa breached the model, as they do not have the requisite information. 
They use Alcoa as an example to demonstrate the RRC methodology. 
Another tactic for raising rivals' costs is a predator overbuying some input. 
overbuying involves the predator buying more of tbe i.nput it needs. This 
can be either the Bottleneck or Real Foreclosure scenarios. Kratterunaker and 
Salop give the example of Alcoa. Alcoa possibly bought more bauxite 
it needed. Krattenmaker and Salop say this could have raised rivals' costs.38 
Professor John Tharp,39 along with Lopakta and Godek,4o analyse the 
testimony and argue Alcoa was only reducing transaction costs by long term 
contracting. They thus conclude the model is of no use. 
here again Kranenmaker and Salop do not offer Alcoa's 
overbuying as definitive RRC behaviour. They only use it to demonstrate the 
model's methodology. While Tharp et at. appear to be correct about tbe Alcoa 
case, this does not invalidate tbe modeL Tharp et al. have knocked down a 
37 
38 
39 
40 
Id. at 3 19. 
Krattenmaker & Salop, supra, note 10, at 236. 
Tharp, supra, note at 
Lopatka & Godek, supra, note at 320-324. 
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straw man. Krattenmaker and Salop offer no conclusions on Alcoa; they use it 
as a possible example. 
In any event the model takes account of the concerns about overbuying 
as to raise rivals' costs. Krattenmaker and Salop require: 
"proof that as a result of inefficient resource use from 
overbuying, the purchasing firm's [predator'sJ marginal cost is, in 
driven up to a level above the price it receives for its 
output. This burden would generally be very difficult for 
'plaintiff to carry; it is the equivalent of the Areeda-Turner test for 
predatory pricing as applied to input purchases".41 
In any case, under Section 36 a dominant fum which bas valid reasons for 
overbuying should not attract liability. 
Although, RRC model may be most easily understood when applied 
to naked exclusionary contracts, the fact naked exclusionary contracts are so rare 
does not invalidate the mode1.42 
5 Rivals have counterstrategies wbicb can defeat the plan to raise their 
costs. 
Some critics argue that rivals have counterstrategies tbat enable tbem to 
defeat the predator's cost raising strategies.43 As can readily do so the 
model does not merit antitrust concern. 
Rivals can do so in a number of ways. First, can obtain needed 
inputs from suppliers other than suppliers that enter into the exclusionary rights 
41 Krattenmaker & Salop, supra, note 10, at 282 n. 228. 
42 
43 
Rasmusen, Ramseyer & WileYt ~~~==.:::.;. 81 AM. ECON. REV., 
1137 (1991). 
Easterbrook) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 48 U. cm. L. 
REV.) (1981). 
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contracts. Unless the predator succeeds up a dominant portion of the 
. . 
input market, a rival could contract with the remaining suppliers to satisfy its 
needs.44 Where rivals can do this, the stage of the RRC model is not 
satisfied. In some cases, especiaJJy with the Bottleneck this is not 
possible. 
second scenario is for rivals to integrate with suppliers. Thus, rivals can 
develop their own sources of inputs.4S The mere threat of integration may 
prevent a predator from trying to obtain exclusionary rights contracts.46 
However, such a threat to be plausible. It may not be so where the predator 
controls most of the market and the rivals are small 
A third counterstrategy is for rivals to bid against the predator for the 
exclusionary contract47 The bidding may go so that both the 
predator's and rivals' costs are raised. However, the predator after raised 
rivals' costs and begun making supracompetitive profits will be able to afford the 
suppliers' price.48 In any event, in tIDs scenario consumer welfare is 
harmed. The result- of the strategy and counterstrategy is that everyone's costs 
are raised. The effect will higher prices for consumers. 
In relation to predatory product innovation, a that manufactures 
44 ABA Monograph, supra, note 20, at 43. 
45 Klein, Crawford & Alchian, ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~...-!.!.!. 
='--""''''''-'-'''=~_'-'-''=-., 21 
46 ABA Monograph, supra, n~>te 20, at 43. 
47 Hovenkamp. 'supra, note 25, at 1313-1315. 
48 Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 10, at 265. 
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products that complement tbe predator's product, may develop a 
manufacturing technique. TItis will enable it to quickly cbange its product to 
account for cbanges the predator makes in its product. This enables the firm to 
accommodate predator's altering their products to make them incompatible with 
rivals' products.49 
While rivals do have oounterstrategies they are not so overwhelming as 
to invalidate the modeL 
6 Input suppliers won't enter exclusionary rights contracts 
An exclusionary rights contract means a supplier loses a major buyer. To 
compensate for this; tbe supplier will cbarge a substantial premium. This will 
effectively substantially raise tbe predator's costs. However, the predator will be 
able to pay for tbis out of its supracompetitive pricing.50 If the predator, is a 
well established dominant ~ suppliers may have no real choice in entering 
into exclusi~nary ri$hts contracts. 
Suppliers may not only supply in the same market as the predator and its 
rivals. For example, if Alcoa did pay utilities not to sell 'to rival aluminium 
companies, they could still sell to steel manufacturers, car manufacturers and 
other electricity consumers. 
Another criticism is that suppliers will not grant exclusionary rights 
49 Scberer,1:Y!.!:!ll-g,;u.~~~~!.!:L!...!..!.ll~~ 62 N.Y.U. L. REV., 998, 1014-
1015 (1987) resilence of peripheral equipment 
manufacturers the face of IBM's efforts to exclude them from the 
market). 
50 See, supra, note 47. 
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contracts as they are likely to lead facing a monopsonist purcbaser.51 
This is not necessarily so. It depends on the exclusionary rights contract. 
Suppliers may be able to get out of the contract reasonably and quickly. 
Thus, this criticism does not invalidate the modeL 
7 The Model is based on discredited leverage theory 
criticism is based on the Chicago School view of vertical integration. 
Sucb scbolars argue that only one monopoly profit is possible in a chain of 
production. The that a monopoly can one monopoly profit in one 
It cannot extend or leverage its monopoly power into another market. 
It has already made its profit,52 
The criticism,. as applied to the model, is that it assumes input suppliers 
can gain power simply by integrating with their purchaser. This view, however 
assumes a monopoly input supplier. This is not necessarily so. Using the Alcoa 
example, Alcoa purchased exclusionary rights from a number of electricity 
utilities - not a national electricity supplier. In exclusive dealing the predator 
will contract with numerous - not with a monopolistic retailer. 
there will be a monopolistic supplier. However, the 
leverage criticism depends on the Chicago School view being correct. 
The Chicago view is not unanimous. Professor Louis Kaplow argues a 
51 ABA Monograph, supra. note 20, at 
52 R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR 
WITH 141-144 (2d 1993); R. & F. 
EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST CASES AND MATERIAlS, 870 
(1981). 
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monopolist can extend profits by vertical integration and reducing competition 
in the output market. This occurs when: 
1 entry barriers are heightened 
2 integration facilitates price discrimination 
3 integration avoids price regulation.s3 
Krattenmaker and Salop make the same point,54 
'In any event Section 36 of the Commerce Act expressly covers monopoly 
leveraging. 55 
8 The Model is too complex 
Professor Calkin.s 'the model is too complex for courts to 
administer. He the complexity will lead to courts and enforcement 
agencies misunderstanding it and either condemning normal behaviour or finding 
no whatsoever.56 
Brennan argues the only benefit of the model is that it enables lawyers 
to raise clients' costs.57 
While analysis involved may require a court to consider many things -
all antitrust litigation requires this. The time involved doing so may be more 
53 Kaplow,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 85 COLUMBo 
REV., 5 
54 Krattenmaker & Salop, supra, note 10, at 248-249. 
See Chapter V, infra. 
56 Cal.kins, supra, note 10. at 68. 
57 Brennan, supra, note 5. 
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New Zealand, as New Zealand' has DO equivalent of the American summary 
judgment procedure. The onJy way to assess whether the criticism is correct is 
to apply it to section 36. This is what I shall do after outlining the constituent 
elements of section 36 in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER V 
SECTION 36 AND ITS CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS 
Introduction: 
Section 36(1) is the Commerce Act's predation section. is to 
prohibit predatory behaviour. A necessary coroUary is that it must distinguish 
between normal cOp:lpetition and predation. New ~'Ua.lJl\J courts recognise this. 
Tipping J. neatly .I...Lt.Ll-''-U up s. 36's function in ~~..!.!!.!:!Ji.!.'i~~.;!,lL!.~~ V 
...!.!.j~~~~~tl.ill~~ when he observed: 
reads: 
"[1] would the following proposition. It is not a breach of 
s. if a person albeit with a dominant position, simply acts in a 
competitive manner. It would be an irony if such conduct could 
be attacked because it is competition which the Act is designed to 
promote",2 
The section is entitled "Use of a Dominant Position in a Market". It 
(1) No person who has a dominant position a market shall use that 
position for the purpose of -
(a) Restncting the entry of any person into that or any other market; 
or 
(b) Preventing or any person from competitive 
conduct in that or any other market; or 
1 (1990}1 NZI,.,R 731. 
2 Id. at 761. 
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(c) any person from tbat or any other market. 
(2) For the purposes of this section, a person not use a dominant 
position in a market any of the purposes specified paragrapbs (a) 
to (c) of subsection (1) of this sectioD by reasoD only that that person 
enforces or seeks to enforce any right under or existing by virtue of any 
copyright, patent, protected plant variety, registered _~_ ......... or trade mark. 
(3) Nothing in this section applies to any practice or conduct to which this 
Part of tbis Act CA.I.JU"-1\,,,.:> which has been authorised pursuant to Part V of 
this Act. 
The section has constituent elements. It prohibits: 
(a) person wbo is in a dominant position in a market 
(b) from using that position 
(c) for purpose of restricting entry ill a market, deterring 
competitive conduct in a market or eliminating a person from a 
market? 
I shall analyse eacb element. Part n of this chapter will discuss 
"dominant position". However~ I will only do so briefly. It is only the threshold 
condition for the operation of the section. It plays no part in distinguishing 
pre<iation from normal competitive behaviour. ill will discuss tbe "use" 
element. Part IV, the purpose VL'-'JL.U ...... !.L. In parts ill and IV I will extensively 
refer to Australianlaw on s. 46 of tbe Trade Practices Act (1974). Part V 
discusses how tbe RRC model in with s. 36. 
3 
181-182 in COMPETITION LAW AND 
POLICY IN NEW ZEALAND (Ahdar ed. 1991). 
Dominant Position in a Market: 
Section 3(8) defines IIdominant position" as follows: 
the purposes of sections 36, 66 and 67 of this Act, a dominant 
position a market is one which a person as supplier or an 
acquirer of goods or services, either alone or together with any 
interconnected body corporate, is in a position to exercise a 
dominant influence over the production, acquisition, supply, or 
price of goods or services that market, and for the purposes of 
deten:nining whether a person is in a position to exercise a 
dominant influence over the production, acquisition, supply, or 
. price of goods or services in a market regard shall be had to -
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(a) The share of the market, the technical knowledge, the access to 
materials or capital of that person or that person together with any 
interconnected body corporate: 
(b) The extent to which that person is constrained by conduct of 
competitors or potential competitors in that market; 
(c) extent to which that person is constrained by the conduct of 
suppliers or of goods or services in that market. 
The key phrases are "person", \tin a position", "dominant influence" and 
"market". I shall only consider dominant influence.4 This threshold derives 
from Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome. provides: 
OiAny abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position 
within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be 
prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as 
it may trade between Member Such abuse may, 
particular, consist in: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or 
selling prices or other unfair conditions; 
(b) limiting production, or technical 
development to the prejudice of consumers; 
4 For a comprehensive account of these factors see Hampton, supra, note 
3, at 182-186. also, B run t, ~~"'-LI!~~l:ll.!!~!.i:!.!::!.!~~!:.Y.Q.!.L£~.!..,!,Yl!!:!. 
~~~~~~~~~~~~ 115 in COMPETITION LAW 
AND POliCY IN NEW ZEALAND (Ahdar 1991). 
(c) applying dissimilar conditioru; to equivalent 
with other trading parties, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to 
acceptance by the other parties of supplementary 
ohligatioru; which, by their nature or according to 
commercial usage have no connection with the 
subject of such contracts". 
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The s. 3(8) definition equates with the economic definition of market 
power.' This is ability to raise price without losing to existing 
competitors or new entrants so the increase is unprofitable.5 However, as 
Hampton notes, s. 3(8) definition with its "exercise a dominant 
influence over production, acquisition, supply or price" expands the traditional 
economic definition.6 is more than the ability to give and charge more. 
Article 86 stresses that a dominant position involves the ability to act 
independently of one's rivals, customers and consumers. The Commission, 
defined the concept of a domi.nant position as: 
"Undertakings are in a dominant position when it is possible for 
to behave independently which puts them in a position to act 
without to their competitors, purchasers or suppliers. That 
IS case when, because of their share of the market, or because 
of share of the market combined with the availability of 
technkal knowledge, raw materials or capital they have the power 
to prices or to control production or distribution for a 
significant part of the products in question. This power does not 
5 SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCfURE AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 10-11 (2d 1980); HOVENKAMP, 
ECONOMICS AND ANTITRUST LAW 55 (1985); P. 
AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW, Vol. II 321-346 (1978); 
Posner and Landes, 94 HARV. L. 
REV., 937 (1981). 
6 Hampto~ supra, note 3, at 186. 
7 [1992] CML~ D.l1. 
necessarily have to result from an absolute dominance enabling 
the undertakings which hold it to eliminate power of ............ ,1.:"'-"1 
on the part of their economic partners but it is sufficient that they 
be strong enough as a whole to ensure those undertakings 
complete freedom of action even though their influence on the 
individual market in.8 
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yet, no New court has considered the meaning of a "dominant 
position" in the context of a s. 36 case. The case law points out that s. 3(8) 
derives from the European case law on Article 86.9 Cases involving mergers 
cited the European approach with approval; notably Davison 
~~~=.........,~ v ~~b!Scl.~~!.U!;!~~.!,;!,.1O Tipping J. cited 
II The Coun of Appeal also did so 
12 
liThe concept of dominant posltlon in tbe New Act 
appears to have been drawn from the 
referred to the judgment of Davison C.J. in """"'-" .......... =~~~~ 
v [1987] 2 NZLR 682, 690 in which 
be refers to the meaning of "dominant position" adopted by the 
Commerce Commission as: 
'Dominance is a measure of market power. Being 
in a "dominant position" is interpreted by the 
Commission, in essence, as having sufficient market 
[economic strength] to enable the dmninant 
party to behave to an extent in a 
discretionary manner without suffering detrimental 
effects in the relevant markets[s]". 
8 Id. at D. 27. 
v 
9 v~~~~~~~ 
647,679; Tru Tone Ltd v"",-",-,,",,,-,-,,,,,-
Records Retail Marketing Ltd (19881 2 NZLR 
10 (19881 2 NZLR 682. 
11 Supra, note 1. 
[1992J 2 NZLR 641. 
This is a conversion of the statutory lULl5U<"'5V into the language of 
economists ... ". 13 
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Thus, it appears "dominant position in a market" equates with the 
Australian s. 46 "threshold of a substantial degree of noruIIPT in a market,,,.14 
However, this is uncertain as the Court of Appeal in a merger case, """"--""""""""""""""'" 
Corporation of N.Z. Ltd v ~~~~~~~~~ held it was nol prepared 
to read "dominant" as meaning "substantial market power". Cooke held only 
one person can be dominant and drew on the dictionary to define dominant 
position. 16 Court economic concept of 
have criticised the decision. I? However, the 
13 Id. at 648-649. 
14 Section 46 of the Trade Practices Act provides: 
15 
"(1) A corporation that has a substantial 
a shall not take 
for the purpose of: 
of power 
of that power 
(a) eliminating or substantially damaging 
a competitor of the corporation or of 
a body corporate that is related to the 
corporation in that or any other 
market; 
(b) the entry a 
that or any other market; or 
into 
(c) deterring or preventing a person from 
engaging in competitive conduct In 
that or any other market." 
[1992] 3 429. 
16 Id. at 442. 
17 
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decision arguably is irrelevant to s. 36. As Hampton notes, "dominant position" 
plays different roles in s. and the merger provisions. In the provisions 
it is the standard by which Commerce Commission or the courts determine 
whether a business acquisition bre'aches Act. In s. 36 it is simply a threshold 
for the operation of section. IS Thus, "dominant position" plays no role in 
distinguishing nonna] competition from predation. That js the role of the "use" 
and "purpose" provisions. 
Use: 
have recognised that it will often be difficult to separate use 
and purpose elements of s. 36. They are often interconnected. As Gault J. 
observed in Electricity Corp. Ltd v -""'-"=~~===-s.~=.19 
"The conduct prohibited by the section [section 36] is the use of 
the dominant position for the proscribed purposes. There will be 
circumstances in which the use of the market position and the 
purposes are not easily separated but the two requirements must 
be kept in mind".20 
Despite difficulty the courts consider "use" as a separate inquiry which a 
plaintiff to establish to a breach of s. 36. lndeed in Williams v 
both the Federal and Full Federal Court of 
found that the defendant had a substantial of market power and the 
18 Hampton, 635,750 in BUTfERWORTHS 
COMMERCIAL LAW (J. Farrar & A Borrowdale ed 1992). 
19 Supra, note 
20 Id. at 646. 
21 (1987) ATPR, para 40-781, affirmed on appeal (1987) ATPR, 
818. 
40-
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requisite purpose. However, the defendant had not breached s. 46, as it had not 
advantage" of its market power. Thus, use is a separate and requisite 
limb which a plaintiff must prove to establish s. 36 liability. The "use" limb helps 
courts distinguish betvJeen predation and normal competition. 
The most imponant case on IS the High Court of Australia's 
decision v Broken Hill Pry Ltd.21 
High Court "take advantage of' with . Thus, the case is extremely 
relevant to s. 36. Broken Hill Pty Ltd (BHP) produced 97 per cent of steel in 
Australia. It suppl.led 85 cent of tbe count.r'fs and products. It 
also manufactured "Y -bar" feed slock. Y -bar i.s in tbe of star 
picket fences. BHP was Australia's only manufactUrer of Y -bar. Y -bar was the 
only product BHP did not selJ generally. BHP sold Y -bar only to Australian 
Wire Industries - one of its wbolJy-owned subsidiaries. Queensland Wire 
Industries Pty Ltd (OWl) manufactured galvanised wire (rom rods it obtained 
BHP. It also acquired star picket posts from BHP competed v.ith BHP 
in tbe rural fencing market Queensland. QWl had a 28 per cent share of that 
market. QWl requested BHP supply it with V-bar. It wanted to manufacture 
star picket posts. BHP declined. saying its policy was to refuse supply, or to 
offer supply at an uncompetitive price. because it wanted to keep the 
manufacturing of star picket fences to itself. QWl sued aUeging breacb of s. 46. 
At tnstaoce,2:3 Pi_neus J. found BHP bad a substantial of market 
power and tbe requisite purpose. It had not taken advantage of 
(1989) A TPRJ para 40-925. 
(1987) para 40-818. 
market 
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power. OWl's claim failed. He held "take advantage" required some 
reprehensibility of conduct. After examining authority held: 
"What all the cases referred to above have in common, in my 
opinio~ is that they are consistent with a reading of "take 
advantage of' which is pejorative and Dot While I cannot 
(with respect) accept that characterising the acts complained of as 
merely an of legal rights, whether contractual or 
otherwise, can be an answer to a claim based on s. 46, it appears 
to me that the Australian cases tend to support the view that there 
is not taking advantage unless there is a misuse of power",24 
Pincus 1. held a plaintiff .bad to show that the conduct was "unfair", 
"restrictive", "predatory" or 'would ordinarily be regarded as reprehensible" 
before a court would call it '-'~~a advantage of' power. BHP had done 
nothing commercially reprehensible in refusing to supply OWl. 
The Full Federal Court held that as had never sold Y -bar, no 
for Y-bar existed so s. 46 did not apply.2S The Court consequently did 
not discuss 
The High C9urt unanimously rejected Pincus 1,'s views.26 It held courts 
were to "take advantage" in a neutral, not pejorative sense. Mason 
and Wilson J. held: 
"Pincus J. suggested that the phrase Iltake advantage" requires that 
defendant be doing something (reprehensible'. His Honour 
also used the phrases '(competition] deserving of criticism' and 
<predatory or apparently as equivalents for 'reprehensible. 
It is unclear precisely what the phrases are supposed to but 
they suggest some notion of hostile intent For our part, we have 
difficulty in seeing why an additional, unexpressed and ill-defined 
standard should be implanted in the section. The phrase 'take 
Id. at 48, 819. 
(1988) ATPR, para 40-925. 
. . 
26 Supra, note 12. 
advantage' in s. 46( 1) does not require a hostile intent inquiry 
nowhere is such standard specified. And it is significant tbat 
s. 46(1) already contains an anticompetitive purpose. element. It 
stipulates that an infringement may be found only where the 
market power is taken advantage of for a purpose proscribed 
(a), (b) or (c). It is these purpose provisions which define 
what uses of market power constitute misuses".27 
Similarly. Deane J, held: 
"It is true that the words 'take advantage of can be used with an 
adverse implication. Tills is particularly the case where the 
words are used with another person as their object. Of 
themselves, however, the words 'take advantage of n. power' are 
morally indifferent. a matter of language, a parliament can 
'take advantage' of its legislative power to make good laws; a 
government can 'take advantage' of its executive power to protect 
and benefit the community; a trading corporation can 'take 
advantage' of its trading power to advance trade and competition 
to benefit of its shareholders, its employees and those with 
whom it deals; an ordinary person can 'take advantage' of such 
power as he to achieve objectives which are praiseworthy 
socially desirable. Read in context, words Itake advantage 
of , .. power' are simply inadequate to superimpose upon the 
.... Vl-lV.LJU>..., notions and objectives which s. 46(1) reflects some 
indefinite moral or public purpose qualification requiring 
circumstances where the or passive use of the relevant 
market power for one or other of the 'designated anti-competitive 
purposes is morally or socially undesirable".2B 
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Dawson J., who generally with J., also held: "that the words 
'take advantage of do not have moral overtones in context of s. 46".29 
Toohey J. also rejected Pincus J.'s pejorative Interpretation of take 
advantage. He relied on tbe dictionary meaning of "take advantage of' and the 
Blunt Committee to bold that "take advantage of" means "use". His Honour 
held: 
Id. at 50, 010. 
28 rd. at 50, 012. 
29 Id. at 50, 01~. 
U\..LL""" ..... for OWl accepted that s. 46, read as a whole, imports the 
notion of misuse of power: But, he said, that notion is not to be 
derived just the words 'take advantage of'. of 
is supplied by the requirement in s. 46(1). the 
amendments of 1977, that the taking advantage of power must be 
for a proscribed purpose. Counsel invited the Court to treat the 
words 'shall not take advantage of that power for the purpose of' 
as a composite expression involving two elements. On this 
approach, it is unnecessary and unhelpful to employ expressions 
such as 'predatory'. There is no breach of s. 46 unless there has 
been a use of market power for one of the purposes proscribed by 
the section. But once it appears that has been a use of 
market power for such a purpose, the section has been 
contravened and it adds nothing to consider the motives of the 
corporation taking advantage of market power which it has. 
The interpretation relied on by OWl is, my view, correct 
one. It gives effect to tbe ordinary meaning of the 
'take advantage of' which Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 
(1973), vol. 1, speaks of as '[t]o take, a[dvantage] of a 
thing: to use any favourable condition it offers' and by the 
Macquarie Dictionary (1981), as 'to make use of: to take 
advantage of an opportunity'. That too was the opinion of the 
Blunt Committee which consjdered that the words 'take advantage 
of' mean 'use market power\ that is they are a reference to the 
'overt deliberate of market power' (Trade Practices 
Consultative Committee) (Blunt Committee): Small Business and 
the Practices Act (1979), vol. I, p. 70, para. 9.27). The 
Blunt Committee recommended, in that same paragraph, that the 
words 'take advantage of' be replaced by <use' to avoid any 
confusion and misunderstanding. That recommendation was not 
adopted. If there is a distinction between those expressions, it 
perhaps lies the notion that 'use' carries a sense of positive 
action while 'take advantage of stem mere passivi%. 
I doubt -tbat in truth there is any real distinction involved." 
104 
The Higb Court held that to take advantage market power is to do 
something whlch a fum can onJy do because of its market power - i.e. to do 
somethlng whlch it could not do in a competitive market. Mason C.J. and 
Wilson J. held: 
"In effectively to supply Y -bar to tbe appellant, BHP is 
30 Id. at 50, 023. 
taking advantage of its substantial market power. It is only by 
virtue of its control of the market and the absence of other 
suppliers that BHP can afford, in a commercial to withhold 
V-bar from the appellant. If BHP lacked that market power - in 
other words, if it were operating in a competitive market - it is 
highly unlikely that it would stand by. without any effort to 
compete, and allow the appellant to secure its supply of V-bar 
from a competitor".31 
Similarly, .LJ""<:.LLL"" J. held: 
"As has beer:! said, BHP is prepared to sell to outsiders any of 
products from its rolling mills with the exception of Y -bar. It has, 
on some occasions the past, sold Y -bar to overseas prnchasers, 
refusal to supply Y -bar to QWI otherwise than at C!-U unrealistic 
price was for the purpose of QWl from a 
or wholesaler of star pickets. That purpose could 
only be, and has only been, achieved by such a refusal of supply 
by virtue of BHP's substantial power in all sections of the 
Australian market as the dominant supplier of steel and 
products, In refusing supply in order to achieve that purpose, 
BHP has clearly taken advantage of that substantial power in that 
market",32 
Dawson J. took a similar view stating: 
"[T]bere can be no real doubt that BHP took advantage of its 
market power in this case. It used that power in a manner made 
possible only by the absence of competitive conditions. Inferences 
in this regard can be drawn from the fact that BHP could not have 
refused to supply Y·bar to aWl if it had been subject to 
competition in the supply of that product. BHP supplies all its 
other steel products without restriction and its practice with regard 
to Y~bar was not in accordance with its normal behaviorn. If 
there had been a competitor supplying Y -bar, BHP's refusal to 
supply it to QWI would have eroded its position in the steel 
products market without protecting AWl's position in the fencing 
materials market. Moreover, the existence of barriers to into 
the steel products market must inevitably, upon the of the 
trial Judge, influenced BHY in the course which it took",33 
31 Id. at 50, OIL 
32 Id. at 50, 014. 
33 Id. at 50, 016 - 50, 017. 
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Toohey J. concluded similarly saying: 
"The only reason why BHP is able to withhold Y -bar (while at the 
same time supplying all the other products from its rolling mills) 
is that it has no other competitor in the steel product market who 
can supply Y -bar. It has dominant power in the steel products 
market due to the absence of constraint. It is exercising the power 
which it has when it refuses to supply OWl with Y-bar at 
competitive prices; it is doing so to prevent the entry of OWl into 
the star picket market; and it has been successful in that 
attempt".34 
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The High Court's approach to determine whether a firm has taken 
advantage of its market power is to ask whether that firm would have acted 
differently if it were in a competitive market. As the Trade Practices 
Commission puts it: ''whether its conduct was made possible only by the absence 
of competitive conditions".35 The Commission also framed the test as: 
"[W]hether the conduct of the powerful corporation was only 
commercially feasible because of the certain degree of freedom 
the corporation enjoyed from competitive constraints. A powerful 
corporation will be found to have taken advantage of market 
power if it c'ould not have so acted without market power".36 
Professor Warren Pengilley bas criticised this aspect of the decision.37 
He argues that the High Court was incorrect in assuming that had BHP been in 
a competitive market it would have supplied OWl. He comments: "[W]e aD 
know that any number of companies subjected to competitive conditions 
34 Id. at 50, 025. 
35 Trade Practices Commission, Misuse of Market Power - A background 
paper. 27 (Feb. 1990). 
36 Id. at 36. 
37 PengIDey, Denial of Supply and Misuse of Market Power in Australia: 
What Follows from the High Court Decision in Queensland Wire?, 
Special Report, A TPR (1989). 
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frequently choose not to supply their products to outside entities".38 
However, it was not mere refusal to supply that breached s.46. It 
was refusal in context of the case. Had the market been 
competitive it would not have been commercially sensible for BHP to refuse to 
supply. The High Court acknowledged that a firm with substantial market power 
can. refuse to supply if it had a legitimate reason.39 BHP none. Thus, its 
refusal was not commercially sensible. Hampton notes about QM and the 
take advantage limb: 
" ... the basic thrust of the lustices' reasoning is sound in that it 
to confine role of the misuse provision to conduct which 
source either wholly or partially in market power".40 
OWl implies that the substantial market power must be cause of the 
impugned conduct. It is ... ., "' .... :u 1.<1.< , a "but for" test. The conduct was not 
possible, but for the substantial market power. 
Subsequent Australian Courts bave followed QWl's.reasoning on "take 
advantage". One sucb case is ~~~ V ~~::.!:J-~~~.s...!=.u=..41 Here three 
pastoral Dalgety, and Primae, formed an association called 
Goondiwindi Livestock Auction Sales Association. Through the Association they 
jointly owned saleyards at Goondiwindi. The respondents each provided 
auction services at the sales yard. Dowling, a local ............ v.uv"'. and agent applied 
to join the association. association refused. It did not want anyone to 
38 Id. at 16. 
39 Supra, note 12, at 50, 011 per Mason C.1. and Wilson J. 
40 Hampton, supra, note 3 at 199. 
41 (1992) ATPR~ para 41-165. 
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run livestock auctions at sales yards as it owned them. Dowling sued .... La'l".LL.!=. 
breach of s. 46. 
Lockhart 1. held the association did not have a substantial degree of 
power in the relevant power. Honour however, considered the "take 
advantage" of s. 46. He said: 
"The central determinative question to ask is: has tbe corporation 
exercised a right it would be highly unlikely to exercise or 
could not afford for reasons to exercise if the 
corporation was operating a competitive 
His Honour, ·reinforcing the test. commented: 
"Competition by its very nature is deliberate and ruthless and s. 46 
encourages What it discourages is conduct which would not 
possible a competitive market, thereby promoting 
campen tive conduct" ,43 
His Honour held) refusing Dowling membership. association had 
not acted in a way made possible by lack of a competitive market. His Honour 
further said the association was not in the business of granting licences or 
of saJeyards. It was in the business of providing livestock selling services.44 
presumably means the association might have met the take advantage limb 
of s. 46 if it was in the business of leasing or licensing saJeyards. As it had never 
granted leases or licences DO one could argue it would do so in a competitive 
market. Honour also considered it was self-evident that a finn is equally 
unlikeJy to licence its private property to a rival, whether the market is 
42 Id. at 40, 
43 Ibid. 
44 Id. at 40, 278. 
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competitive or uncompetitive.4S 
Federal Court Natwest Australia Bank Ltd v ~~--..::..~~::::!. 
followed OWl. respondent was the 
supplier of strapping products vital to the applicant's wool processing business. 
The owed the respondent The respondent "' ...... "' ....... to supply 
the applicant47 until it repaid debt. 
power. 
French J. held respondent had not taken advantage of its market 
Honour held: 
"If a corporation with substantial market power were to engage an 
arsonist to burn down its competitor's factory and thus deter or 
prevent its competitor from engaging in competing activity, it 
would not thereby contravene s. 46. There must be a causal 
connection between conduct and the market power 
pleaded such that it can be said that the conduct is a use of that 
power. many cases the connection may demonstrated by a 
showing of reliance by the contravener upon its market power to 
insulate it from tbe sanctions that competition would ordinarily 
visit upon its conduct'I.48 
His Honour held the facts showed no link between tbe refusal to supply and the 
respondent's power. Any tbe respondent's position would 
to supply in the circumstances, irrespective of '-'" ...... u" ..... of competition. 
Similarly, the 
45 Ibid." 
46 (1992) ATPR. para 41-196. 
Natwest Australia Bank was actually an appointed agent and mortgagee 
possession of the of Pastoral, a wool processing, baling 
and company. Natwest was tbe receiver under the debenture. 
48 Id. at 40, 644. 
held: 
'The Court must ... consider whether, even without substantial 
market power, the person tnight have been able to make same 
decision. decision to contract with a particular person will 
normally not· be an exercise of market power".50 
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Spender Davids Holdings Pty Ltd v ~~......:..<;~......=>= held that a 
retailer acquiring shares in another is Dot taking of market 
power, even if market power and the requisite purpose exist. The reason was 
that conduct is possible in a competitive market. 
t'roltessor Warren Pengilley argues that the Trade Practices Commission's 
written subtnission in support of its application for to intervene influenced 
the High Court's test for "take advantage" in OWl.52 The Commission 
submitted: 
"BHP , .. can onJy refuse to supply OWl with impunity if it is 
confident that OWl cannot obtain supplies of Y -bar from any 
other source".53 
It further argued that because had excess capacity mills 
it would have supplied OWl a competitive market rather than lose sales to a 
rival. Only if it supplied OWl could it .......... CUJ-4'u'""" profits,54 
As Doctor Stephen Corones notes,55 the OWl test is sirrUiar to U.S. 
49 (1993) ATPR, para 41-215. 
50 at 40, 956. 
(1993) ATPR, para 41 14. 
Pengilley, note 37, at 21. 
Practices Commission SUbtnission, para 1]. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Corones, Misuse of Market Power, 1 ATPR, para 5-295, 3, 761. 
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Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Berkey Photo Inc: v ~~~!....:!:!~~ 
5::.&..56 Before discussing the New Zealand decisions on I shall briefly 
outline U.S. law on monopolisation and use. 
Section 2 of Sherman Act governs monopolisation or dominant firm 
predation. It provides: 
person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize t or 
combine or conspire with other person or persons to 
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with nations, shall deemed guilty of a 
misdemeanour .. .',57 
The Supreme COlli1 at one stage U.S. v Grinnell Corp.58 held that s.2 
requires two elements: 
(1) possession of monopoly power the relevant market", 
is the threshold test is remarkably similar to the Australian 
threshold "a substantial of power" and resembles New 
Zealand's Dominant Position threshold. 
(2) "the wilful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from 
growth or development as a consequence of a consequence of a superior 
product, business acumen or historic accident".59 
The Supreme Court altered the second element in Aspen Skiing Co. v 
to: 
56 603 2d (2d CiT. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). 
U.S.c. § 2 (1988). 
58 384 U.S. 563 (1966). 
at 570-571. 
60 472 U.S. (1985). 
"the wilful acqUlS1tlOn, or use of that power by 
anticompetitive or exclusionary means or for anticompetitive or 
exclusionary. purposes",61 
1 
The second limb derives from Judge Learn~d Hand's famous62 
decision in Alcoa controlled 90 
per cent the aluminium ingot market. The Second Circuit held Alcoa 
breached s. 2 by doubling redoubling its production capacity over years 
to meet anticipated increases in demand before others had a chance to enter the 
market. The Court observed Alcoa anticipated and forestalled all 
competition and succeeded in holding the field alone".64 The Court that 
"size not determine guilt" and that "persons may unwittingly find themselves 
in possession of a Plonopoly",65 It indicated a court would probably not find 
a breach of s. 2 if the had the monopoly "thrust upon it".66 In discussing 
the requirements for breach of s. 2 Judge Hand stated: 
order to fall within s. 2, the monopolist must have both the 
power to monopolise and the intent to monopolise. read the 
passage as demanding any "specific" intent makes nonsense of it, 
for no monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what is 
dOing".67 
61 Id. at 605. 
62 Robert Bork calls it infamous, R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST 
PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR wrrn 428 (2d ed. 1993). 
63 148 2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
64 Id. at 430. 
65 Thid. 
66 Id. at 429. 
67 Id. at 423. 
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following took the position, a satisfied 
deliberateness or intent element of monopolisation if the monopoly was 
the probable result of what the did, as opposed to a situation that was 
thrust upon the 
These decisions show principles the second or 
deliberateness element of s. 2. On one hand s. 2 abhors monopoly power 
because of the danger it will lead to higher prices, lower output, poorer quality 
and less innovation. On other hand a firm that competes through lower 
prices, higher output, better quality or more innovation may well thereby achieve 
or maintain a monopoly. This is simply a restatement of Judge 
Easterbrook's views that competitive and exclusionary conduct look 69 
Judge Hand noted "[t)be successfuJ competitor having to 
compete, must not upon when he wins".70 "--"-'-'''-'''= did not establish 
clear standards by which to distinguish predation from normal competition. It 
arguably that a firm with monopoly power might breach s. 2 by simply 
normal competitive conduct that is generally considered 
procompetitive, if the effect of such conduct is to enhance its market position. 
68 See e.g., v 384 U.S. 563, 576 n. 7 (1966) ("consciously 
acquired" monopoly obviates necessity to determine intent); U.S. v 
~~~~~== 344 U.S. 131, (1948) ("the requisite 'purpose or 
results as a consequence of what 
was done"); v 100, 106 (1948) ("restraint or 
monopolisation" as "necessary and direct" of conduct). 
69 Easterbrook, ~~~~=.t;o.-==~"""""-""-"'=== 61 NOTRE DAME 
972 (1986). 
70 Supra, note 63, at 430. 
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Not surprisingly commentators have crucified the case.71 
Latter decisions have generally held that lawfulness does not require that 
a finn be entirely involuntary or passive in acquiring or maintaining monopoly 
pO\'l{er. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in ==.:..:..:.::~'-"'-"'-"=~""'-'- v ~~~ 
72 held ", .. =='-=~ upon" pbase does not "' ....... .u. .. ,"'. It been 
criticized by scholar:; ... and the lV .... ·" ...... "" Court seems to have abandoned it".73 
The Seventh Circuit bas noted " ... the posses~;o of lawfully acquired 
monopoly power ... is not forbidden from improving in 
manufacturing or even through the effect of doing so will be to 
maintain or improve his srues"?4 
u.s. Courts now and categorize conduct that can the basis of a 
s. 2 claim and distinguish it conduct that should not. characterize 
unlawful conduct as "anticompetitjve", "predatory", exclusionary'". ''unreasonably 
, "abusive" or "directed at smothering competition", Courts describe 
lawful conduct as "competitive", "honestly industrial" or involving "legitimate 
business reasons", The High Court of Australia observed in OWl these labels 
do not clearly distinguish between predation and normal competition.75 
71 BORK, supra, note 62 at 165-170; P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, 
ANTITRUST LAW, para 729 (1978); In v 903 F. 
2d 659, 668 (9th Cir. 1990). The Ninth Circuit observed "had been 
questioned by just about everyone who has taken a close look at it". 
72 Supra, note 
73 Id. at 274. 
74 v Ventron Corp., 567 F. 2d 701, 712 (7th 
1093 (1980). 
Supra., note 12, at 50, 016 per Dawson J. 
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Similarly the Fifth Circuit has stated: 
"There is obviously a tension in legal assignment to 
protect competition but not competitors. Fighting hard but fair. 
avoiding ruinous competition and avoiding predation are often 
used catch-words that fail in their normative purpose· they 
do not segregate desired undesirable conduct in the market 
place".76 
Although the various have slightly different tests for distinguishing 
predation and competitioI\ the foUowing seems to be correct. 
Courts find conduct predatory where it would be economically irrational for the 
monopolist but for its adverse impact on competition.n . In contrast, more 
vig~rous competition, or the pursuit legitimate business objectives~ 
is not generally even for a with monopoly power and even where 
conduct disadvantages its rivals.78 Circuits stress that a monopolist 
must be allowed to compete vigorous]y.79 
76 ~~~~~~~~~'..LL..!~ V ~~~~~~!..>.2:~ 735 2d 
844, 888 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 
77 v 910 
2d 139, 148· (4th 1990) ("if a shows that a defendant has 
harmed consumers and competition by making a short term sacrifice in 
ordere to further exclusive anticompetitive objectives, it has shown 
predation by that defendant".); !llSJrumQlli~~~il~~tru!~1J"QIJ4 
v 817 F. 2d 639, 649 (10th Cir. 1987) ("conduct constituting an 
abnormal response to opportunities); v 
=--=-''--'''-''= 746 F. Supp. 915, 924 (E.D. Mo. 1990) ("Such conduct makes 
sense only because it competition ... To be labelled 
anti competitive, the conduct involved must be such tbat its anticipated 
benefits were dependent on tendency to discipline or eliminate 
competition ... "). 
78 supra, note 60. 
79 ~~~I'I- v 916 2d 924, 927 (4th 
Or. 190) ("A desire to increase market share or even to drive a 
competitor out business through vigorous competition on the merits is 
not sufficient".); v 903 2d 659, 668-669 (9th Cir. 
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The test resembles the OWl test. If conduct is economically irrational for 
a monopolist, but for its on rivals, presumably it is only possible or 
commercially feasible for a monopolist to do. 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeal's ~~~~~ test is relevant. 
The Court established two tests to determine whether conduct was a use of 
monopoly power. First, a monopolist is liable if its conduct is impossible without 
monopoly power. Court regards a competitive advantage made possible 
only by monopoly power to be use of monopoly power. However, a competitive 
advantage due to or integration is not use of monopoly power. Thus, use 
of economies of scale and integration is lawful. 
Second, a monopolist whose conduct has an exclusionary effect, 
beyond what it would without market power. some acts, although both 
monopolists and rivals can do them, only harm competition when a monopolist 
commits them. The Court gave the example of predatory pricing, lease-only 
policies and exclusive buying. 
The Berkey test does not automatically impose liability on an exclusive 
dealing or lease-oQly monopolist. plaintiff still to show intent and the 
monopolist can show no use by claiming conduct was efficiency enhancing. 
The Supreme Court stressed efficiency when it held: "If a has 
been "attempting to exclude rivals on some basis other than efficiency" it is fair 
1990) ("an efficient, vigorous, aggressive competitor IS not the villain 
antitrust laws are aimed at eliminating".). 
80 Supra, note 
Supra, note 60. 
1 
to its behaviour as ·predatory".82 It also adopted the Areeda-
Turner test of exclusionary (predatory) behaviour:83 
"exclusionary" comprehends at the most behaviour that not 
only (1) tends to impair the opportunities of rivals, but also (2) 
either does not further competition on the or so in an 
unnecessarily restrictive way".84 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in ~=~--""'~~~~~ v 
has enunciated the difference between acceptable 
and illegal conduct by a monopolist) in very similar terms to the OWl test. The 
case involved a monopolist's refusal to extend credit or replace defective 
materiaL Court held: 
U[A]cts [by a monopolist] which are ordinary business practices 
typical of those used in a competitive market do not constitute 
anticompetitive conduct violative of section .86 
This is exactly the same as the test. Thus, law is relevant. 
New Zealand: 
Initially, the High Court paid little attention to the "use" element 
held: 
"As a first observation I would have thought if a person 
baving a dominant position acts a particular way with a 
prohibited purpose mind it is almost axiomatic that such person 
82 Id. at 
83 & TURNER, supra, note 71, at 78. 
84 Supra. note 60, at 605. 
85 738 F. 2d 261 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985). 
86 ld. at 266. 
87 Supra, note 1. 
has used his dominant position for a prohibited purpose ... It 
seems to me tbat the key question is not so much whether a 
dominant party its dominant position but rather whether 
or not its conduct is proved to been for one of the proscribed 
purposes ... 
I would venture the following proposition. It is Dot a breach of s. 
36 if a perso~ albeit with a dominant position, simply acts a 
competitive manner. It would be an irony if such conduct could 
be attacked because it is competition which the Act is designed to 
promote. However~ if someone with a dominant position takes 
some action for a purpose proscribed by s. 36 then clearly they are 
using their dominant position in a manner which s. 36 prohibits. 
The line may well a fine one in certain cases but it will be a 
matter of and degree and ultimately of judgment in the 
individual case whether the line between what one might call 
legitimate competition illegitimate competition 
crossed",88 
This interpretation places virtually no significance on the "use" element of s. 
The High Court 
Ltd89 differed and emphasised the "use" element. 
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The case involved the Port Company imposing a levy on a shipping 
company and an associated stevedoring company which wanted to use the port. 
The shipping company claimed this breached (inter alia) s. 36. A key element 
of the defence was that a combination of economies of scale and high 
transaction costs made all cargo handling activities at the port a natural 
monopoly. In short the port company did not use its dominant position. 
High Court observed: 
"Section 36 provides that no person who a dominant position 
in a market shall use that position for proscribed purposes. There 
must be 'use' of dominant position for infringement The section 
does not say that no person who has a dominant position in a 
market shall 'act' for proscribed purposes, The evidence of Dr 
88 Id. 761. 
89 [1990] 2 NZLR 662. 
Williams and the submissions for Port Nelson Ltd took the stance 
that there is no ~se' of position where a person simply 
is doing something which would be done in a competitive situation 
in any event, Put so baldly, and as a theoretical proposition, few 
would disagree. If a person simply a normal competitive 
fashion, as he would whether dominant or not, that person hardly 
can be to be 'using dominance'. Port Nelson Ltd its 
submission seeks to build on this proposition, through Dr 
Williams' theory of expansion through economies of scope, to a 
pOSition where it is Port Nelson Ltd demands for use of its 
own forklifts or additional payments are steps Port Nelson Ltd 
would take in a normal competitive situation, irrespective of 
dominance. ,Ultimately is a question of fact.,,90 
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In resolving this question of fact the Court discussed the competitive 
pressures Port Nelson would face a competitive market and concluded: 
"We do not accept tbat imposing a requirement for plant hire, 
or additional payment, Port Nelson Ltd is acting as it would in a 
competitive situation., and is not using its dominant position. Its 
present deI:.!lands are possible only because of its dominant 
position. Its demands, at time stark, are a use of that 
dominance".91 
The High Court's test is consistent with the OWl 'test and the Trade 
Pra~tices Commission's formulation of the OWl test. A.lthougb the High Court 
did not quote when discussing use it referred extensively to it when dealing 
with dominance and 
The next and most New Zealand case is Electricity Corp. Ltd 
V ====-c==.s ........... =.92 Geoilierm an intending producer of electricity in 
the central North Island, claimed that Electricorp (which was allegedly dominant 
90 Id, at 706. 
91 Id. at 707, 
92 Supra, note 12. 
in that market) had breached s. 3693 by ~ 
1. Making public statements calculated to deter customers, financiers 
and investors from dealing with its competitors. 
Objecting to Geotherm's statutory applications at every 
opportunity and an all possible grounds. Geotherm alleged many 
of applications were baseless and that Electricorp had 
led perjured evidence and had assisted other objectors. 
3. Entering into contracts with electrical supply authorities which 
prevented competition for electrical supplies. 
4. Attempting to influence key specialists too withhold services from 
Geotherm. 
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In essence, Geotherm claimed Electricorp bad a policy to exclude aU 
competitors. 
Electricorp sought to have the Statement of Claim struck out. It was 
unsuccessful before Barker 1. in the High Court.94 The case went to the Court 
of Appeal. Both parties agreed that the pricing contracts could be a breach of 
s. 36,95 Court of Appeal would have been happy to have left tbe 
Statement of because the public statements and objections etc. were 
relevant in ascertaining Electricorp's purpose.96 However, the Court also 
considered whether such conduct could amount to "use" of Electricorp's 
93 Id. at 644 and 645. 
94 Unreported, HC, AuckJand, C P 1248/91; 193/92. 
95 Supra., note 12 at 647. 
96 Ibid. 
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dominant position. 
The Court clarified the "use that position" element of s. 36. The Court 
confirmed it was analytically separate from the "purpose" element 
plaintiff had to prove both: 
"The conduct prohibited by the section is use of the dominant 
market position for the proscribed purposes. There will be 
circumstances in which the use of the market position and the 
purpose are not easily separated but the two requirements must be 
kept in mind".97 
that a 
The Court held "to use" that [dominant] position would be actually to 
or to exercise a dominant influence over production, acquisition, 
supply and price of goods or services in their relevant "That ... may be 
done directly or in many ways ... and the effects or potential effects of 
particular conduct will be determined only on a close assessment of the market 
.. 98 
The Court looked to s. 46 of the Australian Trade Practices Act and held 
it may not be directly comparable. 
"[W)e are not satisfied that use of a market position necessarily is 
the same as use of market power. It is arguable that use of a 
dominant position is to be construed as use of the market power 
flowing from that position. But equally a position which 
unconstrained discretionary conduct is open may be used without 
engaging in that conduct as by threatening to do SO",99 
Use of that position is not confined to market activity the production, 
acquisition, supply and price of goods and services. It extends to conduct 
97 Id. at 646~647. 
98 Id. at 648. 
99 Id. at 649. 
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cap~ble of ~ .... '"" ..... those market elements. There must nUl .. '''''' be a clear 
and direct between the influence and the dominant position. Finally, the 
Court quoted from Hampton.1OO 
"Although s. 3(8)(a)~(c) contains a non exhaustive list of factors 
that aid in market power analysis~ one must bear in mind that the 
concept of market power employed in s. 3(8) extends beyond 
narrow economic notion, viz, ability of a firm to profitably 
raise price above marginal cost. The s. 3(8) test is whether a fum 
"is in a position to exercise the dominant influence over the 
production, acquisition or supply or price of goods or services in 
a market. This expansive notion market power would embrace 
rights, powers or advantages that enable the firm to exercise a 
major influence over one or more of the market variables 
mentioned. Assuming such rights etc. contribute to 
dominance, then taking advantage of such rights will involve the 
"use" of the firm's dominant position".IOl 
The Court's overall approach endorses the view that s.36 covers conduct 
which only a dominant firm could perform. 
This is entirely in line with the OWl test. Indeed the Court of Appeal 
endorsed the OWl approach: 
"The interpretation of s. 46 adopted by the High Court of 
Australia indicates a similar approach to that dictated by the New 
Zealand s. 36".102 
It further noted: 
"The actual conduct under scrutiny in that case [OWl] was refusal 
to supply goods. That could have been done by a supplier with a 
single customer. It was not the conduct itself that amounted to a 
use of market power for the prohibited purpose but the conduct 
in market context' for the particular anticompetitive 
100 Hampton, supra, note 3. 
101 Supra, note 12 at 650. 
102 Id. at 649. 
purpose". 103 
Electricorp's conduct only made commercial sense or could financially 
viable because it was a dominant firm. Having set out its views on the 
constituent elements of s. 36 the Court considered each allegation separately. 
1. Statements of Policy: 
Electricorp had apparently made pubUc statements that it had a 
policy to its virtual monopoly and it intended to take steps 
to deter potential competitors and customers. Electncorp 
allegedly said it would lower its charges in order to meet any 
competition. The Court held statements could breach s. 36 
and whether they did in this case bad to be detennined on the 
evidence. I t noted -
"[W]e are not satisfied that statements on 
behalf of a company in a dominant position as to 
the intended of market power to deter 
potential competitors made circumstances that 
make them in fact likely to deter competition could 
not faU within s. 36. Such statements may said to 
"use" a dominant position if it is the dominant 
position that the statements the force 
amounting to 104 
With respect this seems to be correct. Such statements could deter 
competitors and customers. A firm's dominance gives these statements serious 
force. Its economic resources ensure it will be able to, back up policy 
effectively. Sucb statements could deter investment. One can extend this 
reasoning to threats of litigation. This too, could discourage investment. Again 
103 Ibid. 
104 Id. at 650. 
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dominance the threats serious The statements will have extra 
deterrence if dominant firm a reputation for successfully preventing firms 
from competing with They may also raise potential entrant's costs as it 
is likely to seek legal advice in evaluating threats. nondominant IS 
unlikely to have such a reputation and be able to afford to back up the 
statements as effectively. 
Statutory Approvals: 
Electricorp argued that exercising statutory of objection can never 
a breach of s. 36. it objected about the Electricorp 
exercised rights, namely tbe alleged perjury, over reaching grounds of 
opposition assisting other objectors. The Court rejected Electricorp's 
contentions and was not prepared to say exercising statutory rights could not 
be a use of s. 36. It said ", .. it can be argued with some strength that the 
exercise of statutory rights will nOI necessarily be beyond the scope of the New 
Zealand s. 36",105 The Court that if 
" .. , technical knowledge access to material capital (factors 
which indicate whether a can influence price, acquisition, 
production and supply and thus have a dominant position in the 
market)" are an element of a dominant position and are used in 
tbe course of the exercise of statutory rights for a proscribed 
purpose, s. 36 be breacbed".I06 
Again respect, this appears to be correct The purpose predatory 
litigation is to increase costs and to delay or prevent entry. Achieving this car! 
105 Id. at 65l. 
106 Ibid. 
influence price, acquisition, production and supply of goods and services. The 
Court rejected the. argument that allowing objections to be a breach of s. 36 
would mean a rehearing of all statutory objections. 
The Court did think that exercise of reasonable rights of objection 
could contravene s. 36. 
"[AJ monopoly is entitled to make a case to the appropriate 
licensing or other authority for the preservation of its monopoly. 
The submission of reasonable arguments to that end and the 
taking of reasonable steps to prepare the case could not in 
themselves amount to use of a dominant position in the market. 
Something more would have to be shown to bring Electricorp (a 
dominant firm's) conduct within s. 36".107 
The Court could not discount that possibility so it refused to 
Statement of Claim. 
out the 
It is necessary to examine what factors led the Court of Appeal to 
conclude Geotherm alleged the following:-
(i) The statutory obje,ctions were part of a larger 
anticompetitive scheme. 
(li) Electricorp committed perjury and made 
misrepresentations during the of the 
statutory objections. 
(iii) Electricorp had assisted other objectors. 
(iv) Electricorp's objections were in many cases baseless. 
(v) Electricorp objected every stage on all possible 
grounds. 
TIlls was the "something more" the Court of Appeal referred to. 
lOT Id. at 655. 
A nondorninant firm can make reasonable 2U]JJCm:s and take reasonable 
steps in preparing a case. "Reasonable arguments" suggests that the making 
them wants to, or at least, bas a cbance to win. A firm that makes unreasonable 
arguments cannot win. A fum in a competitive market could not afford to waste 
money on a case it could not win. Similarly, it would not be able to afford to 
object regardless of the merits or afford to assist other objectors. above 
facts are also relevant to purpose. A firm which brings a case it cannot win must 
have a purpose other than winning. This must be to harm the other party. 
Thus, bad Electricorp not been dominant it could have acted as it did. 
This is in line with the U.S. Courts' view that conduct is predatory if it would be 
economically irrational for monopolist, but for its adverse impact on 
competition. lOS Such conduct would be irrational for Electricorp if it was in 
a competitive market. 
In the High Court Barker J. recognised that although each separate 
incidence of ...... , .. , ..... conduct may not amount to "use" when considered 
together they could be a use, i.e~ Electncorp's policy of excluding Geotherm 
could be a use. 109 is in line with the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of 
AppealsYo There, even where no single act of a monopolist is an act of 
monopolisation, a group of acts, in aggregate, can violate s. The Court terms 
this the IImonopoly broth". 
108 See, supra. note, 77. 
109 Supra, note 94. 
110 City of Mishawaka v '--=-'==~'-"""'-'''''-=--!....!='-=~~ 616 2d 976 (7th 
Cir. 1980), cen. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 (1981). 
"[WJe might agree with the [defendants) that no one aspect 
standing alone is illegal. is the mix of the various ingredients of 
[defendants'] behaviour in a monopoly broth that produces the 
unsavory flavour".l11 
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The "monopoly broth" concept still meets OWl test. Elecrricorp's policy was 
only possible and only made sense because of its .... VltLI..U. .. U.LJi .... "". 
Subsequent New Zealand Courts have adopted the and 
reasoning. The High Court in V ~~~~~-YA. 
The 
commented on Telecom's conduct that: 
"It is obvious that Telecom could only do this by use of its 
dominant position in the market".1l3 
of Appeal in ..ill~!I!: adopted the QWI test: 
"To determine whether particular conduct involves use of a 
dominant position a market for any of the purposes specified in 
s. 36 has been said to consideration of whether the 
conduct would have open if the party concerned were (sic] 
not in a dominant position - if it were [sic] in a fully competitive 
market. Such a test reflects the underlying purpose of the section 
which is to promote competition. monopolists are entitled 
to act competitively and the section must not be applied so as to 
constrain themn,Us 
The Court re-emphasised its comment in =='-"=~ that a court must 
consider the conduct in its commercial context. 
Thus, New Zealand courts now that a dominant conduct be 
111 Yd. at 986. See also v 662 
F. 2d 921, 929 (2d Cir. 1981) ("the proper inquiry is qualitively, there is 
a 'synergistic' effect"). 
112 1993 5 TCLR 166. 
113 Id. at 208. 
114 Unreported 17/12/93 CA 25/93. 
115 Id. at 24. 
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only possible or commercially se'nsible because of the lack of a competitive 
market, before that conduct is a "use" of a dominant position. However, a 
number of cases have ignored the use limb and concentrated solely on the 
purpose limb. These cases arose out of the New Zealand Milk Corporation and 
other milk suppliers terminating groups of milk vendors' contracts to deliver 
milk. The Corporation entered into these pursuant to the Milk Act 1988. The 
Milk' Act was due to expire from 1 April 1993. In late 1992 the Corporation 
gave notice' to its vendors of a new franchised vendor home delivery scheme. 
This was to come into from 1 February 1993, i.e. 2 months before the Milk 
Act expired. Corporation reduced number of licensed vendors 
considerably. The new franchisees wouJd have exclusive rights to sell milk within 
defined zones. The existing vendors had the right to apply for one of the 
franchises. The unsuccessful ones were entitled to an "exit payment" provided 
they agreed not to compete against franchisees for 6 months from 31 January 
1993. They also had to supply customer details.1l6 
The unsuccessful vendors sought injunctions alleging (inter alia) breach 
of s. 36. None of the cases discussed use, but dealt with whether the 
Corporation and other suppliers bad an anticompetitive purpose. While the 
cases were interlocutory and thus, only have a limited prec~dent effect both, J. 
116 New Zealand Milk Corp. Ltd v McDonald [1993J 2 NZLR Hyde v 
~~~~ unreported, 3/11/92, Wbangarei~ CP 52/92, Penlington J., 
~~~~~W-!.YYJ~w:::!!::!6 unreported; 10/12/92, Wbangarei, 
v Interrnilk Ltd. 
225/92, Thorp J.; Wellington 
v ManawatujRangitikei Milk 
Vendors Association, unreported, 27/10/92, Wellington, CP 681/92, 
Neazor J._ 
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Blanchard and PenlingtoD J. in 
Hyde v Topurilk Ltdll8 approvingly cited Tipping 1'5 comments on use 
Penlington 1. held: 
First., the conduct under attack must have had an anti competitive 
purpose. Mere use of a dominant position without baving the 
purpose prescribed by s. 36 does not result in a breach of the 
section. Tipping J. expressed the point with the utmost clarity in 
Magic Millions v [1990] 1 NZLR 731 esp at 
p 761 where his Honour said: 
"It seems to me that the key question is Dot so much 
whether a dominant party has used its dominant 
position but rather whether or not its conduct is 
proved to have been for one or more of the 
proscribed purposes.,,1l9 
With respect., Tipping 1's comments on use can no, longer be the law 
following the Court of Appeal's comments in ===~. 
A number of unresolved issues remain over the "use" element. I examine 
each of these. 
Efficiency and Use 
Frances Hanks and Doctor Philip Williams argue that OWl means that 
if a conduct promotes efficiency it cannot be a use of a dominant 
position. 120 . They argue that: 
"The of the decision of the High Court in OWl is to 
117 Supra, note 116, at 21. 
118 Supra, note 116, at 49. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Hanks & Williams, Implications of the Decision of the High Court in 
~~~~~ 17 MULR, 437 (1990). 
encourage parties to argue efficiencies before the courts. Far from 
introducing value judgements into the section, the construction 
places economic efficiency at the heart of s. 46"yl 
130 
Michael O'Bryan 122 He argues the High Court placed its greatest 
emphasis on the "take advantage" ..., ..... 'LU .. 'U 
key to s. 46 analysis. l23 
of s. 46 which means economics is the 
The OWl test, is that a firm has not used its dominant position if it would 
",Uill'.U.;,v in same conduct in a competitive market. In a competitive market 
a finn has actual or potential rivals. Rivals force the to improve productive 
efficiency. No one has the ability to do its own thing 'or ignore rivals. 
Rivals restrain the firm's market power. They can offer or threaten to offer a 
new product. a cheaper product or a more em~ca product. Thus, to maintain 
or improve its market share the firm must improve its productive efficiency. 
If a dominant firm's conduct improves its productive efficiency. it is acting 
tbe same way as it would in a competitive market. It has not used its dominant 
position. With respect, the ..,,..,,r111"M,,,,, .... t is compelling. Professor Maureen Brunt 
has commented: 
"In any event, one would think from a commonsense viewpoint 
that to interpret IItaking advantage" as conduct that would not be 
possible or commercially sensible under competitive conditions 
would point directly to the relevance of evidence on efficiencies 
likely to result from the conduct at issue". 124 
121 Id. at 444. 
O'Bryan, ~;UW~~~~,,£&.Q.lJ!;U!J!!;;'§' 1 CCU 64 (1993). 
123 Id. at 64. 
Brunt, Australian and New Zealand Competition Law and Policy. in 1992 
FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, 131, 
170. 
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New Zealand Courts seem to have adopted the argument. 
Nelson l25 is an apposite "'''' .......... v defendant's argued tbat its use 
levy was due to its economics of scale and it being a natural monopoly. The 
High Court accepted the argument in tbeory. 
"We can accept that in a search for economies of scope, reacbing 
out to insert plant and into a new range of activities, [the 
defendants] (indeed probably would) think it desirable to 
require stevedores to use PNL plant, or make additional payments 
thereby PNL with such ecoflomies",I26 
The Court held that whether the levy achieved efficiencies was simply a 
"question of fact". 127 
As a matter of fact, the Court held it was DOi. It held that Port Nelson 
was seeking to charge a level and structure of rates that was more than the 
"commercially reasonable".I28 Thus, levy per se was not use of a dominant 
position. It was tbe amount of the levy. It was too high for Pon Nelson to 
achieve its efficiencies. It could have achieved them at a lower level. The 
means Port 'Nelson used to obtain the efficiencies were unnecessarily restrictive. 
It could have obtained them in a less restrictive way. It could only claim tbe 
of the level because of its dominant position. It could not have obtained 
such a high levy had the market competi live. case is consistent with 
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision ~~.129 The Court expressly adopted 
Supra, Dote 89. 
126 Id. at 706. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Id. at 710. 
129 Supra., note 60. 
the Areeda-Turner definition of predation; 
"Behaviour that not only 
(1) tends to the oppornmities of rivals, but also 
(2) either does so in an unnecessarily restrictive way".l30 
High Court said the advisable was to undertake a proper cost analysis 
of the levy to ascertain a cOIl11l!erdally acceptable level. Thus, the Court 
accepted the efficiency argument It held the means the defendant sought to 
achieve efficiencies (the levy) was acceptable. The level of the levy was 
however not Thus, as a matter of fact the defendant used its dominant position. 
lligh Court 
accepted the Briefly the facts were that Telecom 
was the former monopoly telecommunications service provider. government 
privatised i~ and deregulated the telecommunications industry. Clear is a new 
entrant to the market. It sought entry in the market for local calls. One of the 
main issues was what price Gear should pay for interconnection into the market. 
Telecom, after changing its stance, offered supply on basis of the Baumol-
Willig This rule aJJowed Telecom to charge Clear an amount equal to 
Telecom's lost revenue as a result of Clear's interconnection, Le. it wanted to 
recover its opportunity costs in aUowing Clear access. Clear argued and the 
Court accepted that the Baumol-Willig rule allowed Telecom to charge 
monopoly The rule forced Clear to underwrite existing 
monopoly profits and inefficiencies. The could not determine 
130 Id. at 605. 
131 Supra, 112. 
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monopoly profits and ll1...,LLl""'''''''U, .... l on the evidence. 
The High Court held that the Baumol-Willig rule was consistent with 
what a firm could a competitive market It said: 
"In the end it is our judgment that implementation of the Rule is 
more likely than the alternatives to improve efficient competition 
in New telecommunications. In that case, Telecom 
cannot be said to be using its position of dominance for the 
purpose of preventing or deterring Clear from engaging in 
competitive' conduct in the New telecommunications 
market. If defendanfs conduct is more likely than not, light 
available alternatives, to improve competition. the defendant 
cannot be said to be in breach of the purpose requirements of s. 
36. There is an improvement in competition when there is an 
enhancement of an efficient competitive process. (emphasis 
added)". 132 
Thus, the High Court expressly adopted the view that if a dominant fum's 
conduct enhanced efficiency it would not be using its dominant position. 
The Court of Appeal reversed. 133 It did not discuss the use element. 
The Court stressed that any pricing rule which incorporates monopoly profits 
breaches s. It held it could infer from the evidence that the Baumol-Willig 
rule did incorporate monopoly profits. Thus. as with -"-"'-'u.....:...=~ the Court of 
Appeal found as a matter of fact the dominant firm's conduct did not improve 
efficiency. The Court emphasised that efficiency was at issue in the case. l34 
With respect, this seems correct.· J shal] argue later that monopoly profits 
such circumstances and efficiency are mutually exclusive. us Thus, the Court 
132 Id. at 132. 
133 Supra., note 114. 
134 Id. at 37. 
135 See Chapter VI, 
does not rule out the view that efficiency has a roJe to play interpreting 
"use" element. The Coures only comments on use were as follows: 
"[The Higb Court] suggests that so long as there is overall some 
improvement in the competitive process there can be no breach of 
s. 36. However if, but for conduct in question, there would 
have been significantly greater enhancement of the competitive 
process the conduct may well contravene the 136 
134 
Court not define what it meant by the competitive process. If it 
mews consumer welfare, then efficiency plays the key role. The dominant fum's 
conduct enhance efficiency, but if some other conduct will to even 
greater efficiency or if the conduct is UDDecessarily restrictive, then s. 36 is 
breached. However; one could interpret the above comments as the 
competitive process equates with rivalry. Thus, if a monopolist's conduct 
impedes a rival than the section will be breached - no maner what tbe effect on 
consumer welfare. I will discuss point later when discussing whether s. 
deals with injury to rivals or competition. I will argue the latter and say the Act, 
previous authority and economics compels this conclusion. 
It appears efficiency is a part of "use" under s. 36. What ""-=~=~ 
and sbow, is tbat courts will not automatically accep.t a dominant firm's 
efficiency defence. It will careful.1y evaluare it. 
Anotber related issue is whether the protection of a domi.nant firm's 
property rights comes within the use and efficiency umbrella. The concept of 
protection of property rigbts as fcUows. A dominant firm will make 
i.nvestments creating a property right. includes sucb things as building 
stockyards} creating a reputation for its product and building a bridge. A rival 
136 Supra, note] 14) at 37. 
135 
may try and benefit from the dominant firm's actions, efforts and 
without paying or sharing the costs. this way the rival rides on the 
dominant firm's investments. riding harms by reducing or 
eliminating the dominant incentive to make its investments. l3? Without 
these consumer welfare will suffer as the dominant firm will sell 
of its product or not develop new ones. In the s. 36 context this most commonly 
when a rival access to a dominant fum's product or facility. 
dominant may seek to charge for its use or refuse to supply, to prevent free 
riding. While New Zealand courts have addressed free under s. 27 not s. 
36 the authorities support the notion it is relevant to use. For example, 
Court held Port Company could impose a levy. It held 
amount s. 36. It ruled the parties should undertake a proper cost 
analysis to establish a commercially acceptable level. Such a level must include 
a to compensate the Port Company for its investments and to prevent free 
riding. 
Sim.ilarly, some of the Court of Appeal's comments Clear l39 support 
property important s. 36. The Court held Clear bad to pay 
an access levy. Cooke P. stated "that Telecom is entitled to a fair commercial 
retQrn for granting Gear use of the network assets without regard to present 
137 
138 
139 
86 (1960); R 
3 J.L. & ECON., 
LJLJ---"'" & D. KASERMAN, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS, 
(1985); R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW : AN 171-172, 351-353 
ECONOMIC 208-211 (1976). 
Supra, note 89. 
Supra, note 114. 
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monopoly" ,140 A commercial return must include compensation for 
Telecom bought network assets and improvement it made to them. 
This is in line with the U.S. authorities on facilities. An 
has to pay a reasonable access fee,l41 Once again this must include 
compensation for the monopolist baving developed the essential facility, 
Similarly, where more one facility exists the owner of the does 
not have to give access to rivals. Protection private property is one reason. 
Indeed, in _=~ Lockhart J. held that the association was allowed to use 
the stockyards as it saw fit and not to share it with n ..... 'cn."Ic who had no 
proprietary in it. association presumably wanted to prevent free 
riding. Courts have reached the same conclusions 
Judge Haynsworth 
"It frequently bappens that a competitor field will 
acquire sites which a may think more desirable than the 
__ ,.., available sites, but the first comer is not required to 
or aJJ of its desirable to the latecomer simply 
latecomer to compete more effectively with it",l44 
Although I have argued that dynamic efficiency is too uncertain to 
relevant Wlder s. 36, protecting private property and preventing free riding aids 
dynamic efficiency. Allowing free riding will discourage innovation. Why will 
140 Id. at 7. 
141 Note, 
COLUM. L. REV., 441 
Supra, note 41. 
143 323 F. 2d 124 (1963). 
144 at 1. 
a innovate if its rivals can 
137 
ride on its investment in research and 
development? It won't. The encouragement of innovation, by preventing free 
is entire basis of granting patents. 
Thus, protecting of private property and preventing free riding is part of 
efficiency and use under s. 36. 
The result of treating efficiency as part of the use limb downplays the 
purpose limb of s. 36. a dominant fum~s conduct enhances efficiency it will 
never meet the use limb. Thus, it will not breach s. 36. qn the other hand if 
a dominant conduct reduces. efficiency it will be extremely difficult to show 
its purpose was not anticompetitive. 
Some commentators have seized on the down playing of purpose and 
argue "use" means something tess than conduct only possible or commercially 
sensible in the absence of competition. 
Yvonne van Roy145 and Janet November146 building on work by 
Vogelenzang and Hampton argue the QWl test is too wide. They argue 
although one must ~how a causal connection between the dominant position and 
use the connection is not the QWl "but test; viz, the dominant conduct 
was not possible or sensible but for its dominant position. They argue two main 
types of "use of a dominant position" exist. 
1. Conduct which only a dominant can perform. They call this the 
145 Van Roy in GAULT ON COMrvtERCIAL LAW, para 36.07(3). 
146 
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narrow OWl test,141 
2. Conduct which any can perfonn but the effect on market conditions 
would not occur or be treater if the firm were Dot dominant. They call 
this the broad OWl test. l48 
The second type covers conduct possible by anyone, but the finn's dominance 
magnifies the conducts effect. 
They argue' that the purpose limb determines liability.149 Once the 
conduct falls into the two above types, a defendant established the use limb. 
A court then determines liability by exam.ining purpose. Van Roy the 
trouble with the OWl test is that it will not catch things, such as refusal to supply 
or price cutting, as nondominant can perform them for various reasons. 
She claims that case of refusal to supply by a dominant will be a use 
of a dominant position. The dominance will magnify the refusal's effects. 
She argues courts should determine Hability under tbe purpose limb.1.5O 
Presumably, a refusal to supply because the customer is a poor credit risk, will 
be lawful as no anticompetitive purpose exists. The problem with is that the 
Federal Court in Boral held that such a refusal is not a use of a dominant 
147 Id. at 196. Van Roy repeats November's argument. 
148 Id. at 197. They build on an analysis originally done by Vogelenzang, and 
Hampton; Vogelenzang, ~=~"-=-=-~.......,.,~~~=--<=~'-"-=''''''-~ 
Hampton, supra, note 3, at 198-199. 
149 Van Roy, supra, note 145; November, supra, note 146, at 198-199. 
150 Roy, supra note 145. 
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position. l5l 
November and van Roy claim shows use element 
incorporates their two types of use of a dominant position.lS2 I have 
above that is consistent with the "narrow" OWl test. Subsequent 
courts, including the Court of Appeal in adopted the narrow 
test. IS3 It is part of the s. 36's jurisprudence. 
The problem with the broad test is that it does not adequately 
distinguish between predation normal competition. Hampton rejects the test 
as it captures lIordinary business practices typical of those used in a competitive 
market".154 He argues the ... "' .. ",:: .. , test is the appropriate test. This 
test does not impose liability for use of scale economies and vertical integration. 
As Hampton notes: "It is not a violation of s. 2, however, for a company lawfully 
possessing monopoly power simply to enjoy the benefits such as efficiency and 
integration which naturally flow from size but which may coincidentally 
damage a competitor".156 
Van Roy November's broad OWl test use, would mean that such 
use of efficiencies and integration would be a use of a dominant position. They 
claim the purpose limb will detertnine liability. However, they rely too heavily 
Supra, note 46. 
Van Roy, supra, note 145; November, supra, note 146, at 207-209. 
153 See text accompanying notes 1 19, 
154 Hampton, supra, note 3, at 199. 
155 Supra, note 
156 Hampton, supra, note 3, at 200. 
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and place too much confidence in purpose being able to distinguish between 
predation and competition. 
Purpose: 
The Utility of Purpose: 
As mentioned above. the aim of s. 36 is to distinguish predation from 
normal competitive behaviour. One must ask how useful purpose is in 
distinguishing. U.S. commentators and courts have argued it is not useful at all. 
Judge Frank Easterbrook, v ~~~~~~~ 
157 has stated that courts should ignore questions of purpose in deciding 
monopolisation cases. He argued that a firm's purpose to harm its competitors 
is indistinguishable from its purpose to compete. Thus. looking only for the 
purpose to harm competitors invites courts to penalise bard competition. He 
suggested llfums intend to do all the business they can to crush rivals if they 
can".158 He added" ... [IJf courts use the vigorous nasty pursuit of sales as 
evidence of forbidden 'intent' they run 
of competition".159 
risk of penalizing the motive forces 
He went further in v 
Insurance 160 by saying a competitors "intent to harm 1S not a useful 
157 881 F. 2d 1396 (7th Cir. 1989), <:ert. denied, 494 U.S. 1019 (1990). 
158 Id. at 1401. 
159 Ibid. 
160 784 F. 2d 1325 (7th 1986). 
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standard in antitrust".J61 
Professor Harold Demsetz thinks the same.162 Former Judge and 
Professor Robert Bark also is sceptical about purpose being useful in 
distinguishing between predation and normal competition. He comments on 
Justice White's view v 
~~~~~>=~-==164 that courts can distinguish the two on the basis that 
predation involves an intent lito drive others from the field and to exclude them 
their right to trade"; 165 
"This is about as useful as defining normal sexual conduct as that 
engaged in to express love and abnormal sexual conduct as tbat 
engaged for gratification. Whenever a competitor 
competes he intends to take business away from which 
involves excluding them. If he were completely successful in a 
market, he would thereby exclude them completely, and be would 
have intended to do so. Some test other than an intent to exclude 
must be framed".l66 
Similarly, Areeda and Turner have commented on the limitations of using 
purpose or -intent to distinguish predation from vigorous competition. 
"[TJbe antitrust appraisals of conduct depends upon understanding 
its possible anticompetitive consequences and its possible benefits 
for effective competition. Often the benefits will not be apparent 
or persuasive the defendant identifies rus purpose in so 
acting, shows the legitimacy of that purpose in terms of antitrust 
objectives and suggests that the challenged action is an appropriate 
and perhaps the way of acrueving that legitimate 
161 Id. at 1340. 
162 Demsetz, =~-=-='--=~ 72 AM. EeON. REV. 45 (March 1992). 
163 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
164 221 106 (1911). 
165 Id. at 181-183. 
166 BaRK, supra, Dote 62, at 38-39. 
purpose. But the critical point is that the nature and 
consequences of a particular are the vital consideration 
not the purpose or intent".167 
While Easterbrook Bork are correct in that purpose alone does not 
adequately distinguish predation from competitive behaviour, the problem does 
not arise under s. 36. Section 36 requires proof of use and purpose. Purpose 
alolfe does not establish liability under s. 36. Despite Easterbrook's views, 
purpose alone never amounts to s. 2 liability. The First Circuit Court of Appeals 
noted 
that: "desire to crush a competitor standing alone, is insufficient to make out a 
violation of the antitrust laws".169 Similarly the Second Circuit in -=-='''''-'''''''''''--="'''''''''''= 
Football League v NFL170 held: "hopes and dreams alone cannot support a 
section 2 claim of rnonopolization". l7l Intent, however, helps determine 
wbether conduct is predatory. Only general - not specific intent is necessary,I72 
Supreme Court acknowledged in ~~~~~~~ v ~~~~~~ 
Skiing Corp.:173 
"evidence of intent is merely relevant to the question whether the 
167 P. AREED,t\ & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW, para. 729 (1978). 
168 883 F. 2d 1101 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027 (1990). 
169 ld. at 1113; see also v :r/..f'~~'~~~~ 
F. 2d 370, 379 (7th Cir. 1986) ("if conduct is not objectively 
anticompetitive tbe fact that it was motivated by hostility to competitors 
... is irrelevant), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 934 (1987). 
170 842 2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1988). 
171 Id. at 
172 U.S. v ~~"'-=~ 384 U.S. 563 (1966). 
173 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
challenged conduct is fairly characterised as 'exclusionary' or 
(anticompetitive' - to USe the words the trial court's instructions 
- or 'predatory' to use a word that scholars seem to prefer. 
Whichever label is used there is agreement on the proposition that 
'no monopolises unconscious of what is doing'. Judge Bork 
stated more recently: 'Improper exclusion (exclusion not the result 
of superior efficiency) is always deliberately intended'''.174 
More recently the Seventh Circuit explained: 
we have to be clear about what is meant by "intent", for in 
context of a monopolization case "intent" is an elusive concept. 
The "intent" to achieve or maintain a monopoly is no more 
unlawful than the possession of a monopoly. Indeed, the goal of 
any profit-maximizing firm is to obtain a monopoly by capturing 
an ever share of market ... Monopolies achieved 
through superior skill are no intentional than those achieved 
by anticompetitive means (as Learned Hand observed, "no 
monopolist monopolizes unconscious of which he is doing!!), so the 
intent relevant to a § 2 Sherman Act claim is only the intent to 
maintain or monopoly power by anticompetitive means. 
Section 2 forbids not the intentional pursuit of monopoly power 
but the employment of unjustifiable means to gain that 
power".175 
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With respect to Easterbrook and Bork:, they frame purpose test too 
narrowly. Predation does not involve the purpose to crush rivals. 
purpose required for liability should be the dictionary definition of plan or 
design.· Thus, the purpose at issue is more complex than the simple object to 
crush one's rivals. While that purpose is indistinguishable from a purpose to 
compete vigorously. the purpo~e of strategic predation is the plan to 
disadvantage one's rivals. To make a rival's product less attractive. A predator 
may do so by raising rivals' costs. A purpose to do this is completely different 
174 Id. at 602. 
175 v 935 F. 2d 1469, 1481 
(7th CiT. 1991) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). 
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from a purpose to compete vigorously. Courts should condemn a fum with such 
a purpose. 
The structure of s. 36 prevents courts condemning conduct on purpose 
alone. But, as the purpose plays an important role in distinguishing 
predation and normal competition. However, one must always remember that 
purpose alone does not suffice. In many cases the purpose of predation and the 
purpnse of competition are the "' ........... ", viz,. to increase sales and thus harm rivals. 
breach s. 36 a dominant firm must have the purpose of achieving one 
or more of the consequences described in s.36(1)(a)-(c). It is unnecessary that 
tbe dominant firm achieve the consequences. On the other band, liability does 
not automatically occur if the dominant conduct leads to the s.36(1)(a)-(c) 
consequences. The key question is whether the dominant firm bad the requisite 
purpose. Dyson Heydon has stated the test as: 
"What may required is proof that the conduct producing the 
consequences was motivated by or inspired by a wish for the 
occurrence of the consequence".!76 
A firm may know that one of the listed consequences may occur as a 
result of conduct yet still not have the requisite purpose. High Court 
Port Nelsonl77 recognised this and observed: 
"The word used is not merely "intention". Intention to do an act, 
which it is known will have anticompetitive in itself 
is not enough. "Purpose" object or aim. The requirement 
is that "the conduct producing the consequences was motivated or 
inspired by a wish for the occurrence of the consequences": 
Donald and Heydon Practices Law (1989) 5.400, 
2621; In. the words Toohey 1. 
176 D. HEYDON, TRADE PRACTICES LAW, Vol. 1., para 5.40. 
177 Supra, note 89. 
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Ltd v ~~~-""':;'...!;,l.-...:"""""-= (1989) ALR 577,602, .3i-/'-',Q..I\..U1J:; 
of the s. 46(1)(a), (b) and (c): 
reference to 'for 
notion of an 
in each of 
purpose of 
to achieve the 
in s. 46(1)".178 
Thus, the Court distinguished between purpose ,and intention. A 
dominant fum can to do an act knowing it will have one or more the 
proscribed "" ..... ~,...,.,., yet not requisite purposes. Federal 
Court of recognised in Berlaz Pty Ltd v ~~~~~~~ 
mlWJ~M!l.179 Fine Leather leather goods. Berlaz distributed 
A number of arose between In particular, Fine 
Leather was concerned Berlaz had relabelled goods. showed 
Fine was contemplating competing with Leather 
terminated, , distributorship sought an injunction, 
Leather's was to eliminate or substantiaUy u£u.u.a~:;" it as 
a competitor. Fine claimed it Berlaz' because it was an 
uns~tisfactory distributor. Pincus J ........ ..,Ju..u"'..,~ .... Berlaz's application. He held it 
was not possible to conclude Fine purpose was to competition 
or deter competition. His held: 
distinction bas to 
The clear 
Leather's] 
damage 
knew 
drawn between 
I have gained from 
and consequence. 
evidence is that 
178 Id. at 707. 
in acting as it 
as a competitor, no doubt 
terminating the distributorship would be 
of these results".lBO 
(1991) ATPR, lB. 
1BO Id. at 52, 
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Similarly 
Federal Court recognised knowledge that conduct will ............... l','-' rivals is not 
enough to establish liability. 
liThe mere admission by {two witnesses] of a recognition that the 
activity which they thought necessary for the successful 
defence of Westworth Courier would damage Express is 
not adm.ission by them that damage was a purpose of their 
activity".l82 . 
. Penlington J., in V 110 stressed ~"........~~~ as well. Topmilk 
was the omy milk processor in the north the North .l')1a..l..I'U. It held an 
exclusive Milk Corporation pursuant to the Milk Act to 
and supply milk in the far north. Hyde sold milk to the public delivered it 
to homes, pursuant to a contract with Topmilk. Milk Act was due to expire 
on 1 April 1993 and industry was to become deregulated. Disputes arose 
over the plaintiff .LllGl~'l::. unauthorised deliveries milk, being behind in 
payments, his obstreperous attitude, poor performance as a milk vendor and 
failure to supply information to Topmilk. Topmilk started making home 
deliveries. Topmilk then tenninated contract with Hyde for above 
rea\SOIlS and stopped' milk to Hyde. It made home deliveries Hyde 
used to. Hyde sought an alleging (inter alia) breach of s. 36. 
Topmilk daimed it did not have the requisite purpose. It claimed its termination 
was a reasonable commercial response to situation. It was protecting its 
business interests. It bad a statutory responsibility to maintain borne delivery in 
181 (1991) ATPR, para 4 128. 
182 Id. at 896. 
183 Supra, note 116. 
147 
the far north. Once it had terminated Hyde, it made the deliveries. It had to 
choose someone, It chose itself. Hyde claimed Topmilk had proscribed s. 
36 purpose. Penlington J. repeated the ~,-"-,-~"""",,,,,comments on the difference 
between intention and purpose. 
"Secondly, an intention to do an act which is known will have anti-
competitive consequences itself will not suffice. Rather, there 
must be proof that the person who has a dominant position in tbe 
market was motivated in the use of his market power by a desire 
to bring about anti-competitive consequences proscribed by s. 
36. See Union Shipping (NZ) Ltd v [1990] s 
NZLR 662 per McGeehan J and Mr R.G. Blunt at p 707",184 
His Honour held Topmilk did not have the requisite purpose. Although 
it knew termination would bave anticompetitive consequences, it still did not 
have the requisite purpose. He held the purpose was to prevent Hyde making 
unauthorised home deliveries.11:l5 This was not tbe proscribed s. 36 purpose. 
Thus the plaintiff U;. .... .Jl"' ..... to raise a serious to be tried under s. 36. 
Similarly, =.r-= V Northland Dairy Products Ltd,l86 Blanchard J. 
distinguished intention from purpose. That a defendant knows its actions will 
have anticompetitive consequences does not mean that those consequences were 
its purpose. The facts were similar to the McDonald187 case. The defendant 
terminated one of its vendors. It claimed its purpose in restructuring. was to 
make operations more ..... LIJ .......... l..L. so it could better meet the competitive 
market place the milk industry became deregulated. In particular it wanted 
184 Id. at 50. 
185 Id. at 51-52. 
186· Supra, note 116. 
Supra, note 116. 
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to be able to respond to any move the Milk Corporation made into the 
Northland market. It claimed its old of distribution was inefficient and 
the new system was It knew its actions would be to disadvantage the 
plaintiff. Blanchard J, held the defendant's reasons for restructuring and 
terminating the plaintiff made commercial and competitive sense. said ", .. 
I am far from convinced that this is a change introduced in order to prejudice 
[the plaintiff) in any way".l88 Accordingly he held the defendant did not breach 
s. 36 as it lacked the requisite anticompetitive purpose. 
Van Roy and November argue that intention and purpose are 
synonymous.la9 They argue that Courts have distinguished between 
intention and oblique intention. direct intention is doing an action with the 
aim of deterring or eliminating a rival; whereas an oblique intention is doing an 
act knowing or eliminating a rival is a side consequence. Purpose 
s. 36 is direct Oblique intention does not breach s. 36,190 With 
respect, this is an exercise in semantics. The Courts have distinguished purpose 
intention.l91 Section 36 uses the word purpose - not direct intention. 
While purpose and direct intention may be synonymous, purpose and oblique 
intention are not. One cannot equate purpose with intention when purpose 
188 supra, note 116, at ~O. 
189' Van Roy, supta, note 145 at para 36.08; November. ~~~~~~= 
LLM research paper VUWLR, 
190 Van Roy, id.; November, id. at 24-25. 
191 See text accompanying notes 176-188, 
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not involve oblique intention. To do so complicates 
Courts have distinguished from purpose. 
~~~ Court held once a plaintiff has established the defendant has the 
requisite anticompetitive purpose, the defendant's motives are irrelevant. The 
Court noted: 
"If, bowever, the anticompetitive effects are within defendant's 
purpose, questions of morality and motive become irrelevant: 
is no breach s. 46 unJess there has been a use of 
power for one of purposes proscribed by the section. But once 
it appears there has use of market power for such a purpose, 
the section been contravened it adds nothing to consider 
the motives the corporation taking advantage of tbe market 
power which it bas": at p 601, per 
Toohey J. like effect we Deane 1. at p 587: It is "not to 
the point" the anticompetitive purpose altruistic or 
even patriotic motives eg ... to protect local standards and 
employment". 192 
Cooke P. the same distinction 
193 i~sue was whether a levy the Board imposed on new growers 
had purpose of deterring entry into the growing industry. High 
Court held the Board's purpose was to increase fairness' between new and 
established OTfl'UJP 194 Cooke P: recognised this was the Board's motive but 
that did not mean its purpose was not anti competitive. 
"The difficulty, as I see it, is that tbose two ways of analysing the 
Board's purpose are not realty different. They are not in contrast 
but alternative ways of the same thing. Board has set 
out to ensure that newcomers would not be attracted to the 
industry partly by the prospect of establishment costs seen by the 
Board as unrealistically low. . .. [ cannot avoid the conclusion that 
192 Supra, note 89, 708. 
193 [1989] 3 NZLR 158. 
194 (1989) 2 103,564. 
the arrangement for the levy betweeo the Board and the 
Federation, well motivated, bad a substantial purpose 
of deterring entry into tbe apple growing industry or of 
production".195 
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Cooke P. re-emphasised this when discussing Apple Fields Swann v 
n ••• The policy of the board of levying contributions to capital costs 
inevitably involved restricting competition. The one purpose 
necessarily meant otber. The underlying motive was to 
fairness, but a policy with a restrictive purpose was 
followed witb that motive".l97 
Another outstanding issue is whether s. 36 means objective or subjective 
purpose. Barker J. 
favoured an objective test. His Honour relied on Smither J:5 comments 
"Smithers J. in tbat case referred to the equivalent provision in the 
Australian Act as needing to be interpreted objectively; he relied 
on tax cases in which the subjective purpose, motive or intention 
of a taxpayer was held irrelevant interpreting tax evasion 
legislation which was concerned with the character of acts done 
and transactions",200 
Holland J. the High Court in ~~'--"-~IW. favoured a subjective test,Wl 
Cooke P. in the Court of Appeal the question open. Tipping J, 
195 Supra, Dote 193, at 162. 
196 [1992] 2 NZLR 
197 Id. at 147. 
198 [1987] 2 NZLR 647. 
199 (1986) 69 ALR 660. 
200- Supra, note 198, at 664. 
201 Supra, note 194, at 103, 581. 
.....:.=== held s. 36 involved a subjective test. 
"When one is talking of purpose one is really talking about what 
a party It is clearly a subjective matter. Unless that 
party gives evidence ... as to its purpose then the court is left to 
infer with what p~se a person acts from all the available and 
relevant materials". 
His HonouT quoted no authorities. The ~LL.L~~ Court disagreed: 
"We must say we are reluctant to adopt an entirely subjective 
approach. As the development of the law of contract rather 
demonstrates, the commercial field is one in which objective 
ascertainment of states o( mind has much to commend it. We 
would be sorry to see the objectives of s. 36 inhibited by any 
undue subjectivity as to purpose, perhaps more natural to the 
criminal law. However, the light of Tipping 1,'s firmly 
expressed view, we will leave question of principle opeo".200 
Subsequent Courts have favoured the objective approach. The High Court 
Clearv-",-",,== observed: 
" ... when one is considering tbe overall purpose or intent of a large 
corporation an objective assessment should be made".205 
The Court of Appeal in the same case observed:206 
202 
203 
204 
205 
206 
207 
'ID circumstances such as prevail in this case - wbere a competitor 
realistically cannot enter the market witbout access to the facilities 
of a a dominant position, a separate investigation of the 
purpose of the behaviour is hardly The anti-competitive 
purpose is to the inferred from the inevitability of the 
consequences of refusing to deal except on terms that lead to 
competitive disadvantage.,,207 
Supra, Dote 1, at 731. 
Supra, note 89, at 709. 
(1992) 5 TCLR 166. 
Id. at 198. 
Supr.a, note 114, at 38. 
Id. at 39. 
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This is an objective test. 
The High Court of Australia in QWI208 did not specifically deal with the 
issue. However, it inferred that BHP bad an anticompetitive purpose for the 
following reasons: 
1. BHP did not offer a legitimate business reason for refusing to sell to 
QWI.209 
y ~bar was the only produCt of BHP's rolling mills it did not offer to 
sell.210 
3. BHP knew that the major distributors insisted on a full range of rural 
fencing products consisting of posts and By refusing to supply Y -bar 
BHP could keep the major distributors for itself.21l 
4. BHP had acted in such a way that was not possible in a competitive 
market. It had excess capacity in its steel rolling mills. In a competitive 
market it would have supplied, rather than lose sales?12 
This seems to an objective test. High Court did not rely on 
any "smoking gun" such as an internal note. [t inferred purpose. 
However, subsequent Courts including the Full Federal. Court in 
Operations v Pont Data Pty Ltd213 and the Federal Court in ~~~~==-
208 Supra, note 
209 Id. at 50, 011. 
210 Id. at 50, all, 50, 012 and 50, 025. 
211 Id. at 50, OIL 
212 Id. at 50, 01'1, 50, 016 - 50, 017 and 50, 025. 
213 (1991) ATPR, para 41 - 069. 
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held s. 46 involved subjective purpose. 
The Federal Court in 
the opposite conclusion, holding s. 46 involves objective 
purpose. Davies and Einfield J.J. analysing held: 
" ... after it bas ascertained what the nature of the conduct 
was, what conduct was designed and what it was likely to 
achieve and what was the manner of its implementation. 
ultimate test is an test which ... involves notions of 
markets, market power, competitions in a market and 
competition"Y7 
The weight of authority both in Australia and New Zealand, thus, favours an 
objective test. 
Van Roy and November however, it should be a subjective 
test,21S Van Roy argues the ""-'L",-,,-~=!::!. analogy with purpose of a 
contract is incorrect. Sbe argues that a contract cannot have a purpose - only 
people can. Thus, when courts construe a contract, tbey are determining its 
meaning, not tbe purpose behind it. Thus, courts should adopt subjective 
purpose.219 However, Van Roy's major premise that contracts do not have a 
purpose is misplaced. and New Zealand Courts 
214 (1991) ATPR, para 41 - 128. 
215 (1992) ATPR, para 41 - 274. 
216 (1993) A TPR, para 41 274. 
217 ld. 41, 697. 
218 Van Roy, supra, note 189; November, supra, note 189, at 31. 
219 Van Roy, id. 
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contracts as purposes in the context of tax legislation.no A contract 
may have the purpose of tax evasion. In those cases the subjective purpose of 
the . taxpayer who entered the contract is irrelevant. The same concept must 
apply to s. 36. 
In many cases, however the distinction between subjective and objective 
purpose will be irrelevant. Cooke P. 
there was no difference. Althougb that case involved s. 29 
His Honour's comments apply to s. 36: 
and v 
to some difference of 
test of purpose under 
of two. Cases 
(Auckland Airport) Ltd [1987] 2 N.Z.L.R. 647. I am disposed to 
think that, if a purpose is discernible on the a contract or 
arrangement having regard to the express terms considered in the 
light of any relevant sWTounding circumstances, such a purpose 
will qualify under the statute. That might be described as an 
objective approach. But it is at least conceivable that may 
also be cases where, although the purpose is not so apparent, it 
can be shown by evidence dehors a contract or arrangement that 
the intention of the party who sought the inclusion of the relevant 
provision was of a kind falling within prohibition in s. 29, and 
it may be that in such a case what may be called a subjective test 
is sufficient. It is unnecessary however for present purposes to 
a definite view on tbat point because, on the face of 
particular rebate arrangement and the evidence, it is manifestly 
well arguable in my view that there is no difference between an 
objective test and a subjective test: that both are satisfied".222 
Similarly in "'-='-"'--'-...:..=:= the High Court both objective and subjective 
220 See, supra, note 200. 
Unreported, 2/11/93, CA 243/93. 
222 Id. at 5-6. 
standards were met. The Court observed: 
"Proof of purpose, in the nature of these cases often ~ll turn upon 
inferences drawn from actions circumstances, with a sprinkling 
of internal memoranda and correspondence. Protestations of 
inner thoughts which do not reconcile with objective likelihoods 
are unlikely to carry much weight. In many cases, and this 
ultimately is one, both objective and standards are 
met."w 
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High Court in -""""= V ...!..k~~ quoted this approvingly and noted in that 
case - the distinction between objective subjective purpose was 
"academic".224 
Proof of Purpose: 
Courts, as seen above, infer purpose from the dominant conduct. 
They also can rely on written documents memoranda by the dominant 
However. the should not be determinative. They may simply be mere 
bragging or statements consistent with hard competition. For example in 
defendant had made notes saying such these turkeys ougbt to be 
flushed".2Ui Judge Posner held such statements were consistent with bard 
normal competitive bebaviour. Indeed the High Court in Clear v ~~~ 
implies that one should regard such statements witb caution.227 
223 Supra, note 89, at 707. 
224 Supra, Dote 204, at 57. 
Supra, note 169. 
226 Id. at 376. 
Supra, note ~04) at 198. 
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The Second Circuit Court of Appeals best summed up what courts should 
do when faced with such statements in WilHam Inglis and Sons Baking CQ. v 
The Court noted that mere "boardroom 
ruminations" regarding rivals are not evidence of predatory intent. 
What is required instead are direct implications that can be drawn from 
available evidence on the underlying purposes of the defendant's actions. It 
further noted that mere "bragging" or other gratuitous statements are hardly 
sufficient to intent behind specific conduct.229 The Full 
Court ~~~~~~~~== v ~==~~~~~~~~~ held 
similarly. This involved alleged predatory pricing. The defendant had (inter 
alia) made press statements saying it was going to defeat the newcomer. The 
Full Federal Court held: "bellicose employed in [press] interviews [was] 
more indicative of swagger, braggadocio and the presentation of a 'strong' image 
to readers .,,' [than] of tbe existence of a purpose proscribed by s. 46",231 
Another important element in proving purpose is whether the defendant 
can show it bad a legitimate business justification for its conduct. If the 
defendant can show it bad legitimate commercial justifications for its conduct 
couns will be unlikely to find it had an anticompetitive purpose. Conversely, if 
it cannot courts will likely infer an anti competitive purpose. 
OWl is a good example. BHP could not offer a .legitimate 
228' 688 F. 2d 1014 (9tb Cir. 1981), cen. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982). 
229 Id. at 1035. 
230 (1992) para 41-167. 
231 Id. 
reason for its refusal to supply. Mason CJ. and Wilson 1. said: 
"Thus conclu$ion [of Pincus J.J that to sell was 
for an impermissible purpose was supported by the fact that 
did not offer a legitimate reason for the effective refusal to seU 
" 232 
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Subsequent Australian Courts have found no anticompetitive purpose 
where the defendant offered a legitimate business reason for conduct. In 
the def~ndants said their reason not to allow the plaintiff the use 
of their stockyards was not to share it with persons who had no proprietary 
interest in it and to use it as they saw fit. Lockhart 1. while accepting that a 
subsidiary purpose was not allowing competition said that the defendant's 
dominant and substantial purpose was former and the plaintiffs had not 
established purpose?34 
involved Singapore Airlines terminating Taprobane's services as a travel 
agent Singapore Airlines claimed its purpose was to improve its profitability by 
ensuring it dealt only with established operators who might be expected to 
provide regUlar and reliable custom to it. Singapore Airlines had lost money 
when one of its previous had collapsed. The Federal Court held 
Singapore Airlines had the requiSite proscribed purpose as the evidence showed 
Taprobane was an efficient operator which did Dot represent any risk of financial 
Supra, note 
234 Id. 40, 276. Honour's comments were obiter. 
(1992) ATPR, para 41-159, (Full Federal Court); (1990) ATPR, para 41-
054. (Federal Court). 
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loss to Singapore Airlines. The Full Federal Court reversed. The case turned 
on market definition. The Court observed (obiter) that although there was 
evidence of a of than rational antagonism to Taprobane by Singapore 
did not support the inference of an anticompetitive purpose. The 
airline's conduct did not appear to have had any anticornpetitive objective. The 
purpose terminating Taprobane was its stated ooe.236 
ill v~~~~~~~~~~~~ J. held 
Fine Leather's purpose was its stated one of terminating an unsatisfactory 
distributor. That it also had the consequence of decreasing competition did not 
mean Leather' had that purpose. v 
Boral refused to supply 
exclusive product because tbe plaintiff was insolvent and owed it a debt. French 
1. held this was not a taking advantage but also held Boral did not have the 
requisite anticompetitive purpose. Honour held Borafs purpose was to 
make it payment from an insolvent creditor.239 is not 
anticompetitive. 
involved a dispute as to the amount of past licence APRA owned 
performing rights which it licensed to performers. APRA refused to licence the 
236 Id. at 40, 178. 
(1991) ATPR, para 41-118. 
238 (1992) ATPR, para 41-196. 
239 Id. at 40, 644. 
240 (1990) ATPR, para 41-042 (Federal Court); (1991) ATPR, para 41-074. 
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defendants 'until they had paid in full. The judge inferred, despite the 
dispute, that APRA's purpose was to prevent the defendants from in 
competitive conduct in the provision of a night club.241 On appeal the 
Federal Court reversed this in and .......................... ,1'> a purpose. The Court 
held: 
"APRA bad .nothing to gain by putting the respondeots out of 
business. On the contrary, it was in interests of to 
maximise the number of its material, so long as they paid licence 
fees. APRA's purpose was to prevent unauthorised use of 
material, so long as they paid licence fees. APRA's purpose 
was merely to prevent unauthorised use of its material and 
integrity its licensing system",242 
cases held the same. In ~ILt~tru:Jw.g!J&SUYlQ1jQ§n~:1{l v 
Berk (Old) Pty Ltd243 Joske 1. beJd that 
lithe respondent had substantial reasons for terminating its 
agreement with the applicant and I am satisfied on the evidence 
that respondent genuinely considered that it should terminate 
the agreement for the sake of and in order to protect its legitimate 
trade and business interests".2M 
The above authority shows that if a defendant shows it had a legitimate 
business justification for its conduct Australian are unlikely to find that 
the defendant had the requisite anticompetitive purpose. 
New Zealand courts have indicated the same. ARA245 involved the 
ARA limiting number of rental vehicle concessions at Auckland Airport to 
241 at 
Supra, note 240, at 52, 129. 
(1975) ATPR, para 40-004: 
244 Ibid. 
245 [1987] 2 NZLR 647. 
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two firms. An excluded firm. Budget, claimed the ARA had breached s. 36 by 
refusing it a concession. Its purpose was to exclude other potential 1..11." ... '......, • ..,""'" 
thereby Barker J. held the AM had breached s. 36 but 
left- open possibility a legitimate business justification (By 
oeren(:e I mean if the dominant a legitimate business justification the 
Court will not find anticompetitive purpose). Barker J . 
. III emphasise that ARA does not necessarily have to accept any 
applicant for a rental car concession, including Budget. The 
availability of space, level of proposed for the public and 
other considerations will operate as reasonable constraints ... ".246 
The High Court in ~~~~ said: 
"The' activity covered will not prohibited despite foreseen 
anticompetitive effects if it for unrelated legitimate business 
reasons without purposive pursuit of those anticompetitive 
outcomes thernselves",24S . 
New Zealand Milk Corp.' v McDonald249 is also relevant. The New 
Zealand Milk Corporation terminated a group of milk vendors' contracts to 
supply milk. parties entered into these contracts pursuant to s. 9(5) of the 
Milk Act 1988. Under this Corporation couJd contract out home deliveries 
on an exclusive zone basis. The vendors sought an injunction alleging breach of 
s. 36. They succeeded in the High Court and Court of Appeal. Court 
ultimately granted the injunction on the basis the Corporation bad abused its 
statutory powers under s. 9(5) of Milk Act. Hardie Boys J. however tbought 
246 
247 Supra, note 89. 
248 Id. at 708. 
249 Supra, note 116. 
tbe Corporation did not bave the requisite anticompetitive purpose. 
acknowledged the Board's conduct an anticompetitive but said: 
"But effect does not establish purpose ... The purpose 
was to secure a competitive which unless coupled 
with a purpose of the kind referred to in s. 36 is a legitimate 
objective of competition. borderline is a fine one. 
I incline to the view that the fate of the unlucky vendors was no 
more than an effect on an incident of a legitimate purpose. In my 
opinion the unlawfulness of the purpose lies s. 9(5) of the Milk 
Act. not in s. 36 of the Commerce Act".25o 
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High Court in -"""-'= v ~o.=~ also emphasised the test that 
even a monopolist may refuse to supply for a legitimate reason.251 
Thus, it is arguable a legitimate business reasons defence is part of New 
Zealand law. 
A number of comments can be about the concept. 
U.S. law recognises such a defence. v Aspen Highlands 
involved a dominant ski operator refusing to continue a joint 
....... t'>v'-'-''''' ... with a smaller competitor. The trial judge had instructed 
the jury that a firm's refusal to with a rival not breach s. 2 of the 
Sherman Act so long as "valid business reasons exist for that refusal ", The jury 
found a breach and the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court 
Supreme Court considered whether the trial record supported the jury's 
conclusion there was no valid business reasons for the defendants refusal to deal. 
The linchpin of the inquiry was whether the evidence showed that the defendant 
250 Id. at 
251 Supra, note at 195. 
U.S. 585.(1985). 
bad been attempting to exclude rivals on some basis otber than efficiency. 
defendant did not any. The" Court found none. It held that: 
evidence supports an inference that [the defendant] was not 
motivated by efficiency concerns and that it was willing to sacrifice 
short-run benefits and consumer goodwill in exchange for a 
perceived long-run impact on smaller rival".253 
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The Court held the jury's conclusion was "strongly supported by [the 
failUIe to offer any efficiency justification whatever for its pattern 
of behavioUI".254 
The Supreme Court tbus, placed efficiency at the heart of the legitimate 
business defence. If the reasons the defendant proffers for its conduct do not 
enhance efficiency they will not be legitimate business 
Subsequent U.S. courts, following Aspen recognise the legitimate business 
reasons the 
Eight Circuit Court of Appeals dealing with the defendant's refusal to extend 
credit or replace defective material, discussed the difference between acceptable 
and illegal conduct by a monopolist: 
"Anticompetitive conduct conduct without legitimate business 
purpose. Such conduct makes sense only because it ..... J..U-LLLL, ... 
competition. Acts which are ordinary business practices typical of 
those used in a competitive market do not constitute 
anti competitive conduct violative of Section 2. The exercise of 
business judgment cannot be found to be anticompetitive".256 
Second, the defence is a L.U..I.L .......... business purposes defence. Courts will 
253' Id. at 206. 
Ibid. 
738 F. 261 (8tb Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985). 
256 Id. at 266. 
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not simply accept a dominant finn's preferred reason. They will assess it. One 
has to be careful before accepting a dominant reasons for its conduct. 
This is especially so New Zealand where the Government has privatised state 
monopolies. Doctor James Farmer has noted: 
", .. the former state monopolies, while possessing 
advantages given to them by earlier statutory regimes that 
conferred their monopoly status on them were also inevitably 
saddled with the legacy historically high-cost structures and 
inefficient management and labour systems and practices. These 
made them extremely vulnerable to new entrants, especially those 
enjoying benefit of foreign capital and expertise and able to 
make use of modern low-cost, technology and implement 
systems without heavy transition and restructuring 
costs".2S7 
Thus, a dominant may claim purpose is to achieve efficiency. 
However, its purpose may be to prevent the newcomer taking advantage of 
its efficiencies and new technology, thus impairing competition. 
An example of this is ~!...L..!~~~.258 The port company claimed the 
purpose of its levy was to enable its staff and equipment to be fully utilised. 
However. tbe Court found that the levy was too high to achieve that. It could 
have done so by having a lower levy. The high levy indicated that its purpose 
was to eliminate the use of non Port Nelson equipment and staff. Thus, courts 
will. not automatically accept any business justification a defendant gives. 
justification must be legitimate. This is true the U.S. as well. 
ThirdJy, some commentators have argued the defence is not open under 
the Commerce Act. Thomas Weston and Bernard Hill argue Cooke P's 
257 
258 Supra, note 89. 
comments Apple Fields ran counter to a legitimate 
Cooke P. observed: 
difficulty, as I see it, is that those two ways of analysing the 
Board's purpose are not really They are not contrast 
but alternative ways of saving the same thing. Board has set 
out to ensure that newcomers would not be attracted to the 
industry partly by the prospect of establishment costs seen by the 
Board as unrealistically low. . .. I cannot avoid the conclusion that 
the arrangement for the levy between the Board and the 
Federation, however well motivated, has had a substantial purpose 
, of entry into the apple growing industry or. increases of 
production". 
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Weston and Hill's argument depends on Apple Field's motive . . IDlposmg 
the levy being a legitimate one. With respect, it was not. It was a blatant 
Raising Rivals' Costs scenario. It hobbled new growers. It made them incur a 
cost with no justification other than Fairness has nothing to do with 
efficiency. It simply made life more difficult for the new competitors. It made 
apples more expensive for domestic consumers. It was based on the concept of 
a levy playing field to whlch the High Court in "'---""=---=~~= V ~~!.l::.!..l!Q:. 
gave a short Apple Fields is not authority for rejecting 
a legitimate business purpose defence as purpose was Qot legitimate. 
Cooke P.'s comments in N.Z. Milk COrp.262 seem to run counter to a 
legitimate business purpose defence. Honour accepted that lithe line 
between effective competition and impermissible use of a dominant position can 
Hill & Weston,~~~~!:.!:::!:.!::!~~~~~w.Y~~~~~~~.!...!.:':'::!."­
"""""'''''''''''''= Unpublished Seminar Paper, 25 
260 [198903 NZLR 158 at 162. 
261 [1990] 2 NZLR 1. 
262 Supra., note 116. 
a fine one"U3 but concluded: 
"". I am unabJe to accept that a statutory monopolist who seeks to 
exclude traders from a market can say plausibly that this is only an 
attempt to compete more effectively with possible 
competitors. Inevitably the ouster is much more than that. The 
purpose is necessarily restrictive of competition ll ,264 
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On the other band, Hardie Boys J. heJd the defendant did Dot have an 
anti competitive purpose. As mentioned above, he said the Board's purpose was 
to se'cure a competitive advantage.us This was not anticompetitive. Blanchard 
J, held similarly in the Byers266 • case. His Honour framed the purpose in 
efficiency terms. 
[The Defendant's] case is that the old system was based on cost 
plus and was, very inefficient. It therefore had to be restructured 
for the reasons set out in the portions of the affidavits, especially 
that of Mr Sowter, quoted above. Daily allowances had to got 
rid of remuneration systems standardized. The reallocation 
of milk rounds was also part of a new marketing exercise involving 
the adoption of new brand names, launching of new products 
the use of new IIget Up".267 
to become more efficient is a legitimate business purpose. 
The cases show how different courts can have views on purpose. Ali 
involved substantially the same facts - the Courts reached different 
conclusions on purpose. PenlingtQn J., Blanchard J., Thorp J. and Hardie Boys 
J. held the defendants did not have an anticompetitive purpose. Cooke P., 
263 Id. at 546. 
264 Ibid. 
265 Id. at 
266 Supra, note 116. 
267 Id. at 
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Hilyer J. and Neazor J. thought the defendants did. Of course, ultimately it is 
a matter of fact. 
Section 2(5)(b) of the Commerce Act may negate a business 
purpose provides that a proscribed purpose need only a 
substantial purpose. It need not be the sole or even dominant purpose. 
dominant firm may have a legitimate purpose, but its substantial purpose may 
be an anticompetitive purpose. Whether it is, is a question of fact. Australia 
has an equivalent provision; viz. s. 4F(b). However, as I showed above, most 
courts now will not infer an antic.ompetitive purpose if the defendant shows a 
legitimate business purpose despite s. 4F(b). Not all Australian cases do this as 
Mark Lyons Ply Ltd v Bursill Sportsgear Pty Ltd268 (a pre OWl decision) 
shows. Mark LyonS was a ski retailer. It organised warehouse sales of 
discounted gear at temporary locations. Bursill was the Australian 
distributor of ski equipment. Practically speaking a retailer bad to 
stock to meet customer demand. Retail rivals of Mark Lyons 
periodically, compl~ed to Bursill about Mark Lyons' discounting. Bursill 
refused to supply Mark Lyons witb Salomon boots the 1987 season. Mark 
Lyons alleged (inter alia) a of s. 46. Bursill contended its purpose was 
to prevent conduct which couJd bring the product into disrepute. It claimed its 
purpose was to protect its products' l.llJ.c;o.I:;." Wilcox 1. held Bursill breached s. 
46. He stated that under s. 4F(b): 
"it is sufficient that an applicant prove that one of the purposes 
actuating a respondent - provided only that this one purpose was 
substantial - was the deterrence or prevention of competition. It 
268 (1987) ATPR, para 40-818. 
is not necessary to prove this was the sole purpose".269 
Honour further held: 
"I think It IS that one of purposes which actuated Mr 
Bursill's decision to refuse to supply of boots to Mark 
Lyons the 1987 season was the to protect established 
retailers from competition to them by Mark Lyons' 
Some.people may regard that as a laudable motive but 
a purpose clearly offends against s. 46(1)(c). The withholding of 
the boots is the purpose of deterring or preventing Mark Lyons 
from engaging competitive conduct - tbat the warehouse sales 
- in the Australian sk) boot market", 270 
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It \Vas possible to the anticompetitive purpose here. One Bursill's 
purposes was to prevent Mark Lyons discounting. Bursill had received 
complaints from otber retailers over Mark Lyons discounting. While Bursill had 
the purpose of protecting its image, it also the purpose of preventing 
discounting. Preventing discounting consumer welfare. If a specified 
is involved it is per se illegal under the Price Maintenance 
provisions?71 under s. 4F(b). was a substantial Thus, 
breached s. 46. Had Mark Lyons not been discounting and only conducting sales 
from warehouses, it is unlikely Court would have inferred an anticompetitive 
purpose. Stopping war¢bouses not harm consumer welfare. All 
the Australian cases where courts have accepted a business 
purpose did not involve plaintiff discounting. 
Whether a purpose is substantial is a matter of fact. Section 2(5)(b) 
certainly does not defeat tbe W-LLtu."" business purpose defence. One cannot 
269 Id. at 48, 800. 
270 Id. at 48, 802. 
271 Sections Commerce Act; sections 96-100 Trade Practices Act. 
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argue it does the case of mixed purposes. do so would in effect be saying 
that purpose equated with known consequences. The Courts have rejected this. 
Fourth, the Court of Appeal's decision in --== v ~~~ may have 
eliminated a legitimate business purpose defence. As mentioned above, the case 
concerned the price Telecom charged Clear interconnection; viz. tbe Baumol-
Willig The Court of Appeal held the rule because it captured Telecom's 
monopoly profits breached s. 36. for purpose, the Court of Appeal held: 
"In circumstances such as prevail in this case - where a competitor 
realistically cannot enter the market without access to the facilities 
of a firm a dominant position, a separate investigation of the 
purpose of the behaviour is hardly necessary. The anti-competitive 
purpose is to be inferred from the inevitability of the 
consequences of refusing to deal except on terms that to 
competitive disadvantage.· As Mr Fogarty emphasised, it is 
necessary to bear in mind s. 2(S)(b) which provides that so long as 
it is a substantial purpose it is sufficient if it is included in the 
purposes of the conduct".m 
This is undoubtedly, correct in this case. Telecom claimed purpose was not 
anticompetitive. Rather it was to increase I shall argue later that any 
rule which ensures monopoly profits is inimical efficiency. Efficiency was at 
issue in this case. Just because Telecom claimed its purpose was "" ....... ,,,.vu .... y did 
not mean tbe Court bad to accept Just as "'--""-''-''-''-='''''''''''- the Court held tbe 
means Telecom used to efficiency were unduly restrictive. Thus, it could 
infer an anticompetitive purpose from that. However, th~ Court of Appeal's 
comments are with respect too wide. The dominant may have any number 
of reasons why it refuses to deal. The new entrant may be a credit risk or a 
272 Supra, note 114. 
Id. at 39. 
debtor of the dominant 
purpose to supply 
169 
as in =---::.=.274 It is hardly. an anticompetitive 
entrant has cleared debt or shown its 
financial stability. The new entrant may prevent a safety risk. Tills was so when 
the British Monopolies Commission investigated the LPG industry. A number 
suppliers refused to supply distributors because they had inadequate 
storage and handling facilities for cylinders.275 refusal to supply for 
such'safety reasons would not be an anticompetitive purpose, irrespective of its 
effect on the competitive ability of the distributors. A New Zealand 
example v n6 
Mobil stopped supplying the service station with petrol because of evidence the 
station's underground tanks were leaking. The station sought an injunction, 
claiming Mobil by ceasing supply had breached (inter alia) s. 36. Fraser J. 
denied injunction. He said he was not prepared to infer an anticompetitive 
purpose. Mobil's purpose in ceasing supply was that there was a real risk of 
leakage and environmental harm if it resumed supply. His Honour held 
this, despite the inevitable consequence was to competitively disadvantage the 
service station. 
Similarly, albeit different '""ULLI>:)Lc.I..U', ..... ." U.S. courts have allowed moral 
justifications for refusals to deal. A monopolist may refuse to advertising 
274' Supra, note 46, 
276 Unreported, 15/7/93, Christchurch, CP 2/8/93, Fraser J. 
spa~e to X-rated film exhlbitors,2n or 
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which engage in deceptive 
advertising or other breaches of ethical codes or unfair practicesYs One can 
hardly call these purposes anticompetitive despite the inevitable anticompetitive 
consequences on the firms that require access to the monopolist's facilities. 
The Court of Appeal could be correct if all the above instances were 
dealt with under s. 36's use limb. refusal to deal because of safety reasons, 
moral reasons or the firm seeking access being a debtor or poor credit risk is 
conduct which a nondominant finn could a court such cases 
would find no use and thus no breach of s. 36. It would not have to consider 
purpose. Indeed, the Courts coulO have decided the milk cases under the "use" 
limbs as well. 279 and involved the 
defendants restructuring its operations to become more efficient and competitive. 
TIlls is possible, indeed mandatory, for a firm in a competitive market. The 
Courts could have that because of this, none of had used their 
dominant positions. The only issue would be whether their restructuring was 
unnecessarily restrictive. This would avoid courts having to pour over 
numerous d.ocume~ts to try and find some incriminating statement. if they 
did, the statements would not be determinative, as they would be consistent with 
277 
(1st Cir. 1980). 
Supra, note 116. 
280 Id. 
281 Id. 
441 
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hard competition as well as predation. However, the Court Appeal in ==-
v appeared not to treat use in that way. The judgment seems to imply 
it would deal with the above examples under the purpose limb. The Court 
noted: 
To determine whether particular conduct involves use of a 
dominant position a market for any of purposes in 
s. 36 bas been said to require consideration of whether the 
conduct would have been open if party concerned were not in 
a dominant position if it were a fully competitive market. 
Such a test reflects the underlying purpose of the section whicb is 
to promote competition. Even monopolists are e.qtitled to act 
competitively and the section must not be applied so as to 
constrain them. 
The above discussions show bow interconnected use and purpose 
limbs of s. 36 are. However. Clear v ~~~ does not appear to foreclose a 
legitimate business purpose defence. It was just in the circumstances of the case 
that the court could infer the anticompetitive conduct. Telecom could hardly 
claim its conduct was efficiency enhancing when its conduct was totally counter 
to efficiency. 
The plaintiff in any s. 36 case has the burden of proof. A defendant 
will have evidential burden of showing a legitimate bus~ess purpose. 
plaintiff will have to prove it was ~ot or that the defendant's substantial purpose 
was anticompetitive. 
The Proscribed Purposes: 
Paragraph s. 36(1)(a) - This deals with restricting entry. This captures 
Supra, note 1 at 24 (empbasis added). 
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cooduct aimed at potential entrants. 
Paragrapb (b) preventing or deterring - This is an extremely wide reach 
covering actual and potential rivals. The word deterring suggests making life 
more difficult. It means s. 36 wider than the U.S. standard under s. 2 of 
Sherman Act. The cases talk of exclusion and foreclosure. These are wider 
concepts than deterring. 
(c) with elimination of current competitor or any trader 
from any market. This is more line with U.S. authorities. 
The to that or any other market means the '"""" ... ''-'u .... not 
use its dominant position in the market in which it is dominant. Section 36 does 
not limit where the dominant firm must use its dominant position. Similarly the 
dominant need not compete in the same market as the alleged victim. This 
means the controversy over leverage in the U.S. does not New 
Zealand,2S3 . 
Hann to Competition or Competitors? 
Another issue with s. 36 is whether it IS concerned with harm to 
competition or individual competitors. The issue s. 36's purpose 
provisions are directed against individual competitors. As Hampton notes: 
"A literal reading of the [purpose provisions] that a 
dominant firm will breach the section when it uses its position with 
the intention of harming some "person" : the section does not 
appear to require proof of an intention to harm competitors",284 
283 ABA ANTRITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 
250-252 (3d ·ed. 1992). 
284 Hampton, supra, note at 
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Courts could llse this to interpret s. 36 in such a way so that whenever a 
dominant finn prevails over a rival. it breaches s. 36. This will be so whether or 
not the dominant triumph is due to it simply being a more 
competitor. 
However the Courts have shown they will not do this. Tipping J. in ~~ 
Millions held: 
"It is not a breach of s. 36 if a person albeit with a dominant 
position. simply acts a competitive manuer. It would be an 
irony if such conduct could be attacked because it is competition 
which is to promote".285 
a person acts in a competitive manner it will harm a less efficient rival. 
This, however, will not breach s. 36. Tipping comments indicate that Courts 
will use the Act's long title to interpret s. 36. The long title states it is "an Act 
to promote competition in markets within New Zealand". If a dominant firm's 
actions do not harm competition it will not breach s. 36. Courts' comments show 
do not view competition as a large number of rivals, a state resembling 
perfect competition. 
~~=~ Court held: 
"Such prOvisions [Sections 27 and 36 Commerce Act 1986] are 
directed at the protection of the concept of competition as such. 
They are not directed at the protection of individual co:petitors, 
except in so far as the latter may promote the fonner", 
Similarly Barker J. stated in ARA case: 
"The test of competition is not concerned with the economic fate 
of individual competitors". 
285 Supra, note 2. 
286 Supra, note 89, at 700. 
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Australian courts have held similarly. The High Court of Australia in 
, in rejecting Pincus J's bolding that "take advantage" incorporates an 
intent element, stress s. 46's object is protection of the interest of consumers 
through promoting competition. 
"[nhere is a fundamental difference between the usual tort and a 
s. 46 violation. In the ordinary tort a tortfeasor's may 
well be relevant to his dangerousness - if to burt 
another he is more likely to cause injury 
hurt'the other. 
~~~:""'=~..!?f.."'.=""""'" then a similar implication of intent might 
~~~~~~~~~~!.!Gv"",,-,-,~= 
by its very 
nature is deliberate and ruthless. Competitors jockey sales, tbe 
more effective competitors injuring the less effective by taking 
away. Competitors always try to 'injure' each other in this 
competition has never been a tort (see v 
"'-""-===~"'" and these injuries are the inevitable consequence of 
the competition s. 46 is designed to foster. 
designed to tbreaten that competition". 
Deane J. ;>."...,.\,.;>."", similar views: 
"[nhe essential notions which s. 46 is concerned and the objective 
which the section is designed to achieve are economic and not 
moral ones .... The objective is the protection and advancement 
of a competitive environment and competitive conduct by 
precluding advantage being taken of a 'substantial degree of power 
in a market for any of the proscribed purposes'''.289 
By that s. 46 aims to protect consumers through competition the 
HJgh Court is stressing efficiency over preserving numerous rivals. As shown in 
287 Supra, note 12. 
288 Supra, note 12, at 50, 101, per Mason CJ. and Wilson J. (emphasis 
added). 
289 Id. at 50, OIl. 
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Chapter I allowing Lll,""L!..l'Fl'-'JU,L small firms to decreases consumer welfare 
by decreasing allocative efficiency. 
Subsequent Australian courts followed the OWl comments. 
Lockhart J., in Dowling, said: 
"Competition by its very nature is deliberate ruthless and s. 46 
encourages this. What it discourages is conduct which would not 
possible in a competitive market, thereby promoting 
competitive conduct".29o 
Thus, s. does not protect inefficient small firms. What it does is condemn 
dominant firm predation. Predation, like normal competition harms rivals. The 
way courts interpret s. 36 distinguishes predation from normal competition. 
While harm to rivals will always a factor, it will not the determinative 
factor. use and purpose limbs ensure courts will not condemn "'u.J'~l\ .... il 
competitive behaviour. way courts have interpreted use and purpose 
ensures this. 
Dynamic efficiency proponents may u..u'~LtF.v this. They will 
dynamic efficiency d~pends on numerous competitors so courts should interpret 
s. 36 so as to condemn harm to rivals. However, as I mentioned Chapter I 
dynamic efficiency depends on the unprovable assumption that the most 
innovation occurs markets with numerous rivals. Indeed some commentators 
the opposite innovation occurs most in tightly concentrated markets 
. . 
with large firms who can afford large scale research and development.291 
Courts should not interpret s. 36 on basis of an unprovable controversial 
290. Supra, note at 40, 281. 
291 Jorde 4 IDGH 
LJ. 1 (1989). 
assumption, To dQ so would harm 
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as it will lead to a decrease in 
productive efficiency and higher prices. It would also be interpreting on the 
basis of hope. Hope, that one of small will make some 
star:tlingly new innovation. Antitrust cannot be based 00 hope. However, 
dynamic efficiency can play a role s. 36. If a small rival bas superior 
technology than the, dominant courts should sceptical of any 
dominant behaviour which excludes, prevents or deters the small fum from 
competing. Courts should be able to infer an anticompetitive purpose very easily 
in sucb circumstances. They should any efficiency justification which the 
dominant firm proffers extremely carefully. For example, in v ~~~ 
if Clear had superior technology than Telecom, the High Court should have 
regarded any efficiency justification sceptically. However, the reports do not 
show whether Clear had superior technology which it more ..... LlJ,,,."' ..... 
is the onJy situation where dynamic efficiency should playa role in s. 36. 
The RRC Model and s. 36: 
The model is compatible with s. 36. If a dominant is able to raise 
its rivals' costs to such an extent that it can price supracompetitively or prevent 
prices falling a court will be able to infer requisite purpose. It should ignore 
any dominant claimed efficiency justification. The issue will be whether 
a has used its "'VJU-U..l.U".LL position to raise rivals' costs. In most cases it will 
be, as methods whicb raise rivals' costs substantially and significantly will 
only be possible and rational for firms that are not in fuJJy competitive markets. 
The model is based on consumer welfare and I argued the Courts have had 
consumer welfare underpinning their interpretation of s. 36. 
Krattenmaker and Salop are undecided whether the model permits an 
efficiency Courts cannot a breach of s. 36 on efficiency (or 
any other grounds).292 The problem with allowing an efficiency defence is that 
it is impossible to. measure efficiencies. Posner refers to efficiencies as "an 
intractable subject for Utigation".293 Bork has rejected an efficiencies 
defence.294 They make these comments in relation to mergers. If an 
.... ~"' ........ '" is too problematic there, it is too problematic for s. 36.295 
Thus, the model and s. 36 are compatible. To assess the model's usefulness to 
s. 36 I now will d~al with various types of conduct which courts have held 
breaches s. 36. 
292 Section 36(3). 
293 POSNER, ANTIfRUST LAW : AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 112 
(1976). 
294 BORK, supra, note 62, at 124-129. 
295 Weiss bas suggested that efficiencies are quantifiable. However, this 
analysis is too complex for courts to use, Weiss, ~~~~~~~~ 
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CHAPTER Vl 
PRlCE SQUEEZES 
Introduction: 
'Price squeezes by a vertically integrated monopolist have one of 
antitrust's concerns.1 A vertically integrated performs two or more stages 
in production and distribution of an end product. For example, a firm may 
produce raw materials or components also manufacture the product out 
of those materials or components. Similarly, a fum may manufacture the end 
product. but be involved in distributing it to retailers or ~_~~... it to 
consumers directly. 
effect a price squeeze the vertically integrated monopolist must have 
a monopoly at one stage the production or distribution stage. The stage 
where the firm has the monopoly must be necessary for the firm and 
unintegrated rivals to compete in another market. For example, the may 
have a monopoly the raw to manufacture an end product. 
will compete with rivals in market for product. The 
can institute a by an umeasonably price to rivals for 
the raw materiaL This cause the price for the rivals' end product to rise to 
such an extent, that it may be impossible for rivals to compete in the end 
1 See generally, D. Swanson, Essays in the Economic Analysis of the 
Antitrust 1-64 (1986) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard 
University). 
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product market. An example is v 
case.2 BHP was the sale Australian 
manufacturer of y':'bar stock Y -bar is necessary to produce picket 
fences. BHP onJy sold Y -bar to Australian Wire Industries (AWl) - one of 
wholly-owned subsidiaries. OWl bought steel picket from BHP and 
competed with it in the Oueensland rural fencing market. OWl wanted to 
manufacture its own steel picket It asked to supply it with Y -bar 
to it to do so. BHP to supply, at unrealistically higb 
prices. These high prices constituted the price squeeze. Pincus in the Federal 
and the lligh Court did not to high price Y -bar as a price 
squeeze. They called in a "constructive refusal to supply".3 However, they are 
synonymous. Court held constructive refusal to supply or price 
breached s. 46 of the Trade Practices Act. Other Courts around the 
world have held price can breach laws. No court yet bas 
analysed price using the RRC modeL In part I will outline U.S. 
taw on price squeezes and apply the RRC model to one case. In part ill I will 
analyse Australian 
and ......... ""--"--~~~~-'l;.""I~~ v ~~==-"-""'==:::!:....;!..~-=::=. using the RRe 
modeL In part IV I will analyse two New Zealand cases, ~~~~~~= 
2 (1989) ATPR, para 40-925. 
3 Id. at 01l. 
4 (1990) ATPR, para 41-057. 
5 (1990) ATPR, para 41-007' and on appeal (1991) ATPR, para 41-109. 
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using the RRe modeL Part VI will conclude the model is relevant 
useful Un assessUng LI\:, .... ,£, ..... 3 under s. 36 of the ..... VLLLLU .... ' Act. 
U.S. Law: 
The first case relevant to price squeezes was 
Colgate was a manufacturer. It announced a suggested price and 
to supply distributors who sold below that price. The trial judge dismissed the 
complaint. The Supreme Court upheld his decision. Court held that firms 
have a general freedom to deal or not to deal as they choose. However, this 
freedom is qualified. McReynolds J. stated: 
"In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly 
the [Sherman] Act not restrict the right of 
trader or manufacturer engaged Un an entirely private business, 
freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with 
whom will And, of course, he may announce in advance 
the circumstances under which will refuse to sell".9 
One of the qualifications, where the fum lithe purpose to 
create or maimaUn a monopoly" covers a price squeeze. The firm may be 
partially integrated. It may have a monopoly over an input to the final product. 
example, raw or a component. charging a high price for the 
input the finn would be constructively refusing to supply. could construe 
6 [1990] 2 NZLR 662. 
7 Unreported 17/12/93 CA 25/93. 
8 250 U.S. 300 (1919). 
9 Id. at 307. 
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thls as having "the purpose to create or maintain a monopoly" over the final 
product However, the was not before the and further elucidation 
was not possible until v (Alcoa).l0 U.S. 
Justice Department alleged (inter alia) that Alcoa had engaged in a price 
squeeze. Alcoa had a monopoly over aluminium ingot. It converted some of it 
into finished products such as rolled aluminium sheets and aluminium cable. It 
sold this to industri.al buyers. It also sold some of the aluminium ingot to other 
(aluminium fabricators) which converted it into finished products. Alcoa 
and the fabricators thus in finished aluminium product market. 
The were not vertically The Justice Department alleged 
Alcoa set the price of ingot so high and the price of finished products so low 
that the unintegrate,d fabricators could not compete the market for finished 
aluminium products. 
Judge Learned Hand agreed. held Alcoa had breached s. He set 
out the constituent elements for an illegal price squeeze. A firm would breach 
s. 2 where -
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
it bas monopoly power over one product, 
its price for that product is higher than a "fair price", 
that product is ne(;es:,a 
competes, 
t<? compete a second market where the firm 
(4) its price in the second market is so low that rivals cannot match it and 
still earn a "living profit", 
The Court noted Alcoa's cost of converting its ingot into finished products 
10 148 F. 2d 416 (2d 1945). 
as a fair measure of the cost its rivals faced in converting ingot into finished 
products. It concluded that in cases, the cost of ingot plus tbe cost of 
converting to rivals was greater tban Alcoa's finished product This 
prevented Alcoa's rivals from profitably competing in the finished product 
market. It held once Alcoa knew how its pricing policy was affecting its rivals 
finished product market, Alcoa had breached s. 2 by unlawfully using its 
monopoly power in ingot to set the price of its ingot unfairly higb and the price 
of its finished product prohibitively low.ll Ironically. Judge Hand held the price 
squeeze did not contribute to him finding Alcoa guilty of unlawfully maintaining 
a monopoly ingot 12 The Coun also expressly noted that the squeeze was not 
part of an attempt to monopolise tbe finished product market. unlawful 
conduct was Alcoa set1ing the price of ingot higher than a "fair price" and setting 
the price of finished product so low as to preclude "a living profit" for rivals 
who bought ingot from Alcoa. 
Commentators from all of the antitrust spectrum have severely 
criticised tbe decision. Professors Phillip Areeda and Donald Turner state the 
decision "was wrong".l3 Professor Stephen Ross says the same,14 They, with 
are correct. the squeeze did not maintain Alcoa's power in tbe ingot 
market or help extend its power into the finished product market, then it simply 
11 Id. at 436-438. 
13 
Id. at 438. 
P. AREEDA & 
also R. BORK., 
Willi ITSELF, 
TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW, 236 (1978). See 
ANTITRUST PARADOX : -POLICY AT WAR 
(2d ed. 1993). 
14 - S. ROSS, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW, 81 (1993). 
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reflected Alcoa's exercise monopoly power. It is not an antitrust breach to 
monopoly power by charging monopoly prices. IS (Alcoa was 
presumably charging monopoly prices for ingot.) 
Commentators have also criticised the decision for laying down uncertain 
guidelines. l6 What is a "fair price" aluminium ingot? How does a court 
determine it? It could be a reasonable return on the capital Alcoa invested in 
its monopoly in ingot. However, this may not the competitive price. 
times of higb it would be below the competitive In times of 
low demand, it would above the competitive price. If the competitive price 
for ingot is above the price", how does the Court set the fair price? Judge 
Hand determining the fair price should involve Alcoa's price in 
converting the ingot, plus a "living profit" for rivals in the finished product 
market. I? This raises the question of what a living profit is. Is it a nonna! 
return on investment in converting ingot to finished products? Simply relying on 
Alcoa's costs of converting may not lead to a living profit for rivals. Alcoa may 
be much more efficient in converting ingot than its rivals. 
15 This is true in 
603 2d 
(1980); ~~~~~~~ 
2d 1115, 1121 (6th 1983); P. 
ANTITRUST LAW, 756 (Supp. 1990). 
if Alcoa 
1093 
Treaty of Rome. See Fox, ~~~~~!.!;;!...!:~~~~~~~~~~ 
18 VAND. J. TRANSNATIONAL LAW, 1,3 (1985). 
16 AREEDA & TURNER, supra, note at 237~239. 
17 Supra, note 10, at 438. 
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charged its rivals the same price it cost itself to obtain the ingot, its rivals would 
not be able to a profit. If so, whose costs are relevant? Marginal rivals, 
the average rival or some hypothetical rival? Ensuring rivals could obtain a 
profit, of how efficient they will lead the courts to preserving 
inefficient rivals the market. This, as shown in Chapter I will not benefit 
consumers at all. They will have to suffer higher Some extreme dynamic 
efficiency proponents may favour this, the hope that one of the inefficient 
rivals develops a more efficient way of converting ingot. However, this is 
speculative. The new method of conversion may never eventuate. In tbe 
meantime, consumers will face higher Allowing inefficient firms to 
survive in the hope of a future innovation IS a poor trade-off for present 
efficiency gains. 
Alcoa's price squeeze not have been result of its deliberate 
efforts. The price for ingot may have risen because of a shortage. This will 
squeeze producers of finished products - irrespective of whether their 
demand changes or not. Similarly, Alcoa's low finished product price may have 
been the result of demand for finished products decreasing. It may have been, 
as mentioned above, because Alcoa was more efficient converting ingot. 
Given the problems a price, the only real remedy in such 
circUlIlStances would be to divest Alcoa of either its ingot monopoly, or its end 
product business. This would help its rivals, but would harm consumers, as they 
would not reap the benefits of Alcoa's efficiency. An alternative would be price 
regulation. 
Despite problems, ~~ remains a precedent. Plaintiffs can and still 
bring squeeze cases. However, very few have involved the situation, 
where a defendant a monopoly in an input used to create a second product. 
Only one such case has found a breach of s. 2; via, v ~~ 
Kaiser manufactured alumiruum sheet and 
aluminium culverts. used the ~heet to manufacture culverts. It some 
sheet to independent culvert manufacturers - including Bonjorno. It also sold 
culvert users. It had 80 per cent of the aluminium culvert market. Kaiser 
sold sheet at two prices: a "specification price" for general purposes a lower 
"commodity price" for culvert manufacturers. Bonjorno buying 
from Kaiser's competitors, so stopped selliog Bonjorno sheet at the 
commodity price. meant Bonjorno had to pay as much for the sheet as 
Kaiser for culvert. Bonjorno could not compete with in 
culvert market. Kaiser it withdrew the commodity because it no 
longer wished to seU to Bonjorno. Bonjorno aUeged this was an pnce 
squeeze. The jury agreed and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld. 
Although Kaiser was not a monopolist alumi.nium sheet (its rivals produced 
more), there was some evidence it was a price leader. Although saying it was 
"problematic",19 the Court held the price leadership in sheet was for 
the to find an illegal price in the culvert market. The Court also 
held tbat a price squeeze was only illegal when defendant intended to engage 
in a price 
"The" plaintiff must present evidence that the defendants 
18 752 F. 2d 802 (3d Cit. 1984), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 908 (1986). 
19 rd. at 809. 
deliberately produced the sufficient to provide a reasonable 
basis for jury to conclude that the 'squeeze' was not the result 
of natural market forces such as supply and or 
competition".20 
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'removes one of the criticisms of ~~ tbe squeeze may be the 
result of natural competition or conditions. ~~ decision did not 
provide a means of excluding such events from an illegal price 
Court concluded: 
"When a monopolist competes by denying a source of supply to his 
competitors, competitors' prices for raw materials 
without affecting own costs, ... then his actions have crossed the 
shadowy of the Act".21 
Most price cases have involved the same product at two different 
levels of the distribution chain. Electric power at the wholesale retail levels 
has been the most common scenario.22 v ~~~~~~~~~= ~~~~ 
is illustrative. American Electric was a privately owned 
utility which sold electric power at wholesale level to local distribution 
systems that power at retail to consumers. It also sold power to consumers. 
It charged the City of Mishawaka's distribution system a wholesale price which 
20 at 809~810. 
22 
Id. 811. 
1979); V.!:...!..l=<.:u......L~~~~~~Y.W 
(9th Cir. 1989) (this involved an alleged price 
and wholesale cellular telephone services). 
465 Supp. 1320 (N.D. Ind. 1979), in part, vacated in part, 616 
2d 976 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. 449 U.S. 1096 (1981). 
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exceeded its retail As the City no viable alternative source supply, 
this eliminated the City as a competitor the retail market. Both the trial court: 
and Circuit Court of Appeals held this was an illegal price 
The Court also a specific intent to maintain a monopoly, not the general 
usually required under s. 2, was necessary for a price squeeze.24 
Court also set down a test a fair This was the comparative billing 
test.25 This measures the price the wholesale customer pays against the price 
the monopolist charges its retail customers. the wholesale price is 
than the retail price, then wholesale price is too higb and the Court 
presumes an illegal 'price squeeze. A defendant can rebut the presumption by 
showing the squeeze was due to '-'llClU-lJ;'~" demand, i.e. normal competition. 
Other courts have established different tests for a price. The Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals in following 
~= established the transfer price test. Here, "the Court asks whether the 
vertically integrated company could have made a profit by selling at its own 
retail rates if it had purchased at its own wholesale If it could have made 
a profit under these assumptions, there was no price squeeze".27 This takes 
account of the efficiency objection to the Alcoa test. If the vertically integrated 
company could make a profit at its own wholesale rates and its rivals could not, 
24 616 F. at 985. 
25 Id. 809; Bonjomo, supra, 18, adopted a similar test. 
606 F. Supp. F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (citing "-== 148 F. 2d at 436; 
illinois Cities of Bethany v F.E.R.C, 670 F. 194-99 (D.C. 
1981»), 758 2d 1148 (7th Cir. 1985). 
27 rd. at 776. 
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the vertically integrated company must more ",LIJ',,-!<;;.ll its If so, 
it will not breach s. 
A third is the comparative rate of return test. The D.C. Circuit Court 
Appeals established tills V 28 This involves a cost-==~~==== ~==== 
based analysis challenged rates: 
"If the wholesale and costs are fully allocated, the 
vertically integrated companys wholesale was 
greater than retail profit margin, an price 
squeeze probably occurred".29 
The First Court of Appeals, in ..!..Q~Jli.b:.Q;ng!rQ v ~~~~~ 
CO.,30 bas eliminated the possibility of a bringing a squeeze "' .............. 
where the defendanfs rates are regulated. Edison was an integrated power 
company that transmitted distributed power Massachusetts. 
It sold 'some of power to rivals and used its lines to transmit electricity 
rivals purcbased from other n",.,' ... T'Ol The Regulation 
Commission (F.E.R.C.) regulated the rates Edison charged 
.:>'-''-''..LUII<. wholesale 
power or for power. Another body regulated the rates it charged 
for distributing power to consumers. Concord, ran a distribution system 
bought wholesale Edison. Edison, over years, 
to authorise increases the wholesale rates it charged customers Concord. 
It did not seek an increase its own retail Concord claimed Edison was 
engaging in a price squeeze. wholesale price was going up, while Edison 
28 672 F. 64 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
Id. at 90. 
30 915 F. 17 (1st 1990), cert. denied, 111 Ct. 1373 (1991). 
kept a low retail price. Concord's retail 
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was becoming non-competitive 
with Edison. Thus, it was losing customers to Edison not gaining new ones. 
Stephen Breyer held the regulation of Edison's in both the 
wholesale and retail barred a of liability.31 He held 
regulation reduced likelihood that a monopolist would be able to charge an 
unreasonably high m first market. Regulation the second market 
suggested it was probably a monopoly with little prospect of competition, 
in any event. Regulators could prohibit Edison's extension of its power into 
retail market, if chose. He also noted Concord, which had a legal monopoly 
in retail distribution within its municipal limits, was unlikely to into 
given stable customer base, even if it was disadvantaged respect 
of who could choose their plant locations. distinguished cases 
such as on the basis they involved several allegations 
exclusionary conduct - including a price squeeze. just involved a price 
squeeze. The other cases also involved wholesale prices which exceeded retail 
prices. Concord did not. 
Judge Breyer also commented on price squeezes in umegulated 
industries?3 He conceded that price squeezes could allow a monopolist to 
extend its power into a market, by raising barriers, by forcing new 
firms to compete with the monopolist in two rather one and 
depriving the market of nonprice competition and pressures innovation. 
31 rd. 28. 
Supra, note 
ld. at 
However, he severely doubted this would occur often. 
reasons why courts should in condemning a price 
mcmoiDoUSl might be more 
consumers will if the victim of the 
than its rivals. 
"""V'J"'V is a monopolist. 
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three 
the 
a court cannot 
a price squeeze 
whether a set of wholesale prices constitute 
.... LA ............ u; ..... p;,J...Up;, in rate-setting price regulation.34 
Judge Breyer's .... \JLLLUJl ....... ,~" on price squeezes 
were obiter, they have In the now, it is 
difficult to establish a price 
A number of reasons for U.S. Courts .. "'."'...... towards price 
UIJ\;;'v~. The first is over pricing. A vertically firm which 
is .......... ~F> ... ' ......... J price squeezing will normally bave a monopoly over the To 
effect a it will cbarge a price for its input. Monopoly 
pricing does 
improperly gain or 
the Sherman Act.lS s. 2 a firm must 
power. Simply monopoly power 
'exercise does not firm's ability to maintain does not 
s. 36 U.S. Courts monopoly pricing in this category. Monopoly 
pricing not the monopolist's It does the opposite. It 
attracts new to share in the new entrants 
the prices down. A monopolist may be able to way because it 
became the most firm. Monopoly profits are the reward 
34 Id. at 1. 
See, supra, 
36 See, ROSS, supra, 28. 
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for its innovation. Thus, courts will not attack them. As monopoly pricing does 
not incur antitrust liability, neither does high pricing, which may not be 
monopoly pricing. An example of this is Laurel Sand & Travel. Inc. v CSX 
Transportation Inc.37 The plaintiff alleged CSX had denied it access to its rail 
tracks by offering to transport the plaintiffs goods, while denying trackage rights 
to the plaintiff over CSX's tracks. The plaintiff considered CSX's price for 
transporting its goods as too high. It alleged the price was too high to allow it 
to compete successfully with CSX. In essence, it alleged a price squeeze. The 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether CSX's price was reasonable. 
The price was "$2.12 per ton., a penny over CSX's average variable costs".38 
The Court held the price was reasonable. It held it must view reasonableness 
from CSX's perspective in the rail business, regardless oJ wbether the rate 
allowed the plaintiff to be competitive in its business. It added: 
"[T]he reasonable standard of the access factor cannot be read to 
mean the assurance of a profit for the person seeking access",l9 
Thus, the Court removed Alcoa's standard of "a living profit" from price 
squeeze litigation. CSX's price of just above average variable costs is not 
monopoly charging. It was not helping it to maintain a monopoly. The U.S. 
approach to monopoly and high pricing contrasts with Article 86 of the Treaty 
of Rome. This defines "abuse of a dominant position" to include "imposing 
37 1991-1 Trade Cases (CCH), para 69, 312 at 65, 185 (1991). 
38 Id. at 65, 190. 
39 Ibid. 
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unfair purchase on seul1n~ Dm:es" 40 As Professor Gr'eQ:IDfV Adams Dotes: 
"[Unfair does not conduct that fits 
the principal States test for mC)QopOllZCllUo,n : the wilful 
acquisition or maintenance of monopoly [Unfair pricing] 
in contrast represents the type of by which monopoly 
power is exploited".41 
A Se(:O[:lO reason for U.S. scepticism with SQlleezes is it m\rol~/es 
squeezing firm with the monopoly input is attempting to 
leverage end product market. Leveraging occurs when a 
monopolist a COIlLlDetltn/e a(jvaJ[lta!~e at second-level market because of 
its control at the first level; rather UI;;\'4U~11;; it is more efficient at the second 
leveL 
40 
Commentators have severely criticised the levera~u! rI."' ... 1· .... ...,' ... 
"Any abuse one or more undertak..ings of a dominant position 
within the common a substantial part of it shall be 
prohibited as common market in so far as 
it may affect Such abuse may, in 
particular, consist 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing or 
selling prices or other unfair trading conditions; 
(b) 
(c) 
production, markets or technical 
de1/el4[)Dlnellt to the prejudice of consumers; 
to equivalent 
parties, thereby 
at a cOIDDi~titive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion 
acceptance by the other of su~>plc~ment,arv 
obligations which, by their nature or to 
comrilercial usage, have no connection with 
subject of such contracts.", 
r-l>.\..I. Cl.J.Uli:l , supra, Dote ]5, at 3. 
Robert 
Bork. 42 Posner and Judge Frank Easterbrook43 argue there is 
only one Lll'U'UVIJVl profit to be the chain of distribution. Leveraging 
involves "double counting", i.e. courts count the same of market power 
twice. A monopolist cannot In,,,,r;: .. ,!>,~,,,, its profits by ... "' ...... 1..1 ... , ...... "'" or leveraging that 
monopoly into a vertically 
U.S. over whether is a breach s. 
2. The held it held a firm cannot 
use monopoly power "to monopoly" ,45 It use of 
monopoly of theatres in some cities to obtain film distribution 
privileges in cities where theatres faced competition constituted 
However, controversy is over whether a monopolist 
breaches s. 2 when it uses monopoly power an a 
second market, without .",dlLllJ::,. to IJV ..... "'''' that market. 
~~~~ v Eastman Kodak Co.46 the Second Circuit stated that: 
firm violates s. 2 by using its monopoly power in one market 
a advantage in albeit without an 
to second 
Circuits, including Sixth Circuit 
ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR 
141-144 (2d 
R. POSNER EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST AND 
MATERIALS, 870 (2d ed. 1981). 
334 U.S. 100 (1948). 
Id. at 108. 
46 Supra, note 
Id. at 
194 
have followed The Ninth 
49 explicitly rejected = ............ :./- findings. The Court 
noted that the antit'rust laws monopolies those that arise 
"Thus, elements of the actions for monopolisation 
and attempted monopolisation are vital to differentiate between 
efficient and monopolies on one hand, and unlawful 
monopolies on monopoly leveraging 
doctrine fails to properly monopolies. The 
anticompetitive implicate the Shennan are not 
when a monopolist a lawful monopoly in one 
power to gain a competitive advantage in the 
definition, the has failed' to 
to a monopoly market. 
fails to meet the second necessary to establish a 
violation of s. Unless the monopolist uses its power in the first 
market to acquire and maintain a monopoly second market, 
or to attempt to do is no s. 2 so 
Other Circuits have judgment on whether they would follow 
Berke): that leveraging s. even when there is no of 
monopolising 
TbeRRC provides economic underpinning for price squeezes. 
2d 135 (6th 
Ventron Corp., 567 
1988). See also Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v 
701 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. U.S. 822 
Judge nor Judge Easterbrook have heard a 
case yet. Given the 
will continue to follow =:"'=./-' 
49' 948 2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991). 
at 548. 
51 (11th Cir. 1990); 
~~~~~,!;;!.!..!,!..!:.,L.!~~~ 910 F . 
...!..!...!::=~==.:.....:~~= 900 2d 
originally left the 
...:...:...::::=~:..o..:.....:::=-l::>.L-= 791 2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1986) . .L!:!.!:!~ 
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A price squeeze, by its very definition raises rivals' costs. However, it does not 
do it by any of Krattenmaker and Salop's four scenarios. The closest are tbe 
bottleneck and real foreclosure scenarios. In those however, the price squeeze 
occurs by the exclusionary rights purchaser buying the only or most of the input. 
This causes the price of the remaining unexcluded input to raise, or forces rivals 
to buy more expensive substitutes. The RRC model's price squeeze is an 
indirect one. The traditional price squeeze is a direct one. The price squeeze 
could give the input monopolist the power over price in the output market. 
Despite the price squeeze being a paradigm RRC scenario, Krattenmmaker and 
Salop do not apply their model to it. This is probably due to U.S. law's benign 
attitude to monopolists charging high prices. However, I will apply the model 
to Alcoa. 
For the purposes of the m<?del, the two markets are the input market of 
aluminium ingot and the output market is the finished aluminium product 
market. The first step is to determine whether Alcoa significantly and 
substantially raised its rivals' costs. We need to know if the rivals could purchase 
sufficient ingot from either, other established ingot suppliers or from potential 
entrants. The case does not mention this. All we know is that Alcoa had a 
monopoly in ingot. We do not know how secure that monopoly was or whether 
new firms could easily enter the market. If Alcoa did substantially and 
significantly raise its rivals' costs, the next issue is whether it injured competition; 
viz, gained power over price in the finished aluminium product market. We 
need to know whether sufficient competition remained in the output market to 
prevent Alcoa gaining power over price. We would consider firms who bought 
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from other suppJiers and manufactured finished aluminium products. 
they sufficiently numerous to Alcoa? We would have to consider 
finished product imports and substitute such as stainless steel finisbed 
products. then could we determine whether Alcoa harmed consumers by 
gaining power over price. 
advantage of the RC model is that it overcomes the leverage 
objection. £"1I.a.ua by substantially and significantly raising its costs can 
market power in finished product market. It can prevent price 
It can do so, even if it not have a monopoly the end product market. 
The power to prevent prices falling consumer welfare. merits 
antitrust liability. However, in the U.S. it is stU! unlikely a court would impose 
liability for such a price squeeze today. The notion that a monopolist can price 
as high as it wants would probably prevaiL However, the situation is different 
Australia New Zealand. 
Australia: 
The Courts over pnce Uv","'",,, does not apply to s. 46 of 
the Trade Practices High or monopoly prices can constitute "taking 
advantage" of power. Monopoly or higb wlll only be possible 
because of the absence competitive conditions. Similarly, the references to 
that or any other in paragraphs 46(1)(a), (b) and (c) mean the with 
a substantial of market power not advantage of its power in 
market where it enjoys market power. leverage is a possible breach 
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s.46. The Australian case is 52 Most commentators treat it as a 
refusal to However, did offer to supply.s3 Its was 
unrealistically Hence, the termed it a constructive refusal to 
supply.54 IS another term a price sqllee:ze. 
produced 97 per cent of Australian It supplied 85 cent of 
and products. It also produced V-bar feed ..:"-v,,n.. This 
is ne(:ess,ary to pro!ou(~e picket ten,ces. was the only Australian 
manufacturer of Y -bars. did not generally. It sold it to 
A WI - one of its wholly-owned subsidiaries. OWl manu1:aCl:un~a from rods 
it UVUI,t:;lJL from BHP. It bought star DICKer fences from and competed 
with BHP in the (JueelrlSlcind rural renlclDig market. It had percent of that 
market. OWl reQueSitea BHP supply it with V-bar. It wantea to manufacture 
star picket ten,ces. BHP would only supply at an exc:esslVely high price which 
would ..... ,.,:.""'nt OWl from COll1pe!tmg with Bill. OWl alleging t\r"'~"1"1 of 
s. 46. .mentioned QWI failed ill Courf5 and 
Federal but prevailed High High Court held BHP 
had advantage of its market power by It would 
note 
53 SQUiee~~e was possible in Easterbrook, 
56 
:.I.:ruUru~!!lUJLtX:..QW~mu~llil!'l~ 1 LEGAL EDUCA nON REV., 
McMahon~~~~~~ 
~~Q.QLrlli.Q~lllliJ:iliJ~lillli!:..LJ'{Mill~~~ 22 ABLR, 7, 21 
See, 
(1987) 
(1988) 
para 40-8 
para 40-841. 
57 (1989) A TPR t para 40-925. 
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have supplied in a competitive situation. The Court held BHP had the requisite 
anticompetitive purpose for four reasons. BHP did not offer a legitimate 
business reason for refusing to sell to OWl Y -bar was the only product of 
BHP's rolling mills it did not offer to sell. BHP knew that the major distributors 
insisted on a fujI range of rural fencing products consisting of posts and wire. 
By refusing to supply Y-bar, BHP could keep the major distributors for itself. 
BHP had acted in such a way that was not possible in a competitive market. It 
had excess capacity in its steel rolling mills. In a competitive market it would 
have supplied rather than lose sales. The High Court did not discuss what price 
BHP should have supplied Y-bar. Mason CJ. and Wilson J. commented BHP 
breached s. 46 because it would only supply Y-bar at "an excessively high price 
relative to other BHP products",S~ They also commented on OWl being able 
to obtain supply at a "reasonable price".S9 Deane J. talked of BHP supplying 
only at an "unrealistically high price ll ,60 Toohey J. held BHP breached s. 46 
because it would no·t supply at "competitive prices".61 Pincus J. at first instance 
linked the definition of a constructive refusal to supply with the ability of QWI 
to compete in product star picket fences. 
"[T]he offer made by BHP was pitched at a level which BHP knew 
would make it impossible of acceptance because [OWl] could not 
mam.lfactur~ star picket from Y-bar purchased at that price and 
58 Id. at 50, 006. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Id. at 50, 012. 
61 Id. at 50, 017. 
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it competitively".62 
Court did Dot grant a It sent the case back to Pincus 
J. to an appropriate order. Ultimately, the parties settled the case on 
undisclosed terms. Apparently, 9Wl never purchased Y -bar from BHP. 
decision has caused comment It is the 
case the world where a vendor it for itself, 
to a new customer. Pengilley criticises the 
decision as it courts to set "fair" prices.63 courts are ill-
to Stephen Corones case can be explained 
on a had leveraged its power Y -bar market to 
obtain a monopoly the star picket fence market. "nn ...... "T although 
U.S. commentators would have doubts about BHP to do so. 
However, one can explain the case on an RRC BHP by refusing 
to supply ","vr-anr high prices raised aWl's costs. meant it 
gained the DO\~er over in the star picket fence the RRC 
analysis the input and the output market is star picket fences. 
By asking a higb raised OWl's costs. To assess whether it 
did so substantiaUy, we whether aWl could have 
bar elsewhere. Pincus J. alternative suppliers existed. Firstly, 
62 
63 
Supra, note at 48, 817. 
64 S. CORONES, COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN AUSTRAUA 
(1990). 
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suppliers existed from feared Korean and was prepared to 
drop prices by 15 per cent to meet such imports. showed that 
when one of its oth.er customers threatened to buy BHP offered 
to it. BHP to the threat with considerable concern", Another 
potential supplier, 
recognised that 
or fence posts to 
existed, BHP believed. "It is now generally 
manufacture a and supply either Y -bar 
65 
Substitutes Y -bar existed. Boral " .... u.n. ....... made X-bar fence 
although they were not popular. Given all OWl may have been able to 
obtain V-bar Thus, BHP may not been able to raise OWl's 
costs significantly. however ignored 
alternative sources V-bar and substitutes. respect, this was 
BHP had not able to raise OWl's consumer weUare would not 
Only OWl as an individual competitor would. High Court stressed s. 
aimed not to protect competitors but consumers.66 
raise OWl's costs, next issue is whether it 
power over star To do so we have to consider 
the competition from 
trial court indicated rivals existed. 
equipment BHP and OWl in 
of star picket 
buyers bought 
and competed. A 
company produced star picket fences. these were too .... AL/I.-.u.i:l. 
Although the Court did not consider 
65 note 55, at 48, 814. 
66 Supra, note 2, at SO, 010. 
The 
Zealand 
to sell 
BHP 
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probably did power over price. It was the predominant of star 
picket It supplied to rivals. It had the to set prices. 
New Zealand fences were too expensive - so they would not restrain BHP. 
It is clear BHP's price of Y -bar to QWI was greater than it 
supplied Y-bar to subsidiary, A WI. even if QWI was more .... .LlJ ..... l ... ,U 
A WI manufacturing star from V-bar) it would not be able 
to lower than BHP. by its pricing the power to 
prevent prices falling star picket fence Under RRC model, 
BHP would be The case is a RRC situation. 
constructively to supply suffered term losses. It lost revenue 
not " .... U..LU1'; to QWI. However, it FZ.a.uu. ......... in the long term power 
over price in the star picket market. 
This is strategic predation. The model s. 46. high price for Y-
bar meets advantage limb. A could infer the requisite 
by by excessively V-bar F> .................... ,F> power over 
the purpose of 
the star picket 
or preventing QWI 
The deterring 
competitive 
is important in 
the RRC model. ........ ",A-LlJO, rival's costs to tbe A....,;-A ... t of gaining power over price 
does not competing. They 
of U-lO.A.LLI1'; ill e mo re difficult for 
can. It deters rivals, 
welfare suffers as 
sense 
all or as much as it 
but it shows how 
otbenvise. The RRe fully explain 
It does so in the pricing was 
consumer welfare 
problem of what price BHP remains. 
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American transfer test squeezes67 is the best alternative. BHP 
could aWl for Y -bar at the maximum level at which could make 
a profit star picket fences. This would force aWl to or more 
efficient as BHP. The price should not to price at which OWl can 
make a profit. a WI be more J...U.'vLJ.J.", than BHP. Guaranteeing OWl a 
profit could to survival of inefficient firms. To do so would 
consumer 
O'Keeffe Nominees Pty Ltd v =--'-''"'''"'''-''''-'''_-=->_ involved a price 
squeeze. This is an interlocutory A full has not yet occurred. 
O'Keeffe was a .y""',.,,, ... '''' ...... of petroleum products in Brisbane. It 
~a.u"''vU its supplies directly from BP. O'Keeffe supplied independent 
competed directly with BP and five other companies. 
BP to increase O'Keeffe's petrol "J""'UU'-,'-' the increase 
would mean it would go out sought quotes elsewhere. BP 
however, lowest ""''",L!.'''' sought an interim, injunction, a.H,",~LlJL~ 
s. 46 by increasing its price. 
Spender J. granted the injunction. held by and 
decreasing O'Keeffe's profits, could purpose of eliminating 
O'Keeffe. Spender J. price which decreased O'Keeffe's profit proved 
major factor is the extent of the 
... there has been a serious reduction 
and it is the effect of the imposed which I 
67 Supra, note 26 and 
68 note 
In 
ability 
as relevant 
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on deterInination of each crucial aspects of s. 69 
J. also held that some the defendanCs statements also 
LaU'Ui:)!A ......... purpose. A .... -< .... ..., ... E!>'"" of BP had replied to O'Keeffe's suggestion 
oil companies ""a.B ..... 'U. the independents out the market as 
"They don't it as blunt as that but it is obvious that's what 
wani as all the evidence points to that result".70 
With tV~l"v<W'i- the decision not fully consider Spender 1. 
.I.V<WI.li:l,",1...I on the price ''V''''LLLU.F, O'Keeffe could not make a profit. This not 
automatically mean BP an anticornpetitive The demand for 
could have as a result of a This is likely as BP's 
price was than the other BP's price was within the 
guidelines Trade Practices and Price Surveillance Authority bad 
O'Keeffe been inefficient. did not consider 
BP retail could have a profit if they to 
purchase at the same price as nder J. concentrated on the 
fate of - not on the effect on consumers. 
RRC model price increased no harm. The input 
is petrol supply. au tpu t market is petrol market. 
price increase costs to Although other suppliers 
existed were more expensive BP may have tbe most 
efficient producer. However, I will assume the first stage of model is 
mel. Cartel Ring or Frankenstein scenarios could have 
69 Id. at 51, 
70 
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applied. The other suppliers could have formed a cartel to fix prices for petrol. 
There were only five other suppliers with something like 70 per cent of the 
petro! supply market. Such a cartel is possible under the HHJ index. 
The next stage is to consider whether BP could have gained power over 
price in the retail petrol market. The answer must be no. O'Keeffe only had 
five per ceQt of th~ retail petrol market. BP had slightly over 20 per cent. In 
the absence of a cartel between BP and the other major oil companies, BP could 
not have power over price. No-one alleged such a cartel'. Thus, consumers 
would not suffer. The RRe model has the advantage here of quickly showing 
BP's price increase did not harm consumers and was not worthy of antitrust 
concern. 
A third Australian case involving a price squeeze is ASX Operations Pty 
Ltd v Pont Data Australia Pty Ltd.71 The Australia Stock Exchange (ASX) had 
a monopoly in stock exchange information. It sold this information to Pont Data 
which on sold it to customers. ASX had a subsidiary company JECNET which 
also on sold the information to customers in competition with Pont Data. Pont 
Data claimed ASX breached s. 46 by (inter alia) charging Pont Data an excessive 
fee for the stock excbange information. 
Wilcox J. at first instance held ASX had breached s. 46. He said: 
"[A]s I have hel<L the fees charged by ASXO are a function of its 
monopolistic position and its misuse of market power".72 
The Full Federal Court agreed. It held: 
71 Supra, note 5. 
72 (1990) ATPR, para 41-007. 
"Not without hesitation, we have concluded that the judgement 
should be read as including the finding against ASX and ASXO [a 
wholly owned subsidiary of ASX] that they took advantage of 
market power for the purpose of deterring the retail competitors 
of JECNET from engaging in competitive conduct, by imposition 
of the fee structures in tbe agreernents".73 
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As with O'Keeffe the Court did not consider whether tbe price squeeze 
harmed consumers. The Full Court held s. 46 does not require a "reasonable" 
pnce. Nor does it prevent monopolists charging a monopoly price. 
"[S.]46 does not strike at 'monopolists' or those in a 'monopolistic 
position'. Nor does it look to the attainment of a commercially 
'reasonable' result. It asks whetber a corporation has a substantial 
degree of power in a market and then proscribes the taking 
advantage of that power for certain purposes. Therefore, there is 
no contravention of that provision by a corporation with a 
substantial degree of power in a market which it uses to obtain a 
particular price, provided that in doing so the corporation has not 
taken advantage of its power for a proscribed purpose".74 
The Full Federal Court did not discuss the "take advantage" limb. It 
concentrated on purpose. It talked of ASX's Hstatements of intention'l and 
"mental state", Wilcox]. in the Federal Coun stated: 
"It is difficult to say to what extent members of [ASX] had 
JECNET in mind when they set the level of fees payable under 
the Signal 'e' agreements ... Wbatever the position, the members 
of [ASX] were well aware, firstly that IDS was profitable whereas 
JECNET was not, and secondly... that the imposition of bigh 
charges on retailers of Signal 'C' must assist JECNET to meet the 
competition of those retailersu • 
Such statements and intentions are also consistent mth nonnal 
competition. Neither court considered the effect on competition. A RRC 
analysis would do. 
73 (1991) A TPR, para 41-069 at 52, 060. 
74 Supra, note 72 at 51, 124. 
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As ASX was the only provider of the information, its price increase raised 
Pont Data's costs. Pont Data. could not get the information .elsewhere. It is the 
bottleneck scenario. Whether ASX achieved power over price is more 
problematic. It appears not. The Full Federal Court held that competition in 
the retail market was 'Vigorous" and "efficient". It noted the number of 
competitors in the market was increasing. Given this it would be unlikely ASX 
could achieve power over price. Thus, no liability would occur under the RRC 
model. Given that other firms could compete and make a profit in the retail 
market after buying from ASX, Pont Data may have simply been an inefficient 
firm. Thus, ,the FulJ Federal Court appears to have been more concerned with 
injury to a competitor rather than with harm to consumers. Yet OWl establishes 
avoidance of harm to consumers is the underlying principle 'of s. 46.75 The Full 
Federal Court held ASX's conn-act with Point Data did not breach s. 45(2) of the 
Trade Practices Act, i.e. it did not substantially lessen competition in the retail 
market. The reason was the number of vigorous, efficient and increasing 
competitors in that market. Thus, a firm can breach s. 46 even though its actions 
have no, or are unlikely, to have any anticornpetitive effect. A literal 
interpretation of s. 46 and ignoring the take advantage limb makes this possible. 
However, this does not achieve the very purpose of s. 46; to distinguish 
predation from competition. Using the RRC model to assist interpretation 
would help. A Court could argue, that as ASX did not gain power over price as 
a result of its price increase it did not have an anticompetitive purpose. Its 
purpose was profit maximising or making itself more competitive. A firm in a 
75 Supra, note 66. 
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competitive can do - so there was no "taldng advantage of market 
power". The RRC model would ensure courts harm to consumers rather 
than mere harm to an individual competitor. 
New Zealand: 
New Zealand 
the conduct as a price 
not any s. cases which the court referred to 
However, one can analyse """"-"'~ ........... =.,r;<~'"@ v 
and="""",,,-v~~~ as pnce 
Port Nelson ran the Port of Nelson. Union Shipping was a shipping 
company with an associated stevedoring company Union Port 
Nelson had a monopoly over mobile and over the port's 
wharves. government deregulated the in Zealand. Port Nelson 
wanted to maintain full use of its fleet of forklifts and drivers. It thus imposed 
a user levy on Union Shipping for Union Shipping to use port. Union 
Shipping claimed this breached s. 36 as it prevented it using its own stevedoring 
plant and manpower. Port Nelson claimed that a combination of economics of 
and high transaction made cargo bandling activities at the port a 
natural monopoly. Thus, its levy was not a use of a dominant position. 
'-'U .. ,LU.JL .. ''-' this natural monopoly meant that Union Shlpping had to use Port 
Nelson>s or additional via the to help Nelson with 
such economies. High Court accepted the argument in theory. It 
76 Supra, 6. 
77 Supra, note ,7. 
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whether the levy a. ... l..u. ... ",...., ...... efficiencies was simply a question of fact.?!! As a 
matter of fact the held it was not. It held the structure 
levy was more than 
test, held Port 
reasonable.79 
dominant 
adopting the OWl 
as it could not have 
imposed had it faced competition. It also inferred as 
anticompetitive on the basis of the amount of the levy. 
Again, the RRC model can aid analysis by how Port Nelson's 
conduct was anticompetitive. input market is access to wharves. The 
output market is shipping stevedoring services. stage, Port 
Nelson raised Union by impos~g the levy .. It is bottleneck 
Union Shipping had to to Port Nelson to gain access. It could not 
elsewhere. It seems amount of the levy Nelson 
power over price in the market. No other competitors existed to 
levy appears to so that restrain Port Nelson. The amount of 
even if Union Shipping was more ... J...U ... ' ..... 'u .. Port Nelson it would prevent 
.... rt.<" ... " falling or prevent 4~~1"'> as low as they would in a competitive 
under the model 
it would not be under U.S. law as that 
as it wants. However, under ~~* 
nr",rn .. Court adopted the Areeda-Turner 
78 
79 
80 
Id. 
decreases competitions on 
585 (1985). 
would be liable. One could 
a firm to charge as high a 
Nelson probably would. 
of predation of behaviour 
an unnecessarily restrictive 
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way.81 The principle of a levy did not breach s. 36, it was just the amount that 
did. The second stage of the model (i.e. does the predator have power over 
price) is useful. If so, it will be hard to accept that the predators purpose was 
to increase efficiency as Port Nelson claimed. However, the model does not 
help detemiine what price Port Nelson should have offered to Union Shipping. 
Again., perhaps the best test is the maximum price that Port Nelson could afford 
to pay and still make a profit. This would force Union Shipping to be as 
efficient or more efficient than Port Nelson. If Port Nelson had the power over 
price in that situation it would not be the result of a cost raising strategy, but 
rather because it was a more efficient competitor. If so, antitrust should not 
intervene. 
Clear v Telecom82 also involved a price squeeze alth.ough neither the 
High Court nor the Court of Appeal referred to that term.. Telecom was the 
former monopoly telecommunications service provider. The government 
privatised it and deregulated the telecommunications industry. Clear is a new 
entrant to the market. It sought interconnection into Telecom's network to 
enable it to compete in the market for local calls. One of the main issues was 
the price Clear should pay for interconnection. Telecom, after changing its 
stance, offered supply on the basis of what the High Court termed the Baumol-
Willig rule. Clear alleged that Telecom breached s. 36 as it knew the Baumol-
Willig rule would be unacceptable to Clear and thus, amounted to a denial of 
interconnection, i.e. it was a constructive refusal to supply or a price squeeze. 
81 Id. at 605. 
82 Supra., note 7. 
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Telecom argued the '-'v.LL.LU.',,", to promote competition. The 
essence competition is that it leads to an ""'J...L, .... " ........ system for goods 
and thus argued its price for interconnection should 
the -price it would a competitive market. 
Telecom called a number including Professor William Baumol. 
said in competitive or cOIne:st use a variety of rules to 
These include: 
1. pricing, with prices that vary in their ratio costs 
from one product to and from one customer to 
inversely with elasticity 
pricing which covers marginal or incremental cost. (Some 
products require a customer to towards fixed costs), 
3. opportunity a C1:lstomer should pay the opportunity of the 
product as well as cost entailed in ':O ....... uJ.y it, 
4. the long term firms should earn a competitive rate of return, i.e. 
revenue must cover total costs. 
Telecom on 3. The High Court elaborated on 
"Where the components or intermediate to 
another firm .. ," and entails some sacrifice of profit by 
the supplier firm (as it thereby up some capacity that 
it would have otherwise itse1f). supplier firm must 
permitted to price the article in question at a level sufficient to 
it for the profit it is forced to because of its 
supply the other firm. Economists to profit 
unavoidably an activity as the opportunity cost that 
activity".S3 
Thus, Telecom to Clear the fuJl pnce it 
5 166 (1993). 
a 
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customer, less its incrementaJ saved by Clear carrying of the 
call. Telecom the same profit even though Clear carries of the call. 
Professor Baumol termed this a or buy" policy. would not "buy" 
a Clear's connection between user and exchange or 10caJ 
loop) if it could make the itself less .... ""., ...... A';O Telecom 
between tbese two It would only interconnect Clear on terms made 
it indifferent as to wbether it made or bought. Telecom would not sell its loop 
below maxjmising 
objected to tbis pol as it forced it to underwrite Telecom's 
monopoly inefficiencies. High Coun held it not 
determine whether existed on the before iL84 However, the 
Higb Court this. Clear's pricing policy was that both Clear and 
have reciprocal access to each otbers network, rally without 
an interconnection payment subje~t only to a nt to balance the of 
inward and outward Ctear argued was a key the 
case.as Competitive telecommunication i reqUIre access to 
each networks. It a provider to give access to all phone 
a location - and not its own customers. argued had the 
been compe ty would a of Customers woutd 
demand it. Telecom It argued was buying an essential input 
and it was to sell (hat on terms covered its opportunity costs. It 
84 Id. at 212·21 
Hill & Weston, ~~~~~~~.!....!::..!.:~:"!"!'!;!'!...!..!:.!.!~~~.!.!.!..!.l~~~~ 
Zealand. Unpublished Seminar Paper, 
not acknowledge it was buying an input from Clear, connection to 
network. The Court ?i"r· ... n" ... ., argument held reciprocity was 
a key COl1t1pCmelQl 
1. 
High Court however ruled the Baumol-Willig not reach s. 
It held: 
" ... [t]he implementation of rule is more than the 
alternatives to improve competJtJon in New Zealand 
telecommunications. In that case, Telecom cannot be said 
position of dominance for the purpose of preventing or 
deterring Gear from engaging in conduct in the New 
......,...' ....... "'r..LL .... telecommunications market. defendant's conduct 
is more likely than in light of available to 
improve competition, the defendant cannot be said to breach 
of the purpose requirements s. 36. There is an improvement in 
competition when there is an enhancement of an efficient 
competitive 86 
High added the following reasons: 
should not Clear from competing' Telecom 
charges Gear what it would charge 
Only firms which can provide service at lower incremental cost 
Telecom can enter the Only those which can absorb 
profit and still compete on price. pricing would 
allow firms with ll.1j:.U ... ", costs than to enter. 
To that extent 15 more tbat ......... 'Ull.1 and can reduce 
prices. to reduce prices to match Clear. will 
reduce profits. This will reduce Telecom's opportunity costs 
a lower price to This enables Clear to 
its prices so on. Thus, rule will establisb a competitive 
86 Supra, note 83, at 217. 
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process.87 
Clear appealed. Court of Appeal holding the 
breached s. judgement of J. identified the reasons 
His Honour held monopoly profi ts the circumstances 
breaches s. 
He 
" ... while I accept that charging monopoly profits per se not 
contrary to New law it does not follow that insisting upon 
charging them a competitor does constitute a barrier to 
entry or a upon the ability of the competitor to engage 
competitive conduct. (s. 36 is not to wholly preventing 
or denying competitive conduct as seems to assumed by 
89 
"The inclusion in any access levy of a 
must affect at which Clear can 
affe~ the vigOill competitive conduct 
deterring a person engaging in 
wording of s. 36".90 
profit component 
the market and so 
would constitute 
conduct to use 
held that it was to infer that price would 
include monopoly profits and it was not an efficient did not 
consider it a s. that the competitive process would ..,1..U.1..U..l...I 
mODopoly rents. "It would be no answer at all if the access levy, 
because monopoly should constitute a barrier as to 
rd. 
88 Supra, note 7. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 rd. at 
Clear from entering the market".9f He further added: 
"I am therefore driven to as inappl~opria1te an access 
catcwate;Q from the base of what chooses to charge 
<::p'r(n",~1': and by cost. I cannot accept 
obic::cts of the are served by a method of 
secures of a in a dominant 
position".93 
I with the decision I make the following points. First, 
Ballmol~ Willig not appear applicable to Telecom. Professors HallIDl:>l 
and Willig argue that a single incumbent firm not maJk<~t power if it 
is constrained by the prospect of entry by one or more £inns not currently selling 
in the market. They term a COIlltestab.le markc~t. If a firm has become the 
only firm in done so by being more efficient than its 
led it to defeat its rivals. This is the key asslllID1)ti(J~n to 
contestable market modeL94 Telecom was not position. It was, as 
'I....1Q,u..t1. J., noted a former statutory monopoly. It won sun due 
to the government privatising it - not because it 
vanquished its rivals because of It is wrong to apply the 
92 at 
at 
Baumol and Willijg's see W. BAUMOL, J. 
PANZAR & R. WILUG, CONTESTABLE AND THE 
THEORY OF INDUSTRY (1982); Baumol, Contestable 
Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure. 72 AM. 
ECON. REV., 1 (1982); Baumol & Fixed Costs. Sunk Costs. Entry 
!!.arr.!S2!JUYJQJ.t~u.ill1m.ru~LQl..M.QllQI,l~ 96 QJ. ECO N " 405 
For a comprehensive 
t hp.r.nJ see Shepherd, Contestability versus Competition. 
AM. (1984); W. ADAMS & J. BROC~ 
ECONOMICS ON TRIAL : A DIALOGUE ON NEW ~'>J>J''-''' ... r 
f ...................... 26-30 (1993). 
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Baurnol-Willig ruJe to a 
Second, Gault commented tbat he could not see a a 
perfectly could monopoly 
"[Blut it seems to me that in a perfectly market if 
there is one supplier sacrificing profit will be a rival or 
potential entrant in a to supply without sacrificing profit. 
If not, there is a the market which is 
contrary to the 
With is confusing contestable with 
Monopoly pricing is simply pricing above cos t. A firm in 
a market bas got by more it a lower 
supply curve. Its marginal costs will rivals. Thus, it will be able to 
price above its (i.e. monopoly price). A rival can enter if it 
can curve below or to the same level as tbe 
market. Until a rival does the firm will to above its 
marginal cost. This will below supply curves and it will 
be monopoly pricing. competition wbere numerous 
compete will monopoly to a rival or potential entrant able to 
enter over the monopoly pricing firm's customers. 
Gault J. also thought essential U ....... ,LUt,l\"'''' was useful in 
considering the doctrine.96 With it is not. the High Court and 
Cooke P. noted reciprocity was an of the case. Cooke P. noted: 
"It would for Clear to use of Telecom's basic 
Clear customers could call Telecom 
'ubiquity' is acknowledged to 
Supra, note 7, at 28. 
96 Id. at 25. 
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such service".97 
This is not the case with an essential facility. A fum that has an essential facility 
does not need any particular customer. A firm seeking access does not provide 
any benefit (apart from increased revenue) to the essential facility. No 
reciprocity exists in an essential facility situation. 
Fourth, Gault J. seemed to suggest that monopoly pricing to an entrant 
will breach s. 36. With respect, this is too wide. Monopoly pric41g may 
encourage entry as firms are attracted by the monopoly profits. What was wrong 
with the Baumol-Willig rule was that it perpetuated Telecom's monopoly profits. 
The High Court argued that Clear, if it was more efficient would force Telecom 
to chase Clear's price down. Eventually Clear would eliminate the monopoly 
profits. With respect, this does not follow at all. The High Court is correct in 
. . 
assuming that in a competitive market if a dominant firm competes with a more 
efficient rival it will have to cut prices - otherwise it will lose sales and revenue. 
If the rival is much more efficient, the previously dominant firm will reach the 
stage where it will not be able to cut its price any more and it will be eliminated. 
This could not bappen to Telecom under the Baumol-Willig rule. It always has 
the backstop of its monopoly profits. If Clear is more efficient, Telecom as a 
rational profit-maximising firm would decide it is not worth chasing the price 
down any further. It would be more profitable to keep charging at the Baumol-
Willig price. It would reach the stage where Telecom was free riding on Clear. 
In this way, the rule offends against the second stage of the RRC model. It gives 
Telecom the power over price. It can prevent the price from falling as much as 
97 Id. at 1. 
it would a competitive market. 
Cooke see:mf~Q to this when commented: 
"The' argument for Telecom ... is that difficulty is overcome 
because, if tban Telecom, Clear will be 
able to attract its customers less : hence 
Telecom its to charge its customers less, to 
remain competltlve : the "opportunity cost" for which 
Telecom is to compensated will fall. could be so but is 
hypotheticaL Telecom would have indemnity and to some 
extent at might prefer to rely on it rather lower 
prices".98 
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Telecom would never be eliminated from market. Yet, possibility 
to happen with the contestable market theory. basis a contestable 
market is that incumbent is most efficient. However, it not stay that 
way. A more efficient firm may eliminate it. The situation was not a 
contestable market. It is more akin to a natural monopoly. The Baumol-Willig 
rule should not apply to such a market. 
Fifth, the model is in analysing case. argued above, the 
second 1S as Baumol·Willig gives Telecom the power over 
price. The stage ]s met as the situation is Krattenmaker and Salop's 
bottleneck scenario. 
Court not say what Telecom could charge. Gault J. seemed 
to indicate Telecom would have to guarantee Clear a profit. 
circumstances as prevail this case - where a 
competition realistically cannot the market without access to 
the facilities of a firm is a dominant position, a 
investigation the purpose of the behaviour is hardly necessary. 
The anti-competitive purpose is to be from the 
inevitability of the consequences of refusing to 
98 Id. 6. 
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lead to competitive disadvantage".99 
!{is does not explicitly state that Clear has to given access 
on terms that it a profit. rejected the rule in this 
case as it Dot exclude monopoly Cooke stated~ in relation to what 
Telecom couId 
"[T]he most that can done is to state a principle, which can only 
be that is entitled to a commercial for 
granting use of the assets, without to the 
present monopoly. Thls means opportunity shouId be 
ignored the charge fixed on basis of what a owner 
not competition for the of subscribers eouId reasonably 
for use of its 
is almost to the fair and vu..:'VJ-'Ul.l., ..... access to an 
under U.S. law. this doctrine is allowed 
to charge a to compensate it U"O' .......... ..Llpr;, the initial ~J.ll,,,,UL in the 
facility.IOI Such a charge mayor not guarantee a 
guaranteeing a harms consumer welfare. It allows a 
under which can survive. No one wants this. 
proponents of dynamic efficiency should only 
obtain access it as efficient as That is what would happen a 
competitive market. If a charges a at which it could not 
a profit, courts should an anticompetitive purpose. 
99 Id. at 39. 
100 Id. 
101 Chapter VII. 
1 89 
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RRC model in analysing the case. It shows how the ............... ,,'v.-
Willig would give power over price. cannot apply full 
model to facts case but it gives insights. 
Interestingly, the Baumol-Willig or "make or buy" does not 
U.S. law, v ~~~!.!::!:..It3o.:.:IL-.!..:!..Io!I~~~ 
involved or buy" in the rail industry. Delaware & Hudson 
Conrail were both rail companies. Delaware Hudson wanted to use Conrairs 
tracks to "' ... rillr-... customers the northeastern states. not need to 
use Delaware & Hudson's Delaware & Hudson did have an alternative 
route but it was longer. Conrail would only Delaware & Hudson to use 
its tracks on basis of or buy policy. Conrail would only let 
Delaware & 
the movement as it would 
L ......... "''-''L..I sued "'-"-""-'jl:..U..1 Delaware 
judgment ""Q,LLLLL.UF, 
iiit received same profit contribution on 
received, if it had been 
breach of s. Conrail 
policy was a legitimate 
it was profit maximising. District Court 
sole carrier. 
for summary 
purpose as 
it. The ......... ''''V1,JlU Circuit 
Coun of Appeals reversed bolding genuine arose over wbether tbe 
or buy policy was a business or a wilfully to 
Conrail's monopoly power. It also beld evidence bad to given on 
whether Conrail's rates constituted a constructive to supply as prices 
had increased 800 cent start of the shipment in question under the 
or buy policy. 
The case proceeded to jury trial. During first week judge 
902 F. 2d (2d. Cir. 1990), denied, III Ct. 2041 (1991). 
220 
informed counsel be could not see any antitrust violation and that parties 
should settle. Rather than enduring a seven month trial the parties did. Conrail 
continues to price according to the make or buy policy to this very day.1M 
~== is distinguishable from Telecom. There was no reciprocity 
involved. Delaware & Hudson did not need to use Conrail's tracks. It had an 
alternative route. Thus, Conrail could never eliminate Delaware & Hudson or 
even hinder it an anticompetitive sense, Delaware & Hudson could make 
- on alternative route. The only is it would 
longer. Prolonging a competitor's train journeys does not violate the antitrust 
laws. lOS Interestingly no one in the ill briefs or written submissions 
even raised possibility, that because Conrail's charge involved monopoly 
profits it breached s. 
Conclusion: 
RRC model analyse price squeezes. It most when 
more than one supplier exists as the -=-"== case. It is not as helpful when 
tbere is a monopoly supplier. One bas to assume that rivals' costs are raised. 
Whether are raised more they would in a competitive market is 
impossible to know. However, second of model is the most 
Ifa gains power over price because of its cost scenario consumer 
welfare is One can also infer an anticompetitive purpose if the firm 
104 Conversation letter with Bruce Wilsoll, Chief Officer 
Consolidated 
105 704 2d 373 Cir. 1983). 
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gains power over price. 
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CHAPTER VlI 
REFUSALS TO SUPPLY 
Introduction: 
Closely linked to price squeezes are to Indeed. courts call 
many price constructive to supply. Refusing to supply can be 
an raising rivals' costs A predator may with a rival. 
It may also control an input. By refusing to supply the input, tbe predator can 
raise rivals' costs. Very courts analyse refusals to supply as a ....... .:>,LUI; rivals' 
condemned However, courts been concerned with 
monopolists to supply. traditional consumer welfare justification 
for condemning a monopolist's refusal to supply is based on the effect it may 
have on consumers. If a non-monopolist to supply a rival, the can 
find another to supply its input. It can still compete in the market for the 
output. more firms that supply a particular product, lower prices are. 
Such refusals to do not injure consumers, as a rival can replace one 
with another. However, the 
Substitute suppUers may not as 
If so, refusal to supply can raise rivals' 
price harm consumer welfare. l 
1 
(1988). 
model shows this is not always so. 
and as tbe original supplier. 
and give predator power over 
If an monopolist refuses to supply, a has 
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or no ability 
to secure input. If it cannot obtain the input or a the relevant 
market loses a competitor it otherwise could have supported. This competitor 
would produce more of output. competitors mean prices. 
RRC shows to supply does not to eLiminate the 
rival harm consumer The may rivals' costs give 
predator power to prevent prices falling to what they would in a competitive 
market. Prices stili 'remain high and consumers suffer. 
A complicating arises with natural monopoly. is a market 
which can only support one firm. If a monopolist refuses to with a that 
is competition a natural monopoly that refusal to will not 
eliminate a competitor which the could otherwise support. In 
competition for a monopoly only one can That will be a 
monopolist. In such a case, to supply will not prevent consumers 
reaping the of competition, lower at any level of the 2 
Excluding last scenario, not every monopolist's refusal to supply 
will harm consumer welfare. The monopolist may also bave valid reasons for 
refusals. No antitrust a monopolist to supply all the The 
RRC model helps identify refusals are anticompetitive. Part IT of 
chapter U.S. law on refusals to supply. I will also the 
essential facilities I will apply the RRC model to some U.S. cases 
show how it analysis. ill "',... .. ..LLUJu. ... " Australian and New Zealand law 
on refusals to supply. Part rv some conclusions. refusals supply 
2 Scbill, note I, 230. 
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are the predator has entered exclusive ................ ..u."'- contracts witb input 
I shall not discuss exclusive dealing That is subject 
another "'.Ll<: • ..., ... ~. 
United States 
Supreme Court U.S. V =~:..= established right for a 
to supply. However, the is unqualified. A monopolist ............ LU.U 
to supply if it the purpose of creating or .-~~o a monopoly. 
Supreme observed: 
.... v"'v.u.,, .... of any purpose to create or maintain.a monopoly, 
the Act not restrict long-recognised rigbt of 
trader or manufacru.rer engaged an entirely business, 
to exercise own independent discretion as to parties with 
whom he will 4 
to 
refuse 
Subsequent cases deal with whether a monopolist had the purpose to 
create or J...UQ,J...U. ................. a monopoly. Unlike aUeged acts of monopolisation 
which require general intent, refusals to deal the monopolist to have a 
specific intent to create or a monopoly.s This is the same standard 
required to establish an attempt to monopolise.6 
u.s.- Courts have analysed monopolists' refusals to under two 
3 250 U.S. 300 (1919). 
4 Id. at 307. 
5 Eastman Kodak Co. v Southern Photo Materials Co .. 273 U.S. 359 (1927). 
6 
CORNELL L. REV. I, 121 (1973). 
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interrelated 
1. the .LU. ...... ,u .. test 
essential facilities test. 
Courts have observed the two of cases are "conceptually similar,,7 "no 
bright line can be drawn between them",8 courts cases using both 
The Circuit remarked: dichotomy, though part illusory 
is a useful analytic too1",9 
I examine each test. 
1. The intent test: 
The Supreme Court case to this test a refusal to supply case 
monopoly over manufacture of photographic materials and 
was a of Kodak. Kodak had been attempting to 
into the retail distribution of photographic supplies. It had bought out most of 
retail Southern refused to sell. n.V\'1Un.. then refused to sell at 
normal wholesale rate to Southern. Southern alleging of s. 
Supreme Court It read a purpose requirement into s. 2. It held 
monopolists narrower dealing prerogatives than ordinary finns. 
7 
8 
9 
~'""'" v ~~~--'-"-'=-= ....... 609 F. 2d 843, 846 (6th 1980). 
855. 
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v 738 F. 2d 
n. 11 (lOth Cu. 1984), affd 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
10 Supra, note 5. 
1518 
Monopolists s. 2 if their refusal to supply manifests an to 
monopolise. Court inferred a to monopolise the 
circumstances of case. There was no evidence of such an 
Similarly, have condemned a monopolist's refusal to supply 
with its rivals. this. The 
Journal published onJy Ohio. It a substantial 
monopoly in ill Lorain. A radio for 
advertising. Journal responded by to sell advertising to any 
local which also advertised on the radio station. Court 
held this "' .... '.H,..·"'" S. 2. Tbe Court the Journal, by to supply had 
the plan to injure the station. It had no trouble inferring an 
intent to 
Conversely, ,if the monopolist refusing to supply not have the 
purpose increasing or mai ng a monopoly or gaini ng a direct 
courts wilJ not condemn the monopolist. Official Airline 
defendant published the Official 
Airline This was a directory that 
all passenger plane transportation in u The plaintiff was a 
commu ler airline. defendant refused to include the plaintiffs airline 
It claimed it did so because it was to provide information 
on and punctual It deemed commuter airlines, as the 
less reliable safe than certified so it refused to list 
11 342 U.S. 143. 
F. 2d r. 1980), cert. denied. 450 U.S. 917 (1981). 
Second Circuit held that only coercive acts~ a purpose to restrain 
competition or an intent to Inr'''p~:,<:p or maintain its monopoly will deprive a 
monopolist its right to supply whom it wanted. Here, the defendant's purpose 
was not anticompetitive. Thus, it not breach the antitrust The 
ignored that the defendant's policy substantially injured commuter airlines and 
consumers airlines. The policy did so by distorting the flow of information to 
consumers of services. Anticompetitive effect was irrelevant. 
Anticompetitive purpose was what mattered. 
Another line of cases have focused on the anucompetitive of a 
refusal to deal. is an example. distributed 
periodicals. was a regional Bluff City's ownership changed 
it stopped supplying Byars. It claimed it had to, to ensure the strict control 
necessary for it to qualify for credit unsold periodicals its national 
supplier. The Sixth Ci.rcuit restated the Colgate intent test: However, it noted 
when discussing intent: 
H[W]hat should matter is not monopolist's state of mind, but 
the overall impact of monopolist's ... [which 1 
be deemed 'uofair' or 'predatorY onJy if it is unreasonably 
anticompetitive".14 
The Sixtb Circuit remanded the case back to the District Cou.rt to 
reconsider whether Bluff possessed monopoly power. It instructed the 
District Court to weigh anticompetitive impact of the refusal to deal against 
the business justification for the monopolises If Byars could have 
13 Supra, note 7. 
14 Id. at 860. 
showed City's refusal caused anti competitive injury, Bluff City could still 
business reasons justifying refusal to supply,IS 
Similarly Eleventh Circuit 
held: 
"A monopolist's to deal actionable ... only where 
[it] is designed to an anticompetitive whether to 
share, to drive up prices or to obtain some 
Hampton that the Supreme decision 
v reconciled the divergent line of cases.19 
_.~_,..., Co. (Ski Co.) and Highlands Skiing Corp. (Highlands) 
operated rival .. >1 ................. facilities Aspen, Colorado. Of the four ski-fields 
Aspen, Ski Co. owned three Highlands one. tbe parties had 
operated an all-Aspen ticket coupon system. allowed skiers to ski on any 
of the four mountains. parties distributed revenue from the all-Aspen ticket 
according to Dumber coupons collected at mountain. Highlands 
generally received 16 to 18 cent of the revenue. the 1976-77 season it 
only received 13.2 per cent. the 1977-78, season Co. said it would 
Id. 862-863. 
919 1517 (1 1990). 
17 
18' 472 
Hampton, 
BUTTERWORTHS COMMERCIAL LAW (J. 
eds. 2d ed. 1992). 
769, 
& A BOITowdale 
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only continue the all-Aspen ticket if Highlands accepted a fixed percentage of 
the revenues. llighlands found the offered (13.2 per cent) 
unacceptable. Ski terminated the all-Aspen ticket. Ski then introduced 
own three-mountain ticket. It also started a national advertising campaign 
that suggested its mountains were the only ski-fields in the area. Highlands tried 
to market its own all-Aspen ticket. failed as Ski Co. refused to accept 
Highland's tickets. It also to seU tickets for mountains to Highlands. 
Without aU-Aspen ticket, Higbland's declined to 11 per cent. 
Highlands sued, alleging Ski Co. bad monopolised the downhill sIding 
market in Aspen by refusing to. co-operate making the all-Aspen ticket 
available. A jury found Ski Co. bad breached s. 2. The trial judge had 
instructed the jury that a finn possessing monopoly power has no duty to co-
operate with its riva1.1O Her Honour further instructed that such a finn, that 
refuses to supply a rival some manner does not breach s. 2 if valid business 
reasons for the refusal?1 
The Tenth Circuit affinned.22 It held (inter alia) sufficient evidence 
existed to support the jUI)"s finding tbat Ski CO.'s intent, in refusing to with 
Highlands, was to create or maintain a monopoly.23 
The issue for the Supreme Court was whether the finding Ski Co. had 
breached s. 2 as a matter of law, "Decause it results the assumption that a firm 
Supra, note 18, at 
21 Ibid. 
22 Supr~ note 9. 
23 Id. at 1522. 
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with monopoly power has a duty to co-operate with its smaller rivals a 
marketing arrangement order to avoid violating s. 2 of the Sherman Act".24 
The Court agreed with Ski Co. that "even a firm witb monopoly power no 
general duty to engage in a joint marketing program with a competitor".2S It 
rejected Ski Co:s that jury's decision on this proposition, given 
the trial judge':; unambiguous instructions that a firm with monopoly power has 
no duty to co-operate with its rivals. 
absence of such an unqualified duty to co-operate, according to the 
did not mean that sucb a refusal to supply "may not bave evidentiary 
SlgJDlllCaIICe, or that it may not give rise to liability in certain circumstances".26 
Relying on the Court noted tbat the right to to supply 
does not include such refusals wben the monopolist bas a purpose to create or 
maintain a monopoly_ Co. did not simply reject an offer to participate in a 
co-operative venture which a rival proposed. Instead, it "elected to make an 
important change in a pattern of distribution that had originated in a competitive 
market and had persisted for several years".28 The Court specifically found tbat 
interchangeable tickets were used other ski areas which were competitive, thus 
permitting the Court to infer that such tickets "satisfy consumer demand in 
Supra, Dote 18, at 587 (footnote omitted). 
at 600. 
26 Id. at 601. 
27 Supra, note 11-
28 Supra, note '18 at 603. 
1 
competitive markets",29 
The Court concluded that Sid Co's decision to end all-Aspen ticket" 
was thus a decision by a monopolist to an 
Of the "market",JO attempted to 
distinguish between practices that reflect only a superior product or a well-run 
business, and the factors practices that tend to exclude or restrict 
competition. Thus, the Court considered whether the trial record supported the 
jury's conclusion that no valid business reasons existed for the refusal to supply 
Highlands. The linchpin of t.his inquiry was whether the evidence showed that 
Ski Co. had been attempting to exclude rivals on some basis other than 
efficiency. The Court found that the refusal to supply denied consumers their 
preference the all-Aspen ticket, adversely affected Highland's ability to 
compete and was supported by any efficiency justification. The Court held 
that: 
"[t)he evidence supports an inference that Ski was not 
motivated by concerns that it was willing to sacrifice 
short-run benefits and consumer goodwill exchange for a 
perceived long-run impact on its smaller rival".Jl 
The Court suggested a tripartite test for -____ ,-, whether a monopolist 
breached s. 2 by refusing to supply: 
1. did the monopolist's conduct harm 
2. did the monopolist's conduct hinder rivals' ability to compete, 
29 Ibid. 
30 Id. at 604 (footnote omitted). 
31 Id. at 610-611. 
3. did any valid business reasons justify the monopolist's conduct. 
Thus, intent and effect of the refusal to deal are both crucial in determining 
whether a monopolist breached s. 2 by refusing to supply. 
The ~= decision is consistent with the Raising Rival' theory, 
more on exclusion of competition than on the monopolist's ability to control 
price, That focus is central to the theory of raising rivals' costs. However, in a 
footnote. the Court ~'-''"'''' cost-raising strategies and implied the basis for 
a cause of action: 
"In any business, patterns of distribution develop over time; these 
reasonably be thought to be more efficient than aJternative 
patterns of distribution that do not develop. The patterns that do 
develop and persist we may call the optimal patterns. By 
disturbing optimal distribution patterns one rival can impose costs 
upon another, that force the other to accept higher costs".32 
Thus, one can read Aspen as lending judicial support to a theory of exclusion 
based on raising rivals' costs. 
The Court characterised the exclusionary conduct in as designed 
to h~ exclude or disadvantage a rival and consumers. This type of 
exclusionary conduct is a paradigmatic example of strategically a rival's 
costs. The termination of the joint venture was more costly to Highlands. 
led to a decline sales to a point it might have had to leave the market. 
Ski Co. placed Highlands at a competitive disadvantage by cutting off its access 
to an essential input or critical mass of consumers. 
Thus, Ski Co's conduct was exclusionary. It gained the power over price 
by raising its rivals> costs. In Bark's words, it "disturbed optimal patterns of 
604 n. 31 (quoting R: BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX: A 
POUCY AT WAR WfTH ITSELF, 156 (2d ed. 1993). 
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disttibution",33 Terminating the joint venture neatly into Krattenmaker and 
Salop's model. They note: 
"[T]he challenged practice .may destroy competition by providing 
a few firms with advantageous access to goodsJ markets or 
customers, thereby enabling advantaged few to gain power 
over price quality or OUtput".34 
Indeed, the RRC theory best explains ~~. The joint venture benefited 
Ski Co., yet it terminated It thus engaged in inefficient conduct. The only 
plausible reason is to rivals' costs. refusal to offer an all-Aspen 
may have hurt consumers may have discouraged from to 
However, Ski Co. must have decided it would rather have a bigger share of a 
smaller market. Although the refusal disadvantaged Ski Co. it disadvantaged 
Highlands more. 1bis is classic strategic predatory behaviour. 
It thus appeared that U,S. Courts in deciding refusal to supply cases, 
would assess how much a costs would increase after the refusal and how 
it affects consumers. 
Most cases have focused on wbether the monopolist has had a legitimate 
business justification for refusing to supply?5 The Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals gave Aspen tbe most detailed attention in ~~~...!:::!!:~~~:....!::::O~~ 
Western Union had a monopoly in 
telex services. It had also leased telex terminal equipment to its customers. 
When it decided to withdraw from the "I..ILLU ...... H market, it had a large amount 
of terminal equipment that it attempted to sell to its customers. Initially, 
it had provided sale force, for distribution to its customers, a list of 
independent suppliers from whom they could such equipment. It 
encouraged Olympia to enter the equipment market and sell terminals 
to Western Union customers. Later Western Union decided it was liquidating 
its equipment too slowly. It then stopped helping Olympia by refusing to refer 
customers to Olympia, as it had previously done, and refused to provide it with 
its customer list. Olympia, without its own force, went out of business. 
Olympia sued breach of s. 2. It won at instance. Seventh 
Circuit Olympia claimed Aspen required Western Union to cooperate 
with it by supplying its customer lists. It argued that as Highlands could not 
survive without cooperation of its rival, so Olympia could not survive without 
Western Union's help. Posner disagreed. held Western 
Union had not acted anticompetitively. He "Refusing to act as your 
competitor's sales is not an unnatural practice engaged in only by firms 
bent on monopolisalion",:n observed that a firm with monopoly 
power has no duty to belp its rivals.38 He distinguished "'-=..,:.="" 
L.:....=~=..J stands for any principle that beyond its unusual 
it is that a monopolist may be guilty of monopolization if it 
refuses to cooperate with 'a competitor circumstances where 
Id. at 379. 
38 Id. at 375. 
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some cooperation is indispensible to effective competition".39 
Aspen was distinguishable. In ~~~ Highlands could not compete 
without being able to customers access to Ski CO.'s larger facilities. 
Competition required some cooperation. By contrast, Olympia could have 
recruited a sales force and identified customers The evidence showed 
vendors who had their own sales forces were able to remain business without 
Western Union's help. Cooperation was not necessary for effective competition. 
£!f!~~ Ski Co:s refusal to cooperate with Highlands was stark contrast to 
its own decisions to cooperate with rivals other ski areas. Rivals in other sid 
areas had joint ticketing cooperation was an 
efficient marketing tool. In Olympia Judge Posner pointed to the lack of any 
"evidence that suppliers of telecommunications equipment customarily provide 
their own customers with lists",40 
Moreover, Western Union had a legitimate and procompetitive business 
justification- - it wanted to sell its supply of telex terminals as quickly as possible. 
Judge Posner observed: 
"[A] monopolist cannot be faulted for wanting to output 
unless engaged in some predatory or exclusionary scheme ... 
. There is no such scheme here; Western Union's long-run design 
is to get out of the telex terminal market".41 
In Ski Co. had no legitimate business justification for conduct. Judge 
stressed vu.' ........ of the refusal to supply on consumers. The refusal 
39 Id. 379. 
40 Id. at 377. 
41 rd. 
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must harm consumers. If not, it is irrelevant that the conduct harms the rivaL 
"[T]be lawful monopolist should be free to like everyone 
else; otherwise the antitrust laws would be holding an umbreUa 
over inefficient competitors. "A monopOlist, no less than any other 
competitor, is permitted and indeed encouraged to compete 
aggressively on the merits .... " 
Today it is clear that a firm with lawful monopoly power bas no 
general duty to help competitors, wbether by bolding a price 
umbrella over their heads or by otherwise pulling its competitive 
puncbes". 
"Most businessmen don't like their competitors, or for that matter 
competition. They want to make as much money as possible and 
getting a monopoly is one way making a lot of money. That is 
fine, however, so long as do not use methods calculated to 
make consumers worse off in the long run. Consumers would be 
worse off if a with monopoly power had a duty to extend 
positive assistance to new entrants, or having extended it 
voluntarily a duty to continue it indefinitely. The imposition of 
such a duty would make firms that or might be thought 
to possess monopoly power, however laudably obtained, timid 
about relinquishing that power, or having done so, timid about 
competing with new entrants".42 
His Honour also that a legitimate business reason was important 
- jf onJy to rebut a presumption that tbe monopolist's conduct was 
anti competitive. His Honour noted: 
"[c]onjoined with other evidence, lack of business justification may 
indicate probable anticompelitive effect".43 
Judge Frank Easterbrook criticises the legitimate business purpose test.44 
He ..,lGLJl1..I,.L:> that often can offer no justification for their conduct. This does 
42 Id. at 375-376 (citations omitted). 
43 Id. at 
44 Easterbrook, ~~~~~~~~!..!2.!:~~~~ 
L REV., 972 (1986); 
~~~ 61 ANTITRUST LJ. 761 (1 
not mean that their 'conduct does not enhance efficiency. Economics slow 
understanding business behaviour. Advances in learning may show what was 
once regarded as purposeless behaviour may actually be efficiency enhancing. 
Given that, courts should not insist on a legitimate purpose for conduct, as they 
run risk of condemning behaviour that may actually be efficiency enhancing. 
Indeed. two Aspen. Professor John Wiley Ski Co.'s 
behaviour was ... .L.LJ.'"'."" as it permitted Ski Co: to promote the area more 
aggressively to who might otherwise visit other ski resorts without fearing 
that some of the newly attracted skiers would spend their money on Highland's 
slopes.45 As Co. did not this argument there was no evidence on 
which to assess it. With respect, courts should require a reason behaviour. 
Wiley's post hoc justification could only be achieved if Ski Co. was consciously 
pursuing it. Ski Co. knew that its conduct was going to cost it in the short run. 
Its only purpose must been to disadvantage Highlands. Also future 
economists 'may demonstrate the conduct was harmful. Under Easterbrook's 
argument consumers would suffer in the form of higher prices until conduct 
was shown to be conclusively anticompetitive. 
Subsequent have refusals to deal on whether tbe 
monopolist had a legitimate business purpose in to deal. The Ninth 
held that even if a 
monopolist's refusal to supply a rival is based partially on a desire to restrict 
45 Wiley> ~~~~~r.....:,....;:~~i::!:&.e~~::L!6:~~~ DUKE 1003. 1005 
(1986). 
46 838 F. 2d 360 (9th Crr.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988). 
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competition, no s. 2 violation occurs so long as the monopolist also had· a 
legitimate business justification decision.47 Other Courts have held 
same.48 However under Oahu Gas reasoning a monopolist to supply 
a customer, if and only if. it bas no business justification for refusing to help 
rival. suggests Courts will accept a monopolist's proffered justifications. 
Most Circuits will not. They will assess the justifications and assess whether the 
conduct was unnecessarily restrictive or not. 
is illustrative. Here. a monopolist newspaper publisber vertically integrated into 
papers. Once it did so, it refused to ~upply its previous 
independent distributors. This put tbe previous distributors out of business. The 
Eight Circuit noted that the specific intent required for liability could not be 
based on 'valid business justifications", It identified two legitimate business 
reasons for the vertical integration. 
1. The ability to set an area-wide uniform retail price to facilitate "in paper 
advertising" new subscriptions and simply subscription collection, and 
2. the capability to be more responsive to customer complaints and assure 
more rapid starts for new subscribers.so 
However, the Court also noted that refusing to supply a monopolist's 
vertical integration could competition in tbree ways: 
47 Id. at 368. 
48 ~=== V ~~~'----"-"~=.:.~ 780 2d 735 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied, 475 U.S. 1087. 
49 2d 692 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 872 (1984), 
SOld. at 697. 
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1. by increasing to entry, 
2. by facilitating the monopolist's ability to price discriminate, 
by allowing it to evade rate regulation. 
Court held so long as the defendant's integration did not have 
"unreasonable anticompetitive effects .. S1 on consumers it would not breach s. 
In other words, it balanced the anticompetitive harm against the benefits of the 
refusal to supply. Court held the concerns with vertical integration 
did not apply The Court stressed legitimate business reasons had to 
involve efficiency. 
"Absent the intent to monopolise, a monopolist's 
legitimate business decision will not be curtailed if those 
promote the redeeming of competition : lower prices, 
greater efficiency and innovation and more responsive service".52 
Other courts have also a legitimate business purpose has to 
linked 10 DCY. "-""== implies courts will nOl automatically accept a 
monopolist's efficiency justiikations. In ~'-'-"""~~~:.::::!.!.~~~~~~~~::!.!. 
the Sixth Circuit found no justification for the 
defendant's leveraging conduct. It rejected the defendant's efficiency claims. 
Only one case involving a refusal to supply addressed the issue a 
rival's cost framework. v 
involved the heal th care industry. Blue Cross was a health care 
51 Id. at 698. 
Ibid. 
53 854 F. 2d 1 (6th Cir. 1988). 
899 2d 951 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 1]0 S. Ct. 3241 (1990). 
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provider in Wichita., Kansas. It paid Wesley Hospital Wichita to treat its 
.. ,,'"" .......... u.... was a national health care provider. It acquired Wesley 
Hospital and some health care financing companies operating in Wichita. Blue 
Cross was concerned about competition from Reazin so it decided lito terminate 
Wesleys contracting provider and reduce the allowable 
payments it would make to [competing hospitals]. thereby increasing Wesleys 
cost of doing business and causing a shift Blue Cross patients from Wesley to 
[the competing hospitals)".ss Blue Cross's termination not only injured Wesley 
but also other hospitals willing to enter into relationships with Blue 
The Circuit held Blue breached s. 2 as its conduct constituted 
wilful maintenance of monopoly power. Although the Court did not expressly 
discuss the raising rivals' costs model, its analysis was consistent with such 
theories. It noted that Blue Cross's acts caused Wesley to spend money on 
advertising) to reduce prices to retain market share and to lose patients.57 In 
determining that monopoly power existed, the Court expressly agreed with an 
"''VT'''::'T"T witness for Reazon that Blue Cross's power to exclude competition gave 
power over.price.S8 The Court held that Blue Cross had: 
"[rJestricted ability of other buyers (competing health care 
organisations) to purchase hospital services on a 
competitive basis through alternative delivery systems, thereby 
Id. at 954-955. 
56 Id. at 966. 
57 Id. at 962. 
58 Id. at 970. 
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restraining competition in the health care financing market .. :1,59 
This is the raising rivals' costs sceoario. As the Court talked 
of the plaintiff's conduct disadvantaging rivals. 
U.S. have primarily applied "intent test" to a monopolist 
refusing to supply a rival. However, courts have developed an alternative 
analysis - the essential facilities doctrine. 
2. The essential facilities test: 
essential facilities or bottleneck doctrine which deals with a particular 
type of ...... u,.:>c;u to deal derives the Supreme Court's decision in v 
~~~:!",!:!~~~L.!;;!.i~~~.60 This was not even a s. 2 case. It involved s. 
1. The held that a group of railroads that jointly owned the only 
in St Louis that could feasibly accommodate from west to east, breached 
s. 1 by denying their rivals access to 00 reasonable The 
reason was such access was to rivals' ability to compete. Building on 
a series of Supreme Court cases that do not even mention the concept, the 
Circuit Courts formulated the doctrine.61 
59 rd. at 965, 
60 224 U.S. 383 (1912). 
61 
The leading' modern case is ~~~~~~~~:.....:::..~"'" V ,,-=,-=-:...62 
AT&T was then a vertically integrated telephone company controlling most local 
telephone networks. It refused to allow MCI to interconnect with its local 
network. The local network was essential if Mel was to compete in the 
distance market. The Seventh Circuit held AT&T's local networks were 
facilities and that AT&T a duty to allow MCI access. It held MCI 
had proved "that it was technically and economically feasible for AT&T to bave 
provided requested interconnections that AT &1"5 refusal to do so 
constituted an act of monopolisation".63 The stated" 
"A monopolist's refusal to deal under these circumstances is 
by' so-called essential facilities Such a 
refusal may be unlawful a monopolist's control of an 
essential facility (sometimes called a ''bottleneck'') can extend 
monopoly power from one of production to another, and 
from one market into another. Thus, the antitrust laws have 
imposed on firms controlling an essential facility the obli!ation to 
the facility available on nondiscriminatory terms", 
The Court also identified four elements necessary to establish liability under the 
doctrine. 
1. control of tbe essential facility by a monopolist; 
a competitor's inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential 
facility; 
708 2d 1081 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1993). 
63 Id. at 1133. 
64 ld. at 1132. 
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the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and 
4. the feasibility of providing .the facility.65 
Numerous Courts have cited these four elements approvingly. However, often 
elements 3 and 4 are changed. Professor William has reformulated 
elements 3 and 4 as follows. 
3. denial of the use of the facility or the imposition of terms 
... with the consequence of substantial harm to competition in a reJevant 
market in which the monopolist competes (or would forced to compete 
with the plainti£f(s) absent the practice. 
4. The Vol ..... ..,. ..... ...., of a ''valid business reason".66 
The fourth element reflects the Supreme Court's findings in Some 
Circuits have accepted trus reformulation. It extends, =~ narrower inquiry 
into the feasibility of providing access. 
The first element focuses on a monopolist's control of an essential facility. 
be essential a facility must be vital to competitive viability. Rivals cannot 
effectively compete in the relevant market without access to it. 
Courts initially applied the term essential facility to tangible 
However, some courts now apply it to intangible assets.61 
The -second is usually not controversial. However the Seventh 
65 Id. at 1 
66 
67 Bell South Advertising & Publishing Corp. v '-"""""'=.;---===== 
Publishing, 719 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1988), affd. 933 F. 
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Circuit addressed it in v Estate of Wirtz.68 Fishman and Wirtz led 
investment groups which wanted to buy the Bulls NBA franchise. 
Fishman had an agreement to buy the Bulis, contingent on him obtaining a 
stadium Wirtz, controlled Chicago Stadium. and refused to it to 
Fishman. Fishman sued alleging breach of s. 2 on basis of the essential 
facilities doctrine. Wirtz alleged that Fishman could have bull t a new stadium. 
Circuit held Chicago Stadium ''was not duplicable without an 
expenditure that would have been unreasonable in light of the size of the 
transaction such duplication would have been facilitated".69 Court held 
that the poipt of the facilities doctrine is that potential market entrants 
should not be required to enter two markets simultaneously. Wirtz also argued 
its refusal did not harm consumer welfare. The Seventh Circuit accepted this 
but held essential facilities doctrine did not require that. A plaintiff in such 
a case did not have to show to consumers when the conduct was not aimed 
at the consumer leveL The Court did note that the ~= decision had stated 
the effect on consumers is significant in labelling conduct exclusionary. 
However, it did not comment on it. 
Judge Easterbrook dissented, saying the case was not an essential facilities 
case. It was not the usual case of a monopolist to supply a rival with 
the purpose of disadvantaging it. Chicago could only have one NBA franchise. 
Thus it was a situation of two firms competing to be the sole monopolist. This 
did not consumer welfare. He chided the majority for not adequately 
68 807 F. 2d 520 (7th 1986). 
69 Id. at 539-540. 
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dealing with ~=. He did however that it was not possible to duplicate 
the stadium.70 
for a plaintiff to allege that access to one facility is simply 
economical" than other alternatives. 
inquiry the practi~ty of duplicating the facility should 
consider economic, regulatory and other concerns. Although 
expensive in absolute terms, the cost of duplication may 
reasonable in light of transactions that would be duplicated and 
the possible profits to be gained".71 
A defendant may ruso defeat an essential facilities claim by providing an 
alternative facility on a reasonable basis. 
Generally, it will be no problem for a plaintiff to establish the third 
element of the essential facilities doctrine. A defendant either has or has not 
denied access. 
The fourth element poses some issues. Although courts do not investigate 
the anticompetitive effect of refusal of access to an essential facility, they still 
take account of the reasons for . monopolist's refusals. If they are 
courts will not require access. Unlike the legitimate business justifications under 
the essential facilities cases do not require reasons to be 
linked to efficiency. Courts will not require access if it is not "technically and 
economically feasible" for the defendant to provide or share access to the facility 
in question. Technical reasons have nothing to do with efficiency. doctrine 
provides that access must be on "a fair and reasonable basis". This has caused 
probleIIlS as courts "have had to set these fair and 
..... """v ...... '(,I.u ...... pnces. cases 
70 Id. at 570-574. 
71 Id. at 540. 
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no discernable pattern. However, one constant is that any has to 
have a component which compensates the defendant who initially invested 
facili ty. 72 
One student note suggested a defendant only has "three narrowly 
drawn defences" for refusing access. 
L Ilmited Capacity of facility, 
2. the inability or unwillingness of the foreclosed party to bear 
monopolist's cost provid..ing acc'c:::ss. 
with monopolist's service of other customers.73 
TIlls corresponds with the case law. The essential faci.lities doctrine does 
not apply if the monopolist does not compete with the plaintiff. U.S. courts 
regard these as arbitrary to No antitrust liability 
only exception is if the refusal to supply IS to prevent discounting. Then, 
however, the conduct is se illegal as price maintenance. Such cases 
do Dot lovolve raising rivals' theory. firm cannot raise its rivals' costs 
if it refuses to supply someone who is not a rival. 
courts do not speak of rivals' costs when dealing with essential 
facilities. Seeing they do not conSider the anticomperitive effect a refusal to 
supply in circumstances, this is not surprising. However, one can analyse 
such eases on that basis. denyiog a access to an essential facility, a 
must raise costs. 
It is still uncertain whether the Court will essential 
72 Supra, note 60. 
Note, supra, note 61, at 474-477. 
facilities doctrine. It the opportunity of addressing 
declined to do so - deciding the case under the intent test. 
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It issue in ~~"". 
The RRe model is relevant useful in assessing refusals to deal under 
U.S. law. I now tum to Australian and New L....I"oJ."-l<.L.t.l. ..... law. I shall not discuss 
whether s. and s. 46 allow the essential J. ......... LU ..... 'w.;> doctrine. The issue is 
beyond dissertation's scope. Other commentators have already addressed 
the issue?~ 
Australian and New Zealand Law: 
Much Australian case law involves a fum to supply (or 
terminating) one of its distributors. Such refusals can breach s. 46. However, 
do not involve the Raising Rivals' Costs analysis. A by refusing to 
supply one of its own distributors does not raise its rivals' costs. 
Accordingly, I not '-U>..JL.:H .... 'VL such cases.75 
The leading Australian case is I have considered this already under 
the price squeeze chapter. I have argued the RRC relevant to the case. Most 
Australian cases involve exclusive dealing. I sbaIl consider ill 
exclusive dealing chapter. A 19l1ll1Cam. refusal to deal case not involving 
exclusive dealing as such, is 
was Australia's largest manufacturer plasterboard and associated 
authorities cited GAULT ON COMMERCIAL LAW, para 36, 09 
(8) (1994). 
76 (1991) ATPR, para 41-076. 
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products. (These materials are used to construct ceilings.) It was the sale 
suppUer Western Australia Western Australian wholesale customer 
was" North 
Perth bought 
Plaster Works Pty Ltd (North Perth). Until January 1987 North 
of plasterboard from CSR. North Perth then began to 
acquire plasterboard from a new entrant - Boral Australian Gypsum limited 
(Boral). North Perth intended to Boral products from a new warehouse. It 
wanted to sell CSR products from existing CSR informed North 
Perth that it would only supply wholesalers who carried a full of 
products. North Perth could not carry a full range of both Boral and CSR 
products. It wanted "access" to any CSR products which a customer expressly 
requested. CSR wrote to North Perth refusing to supply stating it was 
prepared to supply its product to a wholesaler who was going to use 
to supplement Boral's product line or to "top Upll Boral's shortfalls 
products 
supply. 
North Perth complained to the Trade Practices Commission. The COJmIInSS.LOn 
sought an injunction and pecuniary penalties against CSR alleging breach s. 
46 and s. 47. CSR admitted liability. 1. held that the effect of CSR's 
letter was to announce a refusal supply. Its purported reasons for refusal 
were a and a device to stop North Perth .... LLLL!...LI.Ju.J.& breach of the Trade 
Practices Act. French 1. commented, that CSR's behaviour was reprebensible 
that it aimed conduct Boral when Boral was seeking to enter the market 
through North North Perth was vulnerable to a cessation of supply 
This was especially so market power the geographical 
isolation of the and associated barriers to entry. 
One can analyse under the RRC analysis. North Perth was necessary 
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for Boral to compete the Western Australian The market is 
plasterboard wholesalers. By to supply North Perth if it Boral 
products, CSR into an exclusionary rights contract with North Perth. 
Boral's costs. Boral had to find another wholesaler. Given the 
geographical isolation very few probably existed in Western Australia. is 
the bottleneck or real foreclosure scenario. CSR as the supplier had 
over could not obtain plasterboard else 
Western Australia: The only substitutes were presumably more 
supplies other states. Thus RRC model is relevant this case of 
refusal to 
New Zealand: 
same situation applies New Zealand refusals to supply as 
RRC model is only relevant if a dominant firm refuses to supply 
a rival. I shall nOt consider case. did 
nOt involve ARA to supply a rival. [nterestingly, Barker J. analysed 
the case under essential faciJ.ities u.s. Courts would not consider 
as an essential facilities case as the person controlling the essential facility 
not access to a rival. 
None of cases involving Milk Board terminating its 
the RRe model either. terminating milk the Board did 
falSe vendors' costs. They stopped obtaining milk. They could not 
obtain it elsewhere. This is a possible essential facilities case. None of the 
[1987] 2 NZLR 647. 
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Courts possibility. 
I already considered the two leading New Zealand to supply 
cases - and v the Squeeze chapter. I 
concluded the model was applicable. The same applies. 
The ~~ case is to New "-""'.cu<.L.Ln .... The ~~ specific intent 
is very to purpose requirements under s. idea of 
disadvantaging a rival Aspen corresponds to the deterring purpose under s. 
36(1)(c). I have argued RRC theory explains Aspen. Given the 
between s. 36 the model will likely be influential in 
New £...A."QU<l.LI 'U. 
Conclusion: 
The RRC model aids analysis of some types of refusal to deal. It does 
not apply when a dominant firm refuses to supply a non-rival. Nor is it very 
useful in the context of the essential facilities doctrine. One of keys to 
model is the effect raising rivals' costs has on consumers. The doctrine as it 
stands does not consider this. The model is useful and to s. when a 
dominant refuses to supply a rival. 
78 
79 
[19901 2 662. 
Unreported. 17/12/93 CA 25/93. 
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CHAPTER VIH 
OVERBUYING AND PREEMPTIVE INVESTMENT 
Introduction: 
Overbuying is a classic strategy. I predator buys up more of an 
input than it needs. It) Krattenmaker and words, enters 
Exclusionary Rights Contracts with existing input suppliers. This is Real 
Foreclosure scenario. A predator so much of an input that it forces up 
of the available input. This raises its rivals' costs. Closely 
linked to overbuying is the strategy of preemptive Here, a predator 
expands capacity before demand for its product increases. expanding 
capacity the predator will be more input to manufacture its product. This 
will mean of the input is available to rivals. will drive up the price for 
input, thus costs. However, the notion of overbuying and 
preemptive being anticompetitive is controversial. Part of this 
chapter will examine attractions as an anticompetitive Part will 
"""'""' ........ ".:J the criticisms of overbuying and preemptive Part IV will discuss 
the case such as it Part V will discuss whether the strategy could breach 
s. 36. Part VI will offer some conclusions. 
1 
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Attractions as an Anticompetitive Strategy: 
The underlying the strategy is that choose capacity a 
"" ..... 1".' ... way so as to entry. Professor Michael Spence developed a 
detailed model of entry-deterring capacity.2 According to Spence, if a 
wants to maintain market power and higb profitability over an extended period 
of it must develop some form of protection or potential rivals 
from eXIlan,mng. If it wants to protect its position in sun it must able to 
entry from new and e:-;pansion from existing can take 
two of action. The first kind are actions a finn takes before a new 
enters market. Spence calls pre-entry actions positioning. The second 
kind are action takes response to a rival entered. Spence 
calls these actions reactions.3 
The for a predator to deter entry is to find a positioning strategy that 
IS -
(1) 
(2) 
not too costly, and 
. . 
creates incentive for predator to react to entrant in a way that 
3 J. 
is destructive to the 
Preemptive investment is one such positioning strategy. predator 
chooses a capacity so that a new entrant could make no sales at a 
profitable if the used all of capacity. The excess ..... u, ....... , is 
"".u;' ... Vl views it as an investment will oenc:m the 
if the does not use all of predator's monopoly 
It some monopoly profit the capacity. If it not added 
or only an amount which would allowed the new 
entrant would have VLLL.L.LU.J' .......... ' ..... its monopoly profits. Consequently 
preserve position and the process turn most of monopoly profit 
socially wasteful c05tS.4 predator is rent "'''''"'>''''-L',,, by adding capacity,s 
Spence's mbdel is not to manufacturing industry. A 
predatory retailer may also engage expansion-deterring investment. It may 
"over·store" a geographic area to limit expanding,6 
Similarly, a predator may use the a reactions way. added 
4 1. POL. 
5 Id. Posner, argues one the costs of monopoly is that the of 
an opportunity to earn monopoly profits will resources into 
competing those profits. The opportunity cost resources is a 
social cost monopoly. The effect activity is to turn the whole 
of monopoly profits into costs, since will costs in 
obtain a monopoly position until the costs incurred the expected 
return from the position. For an appraisal of see Fisher, 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~93 
6 
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capacity will deter existing rivals from expanding. They will know the predator 
already has excess capacity. Thus, if they try and expand, they will fail as tbe 
predator has the ability to increase output and reduce price. Thus, the rivals' 
profits will be zero if they expand. 
The strategy is a powerful signalling device.7 It signals to potential and 
existing rivals that' the predator has made an irreversible and preemptive 
commitment to the industry. It also signals potential entrants that the predator 
has tbe ability to engage in a price cutting war once a new firm enters the 
market. That signalling may induce rivals to leave the market and persuade 
others not to enter. The signal that the predator can engage in a price cutting 
war may be incorrect. The capacity expansion may have exhausted the 
predator's financial resources. That does not mean rivals will not take any 
notice of the signal. Asymmetric knowledge characterises market. Firms do not 
have perfect knowledge,B Rivals will not know that the predator has exhausted 
its resources and cannot afford to price cut. Thus, they will take the signal 
seriously. This is especially so if the predator has a reputation for responding 
vigorously to competition. Once a firm has established such a reputation it does 
not have to repeat the demonstration very often. It need only do it once,9 
7 Gale & He~wig, Incentive-compatible debt contracts : The one-period 
problem. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 52 (1986); Fudenberg 
& Tirole 'The Fat-Cat EffecL the Puppy-dog Ploy and the Lean and 
Hungry Look', 74 AM. ECON. REV., 361 (1984). 
8 See Krebs & Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect Information. 27 J. ECON. 
THEORY, 253 (1982); Milgrom & Roberts, Predation. Reputation and 
Entry Deterrence, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 280 (1982). 
9 R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMlC PERSPECTIVE, 
184-187 (1976); Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare 
Thus, although the may false rivals will take it seriously. Professors 
Drew and Jean Tirole call falsely signalling that the predator is 
superior in some important way the "signal-jamming theory of predation".lo 
Professor Michael Porter building 00 work has identified 
conditions which must exist the strategy can succeed. ll 
1. The capacity expansioo must be large relative to the expected market 
12 
If capacity expansion is not it cannot be preemptive. A key 
related issue is does each rival prospective tbink future demand will 
be? any rival that demand be enough to absorb the 
capacity expansion and then some. it can choose to enter or expand. To prevent 
rivals tbink:ing this, the capacity expansion must be large. 
2. There must large economies of to total market 
demand.13 
If economies scale are large relative to total market demand.. an early 
preemptive capacity expansion may deny rivals enough residual demand to be 
efficient. If rivals who invest invest heavily and risk a costly 
fill capacity. not, will have inherently higher costs if they invest on a 
1., 284 (1977). 
10 Fudenberg & Tuole, ~~~..!:L!o!~~""""'~~'f-"!!L~~~~ 17 RAND 
11 
J. 366 
M. 
ANALYSING 
12 Id. at 336. 
13 Ibid. 
COMPETITNE STRATEGY: TECHNIQUES FOR 
AND COMPETITORS, 335-338 (1980). 
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smaIl 
The Predator's Capacity Expansion credible.14 
Rivals must a predator when it announces it is committed 
able to capacity. of the factors which will 
credibility are its level of record of 
the predator 
capacity and 
financial stability and backing.15 Without such credibility, rivals not view 
expansIon 
The predator 
can 16 
or they may "''''' ... ,n .. ...., to 
to signal its 
on the predator. 
nH~'lnJ'" motive before 
must be able to "'.b ......... that it is preemptively expanding 
capacity before rivals have committed to expand. If rivals will 
'-'ALJ<.UJ' ..... anyway. will financially themselves to so. 
Rivals must be to back down.17 
assumes rivals will balance the potential of fighting 
Some rivals the predator "":i"o"'~ the risks and risk is not worth 
will not. This is so, if the have made their own heavy 
Some have equal or staying power than 
predator. strategy is against a potential rival or a small existing rival. 
14 Id. at 337. 
15 at 201. 
16 Id. at 
17 Id. at 
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Critique: 
Expanding capacity beyond anticipated demand is conceptually similar to 
predatory pricing. The predator has expanded by adding new facilities when it 
has no reasonable .expectation that the revenue from those new facilities will 
cover its costs. As such the criticisms of predatory pricing are the same as those 
for preemptive expansion capacity. 
First some commentators claim the strategy is not rational. Areeda and 
Turner argue the costs of the strategy versus the anticipated gains are so 
speculative that., like predatory pricing, the likelihood of such conduct is 
remote. IS 
Easterbrook argues that the strategy cannot work if demand is growing. 19 
A predator may not have been able to meet the actual demand when it 
previously expanded capacity. 
The most co"mmon criticism is that it is impossible to distinguish between 
a predatory expansion and an expansion based on a reasonable anticipation of 
increased demand., i.e. it is impossible to distinguish between predatory 
expansion and efficient expansion.2D Demand may be increasing. A firm will 
need to expand. A rational fum will want to expand to meet that demand. It 
may want excess capacity in case demand increases even more. The market may 
change. Demand may decrease. The fum that expanded may look like a 
18 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW, 180-181 (1978). 
19 East~rbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, U. CHI. L. 
REV., 263, 291-293 (1981). 
20 Id. at 295; AREEDA & TURNER, supra, note 18, at 180. 
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predator tbat has extra capacity. In reality it was trying to be efficient and 
was caught out by market changing. Similarly a large capacity may 
due to new cost-saving technology. Condemning expansion would 
condemning efficiency. It may also future i.nnovation in such technology. 
Despite the criticism Areeda and Turner reCOi!IW predatory expansion can 
cause concern: 
or anticipated 
demands is behaviour, it is one ·of most 
responses that we expect a well-functioning to 
generate. Expansion to meet anticipated demands is questionable 
only if consciously carried out well in advance ,21 
They an example where antitrust should intervene. The owner of a 
towns theatre may bund a second theatre. not open tbat theatre 
for five or 10 years. The only function new unused capacity is to 
intimidate possible new 22 
Most criticism arose Krattenmaker and Salop developed the 
RRC model. removes objection that the gains of capacity 
expansion are speculative. mentioned above, expandlng capacity is a form 
overbuying. This costs. If cost cause a predator to 
power over it will be able tb finance expansion out of the revenue it 
saves preventing falling. Professor William Baxter indirectly 
acknowledges this when he notes that one of the only two ways exclusive dealing 
can cause anticompetitive is when a manufacturer "preemptively buys up 
more distribution capacity than jt really and thus confronts rivals when an 
21 AREEDA & TURNER, supra, note at 21. 
22 rd. at 181. 
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W-Ll'''J.a..J shortage of distributional facilities va~.li:>I..Llj;:. its rivals to to pay too 
mu<;h for facilities as a consequence of the shortagell•23 Professor Baxter 
notes this will mean rivals will supply less product the manufacturer will face 
a more inelastic demand curve. means manufacturer prevented 
prices falling. It can for expansion by money it saves by having 
prevented price falling. 
Although the strategy pays for itself over the long run., it may cost the 
predator in the short run. does not destroy the theory as some .....,UUl..<lLj;:.U 
School scholars contend.24 The purpose of the strategy is to influence rivals' 
behaviour. It need not be rational in the short run. Predation usually only 
rational in the long run., terms Of increased prevent values of profits, when it 
conVinces potential entrants that predator will through on its 
commitment the future. the strategy costs the predator the short 
term it long run by the predator power over price. 
IT the predator convinces a to and convinces others not to enter, 
its profits will be generally In such a case the predator has not only 
gained power over prices raising rivals' it has "'WLllllLC:H~;;\..I rivals, 
is a double blow for consumer with respect Chicago School 
scholars are incorrect in requiring strict rationality at every point time when 
explaining predation. 
However, the problem of ciistinguishing between efficient expansion 
23 Baxter, Brief of Evidence in 
~~~ [1990] 2 NZLR 731, 
Easterbrook, supra, 19. 
v 
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predatory I now turn to how courts have dealt with the 
Case Law: 
The case law on the is scarce. first and most case is 
v Aluminium Co. of America25 '.a!.~l). The U.S. Justice 
alleged that Alcoa monopolised the aluminium market· by (inter alia) 
expanding its capacity to meet Judge Learned Hand held it did. 
commented: 
"The only question is [Alcoa] falls within the 
established in who do not seek, but cannot 
the control of a It seems to us that that question 
survives its It was not inevitable that [Alcoa] should 
always anticipate in the demand for 
prepared to supply Nothing compelled it to keep 
and redoubling before others entered the 
insists that it never excluded competitors, but we can think 
more effective than progressively to 
opportunity as it opened, and to face every newcomer 
capacity into a great organisation. 
advantage of trade connections and 
personnel".26 
~~ did not involve the classic predatory expansion. It did not expand 
in advance of "" .... J ...... UY. It £<1".1\ ... '1..1 in response to demand. Not surprisingly 
commentators 27 Areeda and 
25 148 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
26 at L 
27 TIlE ANTITRUST PARADOX A POLICY AT WAR 
165-170 (2d ed. 1993). 
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among argue Judge Hand "'VII ..... '" Alcoa for ....... LIJ.L~ like a 
competitor rather as a monopoust. A monopolist would output. 
the .. it new plants to meet demand. Areeda and 
say it was "absurd" for Hand29 to call expanding to meet 
demands as exclusionary. 
Despite severe one court followed AJcoa Philadelphia 
The Federal 
Court that the National Hockey (NHL) expansion 
new cities was ill to monopolise the 
professional hockey market.31 
"Secondary evidence NHL's intent to maintain control 
over is its continuing policy of expansion tied 
to the increasing for hockey in United and also 
in Of course, if ever this burgeoning hockey 
in North America could nonetheless support only one supplier, 
then this court would be bound to conclude that the NHL enjoys 
a rnonopoly".32 
Since Court could whether only one hockey 
could survive, it held, relying on Alcoa. that the Nl-U:s "''''-,.; ............. was 
of intent to monopolise.3) Other courts declined to follow Alcoa.34 
r-'U.'u...-l.""J. .. hlS. & TURNER, supra, Dote 18, at 18-22. 
29 at 
30 1 Supp. 462 Pa. 1972), 
31 at 511-513. 
32 Id. at 1. 
33 Id. at 1-513. 
A case that involved an expansion was E,I. du Pont. de 
du Pont had aggressively its titanium dioxide 
investigated. However, it own complaint, du 
Pont's expansion was of a predatory strategy, but rather due to it having 
pioneered a large-scale but technology in extracting titanium ...... "' ...... "', .... 
Judge Richard Posner dealt a 
~~~~ v Western Union Telegraph Co.36 
about the offense of monopolization an 
years ago it was thought that even a with a 
lawful monopoly ,rr could not be allowed to monopoly 
against would-be by tactics otherwise it had 
to exercise special - perhaps, indeed, had to hold 
prices high, to encourage new So Alcoa was condemned as 
a monopolist because it had assiduously enough productive 
capacity to supply all new increments for aluminium; 
it would not have been condemned if by its prices blgh it 
had kept demand down to a level that it could supply without 
increasing capacity. Later, as the empbasis policy 
shifted protection of competition as a process rivalry 
to the competition as a means of 
economic efficiency. It recognized that the 
mon~polist ,should be compete like everyone else; 
tbe antitrust laws holding an umbrella over 
competitors".37 
is not suggesting predatory uc.uuu,--,u does not occur. He 
is saying Alcoa's expanding to meet ... ...,J-uc;.u. ...... not breach the 
~~~~~~~v==~~== 
only case condemning internal ex[)aDlSIO 
961 (1969); ==:::::,.l~~~.:!:!.:. v ~~:!:!L!~~~ 
1979), denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). 
35 96 F.T.e. 650 (1980). 
36 797 F. 2d 370 (7th denied, 480 934 ( 
797 F. 2d at 375 (citations VJ-Ll ....... ' ... 
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antitrust laws. Alcoa was Dot predatorily 1-' ........ """-'-.5 capacity. Judge 
developed of rent ""''''''~A''' which is crucial showing why 
predatory expansion harmful.38 While "-"'I-'ItLUt..LLLJ.;; capacity can a normal 
to hinder 
capacity 
""LU',,-H •• U"-Y enhancing it can also be a action 
or even eliminate rivals. key purpose 
With 
s.36. 
I now turn to whether capacity expansion 
can 
36 and Capacity Expansion: 
No New Zealand or Court whether expanding 
breaches s. 36 and s. However, it could be. 
Expanding or overbuying when a firm no need to is conduct 
only a dominant firm could rational. Only a couid to 
do so. expanding ,,-eH.'U,"-l 
Applying 
power over price. This would 
If the model showed that 
price a court should stop there 
anticompetitive harm is likely. 
meet the ="-"'-"="-"-f"-
U"' ........ Ui in inferring an anti competitive 
dominant 
find in favour of 
should not be 
not gain power over 
dominant firm. No 
... .;)L ......... However, 
would not enough. A court would have to consider how 
38 note 5. 
39 [1992] 2 641. 
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has been able to expand. If, as in the du Pont case,40 it was due to a new 
large-scale, but cost-saving technology courts should not condemn the alleged 
predator. To do so would chill innovation. It is likely such innovation would not 
be a use. The dominant finn has acted in such a way that any firm in a 
competitive market could. It has developed a new technology. That is the whole 
basis of dynamic efficiency, i.e. small firms will innovate more than dominant 
ones. 
Nor should a court condemn if the dominant firm can show it believed 
demand was going to increase. If so it was acting like Alcoa. Expanding in the 
belief that demand is going to increase is rational behaviour. A firm in a 
competitive market will do the same. However, a court should just not blindly 
accept such an expl~nation from a dominant finn. It should access whether the 
dominant finn had valid reasons for its belief. If not, the purpose for the 
expansion is likely. 
Section 36( 1 )( c) is extremely relevant here. As mentioned above, the 
anticompetitive effect of capacity expansion (indeed of all strategic behaviour) 
is to disadvantage or deter rivals. It may not eliminate rivals. This is exactly the 
purpose s. 36(1)(c) condemns. The subsection does not require the elimination 
of rivals. A dominant firm will argue that its purpose for expanding was not 
anticompetitive. It will argue it was doing it to make itself better prepared to 
take advantage of any increased demand in the future. The RRC model and 
Spence's work show such expansion can harm rivals.41 If the factors, I 
40 Supra, note 35. 
41 Supra, note 2. 
above, are not present courts should able to a 
purpose" Wider s. 2(5)(b), was to deter rivals. 
Conclusion: 
The RRe ;u.lV,",'",' 
or 
or overbuying can, in cause 
It is worthy of antitrust concern. RRe model 
..... "'\~I,.A""U 36 can condemn predatory expansion. 
for courts considering a capacity expansion 
s. 36. It is relevant. 
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CHAPTER IX 
PREDATORY INNOVATION 
Introduction: 
Economists that product can be a means 
predation. 1 predator can a new product, not as of normal 
competition, as a means '-I">~h rivals. theory of raising 
rivals' costs is understanding innovation may An 
example best illustrates this. 10 ~~~~~ __ X.!. v Eastman Kodak Co.2 
claimed (inter alia) that Kodak bad oew film which rival 
could oot process without purchasing new equipment. This raised 
the costs photo-finishers. the Second Circuit eman(lea the 
case for further .... "'.,"' ...... determination it held Kodak could breach antitrust 
laws if Berkey showed A"",V''''U''''''- had used its power to gain a competitive 
1 Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and 
~=~~-"-"II.L~ 91 YALE 8 (1981); Ordover, Willig, 
"'--'-"'~"'"'-wI-~""""""'~~~~~'-.P 83 COLUM. L. REV., 11 (1983); 
Innovation in 
ANALYSIS 300 (S. 1981); For 
(which I do not see Gilbert, ""-SI,-",e,-",,e~pi~n:.lil-g~~~"'---l::~~~..J.-
in STRATEGY, PREDATION ANTITRUST 
205 (S. Salop 1); Gilbert & Newberry, Preemptive 
~~~~~~~~~o:::..!.!.!~~~u:.. 72 AM. 514 
2 603 F. 2d CiT. 1979), U.S. 1093 (1980). 
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advantage.3 Other U.S. bave also found that innovation can be a means 
predation.4 This idea, is however extremely controversial. Antitrust 
embodies a strong policy favouring innovation. Critics (and Courts) contend that 
allowing innovation as a means of predation "chills" or "stifles" innovation. 
However, it is economically possible and plaintiffs bring cases alleging predatory 
innovation. II of chapter outlines the main theory of predatory 
innovation- VIZ., Professor Jansuz Ordover Robert Willig's theory of 
predatory product innovation. Although this is not the RR C model, raising 
rivals' costs is a key component it. Part III critiques the theory. Part IV 
exapunes law on predatory innovation. no New Zealand case law yet 
exists, Part V discusses whether s. 36 applies to predatory innovation. VI 
offers some conclusions. 
Predatory Product Innovation: 
Product according to Ordover and Willig can be either 
predatory or competitive.s They argue courts must distinguish between 
predatory and competitive innovation. Even, true innovation, such as a 
new product, can be predatory. Courts should condemn such a product 
introducing it is only possible because other exit the market. They apply 
this test to all product innovations. especially where a introduces new 
3 Id. at 
4 See infra, see also Hurwitz & Kovacic, ~~~~~~~'-A...!..!ti::l.:!.!:!:..l:~!....:. 
VAND. 
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components to . system. Tbey propose a two-step test for predatory 
innovations. First they examine structural market factors to 
a can market power. they consider other factors to 
determine predatory on 
Test for Predatory Innovation 
Subject to structural market assumptions, Ordover Willig 
predatory innovation occurs when' an innovation is profitable only if firms 
as a 6 Innovation may cause a rival to exit, but it is only predatory if it 
would not profitable without monopoly power resulting from the 
Markets which lead to predatory innovation have structural 
characteristics: 
1. They must be significantly horizontally concentrated. If monopoly, 
profits will not result on exit of a rivaL 
must have significant hurdles", These occur when investments 
are not fully reversible.7 They are entry that 
a potential entrant, to incumbent, solely the 
incumbent is already in the market.s Without entry hurdles, a has 
no incentive for predation as both potential entrants and existing 
constrain the incumbent. 
6 Id. at 9. 
7 Id. at 11; also Oliver Williamson who stresses the importance of 
irreversible investments to competition, O. WILLIAMSON, THE 
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, 52-56 (1985), 
8 Ordover Willig, supra, note 4, at 11. 
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They must ure-entry barriers", are the costs that a which 
has left must meet to resume production. is not 
viable if a that leaves the can subsequently without 
significant costs, If not, the that exited, constrain incumbent. 
are 
depreciation essential 
reputation and equipment.9 
when entry requires dispersal or 
personnel, advertising, goodwill, 
If horizontal concentration., entry hurdles and barriers 
do not inquiry stops It is Wl.Decessary to allegedly 
predatory for anticompetitive effect or intent as a in such a 
market, no incentive to predatorily innovate, The test determines 
whether possible gains predation can outweigh costs to the 
producer of the allegedly predatory innovation. If a market meets the structural 
focuses on whether the alleged predator innovated because of the 
exit caused. 
Two types of innovation can predatory: 
(1) introducing substitute products, and 
(2) "systems rivalry" or manipulating the components in a system to cause 
component to exit. 
test for both innovation is a predator can 
and development costs through profits on the new product. 
assumes the continuing viability of rivals. to 
9 at 12. 
10 at 15. 
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Introduction of Substitute t'r(Jidu4~tS: 
A firm has to a nwnb~~r of turlda.memt,al aleCl!~lOI1S when introducing 
a new product. These include timing, development, 
advertising and adjustments in price and of """..,"tnH' proeju(;ts, 
model assesses each of these factors singlely and as 
overall innovation strategy. 
Introducing a new can anticompetitive and predatory. It may 
often be more effective than pr~~daltOl-:Y pnc:tng in causing rivals to exit. The 
greater effectiveness is due to costs a firm 
incurs in introducing a new product. As in a firm's 
im'esltm~~nt in research and development and other sunk costs a to 
of 
rivals to 
innovators term commitment to the market.l1 can cause 
refusing to exit may COIIVlllce 
predatory pricing is not permanent. A rival 
predator that it intends to stay in the market. 
This will cause the pff~aator to cease pn~aa~to]'Y pnClng. 
The Ordover-Willig model \111'\1"11'<.: as LVLJev"".,. dOmiltlaIlt producer of a 
product introduces a new and superior model. The new mOiQel.'S is low 
to cause consumers to change from previous models, 
occurs. 
producers 
Facing declining sales, and revenue, rival 
product and seU tbeir productive assets. 
After the rivals exit, the innovator and eams monopoly profits. 
Entry hurdles and re-entry h"'p ...... "" .... Dlrotlcct the tnDlov:ator. 
Successful predatory innovation and predatory pn.ClIJlg are iJLLUJJ.QJ. Both 
11 Chapter VOl 
involve the short term sacrifice of profit which causes exit and 
higber long tenn profit. Predatory innovation does this 
perceived quality of the profit rather by decreasing price. 
permits 
the 
Ordover Willig say, order not "chm" innovation, courts would 
have to 1I,;;"'(Uil.LUI".< predatory product introduction closely. Short term 
sacrifice, high horizontal concentration, hurdles re-entry barriers alone 
will not establish a claim of predatory product innovation. The predator's 
product introductiqn also substantially the likelihood of a 
exiting. A plaintiff must establish the defendant's purpose for 
predatory innovation. As firms an return on research and 
development investments, Courts must assess the innovator's conduct in terms 
of expected returns not after the fact. that the innovation turned out 
to be profitable only because a rival exited does not suffice to establish liability. 
The model would not require rivals to It is if tbe new 
product causes the costs to rise sufficiently to the predator power 
over price. the model is not as as the Ordover-Willig model 
for predatory product innovation. 
Predatory Rivalry: 
Ordover and Willig say predatory innovation standard applies 
to "systems 12 occurs where a predator innovates in to 
the predator's market power to another component in system. 
model be shown as follows: A manufactures a product 
12 Ordover & Wi..Uig. supra, note 4, at 19. 
Al and which it sells separately. has with two 'l.-VlJeu ......... 
monopoly power over B COlnpe~tes in the market component 
witb its compatible component, Consumers can therefore a product 
comprising and or and B2. An is computers. single 
personal computer (AI) can be used two different printers (A2 and B2). 
A then introduces a new 
the same function for consumers as its 
system, AI' 
Al and A2 
. This serves 
Component 
is, however, incompatible with All, Furthermore, firm A stops Al or 
Al higher before. Using computer example, the 
computer company making its old personal computer and introduces a new 
personal computer that is compatible only its printer, not with its 
printer. a result, consumers switch to the new product and finn B 
loses substantial sales of its product B2. If A's innovation causes B to lose 
enough sales, B will eventually leave the market, A the power to 
above cost issue is when, if ever, antitrust should condemn 
A for "' ....... L;)UJ'F> firm B from the rn~1·1r .... 't 
the RRC model does not require B to exit before attaching 
liability. The innovation need raIse sufficiently give the 
power over price. 
Ordover and recommend a two-stage deciding 
predatory systems rivalry The the structural test 
above, i.e. 
re-entry 
there are 
They say 
horizontal concentration entry hurdles 
plaintiffs will ... "'''''" ......... in the test -
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the structural simply anse very 13 They state 
the "must exhibit high concentration". They do 
not define very conceotration.14 
second undertook systems rivalry 
solely because of the r\rr'l:np.£'T of additional monopoly "u ... u,UJ.b from the 
irreversible exit of 
issue is not 
whether the 
raison d' etre 
The authors ...... "'LIl ... U 
Ordover, Sykes Willig state: 
to exit but 
attendant on was the 
two vital factors in deciding the 
was predatory : the "compensatory price" and the level type of research 
development 
The Compensatory Test: 
Under and the innovator has a defence to a 
'lOT"" ...... " predation by pricing at or below its 
compensatory authors tbe compensatory price as follows: 
liThe compensatory price a pre-existing component is the 
lowest would \AjJ.J.J.IJ'JUJ.;> ....... v the innovator for making 
component available under continued premise" ,16 
the innovator 
it only at a 
13 Ordover, 
14 Id. at 1 
Id. at 1 
16 
to continue selling the 
than 
& Willi g, 
Willig) supra, 
compensatory 
note 1, at 1 
4, at 43. 
component or 
then there be 
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predatory profit 
availability of the 
That the innovator's about the price or 
component could only be rational on basis that 
a will leave the market. 
markets. which met Ordover Willig's first stage test, 
compensatory 
component at or 
test imposes a duty on the to sell the pre-existing 
compensatory price. Ordover Willig suggest two 
formulae, which they ... uJu...;J ... "' ....... for calculating the 
1. of the pre-existing tha t compensates the innovator 
lost sales of the new the production cost of the 
COlno·on<~nt plus the lost profit on new systems) or 
the price that 
the mark-up on 
the same mark-up on tbe component as 
new component, when the is 
calculated conservatively.!? 
Under the compensatory meets an efficiency test. IS 
The test ensures new system produces surplus over its 
current production costs old system, with research development 
costs for the new systems costs that cannot be recovered. 
consumers 
market, then a 
pre-existing 
the new system to the old, and this forces rivals from 
economic surplus can if and only if 
is made available at or below 
If the component is not so the plaintiff has established 
price. 
case. 
17 Id. at 
18 Id. at 43-47. 
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Level Type of ...... OC;.;:,lIJOJl and Development Costs: 
plaintiff can prevail by showing a a predatory purpose 
for research and development in the new system. A can 
a predatory if the innovator expected to recoup its and 
development investment only by a rival to and thereby earning 
monopoly profit. In contrast, the innovator can it did have a 
by showing that it based its and development 
investment on a ex ante I'>VY'IPrT economic superiority of 
new system would enable innovator to investment. 
Ordover Willig's and development test bas elements. 
1. The test only considers ex ante expectations. It ignores whether the 
research development investment, in turned out to pay for itself. 
The evaluates purpose for the research and development 
investment, not objective as compensatory price test. 
The plaintiff has the burden of proof to establish 
improper motive. 
Plaintiffs will find this burden difficult to Ordover Willig note: 
would most likely need a 'smoking gu a document 
or that clearly reveals innovator'S culpable state 
of at 
decision".19 
the and development] 
19 Ordover, Sykes & WUJig, supra, note 1 at 1158. 
Critique: 
have severely criticised Ordover and 
Sidak writes: 
most glaring deficiency in the ... model is its 
of the chilling effect that its proposed test would have 
activi ty". 20 
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test is unduly complex. This would necessitate costly lll.1iF,UI.IVll 
analytical details of the model become clear and 
that efforts to distinguish predatory innovation 
ULU.l'-UiL after-tbe-fact assessments that measure product 
needed to attain them. 
development is a ........ "' .............. 1<>"'--1 ... ...,' ..... U- uncertain activity. Ex post 
evaluations weight to the valid expectation a firm had for 
its when it undertook them. 
development scenarios present circumstances 
where the and procompetitive purposes. All 
innovators the new products causing rivals to exit, leaving 
the innovators with the ability to monopoly Courts that attempt to second 
guess bona fide technical judgments made under conditions of uncertainty would 
risk entering a slippery, error-prone terrain. 
20 Sidak, Debunking Predatory Innovation, 83 ........ '-JJLJ .. J 
1142 (1983). 
21 Ibid. 
22 Id. at 1164. 
1 
Other commentators, as Professors Areeda and Herbert 
Hovenkamp23 a firm is to use innovation as a means of 
predation. and development is bldeously expensive. will Dot 
_~ ... _ .... ~ in it withou.t some reasonable expectation that it will result in 
technical state of art. 24 
Investments in technically empty product work runs a 
number of rivals may around the obstacle, 
rendering the • ..., .. 'ULUc .......... blockage useless.2S rivals may to devote 
their product development resources to achieving real 
breakthroughs. Would-be will realise that u ................. 5 to keep pace 
example by diverting scarce resources to projects ""~~u~ no technical 
advances impede rivals - produce damaging where 
technological ..................... . generates Why would a spend 
sums on techrllcally empty product development when it could spend it on 
and 
It is difficul t and costly to stop development. 
Research and development is a commitment. Predatory on 
AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITR UST LAW SUPPLEMENT 
(1990). 
24 Id. 684. 
25 62 N.Y.U.L. REV., 998 at 
26 
peripheral equipment manufacturers 
did this to counter IBM's efforts to them from the 
Easterbroo~ 
PREDATION 
in STRATEGY 
ANALYSIS, 416, 417 (S. Salop ed. 
the hand, is necessarily temporary. A can stop it very 
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The 
only lost revenue is on 
losses. All the money 
low price sales. Predatory innovation greater 
on research development is lost for good.27 
1rhe research not even send a that the is a hard 
competitor. It may send opposite signal. firm does oat what it is 
research and development. 
Frank i'''''rn'l",.,,,,Lr criticises model as being unworkable. The 
model that the predator's product innovation must mcrease 
of irrnovatioo the likelihood of a exiting. Elsewhere the model 
probability of a rival exiting. argues the model does not 
establish how likely) is too likely.28 Is it cent or 70 Ordover 
and Willig also do not how a court can determine such likelihoods. if in 
the rival survived. 
Dotes that model will innovation.29 
Introducing a new product is a gamble. Many Dew Under 
product may Ordover-Willig an innovator two risks. First, 
innovator losses from that failure. Second, the innovator 
a predatory innovation is likely to discourage 
significantly. if the new product succeeds, the innovator faces a predatory 
innovation a plaintiff will argue that an alternative 
28 
caused it barm. This will involve courts assessing 
...... " ............ ....,,, & HOVENKAMP, supra, note 
Easterbrook, supra, note 
Ibid. 
at 441. 
some non~existent innovation, pursued developed through an 
alternative strategy, would better for innovator its rivals. will 
involve Courts speculating on .~,.,...,~ they are ill-trained ill-equipped to do. 
I t would also give the best of possible UU""~II1~ Rivals can wait and see 
whether the new product succeeds. so they can cballenge "the new product on 
. basis of hypothetical profitability hypothetical strategies . will 
discourage innovation. Indeed, it will cause firms to and 
development to the paying damages io an antitrust 
Proponents of dynamic IvLLlll.-' ..... il"-'V would agree. argue that technological 
nTI,url''''''''' is chief source of consumer welfare.31 anything lessens 
the incentive to innovate consumer welfare. 
Easterbrook criticises the compensatory price He it 
Ordover and say tills is the price at old model 
would as as new model sales. Yet if the new model 
sufficiently to old, no one will purchase old models at 
"compensatory prices". How can a finn sell a product no one wants?32 
Former and Professor, Robert Bork argues that a firm which 
changes products} characteristics is not engaging predation. He admits it 
be an barrier - however, he physical product differentiation 
30 Ibid. 
31 
32 
See J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND 
......... ............... ,. INNOVATION 81-106 (1942); F. 
GROWTH : SCHUMPETERIAN (1984); M. 
COMPETnITVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS (1990); 
Scherer, supra, note at 1010-1012. 
Easterbrook, supra, 25, at 446. 
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as a form efficiency: 
differentiate their products physically in to increase 
their to customers: differentiation strictly 
fundamental a mechanical or it may be decorative. In 
any case, differentiation is only if consumers 
respond to it favourably. For reason physical product 
differentiation when it succeeds, classified as a 
But can it Of course it can. The entrant 
however to product as wishes, and 
incumbent's differentiation can make his path more difficult only 
if consumers prefer version of product".33 
The RRC cost L.Uu .......... explains how "". ... \£111 innovation rivals' costs. 
it is useless at predatory innovation from innovation. 
A new product will rivals' costs it will innovator 
power over price. A predatory product innovation will same. One cannot 
purpose the innovator F><.L.J...u..u.J'F> power over 
model is thus, limited relevance except in showing how product 
can raise costs. 
criticisms of the Ordover-Willig model are valid. U.S. Courts 
been extremely reluctant to hold innovation predatory. I turn to examine 
case law. 
u.s. Law: 
u.s. Courts have extremely reluctant '-'-'-"LI',","''''' liabili ty product 
innovation. have noted the antitrust laws have a strqng policy 
33 R. BO~ THE 
WITH ITSELF. 312 (2d 
PARADOX A POLICY AT WAR 
1993). 
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innovation.34 They have argued antitrust should not "chill" or "stifle" 
innovation.lS However, Courts bave identified two areas of antitrust concern 
over innovation: 
1. design change, and 
2. failure to disclose new products. 
1. Design Cbange: 
The introduction of a new product alone is not predatory conduct alone. 
The Second Circuit in Berkey Photo, Inc. v Eastman Kodak CO,36 observed: 
"Because ... a monopolist is permitted, and indeed encouraged, by 
s. 2 to compete aggressively on the merits, any success that it may 
achieve through "the process of invention and innovation" is clearly 
tolerated by tbe antitrust laws".37 
The Court also noted "any f:inn, even a monopolist, may bring its products to 
market whenever and however it cbooses",38 The Court, however did say this 
rule is not absolute. It rejected Kodak's argument that "new product 
introductions are ipso facto immune from antitrust scrutiny".39 The Court noted 
34 Berkey Photo. Inc. v Eastman Kodak Co .. 603 F. 2d 263, 282 (2d Cir. 
1979), cert. denied. 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. 
v IBM, F. Supp. 423, 433-44 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (innovations are "precisely 
what the antitrust laws were meant to encourage"); In re IBM Peripheral 
EDP Antitrust IJtigation. 481 F. Supp. 965, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 1979) ("Truly 
new and innovative products are to be encouraged, and are an important 
part of the competitive process"). 
35 See, e.g. Berkey Photo. supra, note 2, at 282-283. 
36 Supr.a. note 2. 
37 Id. at 281 (citation omitted). 
38 Ibid. 
39 Id. at 286 n. 30. 
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that "the situation might be completely different,,40 if a firm engaged in other 
conduct that was related to the introduction of the new product which was not 
intended to benefit the finn through increased output. Here, associated conduct 
to the innovation made Kodak liable. The Court held Kodak breached s. 1 by 
extracting arguments f:rom two rivals, Sylvania and General Electric, that the two 
firms would keep secret new flash cubes they were developing in separate joint 
ventures with Kodak. The Court held the agreements effect was to keep a 
"desirable innovation" off the market for an unnecessarily long time "solely to 
suit Kodak's convenience".41 It is extremely uncertain whether future courts 
will follow Berkey's.reasoning. Justices Rehnquist and Powell sharply questioned 
its soundness in their dissent from the Supreme Courts denial of certiorari.42 
Justice Rebnquist described the Second Circuits reasoning on the above point 
as "little less than bizarre",43 
Some cases have suggested that introducing a new product can constitute 
monopolisation if a l.ess restrictive alternative is available to achieve the requITed 
goal.44 However such comments were obiter. No court has held as such. 
IBM's changes in the design of various of its peripherals led to a flood of 
40 Id. at 302. 
41 Ibid. 
42 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). 
43 Id. at 1094. 
44 Transamerica Computer Co. v IBM, 698 F. 2d 1377 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 955 (1983); Northeastern Telegraph Co. v AT & T, 651 
F. 2d 76, 94-96 (2d Gr. 1981), cert. denied, 4555 U.S. 943 (1982). 
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litigation.4S The Ninth Court Appeals never found a breach. It held 
as a matter of law it was not anticompetitive for IBM to integrate central 
processing (CPU) certain features that it previously sold as separate 
products. It so held even though it prevented IBM's rivals from offering 
own versions of the ~eparate products.46 It so held because 
"uncontroverted" evidence that "integration was a cost-saving step" and on 
"substantial evidence" that "it represented a performance improvement".47 
such improves performance or reduces cost it be lawful 
regardless of the resultant incompatibility with formerly interchangeable 
competitive parts. Court noted 
45 
46 
UIBM, assuming it was a monopolist, the right to its 
products to make them more attractive to - whether by 
reason lowering manufacturing costs and or improved 
performance. It was under no duty to help CalComp or 
peripheral equipment manufacturers or expand. IBM 
not have provided its rivals. with disk products to or copy 
... nor have constricted product development so as facilitate 
sales of rival 'products".48 
44. 743-744. 
47 rd. at 744. 
Id. at 744 (citations 
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the District 
Court upheld one of IBM's interface changes despite "Ull\...LL.Lit< adopted it 
principally to preclude competition. The Court set out the following test for 
the design is unreasonably restrictive of 
monopolist's conduct violates the Act. 
allow the to consider effects of the on 
competitors; the of the on consumers; to 
which the was the product of desirable technological 
evaluation by 
determining the 
monopolist's since a contemporaneous 
should helpful to the factfinder in 
of a change".50 
As mentioned above, the Court found IBM one of its 
predominantly to preclude or delay competition and to a competitive 
It, also found new interface was "superior" to 
designs and a "negligible" on IBM's It thus found no 
liability. It held to so would be to condemn IBM for intent alone.51 
The Court in following 
~~~:!:J also that to injure 
without enhancing performance or reducing cost would illegal.53 .M.H,<:liU. 
comment was 
49 Supra, 
Id, at 
51 Id. at 1005. 
Supra, 44. 
53 Id. at 
481 F. Supp. 965. 
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Predisclosure: 
U.S. Courts a monopoust does not to notify its rivals 
it intends to a new product into the or to provide its rivals with 
about new In Berkey,54 the argued 
monopoly of camera meant it had to l.,'-'lU.::Iv to rival 
camera manufacturers specifications of new camera to enable them to 
modify their cameras to compatible with the new when Kodak introduced 
new camera. The Court disagreed. ]t explained that an 
rule that would managers and 
protect incentives to would be difficult. if not to craft. 
It noted: 
engaged in the 
were required 
rivals the benefits of those 
likely be vitiated".5) 
expenses of research 
circumstances to 
this incentive would 
Although the Court Kodak did not breach s. 2 to disclose, 
it held it breached s. 1. Kodak had entered into a joint venture agreement with 
two of its rivals. it had disclosed to 
disclosed to other rivals. The 
above, Justices Rehnquist 
wrote: 
54 note 
55 
Court held it should 
breached s. 1. As 
ridsed this part of the 56 He 
1203, 
failure 
concerning its new product a 
.... "'J"'..tal; ..... ..., under s. 2"). 
56 Supra, note 
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"If the Sherman "predisclosure" by one competitor to 
another before a new product can be marketed, I think that 
eyebrows from such a holding should come 
CollIt, and not extrapolations other federal courtS of 
the decisions of this court interpreting Sherman Act",57 
computer cases not breach s. 2 failing 
can enjoy the "lead achieved when it does not 
a new product thus sells in market for some with 
virtually no competition.59 District Court 
held time was one of the primary .... ,," ..... h'UA" to innovate.60 Thus, 
courts not condemn 
Ssection 36 and Product Innovation: 
If New Zealand courts were to allow a case, it is 
they would reasornng 
61 a product change was a superior ........ ..,."'''''' or reduced cost, 
firm introducing it would not have its dominant position. Making a "' ........... p;"..., 
to reduce or improve pelrro.rm:an(~e is possible in a competitive market. 
a ..... V.LJ...U..U.u.u." fum made the change to injure 
rivals without enhancing performance or reducing costs, the use element would 
57 Id. at 1094. 
58 See supr~ 
Berkey, supra, note 2, at 279-283; supra 
note 44,458 Supp. at 437, 
60 ll.,C, ibid. 
61 Supra, note 
Supr~ note 
met. Only a dominant firm could to do so. It would only 
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rational 
a to do so. The purpose limb would be met 
IS likely New Zealand courts would decide the 
cases the same way also. Firms in competitive are 
an.d introducing new products. Thus, would 
no a dominant position. 
Conclusion: 
product innovation is a possible economic theory. However, 
strong policy 
violation. do so would 
showing can 
price is 
innovation. 
innovator power over 
innovation 
courts should not hold it to be an antitrust 
discourage innovation. The RRC model while 
costs and give the innovator power over 
predatory irmovation and competitive 
will rivals' costs and give the 
"'-"'-'aJ." .......... court ever heard a predatory 
CHAPTER X 
PREDATORY HIRING 
I n trod uction: 
a key employee away a rival can be an effective 
anticornpeti tive It can deprive a finn of employee's This 
may be crucial to the continued back a 
plans; Supreme recognised 
v MitcheU,l that by hiring key employees of a rival, a can an 
industry's structure affect competition,2 the case of a new 
entrant it can delay it acting competitively. The may not only have to 
someone new, also him or her. It may also costs. 
firm may have, to hire someone of ""..................... expertise. will likely 
expensive, depending on position in firm. Merely bidding for a 
key employee can raise costs, will to pay the 
more to keep him or It can the power over price. 
Commentators recognjsed .... ""~A.~ firms can use hiring as a predatory 
1 229 (1917). 
2 id. at 259. "Certainly, if a competing trader should endeavour to 
custom his rival, not by offering or cheaper goods, 
employing more competent salesmen, or displaying more attractive 
advertisements, buy by the rivals' to desert him under 
circumstances rendering it difficult or for to fill their 
places, court of would grant an injunction this as 
unfair competition", 
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:) Professors Phillip and Donald Turner written: 
"UoJawful predatory occurs when talent is not for 
purposes of using that talent but for purposes it to 
a competitor. Such cases can proved by showing hiring 
was made with predatory Le, to harm competition without 
...... n..,LL ..... the monopolist, or showing a dear non-use fact. 
either of these -" employment "''-'v' •. u ..... 
exclusionary",4 
VV ..... LLI with predatory as with all predation, is to distinguish 
it from competi tion. make offers to employees as 
a matter everyday business life. 
U.S. courts 
the antitrust 
The 
to hold that hiring a 
S Recently, the 
established 
is normal v .... ..,' ............. "'''' behaviour. 
never breach 
Court of Appeals held it could.6 
determining whether IS 
predatory, Part D of this chapter discusses case and its proffered ...,-.u'''''' ........... " ... ., 
Part ill guidelines and 
model. Part IV discusses wbether 
some conclusions. 
3 v 
~~~~~.l:::.$ 60 FORD. L. REV., 
based in part on 
could breach s. 36. 
4 P. AREEDA TURNER, ANTITRUST (1978). 
5 
6 
antitrust case. 
1354 (5tb Or. 1980), 
note 1 was not an 
Universal Analytics. Inc. v ~~~~!..!..!.U~~~~ 914 2d 1256 
(9th Cir. 1990). 
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Universal Analytics. Inc. v MacNeal-Schwedler Corp.:? 
In this case, a U.S. court, for tbe first time, suggested hiring could breach 
s. 2 of the Sherman Act. Universal and MacNeal were both computer 
manufacturers. Both were involved in producing and developing NASTRAN. 
This was a computer software programme used in the aerospace industry. 
MacNeal bad 90 per cent of tbe market. Universal bad five per cent.s It was 
MacNeal's main rival. Over a 15 month period, five of Universal's NASTRAN 
technicians left and went to work for MacNeal. Universal sued alleging 
MacNeal breacbed s. 2 by attempting to obtain and/or maintain a monopoly in 
the NASTRAN market. Universal claimed the five technicians leaving had a 
detrimental effect on its ability to further develop its version of NASTRAN and 
to compete effectively with MacNeaL9 
The District Court granted MacNeal's summary judgment motion. It 
noted most Universal's employees who left were dissatisfied working there. 
MacNeal also placed the employees in NASTRAN related jobs.10 
The Ninth Circuit, on appeal, held predatory hiring could breach s. 2. It 
defined predatory hiring by quoting Areeda and Turner's description of itY 
The Court held a plaintiff, to establish a breach, had to show clearly that the 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 1257 .. 
9 Ibid. 
10 See Universal Analytics. Inc. v MacNeal-Schwendler Corp .. 707 F. SUppa 
1170, 1176-1182 (C.D. Cal .. 1989). 
11 Supra, note 6, at 1258. 
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predator intended to deny a rival talented employees. A court should find a 
breach only if a monopolist subjectively intended to hire preclusively or it did 
not use the employees in their areas of expertise once it had hired tbem. I2 
, , 
Universal claimed it established MacNeal's subjective intent on the basis 
of a MacNeal interoffice memo which stated the new employees would "wound" 
Universal's businessY The Ninth, Circuit disagreed. It held the memo did not 
show predatory intent. Invoking Aspen Skiing Co. v Aspen Highlands Skiing 
COrp'S14 legitimate business purpose test, the Court held the memo did not 
show predatory intent. The memo did not undermine MacNeal's "legitimate 
business reasons for hiring much needed and competent computer 
programmers".1S The Court held a defendant, in a predatory hiring case, could 
meet Aspen's legitimate business purpose test by showing it put the employees 
to some use in their new finn.16 
While the Court held MacNeal did not breach s. 2 it expressly endorsed 
future claims based on predatory hiring. However, with' respect, the Ninth 
Circuit's test for identifying predatory hiring raises problems. The test says that 
hiring is only predatory if: 
1. the predator had predatory intent when hiring, or 
12 Ibid. 
13 Id. at 1258-1259. 
14 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
15 Supra., note 6, at 1259. 
16 Ibid. 
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2. there was "clear non-use in fact",l? 
Tbis, respect, not distinguish predatory hiring normal 
second limb of test is unsatisfactory. Areeda Turner, whom 
Ninth Circuit followed, ..... v .................. this as the hiring of employee and not 
that employee to use}B only of is to deprive a 
rival employee's skills. 
will rarely, if ever, occur. Few firms 
antitrust violation. However, it 
hire some one and not make use of him 
or Even an employee to some marginal use would satisfy the Ninth 
Circuit's test. It is unlikely a plaintiff would ever succeed under this 
limb of the test. It not stop, or even deter predatory 
The subjective intent raises the same objection. It will difficult 
establish. Jt requi,res searching through a defendant's records to some 
incrinllnatingdoallDent-a 
better. The RRe can 
Suggested test: 
. Requiring objective intent would 
establish 
Any test should incorporate the RRe model. In a predatory hiring 
input market would qualified personnel the particular If 
numerous qualified personnel are available, hiring one from a rival will 
cause the any It can easily another the available pool. 
means that hiring would not rivals' costs. 
Id. at 1258-1259. 
18 AREEDA TURNER, supra, note 4. 
Another factor courts should take into account is how long it takes to 
an employee. few qualified people exist tbe requisite training period 
is long and costly, hiring an employee from a rival is likely to harm competition. 
It is more likely to raise rivals' 
A relevant factor, is the salary structure and profit margins of the 
predator and industry. If a predator hires a rival's employee by offering a huge 
salary, which is not consistent with industry nonn, it is likely the alleged 
predator will have an anti competitive intent. Similarly, if the predator bas low 
profit margins and jeopardises them by paying a huge salary to a new employee, 
it is more likely alleged predator an anticompetitive intent. 
Another relevant factor is alleged predator's past history. Courts 
should "-''''''ULLLU.'-' how it in the the of a rivaPs employee 
consistent with past record? . Has alleged predator always employed 
trained personnel or conducted its own training? it has done its own training, 
hiring of a employee is more likely to be predatory. Similarly, staff 
will help identify whether a new hiring is excessive. 19 
The non-use test is relevant. However, it should not so It is 
more likely a will predatory, if new employee does something which 
does not befit his or her expertise or his or salary. 
None these factors will be all in deciding 
whether a hiring been predatory. An employee may because he or she 
19 . to the Joskow & Klevorick employ in 
A.LLLLLLU'F. whether recoupment is a predatory pricing case, 
loskow & KJevorick, A Framework for Analysing Predatory Pricing 
Policy, 89 YALE L. J., 213 (1979). 
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is dissatisfied with his or ber current job. No liability should occur 
Similarly, an may initiate discussions with the alleged predator. It will 
to say alleged predator an anticompelitive purpose here. A 
may in the hope business will expand. apparent excess staffing 
not determinative. A employees may about to Hiring a 
rivaPs employee is unobjectionable those circumstances. 
the does not give the predator over price, courts should 
not the Consumers will have suffered barm because of 
hiring. Antitrust should intervene. 
Section 36: 
Section capable of 'wUL~U<;;Ll.lllli.i1; predatory 
when a bas no for or 
a rival's 
is conduct which 
only a dominant firm can do. It would not do so in a competitive market. Thus, 
it would be a use of a dominant position. A would consider all the 
I mentioned in previous sectioll, the purpose 
RRC model aids analysis. the does raise rivals' costs 
courts should dismiss the claim. It will if people are 
plentiful. a rival's employee such 'wUJ..u.;)I.aJ.1'Iv'w';' may inconvenience the 
rival it will not disadvantage or deter it. the gIves dominant 
firm power over courts could an anticompetitive purpose. However, 
0 ..... -'+'-'-.0 power over should not be determinative. hiring could be to 
replace a retiring employee. If a firm could do in a competitive 
Thus, "use" element would not met. Similarly, it is unlikely the dominant 
would have a substantial anti competitive purpose . in hiring a rival's 
employee in such circumstances. Although Universal's non-use test should mean 
a breach of s. 36, for reasons mentioned above, New Zealand courts should 
not insist upon a test. 
Conclusion: 
Predatory should a breach s. 36. RRC model 
is useful in identifying whether a hiring was predatory. New Zealand courts 
should consider the' model if they ever encounter a case alleging predatory 
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CHAPTER 
PREDATORY ADVERTISING 
Introduction: 
Commentators regarded advertising as a which a can act 
strategically towards its rivals. Traditionally, they have viewed advertising as 
-~~i'> artificial barriers to This is anotber way of raising rivals' 
costs. Salop and Scheffman noted that by a dominant may 
costs, enabling the dominant firm to increase or market share. 1 
However, idea a9vertising can a predatory tactic is controversial. Chicago 
School scholars argue it is not.2 Part of this chapter V""""U.,L>,L",,, the arguments 
for advertising a means of predation. Part discusses the 
that it is not. Part IV examines U.S. case law. v 
Zealand court might with a predatory advertising claim. 
some conclusions. 
Advertising as an Anticompetitiv~ Strategy: 
1 
The traditional view is advert'ismg by a dominant 
Salop & L>VA.J'->-'-" .... , ..... Raising Riyals' Costs. 73 AM. ECON. 
268 (1993). 
view 
bow a New 
VI offers 
will create 
267, 
2 R. BORK, 1HE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POUCY AT WAR 
Willi ITSELF. 314 (1978); Posner, ~~~~~~~~!.!ll!:!...Y.ill::. 
~~ 127 PAL 925, 930 (1979). 
297 
to entry for rivals. No a barrier to entry 
t'T()te~;sOI George Stigler U"'JU.u~;,,, it as cost of producing (at some or 
every rate of output) which must borne by a firm which seeks to an 
industry but is not by already in the industry".3 Bain 
defines it as the of a firm to increase its long run above its 
average costs without inducing definition is wider than 
Current economic thought 
economies of scale. Yet enhancing. The U.S. Trade 
Commission has adopted definition.s 
3 
what the definition, commentators advertising as 
to entry. Professor LllJ'I'£I.j.U in 1965 summed up the 
prevailing attitude: 
"Economies in production, research, distribution and the 
inevitably costs and will tend to lower 
easily qualifying as procompetitive consequences. tcon~Jmles to 
expenditures, on the other 
qualifications. They may not 
less 
costs at all, 
and if promotional 
to entry whenever 
CODSumer preferences for 
total promotional efforts may 
are intensified, tbey will 
they increase the 
established brands. 
speaking are not as 
" 6 
economies, generally 
as other types of .... '.AJUUl.LU ..... ;:> 
The was tha t advertising could, some 
G. STIGLER, TIIE ORGANISATION INDUSTRY, 67 (1968). 
4 J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION, 252 (1968). 
5 10 F.T.C. 410, (1985). 
6 
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entry by building up durable consumer preferences that an entrant could only 
break down by a very large initial investment in counter-advertising. In the 
1960s, the concern over advertising was related only to mergers. A merger could 
lead to a l~ge firrri with a huge advertising budget. By advertising heavily the 
large firm could discourage entry in the way mentioned above. 
The focus on advertising. as an antitrust concern, has changed. 
Corilmentators now view it as a way monopolists can act strategically so as to 
disadvantage rivals. Professor Michael Spence argues monopolists may invest 
heavily in advertismg and new product introductions as an anticompetitive 
strategy to impede entry and expansion. 7 Advertising can do this in a number 
of ways. As with capacity expansion, it can be a powerful signalling device. It 
signals to new entrants and existing rivals that it is committed to the industry. 
It gives the firm the reputation as a hard and vigorous competitor. This may 
. . 
deter firms entering. 
Advertising may raise rivals' costs. If a monopolist starts a large and 
vigorous advertising campaign, rivals will have to respond. They will have to 
respond equally or even more. This will raise rivals' costs. The effect will be 
greater on new entrants who will not have "deep pockets" to finance such a 
campaign. 
The predator will be able to finance and absorb such a campaign better 
than an entrant or small, existing rivals. It will have better access to capital and 
thus, will have "deeper pockets". Its costs in advertising will be spread over a 
7 Spence, Entry, Capacity. Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing 8 BELL J. 
ECON., 534 (1977); Spence, Investment Strategy and Growth in a New 
Market. 10 BELL J. ECON. 1 (1979). 
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larger sales volume. Thus, it will economies of scale advertising. 
Generally. the predator will use the bigger better advertising agencies. It 
is more likely to able to more eK[)eOSl and effective types 
advertising, such as televisioD or national \Ja.LllLJ<1J.l::.1J.i:l The' rivals' costs 
model shows that if a predator gains power over price it will be able to pay for 
the advertising out of the revenue it saves by preventing from falling. 
Thus, Professor Phillip Areeda and Donald view that advertising is only 
predatory "if the additional promotional costs raise the fum's marginal or 
variable cost above price"8 is not necessarily correct. They base their 
view on their test for predatory However, unlike predatory pricing, a 
predator not have to eliminate its rival under an RRC strategy. The 
benefits are available almost immediately. Without advertising, prices would 
have fallen. With the advertising they don't fall. The predator bas saved 
revenue with which to finance its .advertising. 
can also view advertising as rent-seeking. The predator is turning 
of its monopoly profit into socially wasteful costs.9 One can much 
advertising is socially wasteful. It is not so much "informative" as "persuasive". 
Advertisers try and create an image for a product. Buy a certain car or 
aftershave you will be successful witb women. This bas nothing to do with 
the actual qualities of product It is a fantasy or a daydream. Some argue 
this is wasteful. 
8 
9 
P. 
............L-/ .... "'''' & TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW,'191-192 (1978). 
83 POL. 
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Former Judge, Bark 
barrier to entry.!O No no matter how large, 
advertising is Dot a 
a monopoly on access to 
to find an advertising Any 
agency. He does 
no matter 'how will be 
a product's reputation as an barrier. will 
have had to spend considerable amounts to establish a product's reputation as 
worthwhile or what not. will include on It 
is just the same as on a factory. new firm will have to 
spend money on establishing its product. This will include Thus, 
adopting Stigler's of an barrier, advertising can never 
an entry· 
Another problem with advertising as a predatory strategy, is 
it is essential to vigorous rivalry. Large amounts of advertising cbaracterises 
a firm does not advertise, it will go out of 
existence. Many products are quality-wise LU"-'U..;,WLLlF.UJ. ... UGl.I..In.... .......Vu.:l,..Ll.U''-'. choose 
Cola drinks and cigarettes brand of they want, based on 
are examples When a tobacco company introduces a new cigarette it 
to accompany this with a advertising .... < .. u..u..., ...... to it from 
cigarettes. banning of television advertising had to a 
the number of cigarette manufacturers.. If Bain was correct 
about 
occurred. 
creating barriers, exact should have 
Other empirical v ..... ,""" .. '" show advertising does not create entry barriers. 
10 "-''-'' ............... supra., 2 at 316. 
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Professor Lester Telser on studies he conducted, concluded: 
signifying an obstacle to entry. is 
reverse. It is the high turnover of 
brands and that accounts for the large 
advertising outlays on some products"Y 
Bain argued, without that advertising barriers to entry 
were very high in the U.S. liquor 12 Professor James Fergusson, 
empirically tested the industry opposite conclusion.13 
found the market share of four fell, despite their waging a 
vigorous advertising campaign when with new entrants. The four firm's 
of advertising to sales had Yet, new firms entered. 
Professor Yale Brozen, of these studies concludes 
advertising, far from being a barrier to entry is a means to 14 One can argue 
is efficient as it lowers consumers. Thus) it 
LU ..... " ..... '" markets more competitive. 
is also problematic. Although advertising may increase 
it is difficult to characterise as a means of strategic 
Whenever a new firm enters, the incumbent increase advertising. 
It is an part of competition. The model shows how can 
consumer welfare by raising rivals' costs, but it 
11 
14 
predatory advertising from normal advertising. 
~'-"""-"-oG>-==-':>=~=~ 72 J. POL. ECON., 
NEW COMPETITION (1956). 
~~~~""---"='~~ 40 J. BUSS. $!( (1967). 
(1964). 
~;ryJ!la[[lk[;La1lQ..J;:,.rru;rn.g;..J.llbllru~Wl!QIb in INDUSTRIAL 
NEW LEARNING, 115 (1974). 
a dominant firm ga.ins power over price. 
advertising can have this effect. Ironically forcing a new to 
may benefit the new firm. The advertising brings new 
to the public's attention. The empirical studies show the more a 
new more likely it will succeed. 
rent seeking objective to advertising is, with respect, It 
the purpose of advertising. The provision of 
only purpose. That is its main purpose. It is not the only one. 
very It often contains very little informatio~ a 
product's name. Its aim, in such circumstances, is to consumers aware of 
product. To make them interested enough to the 
It is 
generally the 
about a 
retailer can give them more detailed 
expensive to advertise. The more information 
more expensive it is. Thus, it is more ...., ........ "' .. v ..... 
product and then give more detail once the "' ... ,,'I.V .. U ... d. 
advertising by inquiring of retailers. 
"''"'t''..., ......... '.... to the 
Advertising also has to be Consumers face thousands of 
advertisements very day. To hit borne, advertising must be repetitive. It also has 
be relatively simple. are relatively inattentive to advertising. 
Making 
attention. 
repetitive miss the 
Those who complain 
a of detail will not catch consumers 
is socially wasteful as it is simple and 
to pique consumer's interest. 
IS "persuasive" and not "iniormative" 
advertising causes consumers 
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to pay a higher price for a product or buy more it as same 
product is mucb more to them. The 
inclistinguisbable a due to a product improvemenL It is also 
extremely difficult to distingujsh informative advertising. They 
are usually inextricably mixed. 
appeal to consumers' fantasies and Doing 
more the advertiser's product and thus. is "'u.Jl"' ..... U •• 
rent-seeking objection, is not an objection. It is a philosoprucal one. 
Antitrust should ignore it. 
RRe proponents may claim that when faced by a new entrant, a predator 
may l.D ex(:eSS,lve advertising to rruse rivals' costs. is what 
is excessive. Any' UVLLJ..L.lL.l<.U.",1. will respond to an entrant by 
advertising. Whether is purely a subjective judgment. 
Too many variables exist to be able to a market to which to 
The problem is insurmountable. 
U.S. Law: 
In Berkey Photo. Inc. v ~~.!.!:!;.!,!....!.lt.l~~~ the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals recognised, obiter, a monopolist, some 
s. 2 by advertising. However, it has wide latitude to truthfully 
and ............. "' ...... Circuit stated: 
"A monopolist is not IO['Dl(lGe:n to publicise its product unless the 
extent of this activity is so by competitive exigencies 
as to constitute an entry barrier. a producer 
603 Or. 1979). 
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is ordinarily permitted, much an advocate at law, to 
cause in light possible. Advertising that v"""'v"""""'" 
products and not, at least ... J..U ..... "" 
amounts to constitute anticompelitive conduct 
of s. '2".16 
Similarly, Circuit Court of Appeals held in ~~~~~~ v 
held: 
"Advertising that creates barriers to 
predatory of the type 
preventu•18 
problems with these Berkey quoted two cases 
as authority. American Tobacco Co. v U.S. I!> In the Matter of Borden. 
20 Neither of these cases appear to be on a finding the 
was predatory. Court held 
cigarette in the U.S. had monopolised the cigarette 
The Court on advertising as follows: 
each of the 1937, 1938 and 
expended a total of over $40,000.00 a 
advertising is not criticised as a 
advertising may the 
competitors of Such advertising, 
is also a publicised warning that these companies 
and know how to use a powerful defensive 
weapon against new New competition not enter 
a field, unless it well supported by comparable 
16 at (citations 
17 95 (5th CiT. 1986), cere denied, 486 U.S. 1023 (1988). 
18 rd. 100-101. 
19 
20 
1 (1946). 
669 (1978), aff'd, 
461 U.S. 940 ( 
498 (6th Cir. 1982), vacated and 
national advertising".21 
does not seem to have based 
advertising. The Federal 
that the respondent monopolised the 
authority for Berkey holding 
F.T:C. held Borden enjoyed substantial 
brand 'name" of its product Rea ........."l.I...lv.l..I.. 
juice manufacturers, 
promotional allowan,ces and 
average total cost. As 
substantially above its rivals, 
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.......... ' .... '-'u on defendant's alleged 
"""""'....,..",.= finding, 
lemon juice market is 
is predatory. In Borden, the 
power based on the "dominant 
Faced \Vitb competition from other 
advertising heavily, offering 
In some areas its prices were below 
name allowed Borden to price 
cuts forced its rivals to lower 
prices below their costs. Neither the F.T.C. nor 
Circuit make it clear whether conduct would have been 
without the pricing issues.22 
Second, the and Berkey make it clear that if a ....... "' .... "' .. " .... 
advertises falsely, then it will breach s. 2. Such conduct would not 
of the Commerce Act. It the Fair Trading Act 1986 in New 
The U.S. cases on 
advertising. If it is 
held truthful 
Supra, note 
Supra, 
at 797. 
with tbe content of tbe predator's 
passing off it breaches s. 23 No coun has 
s. 2. have defendants 
2d at 517-521. 
21 
22 
23 See, ~~-L!..~~~~~~ v =~-"-"'~~~ 2d 919 (9th 
1980). 
breached s. 2 a new product long before it introduced it.24 
as advertising was truthful, U.S. courts have 
Berkey suggests it never will breach s. Consequently. law is irrelevant 
to New Zealand. I shall not 
Section 
It is unlikely a New Zealand court would find adverti,sing could breach s. 
36. Increasing advertising in response to a new entrant is part of normal 
competition. It is to it. would do so in a competitive 
market. Thus, it would not a use of a position. Possibly one could 
tbe was excessive and only a dominant firm could so. 
the intractable problem of determining 
The RRC model, while showing costs for rivals, 
cannot distinguish between and normal advertising. Thus, it would be 
of no use a New "'-' .... ·a .... : ... .1U court. 
U.S. decisions on false advertising breaching s. 2 are to s. 
36. False advertising breaches the Fair Trading New "-''''' ...... ,,''' ...... courts would 
not consider such cases under s. 36. can advertise. 
Thus, it would not a use a .... VIJ..U.1..Q...U position. 
Conclusion: 
The RRC model can show how can costs and 
24 note 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
=~~~ v Eastman Kodak Co. 519 F. Supp. 
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the advertiser power over price. However, competitive can have this 
effect. model cannot distinguish between predatory and competitive 
There are strong reasons for holding advertising cannot breach s. 
should not use to hold that can breach 
s.36. 
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CHAPTERXn 
OF JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES 
Introduction: 
Abusing judicial and administrative processes is a paradigm raising rivals' 
costs strategy. It does not into any of Krattenmaker and Salop's four 
scenarios. However, it give the predator power over price. It merits 
antitrust concern. 
In 1978, former Professor, Robert Bork alerted the 
to the of abuse governmental processes,l induding 
judicial and administrative processes. This involves a dominant firm using 
judicial and administrative v ....... ,""'-" as an anticompetitive weapon. A dominant 
firm can do this in a number of For ..... "" .. u .. u.".,.". it can planning 
objections to a rival's into the litigation agai.n.st 
a rival - not in the of winning but to increase rival's costs. As Bork 
the enormous proliferation of regulatory and licensing authorities at every 
of government almost possibili ties for 2 
Mi croe co nomic ushered competition previously monopolised 
markets in New Zealand. Litigation is a way established forms may try to 
1 BO~ ANTITRUST PARADOX: POLICY AT WAR WITH 
ITSELF ch. 18 (1978), (2d 1993). 
2 Id. at 347. 
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competition. Williams J., in ~~~~~=-""~~~ v "-"""'---"-=~~~~ 
commented on thls the context comparative advertising: 
"The vigorous promotional campaign of the obstreperous newcomer 
involved the fashionable of comparative advertising. 
mature monopolist, as is now almost obligatory sucb situations in 
deregulated markets in New Zealand, cried foul. It claimed that 
the advertising material was ... Witb alacrity it commenced 
proceedings sought an interlocutory injunction. established ritual 
was concluded the customary way with the new entrant proclaiming 
loudly ... that the by the monopolist to do with 
protection of consumers deception but were motivated by 
a powerful to stifle incipient competition." 
the last 18 months litigation alleging such abuse New 
and Canada. shows that the could emerge as a 
very important one. Judicial reaction spanned the from scepticism 
by Smellie J. New Zealand High Court v 
CommunicatioQS,4 to a cautious ,... .... "" ...... , .... by Olney 1. in the Federal Court of 
to a '-'-'-'-'-'F,U"''''' to explore the 
issue by Barker J. the Higb Court and New Zealand Court of Appeal in 
to a warm by 
Canadian Competition Tribunal in ~~~~L.A.l~~ij.5!.!:~!.....l:!:;~~~~::.ll v 
Laidlaw.? 
This chapter discusses the law from a comparative perspective. Part II 
3 Unreported, HC, Auckland, CP 1216/92 at Williams J. did not discuss 
whether Telecom breached s. 36 by seeking an injunction. 
4 [1992] 3 NZLR 247. 
5 (1991) ATPR para 41-116. 
6 [1992] 2 NZLR 641. 
7 (1992) 40 CPR [3d] 289 (Competition Trib.). 
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'"'" ... ;I..UU-..Ll ....... why abuse of judicial and administrative processes (abuse of process) 
is an attractive predatory practice. m discusses the New Zealand, 
Australian Canadian case-law and Part IV explores the American law which 
is interlinked with the judicially doctrine. 
V to identify the that are likely to in predatory litigation 
suggests ways in which New Zealand courts might treat under s. 36. 
Part VI 
Attractions as an Anticompetitive Strategy: 
Abuse of processes can an effective anticompetit\ve strategy.s It can 
costs. firm can tie a.competitor up expensive proceedings. The 
parties usually face equal costs although a plaintiff can arrange so that the 
defendant has to more;9 for example, a plaintiff may a 
body, such as an agency, to and thus, avoid 
costs altogether. It may be cheaper to bring an action than to defend it. A 
plaintiff may a defendant undertake expensive discovery. The 
consequences of Hoi"""",,,, are to greater for a uv" ..... uu ......... , so or may 
8 of the strategy, see Hurwitz, 
9 BOR1\. note 1, at 348. 
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feel compelled to spend a disproportionate amount in her or his defence. 
tactic is especially against a small of an 
action are relatively independent of a defendant's 
proportionately higher for a small 
- thus, costs will 
The tactic is particularly effective against potential market entrants. A 
market entrant probably some regulatory approval; for example, 
planning permission. Thus, a bas considerable for objecting 
possibly del'aying entry. Well-timed litigation can divert managerial time from 
developing plans into developing litigation strategy. New entrants 
generally have less capital so are more vulnerable to cost Pending 
or actual litigation may discourage banks or investors lending. It may force 
other to abandon joint ventu.res. 
Apart from rivals' predatory litigation offers other benefits 
for predator. Discovery may turn up useful information. Litigation can 
a competitor's reputation, especially if complaint alleges a breacb of 
consumer protection legislation. It may impair customer relations. 
Litigation may cheaper price predation. effectiveness does not 
depend on eliminating a competitor. delaying entry a dominant finn can 
collect monopoly profits. Bork notes, it well be. wonh the costs of 
litigation for an extra few years' monopoly profitS.lO 
Litigation creates legal risks. Few people are aware of it as a 
possible breach the Act. The "action" occurs in planning tribunals 
licensing authorities and often involves sman businesses. smaJJ-
10 Ibid. 
business people are unaware of the Commerce Act's potential 
protection. Even alleging a violation be risky. law in Zealand is 
its infancy, if not its tOf;W stage. AlJleglLDg a breach is likely to result in 
applications to out a domi.nant will likely appeal adverse 
decisions. a smail fum will incur the litigation costs it is see:JGIlg to avoid. 
The "for'H A '''''' is likely the litigating firm reputation as a hard 
Some commentators believe that a firm's reputation for predatory 
behaviour can be an effective barrier.ll a repluultIOtn may a 
potential competitor eDterul~ the market. prospect long, expensive 
litigation may overwhelm a potential entrant. As Hurwitz suggests, a 
successes Htiga~g or objecting esra011sn a drilling precedent. 12 A firm 
does not even have to succef:a to achieve a deterring reputation. 
Of COllfSje, from society's point Vlew, ablJsi\'e litigation societal 
detriments. leads to deadweight weUaJ'e losses which retard innovation. 
leads to increased pri4:es. If the dominant firm pn~vents entry, it th"" .... r+e 
competition. competition law should such abllse. It is ne<:essary to 
examiIle whether s. covers it. However, one must be ",... .. A ..... As a matter of 
courts should interpret s. 36 to forbid a dOInin.ant firm 
litigation so as to sut)press cornpc;utlon. Courts should not, however, interpret 
s. 36 to dominant firms outlaws, forbidden to enforce legal rights. 
11 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 
184-87 (1976); SCHERER. INDUSTRIAL Jv1ARKET STRUCTURE 
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 559-60 ed.1980). 
12 Hurwitz, supra., 8 74. 
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An example13 illustrate the problem. A wants to build a shopping 
Before it can do so, the proposed location must be re-:zorlea B, a dominant 
market, files various objections in an attempt to delay 
constructing its A successfully overcomes each of B's objections. Its 
victories are Pyrrbic as they its u.u, ............. ,~ ...... resources. it to abandon 
the project. B's ,"-'''', .... .,."'''-' were valid it should not breach SS. 46 and A 
dominant finn be to object. However, there be circumstances 
which conduct should s. 36. This .. u(:u..n'!v~ attempts to identify 
Commonwealth Case-law: 
New Zealand: 
To breach s. 36 a ... v ................. .......,.. must use dominant position for the 
purpose of restricting entry into a market, competitive rna 
or eliminating a a market. Whether a dominant has 
breached s. 36 by. abusing jucliciaJ administrative processes depends on 
whether abuse is use a dominant position and whether the has 
requisite 
The first New ................................. case was ==.....,."..""-"~~~v Geotherm Energy 
14 Geothenn.. an intending producer electricity in centraJ North 
Island, claimed that Electricorp (which was allegedly dominant that 
This hypotheticaJ is derived from v ~~~ 
664 F. 891 (2d Gr. 
14 Unreported 4/10/91 CA 169/91, Barker J. 
had breached s. alia): 
(1) making calculated to 
investors from dealing customers, 
with its competitors; 
(2) objecting to Geotherm's statutory applications at 
(3) 
every opportunity and on all grounds 
alleged many Electricorp's 
applications were baseless and that had 
led evidence and had assisted other 
objectors ); 
entering into 
authorities whicb 
supplies. 
electrical supply 
competition for 
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In essence, claimed that Electricorp a policy to exclude all 
competitors. 
Elecuncorp sougbt to out tbe Statement of it was 
uv ... ...,.:>~,~L.U before Barker J. in the 16 The case went to 
of Appeal. agreed that the contracts could be a breach of 
S. 36.17 The Appeal would have been happy to have left the 
Statement of Claim because public statements and 
18 However, the 
considered whether such conduct could amount to "use" of 
dominant position. 
The Court the "use that position" v .... .-L.I..lv of s. 36. Earlier 
15 at 3 and 5. 
16 
[1992] 2 
18 Ibid. 
authority was split as to whether it was a ''VLU' .... UL which a plaintiff 
to prove. 19 The Court that it was analytically. from the 
element and that a to prove both. 
conduct prohibited is the use of the .... '.n.LL.l.ll ... u. .. 
position for the purposes. There 
in which the use of the market position and the 
purpose are separated but two must be 
kept in mind".20 
The Court held that dominant position would actually to 
or to exercise a ... VLL.I..LU ......... influence over production, 
supply of goods or services relevant market. be 
done or indirectly in many ways ... and the or potential effects of 
particular conduct only on a assessment of the 
21 
The Court looked to s. 46 of the ..!..L!~~~~~!Q;. and held it may 
not be directly comparable. 
"[W]e are that use of a market position necessarily is 
the same as use market power. It is that of a 
dominant position' is to construed as use of power 
flowing from that position. But equally a which 
unconstrained discretionary conduct is open may be 'used' without 
LAp:,"F>J..l.'r, in that conduct ~ as threatening to do SO".22 
Use of that is not confined to activity in the 
20 Supra, note 17, at 646-647. 
21 Id. at 648. 
Yd. at 649. 
supply and price of goods and services. It extends to conduct 
capable of influencing those elements.23 There must, however, be a 
clear and link U"l.l\.<o;; and the dominant position. Finally, 
Court quoted from 
" 'Although s. 3(8)( a )-( c) contains a non-exhaustive list 
aid in market-power analysis, one must bear in mind the 
concept of market employed in s. 3(8) beyond the 
narrow economic DOtiOn. the ability of a to profitably 
above cost. s. 3(8) is whether a firm 
a position to exercise a dominant influence over the production, 
acquisition. supply or price goods or services" in a This 
expansive notion market power would 
or that enable the to a major influence 
over one or more the market variables mentioned, Assuming 
et cetera contribute to the fum's dominance, then 
taking advantage of rights will involve the of 
dominant position''',25 
Court's approach view that s. 36 covers conduct 
only a dominant could perform. set out its views on the 
constituent .... 1 ..... LU'-"IJ.1..o:> of S. the Court considered all~gation separately. 
Statements of Policy: 
tH;~ctrICOlrp bad apparently public statements that it had a policy to 
its virtual monopoly and tbat it intended to take to deter 
competitors customers. allegedly it would lower its charges 
order to meet any competition. The Court held such statements 
Ibid. 
COMPETITION LAW AND 
179, 185 (Ahdar 1991). 
25 Supra, Dote 17, at 650. 
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breach s. 36 and whether did in case to be determined on the 
evidence. It noted: 
"We are not satisfied that statements made on behalf of a 
company in a dominant position as to the intended of 
market power to deter potential competitors, made 
cirClim.stances that fact to competition, 
could not fall s. 36. Such statements may to 
a dominant position if it is the dominant position that gives 
statements force to deterrence".26 
With respect, this seems to be statements could 
competitors customers. A dominance gives statements serious 
Its economic resources eosure it will able to back up policy 
effectively. statements could deter investment. One can this 
...,""'v .......... s;:;, to threats of litigation. This too, could discourage investment. 
dominance gives threats The statements have 
dominant a reputation for su(:ce:ssn preventing firms 
competing with it. They may also raise potential entrant's costs as it 
is to seek advice evaluating tbe threats. A non-dominant is 
unlikely to have a reputation and be able to afford to back up the 
statements as effectivelyY 
26 rd. at 
27 example of the effectiveness of a firm's threats to litigate 
is CVD v 769 Gr. 19885). Raytheon 
threatened to bring a breach of secrets case against some former 
employees and their fonned corporation. case had no 
substance. employees knew this. Despite they granted Raytheon 
a The Court 
"Raytheon did not actually initiate litigation ... 0 ............ 
plaintiffs. Instead, the evidence indicated that it 
the of litigation to exact a licensing 
agreement from In this litigation 
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Statutory Approvals: 
Electricorp argued that statutory rights of objection can never 
breach s. 36. Geotherm said it objected to way "'-'T .... ,,, .. exercised these 
the alleged perjury, I'\U"'TT'P~ __ ~,., grounds of opposition and 
assisting other objectors. The Court rejected Electricorp's contentions and was 
not prepared to say -that statutory rights could not a use of s. 36. 
said" "it can be argued some strength that the exercise of statutory rights 
will not necessarily, be beyond scope of the New Zealand s. 36",28 
Court that if 
"technical knowledge access to materials and capital [factors 
which indicate whether a firm can price, acquisition, 
production and supply and thus have a dominant position in 
market] ... are an element of a dominant position and are used in 
the course of the exercise of statutory rights a proscribed 
purpose s. 36 might be breached",29 
Again, respect, appears to correct. As mentioned above, 
purpose predatory litigation is to increase costs and to delay or prevent 
Achieving can influence price, acquisition, production and supply of goods 
semces. 
The Court did not that exercise of reasonable rights of objectioD 
could contravene s. 36. 
"[A] monopoly [is] entitled make a case to the appropriate 
licensing or other authority for the preservation of its monopoly. 
Raytheon would have proved ruinous to the 
newly formed corporation, and effectively foreclosed 
competition the relevant market", 
28 Supra, note 17, at 651. 
29 Ibid. 
The subm.ission of reasonable arguments to that end the 
ta.king of reasonable steps to prepare the case could not in 
themselves amount to use of a dominant in markeL 
Something more would have to shown to bring Electricorp's [a 
dominant firm's] conduct within s. 36".30 
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The Court could not discount possibility so it refused to strike out the 
Statement of Claim. 
It is Decessary to examine what factors led the Court of Appeal to 
conclude Geotberm alleged the following: 
(i) The statutory OOJleC1)0I1S were part of a larger anti-competitive 
scheme. 
(ii) Electricorp committed perjury made misrepresentations 
during the hearings of statutory objections. 
(ill) Electricorp had assisted other Objectttlrs. 
(iv) were in many cases baseless, 
(v) Electricorp objected at every 
This was the "something the Court of Appeal referred to. 
A nondominant can make reasonable arguments take reasonable 
in nr".n'l"'" a case. "Reasonable arguments" suggests that the making 
wants to or, at least, has a .... lHJ..LI ....... to that makes unreasonable 
ar!!;urrlents C<:lDTIl[)t win. A fum in a competitive market could not afford to waste 
money on a case it could not win. Similarly, it would not be able to afford to 
Object of merits or afford to assist other objectors. A dominant 
firm that has made monopoly ,.,.,..,.,.htr afford to do so. It has "deep 
pockets", In this firm uses its position. The above factors are 
also relevant to purpose. which brings a case it cannot win must have a 
30 ld. at 
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purpose other than winning. This must be to harm the other party. 
The Court, following rejected Electricorp's argument that 
allowing the objections to be a breach of s. 36 would mean re-litigating all the 
statutory applications. The Court quoted Barker . 
II l' see no justification for holding that the plaintiffs' surviving 
allegations disclose no reasonable cause of action or are an abuse 
of process of the Court, even though there may be, of 
necessity, some consideration of earlier litigation before various 
tribunals. I stress that this Court will relitigate merits of 
these applications but will assess the conduct of tbe first 
defendant; investigate whether either it procured false 
evidence, p~d persons to object or made unnecessary objections 
with the purpose of dominant poweru.31 
The case leaves many questions unanswered. The Court considered a list 
of allegations which may a br~acb of s. 32 It is unlikely that this list is 
While the Court talked of reasonable objections and preparatory 
steps it did not say whether reasonableness is objective or subjective. The Court 
also raised possibility that the Bill of Rights Act 1990 might affect s. 36. It 
did not consider how. 
To date the only other New Zealand case involving predatory litigation 
is ~~~ v ~~~~bY.!J,.!.Yd.!~!.!.L!!~.33 Clear alleged that Telecom breached 
s. 36 by br1nging actions and threatening others. The actions alleged breach 
of compromise (a court had granted Telecom an interim injunction over 
this), Trading Act violations, copyright infringement and passing off. Clear 
31 Id. at 
32 Id. at 652. "It may be that the time will come when the relationship 
between s. 36 and s. 14 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 must 
be considered". 
33 [1992] 3 NZLR 247. 
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asked Telecom.to let the Commerce Comm.ission decide these matters but 
Telecom refused. Clear said this showed Telecom's was to 
increase Clear's costs. also alleged that Telecom had an anticompetitive 
policy of scrutinising aJl its advertising and threatening, some cases, bring 
actions under Fair Act. 
.... L'-'''''-J.-U asked the High Court to strike out the of Claim. 
Smellie J. observed that the alleged conduct was at the outer limits what was 
envisaged by s. 36.34 Honour referred to Australian authority 
legal proceedings can in some circumstances amount to a prohibited use of a 
dominant position.lS The cases had not identified those 
circumstances. His Honour extended to court 
Following ~.lL!:!;i~.!..!o Smellie J. held to establish a breach of 
s.36 abusing judicial .. '-'.....,"''-'''' there had to be "something more" than 
reasonable of the rights to sue. His Honour rejected Clear's contention 
Telecom'S refusal go to the Commerce Corrunission together with the 
nature of the complaints was "something more".36 J. noted that 
the Commission was a limited dispute resolution facility . a 
Commission decision is not binding both parties agree, and 
Commission examines complaints thoroughly than a court. A court provides 
34 Id. at 251. 
35 Honour referred to 
(1989) 177 and 
v (1991) ATPR 
41-074. 
36 Id. at 
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a final and binding decision?7 Honour held he not rule that 
Telecom's complaint lacked merit38 SmeHie examined complaints on the 
information he had before (including the injunction decision) and 
that be could not the complaint was triviaL This led Honour to 
strike out Clear's Statement of Claim. 
Unlike Geotberm, did not allege behaviour such as 
perjury or objectors. The facts did not indicate 
complained about of advertising. This shows Telecom did not object 
on all possible occasions without to merits. With respect this ..... ..., ..... ""''Uu 
seems correct. facts not support Telecom an anti-competitive 
purpose, let alone using its dominant position. is nothing wrong in not 
to a disputes tribunal or in scrutinising a competitor's 
advertising. Indeed, the Trading Act, as consumer protection legislation 
which allows a competitor to complain about such breaches, encourages The 
complaints were not Telecom did not use its capital resources to 
actions a nondorninant would have done. a nondominant 
could act just the same. case indicates that New courts may 
use an objective approach determine whether a finn breached s. 36. 
judge the proceedings to decide whether 
did not ask whether Telecom believed them to be 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 The related issue whether 
could breach s. 36 arose 
~~~'--V-..:!.5.:!,L...!:~ unreported, 
complaints were trivial. He 
39 
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Australia: 
Australian courts have not ...u ........... ,;:o""'u the issue of predatory litigation to 
the same as the Court of I'\.UUei':l.l Geotherm. Cad bury Schweppes Pty 
Ltd:v Kenman Developments Pty Ltd40 dealt directly with issue. There. 
plaintiff a.u .... il:. .... the defendant had breached s. 46 of Trade Practices 
bringing an bad sought an injunction against Kenman 
to stop ,n ....... .LIJ...LI<:UJ. selling CD()CO which a wrapping to a well-
known brand. infringed 
Jen.kinson .... LLLAv .... to grant the injunction, that the 
were quite it was unlikely that anyone could H . .LL.' ....... ·.'" the 
two. u<U .......... 'u its action and Honour adjourned it for a 
hearing. brought a s. 46 action alleging that 
bad an improper motive bringing and continuing the above as 
were untenable, and doomed to failure. Kenman did not 
other conduct. Cadburys sought to tbe 
proceedings struck out. Olney J. held only way to the 
Dunlop obtained an interim injunction (based on s. 9 of Fair Trading 
Act and off) to prevent Hose Supplies selling and 
distributing rubber with colour spiral stripes. Hose 
Supplies claimed (inter aHa) Dunlop which had 63 per cent of the market 
was breaching s. 36. Fisher J. not afford the significant 
weight in an interim injunction. His noted: "I have 
some doubts as to whether the of rights this fashion could 
ever be regarded as a breach of s. of tbe Commerce Act". 
40 
subject see Practices 
Practices Act to Intellectual Property (July 1991). 
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anticompetitive motive was from have commenced continued the 
pro ceedings Y Honour read the proceedings and said that the issue 
was. triable, noting J. had that when the case to a 
full he would difficulty in predicting the outcome. 
there was to justify a of s. 46,42 Olney J. held that failing to 
obtain interlocutory relief at a very stage of proceedings not mean that 
continuation of proceedings was '''''''''LU.F, of market 43 With 
this seems Success or lack of it at an interlocutory does 
not the final A nondominant could continue with 
an interlocutory stage. Similarly, a continuation does not 
indicate that a bas tbe proscribed anticompetitive His Honour 
did, however, note that "[t]here may well circumstances which the 
unreasonable pursuit of a claimed legal a less powerful '""VAlu..., .... 
by a with market power could amount to 
advantage power but case is not this 44 Apart from saying 
that the pursuit unreasonable Olney did not what 
circumstances case lends support to the view that test of 
pursuit IS unreasonable is objective. In TelecQll.. 45 the Coun 
looked predicate suit determined whether it objective merit. 
41 Id. at 52, 
42 Thid. 
43 
44 Ibid. 
(1992) 40 289 (Competition Trib.). 
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Canada: 
Director of Investigation and Research v ~~""-'-"-----,-"-==...o~""""-,-,,",,,,,,-~ is 
the leading Canadian case. The Director of Investigations and Research brought 
an abuse-of-dominance case against Laidlaw Waste Systems Ltd before 
Competition TribunaL Laidlaw was the dominant finn in waste collection and 
disposal in four areas on Vancouver Island. Director alleged a 
number of abusive practices including predatory litigation. for the latter, the 
Tribunal noted that Laidlaw used lawyers to threaten legal action against 
customers. In their threatening letters the lawyers said that Laidlaw had brought 
many actions ..... 5 .. l.J...U.:J customers and had always been successfuL In reality 
neither statement was true. The Tribunal noted the danger of abusive litigation 
and threats thereof to competition and quoted a large extract on the topic from 
Bork~s ~=--~=~,,--,,-~~~.46 The Tribunal strongly criticised Laidlaw's 
litigation practice. 
The 
46 
"No one can read the evidence concerning the use Laidlaw made 
of litigation and the threat of litigation in this case without a sense 
of The respondent used its vastly larger size and 
economic resources together with the threat litigation to prevent 
customers from switching to competitors. It commenced spurious 
litigation and threatened litigation against its competitors to drive 
or attempt to drive them out business by raising tbeir costs of 
doing business, is certainly predatory bebaviour".47 
also commented: 
"It would be boped that wben Courts become aware of this kind 
oppressive use of the legal system they would at the very least 
be prepared to award costs Defendant on a full indemnity 
Ibid, at 102-103; BORK, note 1. 
47 Id. at 101-102. 
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basis".48 
Thus, the Tribunal found such abusive litigation could be an anticompetitive act. 
Although s. 79 of the Competition Act49 does not require use market 
position or taking advantage of market power, ~~5U.L shows bow abusive 
litigation is grounded market power. Laidlaw's customers took its threats to 
litigate seriously because its power. This smmc)ns~"""""",,~~where 
Court found threats pu bUe statements could be the use of a dominant 
position if position gave the statements the force amounting to deterrence. 
~~~ also indicates that to be an anticompetitive act, litigation must be 
spurious and made the purpose of driving or attempting to drive out 
competitors. case also shows how a dominant fum can use litigation against 
its customers. The and the misrepresentations as to litigation success 
would deter a customer from leaving Laidlaw. 
48 Id. at 103. 
49 Section 79 provides: 
(1) Where, on application by Director, the Tribunal finds that: 
(a) one or more persons substantially or completely control, 
throughout Canada or any area thereof, a or species 
of business, 
(b) that person or those persons have engaged or are 
_~~~_,...,~ .... in a practice anticompetitive and 
(c) the practice has bad, is baving or is likely to bave the effect 
of preventing or lessening competition substantially a 
market, 
the Tribunal 
from engaging 
make an prohibiting 
that practice. 
or any of those persons 
327 
United States Case-law! 
Introduction: 
Not surprisingly, United jurisprudence contains the most case-law 
on whether the abuse of judicial and administrative processes can violate the 
antitrust laws. Claims have arisen out of a firm opposing a competitor's request 
for governmental approval or for a licence necessary to establish or expand 
business activities. These claims have included opposition to: approval to 
establish or expand a regulated' entity;50 grants of licensing and operating 
rigbts;Sl issue of building pennits;52 zoning and land use decisions;s3 grants 
of cable and other franchises;S4 approval of new products;55 certification of 
50 E.g. v 2d 948 (lIth Cir. 
51 
1986) (hospital's request for a certificate need to expand facilities or 
to enter a health care market); v =,+-,,-,"=""::::== 
424 Supp. 1 (B.D. Mo. 1976) of a bank 
mem., 553 F. 2d 102 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977). 
~==~='--"-"==-==.:. V ~~~~~~ 404 U.S. 508 (1972) 
(highway carrier operating rights). 
52 V~~~~~~Lill~~~~ 
=~~=;!..l..-~~UL> 542 F. 2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 430 
53 v 858 
1075 (5th Cir. 1988) (alleging use of ordinances to put cable 
television operator out of business), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1047 (1989); 
~~~~~~~v 693 F. 2d (8th 
1982) (shopping mall zoning), cert 461 U.S. 945 (1983). 
54 ~~~~~~LU-..!.~~ V ~~--L.!d~.!.IJ 745 2d 1266 (9th Cir. 
1984). 
55 v 466 2d 272 (DC 1972) (alleging 
conspiracy to influence F.D.A to deny fair consideration of new drug 
applications ), 
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personnel;S6 request for government subsidy;57 and issue of municipal 
bonds.58 
The aspects of the opposition which led to the antitrust claims included 
opposition was no hope of success59 and opposition Ylith the 
purpose of delaying entry or burdening the competitor rather than winning.':>o 
Anticompetitive purpose was evinced by there being no hope success. bringing 
actions a tribunal known to lack jurisdictio~ 61 or repeatedly and 
automatically opposing without regards to the merits62 or so long that 
the competitor is denied access to tbe administrative process.63 
Claims have also alleged of the judicial process. These claims have 
involved baseless litigation as shown by rneritless claims such as bad faith 
prosecutions of patent infringements and unfounded allegations of stolen trade 
56 v County of San Mateo, 592 F. Supp. 
57 
58 
59 
956 (ND Cal 1984) (certification of paramedic personnel), affd, 791 
2d 755 (9th Cu. 1986). 
~~~~"""--'= V ~.!..!:..=.~~~~~ 349 F. Supp. 1064 (D. 
Hawaii 1972), affd, 489 1973), cert denied, 417 U.S. 
913 (1974). 
~~~~~~~~~~~~v -'-"-"'=.::...:::~ 761 F. 2d 484 (8th Cir. 
1985). 
==~~= v ~--"""~ 700 785 (2d Cir. ] 983), cert denied, 464 
U.S. 1073 (1984). 
60 rd. 
61 v AT & T, 708 2d 1081, 1156 (7th CiT. 1983), 
cert denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983). 
62 v 690 F. 2d 12401 
1254 (9th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983). 
63 -=-=-=~=....;::::...:==-====v Mississippi Power· Co" 1 2d 1484, 
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64 or bad intervention in proceedings of a 
competitor,65 or brought with a known standing,66 or before a 
court lacking jurisdiction.67 
Misrepresentations made in judicial have been the basis for 
an antitrust 68 Litigation brought for the alleged purpose of 
than winning challenged.69 have included burdening 
a competitor heavy costs,70 publicity/! 
trade secrets by pretrial discovery72 and a competitor to 
disclosure financial liabitity.73 show an ultimate 
of eliminating or decreasing competition in an existing market, or or 
preventing a market. 
The above conduct may merely an aggrieved • .u ... , .... LLlIJ 
64 v Raytheon Co., 769 842 (1st Cir. 1985), cert 
U.S, 1016 (1986). 
65 109 F.TC. (1987). 
66 
67 
68 
69 
71 
~~~ 664 F. 2d 891 (2d 1981). 
1983). -=-=-=--=-.:::-> 708 2d 1081, 1156 
~~~~ V "'"-==...::..:...::.=-~= 1984-1 Trade 
~~..=.o..v =~"'----"-=:.......:...L~='> 694 F. 2d 466, 
461 U.S. 958 (1983). 
""""'"" ......... 'fI-"=~"""'-"--'-== V Heliodyne. 698 F. 2d 386, 
.=...:....:.,s:<.....::~ V =="'---"-=:.......:...;;....::::== 694 F. 2d 466, 
denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983). 
Ibid. 
65, 853. 
1 F.2d 1484 
(7th Cir. 1982), cert 
(9th Or. 1987). 
(7th Cir. 1982). cert 
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legitimately judicial administrative amendment to 
the United States Constitution the to free and this 
protect such conduct.74 need to punish anticompetitive of judicial 
and and yet protect right to the 
the courts to develop the ......"".""""-'--"-'=..=.~~= doctrine. 
Development of tbe Noerr-Pennington Doctrine: 
doctrine petitioning behaviour antitrust 
liability. Supreme established the immunity in Eastern Railroad 
v doctrine imrnuoises 
governmental from antitrust scrutiny even if those have 
competitive Court immunity to adjudication in California 
Court further 
doctrine in Allied Tube & Conduit Corp, v Indian Head Inc. 78, City of 
~~~u=. v Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc.79 and .!....!...!~~~~~.!:..!.-~J".!:U~ 
74 first amendment to the Constitution United declares: 
sball an establishment religion. or 
prohibiting the free or abridging freedom of speech, 
or of press; or right people to people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the government for a of grievances" U.S. 
CONST. 1. 
75 U.S. (1961). 
76 U.S. 657 ( 
77 404 508 ( 
108 1, 93] (1988). 
79 III S. 1, (1991). 
~~""",-" ......... ~v~~~!o.!::-"'---'-"~~"""'!"!.u:!.!:~~~ 
doctrine's scope remains unclear. 
~~ a group of truckers their 
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In spite of all this, the 
association a group of 
railroads, an association of railroad presidents and a public relations firm. 
alleged that the railroads hired public relations firm to direct 
a publicity campaign to discredit the truckers and to lobby for anti-trucking laws. 
campaign succeeded as the Government of Pennsylvania vetoed a Bill 
would have trucks' weight limits on highways. The truckers alleged 
that the campaign's purpose was to eliminate them from the long distance freight 
business. They that the campaign was deceptive because 
railroads sponsored parties to the truckers, thus ~ding the railroads' 
participation. trial court found that railroads had breached the Sherman 
Act Third Circuit Court Appeals~ by a majority, affirmed. A 
unanimous Supreme reversed decision, holding that joint efforts to 
a legislature to anticompetitive legislation not within the 
Sherman Act.s1 The Court noted that the Sherman does not apply to valid 
exercises of government power.S2 Thus, a validly anticompetitive law 
not breach Sherman Act. Since Sherman Act does not cover such 
laws it coul.d not c.over attempts to persuade legislatures to such laws.83 
Court noted that lobbying efforts are essentiaUy dissimilar agreements 
80 113 S. Ct. 1920 (1993). 
365 U.S. at 145. 
82 Id. at 136. 
83 fbid. 
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that the Act traditionally condemns. Sherman Act regulates 
business activity - not political activity. Court held that making lobbying an 
antitrust violation would impair citizens' ability to inform government their 
wishes, thus inhibiting democracy. Finally, the Court noted that to interpret the 
Act so as to prohlbit lobbying would "raise constitutional 
questions".84 
The Court whether the railroads' purpose in lobbying, namely, 
to eliminate the truckers the relevant .......... ' .. IF'" could affect liability. It held 
that it did not. 
U[TJhe right of the people to inform their representatives in 
government their with respect to passage or 
enforcement of laws cannot properly be to depend upon 
intent in doing so. It is neither unusual nor illegal for people 
to action on laws in the hope that they may bring an 
advantage to themselves a disadvantage to their competitors. 
it is quite probably people with just such a hope of 
personal advantage who provide much of the upon 
which governments must act".8S 
Similarly, railroads' behaviour did not liability. The 
Court agreed that the did act unethically> but noted that the Sherman 
Act establishes a code of at ali, is a code condemns trade 
Court did not bold that attempts to influence the government are 
Immune. 
84 Id. 74. a footnote Court stated it was unnecessary to decide 
whether the first amendment protected the railroad's activities. 
85 at 139. 
86 Id. at 140. 
"[T]bere may be situations in whicb a publicity 
ostensibly directed toward influencing government action is a mere 
sham to cover is actually nothing more than an attempt to 
interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor 
and app~cation of the Sherman Act wouJd be justified".81 
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Most subsequent litigation has attempted to define limits of this "sham 
In the extended Noerr immunity to attempts to 
influence the executive branch of government. A small coal company accused 
tbe Mine Workers Union of .... v.u...:!lJU with coal operators to urge 
the of Labour to establish a high LLJL.I..I. .............. UL.U wage for coal workers 
to dissuade Tennessee Valley Authority buying nonunion coal. The 
conspirators hoped that these government wouJd drive the small 
companies from the market. The Court held that the ~~ immunity 
covered the conspirators.88 It reaffirmed that an anticompetitive purpose does 
not remove the immunity. "Joint to influence puhlic officials do not 
violate tbe antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate competition",89 
Court extended ~~ protection 
attempts to influence adjudicatory bodies. plaintiffs ( small Californian 
trucking alleged that the defendants (19 large trucking firms) had 
conspired to undermine the plaintiffs' position in the Californian trucking 
The defendants did so by filing groundless proceedings before State 
87 Id. at 144. 
88 Fora recent commentary exarrurung the role of unions 
litigation, see Durie Lemley, -"-"'-'-""--<.........,. .......... ~-=~~,;-;::~ 
~~~~~~~=~~;::...=.~~ CAL. L. REV" 757 (1992). 
89 381 U.S. at 670. 
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agencies courts to prevent the plaintiffs obtaining the necessary 
approvals to enter market. The plaintiffs alleged that the 
defendants instituted the proceedings or without probable cause"90 
"regardless of the me rits,,9 I of case went to the Supreme Court 
on the pleadings as trial court had it. because of while the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals bad reversed. Justice Douglas, writing for the 
majority, held that Noerr covered legitimate to influence adjudicatory 
proceedings.92 Court suggested either improper or improper 
means make petitioning a sham and means are proper before one 
branch of might not be before a different branch. 
Misrepresentations condoned in. a political arena are not immune to the 
adjudicatory processes.93 Court held complaint stated a cause 
action within sham exception because of the allegations that the 
conspirators were genuinely intent upon influencing public officials but upon 
plaintiffs' cases.94 supported namely, the 
defendants sought to their competitors meaningful access to 
adjudicatory and so to usurp decision-making The 
quoted plaintiffs' that the defendants instituted proceedings 
or without probably cause. It ""f"'~lJ""" of conduct, other access-
90 404 509. 
91 Ibid. 
92 at 510-511. 
93 at 5 
Id. at 511-513. 
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barring, would not be examples were perjury of 
use of a fraudulently-obtained patent to competitors, conspiracy 
officials bribery. list was not exhaustive Court 
that °tbere are many other of illegal reprehensible bebaviour 
which may corrupt the administrative or judicial processes and which may result 
in antitrust violations".9S Douglas held that litigation can 
within the 
"One claim which a court or agency may think may no 
unnoticed but a of claims may 
which the factfinder to conclude the adm.inistrative 
judicial processes been 96 
Lower courts have cited ",""".:I<:4!,,'''' as setting out the for 
sham exception for litigation.97 
Subsequent Supreme Court cases have not provided further 
guidance as to litigation falls the exception. In Allied Tube98 
the Court distinguished a petitioner's liability for caused by the 
requested governmentally-imposed restraint (the petitioner.was not liable) and 
which petitioning directly caused (the 
distinguished n",,,,,, ... ,,,,, petitioning is not 
government action (a sham) and activity which is 
95 rd. at 513. 
96 Ibid. 
97 
98 108 S. Ct. 1, 931 (1988). 
was liable). It 
inely intended to influence 
unethical (not a sbam). 
Mo. 
910 
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the decision, Omni Outdoor Advertising.99 Scalia elaborated on the 
sham exception. 
"The exception to Noerr encompasses situations which 
persons use the governmental - as opposed to the ~~~ 
of that process - as an anticompetitive weapon. classic example 
filing of frivolous objections to license applications a 
with no of achieving denial of the .... "' .......... '" 
but simply in to impose and A sham 
situation involves a defendant whose activities are not genuinely 
aimed at procuring favourable action at not one 
who genuinely seeks to achieve his governmental results but does 
100 
so ..!:.!.Y.~/i..!;:!...~~~~~~ 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ v Columbia Pictures Industries, 
InC. IOI is the Supreme Court's recent ~~ decision. The case concerned 
videodiscs. VVhen a resort hotel operator renting videodiscs to patrons 
in-room viewing, without payment of royalties, eight motion picture studios 
filed a single, apparently reasonable case alleging copyright infringement. 
studios in a controversial copyright decision. 102 hotel operator 
alleging a ~""'-"-'- violation. operator lost at trial and in the Ninth 
Court of Appeals. The Court announced a two pan test for a violation. First, 
challenged suit must Objectively baseless. Second, the person who 
brought the suit must have had the to competition with the 
"governmental Both have to be met. 
Thus, Noerr legitimate attempts to petition government, including 
99 111 S. Ct. 1,344 (1991). 
100 Id. at 1, ( citations (emphasis in original). 
101 113 Ct. 1, (1993). 
102 Id. 1, 930. The Court scholarly criticism the decision. 
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litigation. Not all petitioning is protected. ""-'-"'-~ does not apply when 
defendants' activities are a sbam. must remember that a sham does 
Dot make the activity an violation. A plaintiff has to establish 
elements of a Act violatioD.103 
The Supreme bas not clearly established 
Commentators have described doctrine as a Uquagmire".l04 The lower 
courts that does not protect sham activities. However, they 
over what constitutes a sham. It is necessary to .... A."-L..I...LlH .... what the lower 
.... VIU.., ..... ' .... ' are requirements of a 
The Requirements of a Sham: 
courts generally agree that sham occurs when a 
.... ,;;:;.. ........... "'. not to obtain a result he or seeks, bu t rather to impose burdens, 
delays or costs directly on a competitor. Fiftb Circuit expressed 
the foUowing: 
sham exception comes into play party petitioning 
the government is not at serious about the object of that 
petition but engages in the petitioning activity merely to 
inconvenience competitor. the exception is to 
apply one party has begun that litigation to that 
but rather to force competitor to waste time and 
test as 
103 CVD, Inc. v 769 2d 842,851 (1st 1985) (holding 
plaintiff must prove elements of a Shennan violation 
succeed), cert denied, 475 1016 (1986); v ~~ 
=.::.:. ............. ~~~-"-"" ............ ~~::::...=~ 690 2d 1240, 1247 n. 7, 1259 (9th 
Cir. 1982) (holding if antitrust plaintiff establishes that 
immunity does not apply, it must then establish elements a Sherman 
Act violation). denied. 459 1227 (1983). 
money defending itself. Similarly a party that petltlOllS 
government by engaging administrative processes only to preclude 
or delay its competitor's access to those processes may be liable 
for antitrust damages under sham exception".105 
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In similar vein the Seventh Circuit enunciated the test in the following way: 
"Without a -doubt the intention to harm a competitor is not 
sufficient to litigation or administrative proceedirIgs a sham. 
That anti-competitive motive is the very motive protected under 
Rather the requisite motive for 
exception is the intent to harm one's competitors, not by the result 
of the litigation but by the simple fact the institution of the 
litigation". 106 
Judge Richard in an oft-cited statement in ~-"+'-~~ v ~~~ 
~~...l.l...:~~ said that "the line is crossed when the plaintiffs purpose is not to 
win a favourable judgment against a competitor to harass and deter 
others by process itself, of outcome of Iitigating".l07 
Thus, the various circuits on the requisite purpose. They do not 
agree on what the situation is when a has purposes: for example, it 
hopes to harass competitor but also to win. Some only find a 
when the harassment motive is the firm's sole motive,108 whereas others hold 
that it need only the primacy motive. 109 ~-"+'-~"-'- falls into the latter 
category and the following test: ~= not protect those cases which 
105 v ...L.!....!<~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 858 
1988). 
106 v 708 1081 at 1152 (7th Cir. 1983), 
cert denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983). 
107 Supra, note 72, at 472. 
108 v ~~ 797 3 (6th Cir. 1986), '-LU .... ·U. 479 U.S. 
1035· (1987)~ 
109 466 (7th Cir. 1982). 
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would not have been brought ="-""'~ the injury that a rival suffers simply from 
being enmeshed in the litigation process, regardless of outcome. no 
While the test for a sham is easy to state, in practice it is harder to apply. 
The problem is in nAT/"l'"TTl'~~'~h a purpose. Very few cases provide extrinsic 
evidence a firm's purpose and, usually, courts have to infer it from other 
evidence. The courts have devised tests for u..u..uLLUlE; whether a 
has requisite purpose. 
Some courts, following ~~~~~~~~~~ require a pattern 
of repetitive c1aims. l12 This ind.jcates that a single suit cannot be a sham. 
However, other courts have rejected this and bold that a suit may a 
sham. 113 circuits, again on California Motor Transport, hold that 
only activity which· denies a competitor and meaningful access to the 
agencies and courts" can be a sham. 114 
The courts on whether a successful case can a sham. They 
110 Id. at 
111 Supra, note 76. 
112 
1 v ~o Ml~~ 
1254-57 (9th Ci!. 1982); Interstate Properties v Pyramid Co. of Utica. 586 
F. Supp. 1160, 1162 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
1 v 424 Supp. 163 (E.D. Mo. 
1976), affd mem., 553 F. 2d 102 (8th Cir.). cert denied, 433 U.S. 910 
(1977). 
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accept that in most cases petitioning is not a sham if it Some courts 
present tills as a categorical rule; namely, a successful case means no shamps 
These courts usuaUy hold that this is only in the absence of fraud or 
collusion.1l6 courts say success a strong presumption that the 
case is not a sham.1l7 Other courts hold that while success is an important 
factor to consider, it IS not determinativeYs They reject any rule or 
presumption that .:"' ........... ....,.".:,. petitioning can never a sham. "The determinative 
inquiry is not whether the suit was won or lost, but whether it was significantly 
motivated by a genuine for 119 
The success of a case is an issue as it strongly suggests that the petitioning 
was reasonable or not baseless. Some courts hold that only baseless cases can 
a sharo. 120 However, an unsuccessful case does not mean that the case is 
Many reasonable cases are lost. Most courts attempt to assess the 
objective legal merit of the challenged suit to whether it is baseless. 
Standards as "abusive", "frivolous" or "lacking probable cause" whicb courts 
have adopted are synonyms for Most courts base I essness 
115 
116 ~~~.l:!..l::I..~~-"'-"'-~~~~ ibid; Allied Tube 108 S. Ct. 1, 931, 1, 
938 (1988). 
117 v ~= 797 F. 2d 3 (6th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 479 
U.S. 1035 (1987). 
118 Boulware v ==,""",",,-~::;...:....:o= 1 ~ 1 Trade cases par.a 69, 771 (9th Cir.). 
119 2d 5 (5 t b Cir. 1987), cen 
denied, 484 U.S. 1007 (1988). 
120 =='"'-"......:...:...!'-"== v Codding, 615 2d 830, 841 (9th Cir. 1980). 
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unless petitioning 1S unethical,I21 advanced without to 
merits l22 or of a anticompetitive scheme.l23 One case held that 
a was baseless and tbus a 124 Other courts have found 
baseless ness where the antitrust brought an action without proper 
and a body jurisdiction to the case. 125 
on that the defendant behaved unethically; 
example, 10 misrepresentation or bribery.l26 
~~~~ held that unethical behaviour is irrelevant if petitioner "genuinely 
seeks to achieve his governmental result".127 conflicts with ==="'" 
that misrepresentations and other improper 
would not be immune In the adjudication context.us It is perhaps 
relevant tbat ~~~~~~~~~~ and ~~~~.:::. dealt with alleged 
in tbe legislative arena. The "--="""-"::.......::-"'== also that 
unethical behaviour be an antitrust violation independent Noerr. 
172 
(1965). 
122 ~~~~~==~~==~~=supr~ 119;~====~~~~~~ 
733, 745-46 (8th Cir. 1982). 
2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1983). 
124 F. 2d 5 (5th Cir. 1987), cert 
484 U.S. 891 (1988). 
"-'-'-'=-== .......... ==== v ~~~ 708 2d 1081 (7th CiT. cert 
denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983). 
126 ~-!....!..~~=v Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co.! 640 2d 1107 (9th 
Cir. ·1981). ' 
127 111 S. at 1,354 (1991). 
128 U.S. at 5 (1965). 
One case considered speed in which a defendant pursued its case to 
be relevant.129 
An influential, albeit controversial, test is Judge Posner's cost-benefit 
analysis which rus Honour enunciated 130 test requires a 
court to inquire whether a rational petitioner would have pursued the matter 
motivated by the value of obtaining the requested Under this test 
a lawsuit brought for anticompetitive purposes could a sham even though not 
wholly 1a."--l'-UJlj:; ill lawsuit is a u..LU"''''' it is cost-justified. 
It is unclear whether the ~~ doctrine is based on constitutional 
principles or an of Sherman Act. In ~=..::..!J the Court 
its decision on statutory interpretation although it noted an alternative 
interpretation would raise important constitutional questions. ~~~!Ji:L!:~~ 
~~~'-"--"'= grounded the doctrine the amendment. Recent 
Court authority has not clarified things. Some courts held that despite its 
the ~~ doctrine is now a of constitutional 131 
it is grounded ,in Sherman ACt.132 
129 == ........... v ~~~=~ 1992 - 1 Trade .....,......., ..... .., para 69,771 (9th 
130 694 Crr. 1982). cert denied. 461 U.S. 958 (1983). 
1 
~~"-'U 69 CORNELL. L. REV., 1305, 1306-12 (1984) 
Cornell Note]; Sulliva~ Developments in the Noerr Doctrine. 56 
ANTITRUST L.J., (1987). 
Hand I er & Sevo, ..&.J.!~~~~~.J.L!.!,L.9d!'!'y"'.u.;:L.l:l.!.!.~~~;JL!:.!.!.l!!" 6 
CARDOZO L. REV., 1, 
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Relevant Issues: 
Despite ~~-"!. constitutional overtones and tbe differences between the 
language of the Sherman Act and s. 36 of tbe ...... Ull..LLu ..... Act, it is a useful guide 
to of.admini$trative and judicial processes. American cases identify 
a number of factors and tests which are relevant determining a sham. Some 
of these will be relevant in determining whether an alleged abuse of a judicial 
or administrative process breaches s. 36. 
Purpose: 
Noerr is particularly relevant as to purpose. As mentioned above! a sham 
occurs when a fum litigates, not obtain the requested relieft but rather to 
impose costs etc directly on a rival; that is, when a firm uses the process as 
opposed to the outcome of that process as an anti competitive weapon. There 
no antitrust liability if a litigates with the purpose the result of the 
litigation will harm competitors. The fum is not seeking to use the litigation 
process as an anticompetitive we~pon. 
One can argue that Geotherm 133 makes same distinction. 
Court of Appeal 
a monopoly must entitled to make a case to the 
appropriate licensing or other authority for the preservation of its 
monopoly. submission of reasonable arguments to that 
and the taking of reasonable steps to prepare the case could Dot 
in themselves amount to a use of a dominant position in the 
market",l34 
133 Supra, note 17. 
Id. at 655. 
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Elsewhere the Court said that U[i]t is difficult to a situation which 
there will be a contravention [of s. 36] by the reasonable ",vl'lrr",,,, of rights 
objection".llS Court said was because reasonable u..v, ..... "'. etc, were 
not a use of a dominant position. One can also say, however, that reasonable 
etc not show requisite purpose. Preserving a monopoly means 
a dominant firm wants to thwart competitors. a dominant firm 
arguments and succeeds the authority will make a which 
the likely effect of preserving the dominant monopoly. Making 
reasonable indicates that the dominant firm's purpose was to achieve 
the requested result. This does not breach s. a dominant 
makes unreasonable it is Dot going to It is not going to achieve 
the result it requests. It is not going LO get a decision that will its 
tbat the dominant firm knows, its arguments are 
unreasonable and therefore, that it is unlikely to win, a dominant fum's purpose 
in objecting can only be to hann a competitor, by the process of objecting; for 
example, by costs or delaying or deterring entry. In such a situation 
a dominant finn cannot have a genui.ne purpose to win. Its purpose must be to 
use the process as an anticompetitive weapon. 
Even if this argument is not accepted, the exception is still relevant. 
If a has the purpose of harming a rival by using the judicial as a 
weapon, it must ruso have purpose restricting, or deterring 
competition, thus falling within the scope of the s. 36(1) prohibition. 
UDder s. 36 the requisite purpose need not the' nor dominant 
135 Id. at 65 L 
purpose, but it must be a substantial purpose.l36 
test. 
Baseless Claims: 
and '="""""=..J-
baseless before s. 36 is breached. IS 
345 
is a lower standard 
indicate that a case must be 
line with m~£Qllil!~!dll 
-=".. 
139 The and courts found that the defendants' 
arguments were not that litigation is baseless is extremely 
relevant determining whether the firm which brought the litigation has 
breached s. 36. a .L.LLL .......... !"> helps establish the "purpose" 
A litigant will lose a baseless case. Thus, expected value of legal 
outcome of a baseless IS zero. The only value can be harming 
by the process litigation. the purpos~ of A.LJ./SJ.-Ul/S such a 
suit must be to harm competitors, This is also relevant to "use", as presumably 
only a dominant firm could afford to litigate such a case. A firm a highly 
competitive market could not to spend resources on a case it had 
no hope of VVU.LU..LU;:;. 
Courts not established a standard by which to determine whether a 
base is baseless. Telecom .............. "'" that a colourable claim is not a 
claim. The American have not established any clearer than 
136 Section 2(5) Commerce Act. 
137 Supra, 4. 
138 Supra, note 
139 Supra, note 121. 
As Ateeda and Hovenkamp note, it is unrealistic to ascribe a numerical 
value to .... _'vJ.J, ... UJ."" ..... ,,,,, ... for example, a 50 cent chance victory makes 
case reasonable, whereas a 10 cent chance does not. One cannot that 
precise in a lawsuit's outcome.140 Courts also have to protect 
claims, for it is only by such "''''.i.Ju..u..:> that the law can advance. Perhaps the best 
standard is an unreasonable is one that is implausible or without 
legal foundation. 
Successful Claims: 
Should New Zealand adopt a test a successful suit cannot amount to 
a breach of s. 36?141 The rationale behind is that success indicates that 
claim was valid and belies tbe notion that petitioner was not actually 
the relief obtained ill ~~~.!.!->i. words, a successful indicates 
that the petitioner used reasonable atguments. However, a "per approach to 
successful is inadvisable. successful suit may be part of an 
anticompetitive policy of objecting automatically (that is, or without 
probably cause and without regard to the objections' merits). Sucb objections 
are evidence that the objector may have breached s. 36. They indicate the 
objector's purpose was not to If tbe objector reaUy to it 
would onJyobject when it had probable cause or a cbance of winning. If 
140 AREEDA& HOVENKAMP)ANTITRUSTLAWSUPPLEMENT 
SUPPLEMENT 29-30 (1990). 
141 Hurwitz, supra, note 8, at 108-109; Calkins .:II:::t:..:::t~~=~~ 
347 
objectoes purpose is not to it must be to entangle firm it is objecting 
proceedings. It would not be rational for a nondominant to 
object auto?Jatically. If a has such a policy, a break" in form 
a .,u., • ..,,,,,,,,~',,,,,,,, case should not protect it. Colloquially, a couple good apples 
should not sweeten a rotten barreL An example is 142 
Supreme held that it was a sham a defendant brought repetitive 
with or without probable cause and without regard to the was 
so despite defendants having succeeded 21 out of 40 argwnent 
applies to New Zealand. Objecting automatically is not a reasonable "'"""''''''''1'''''' 
of the of objection. Geotherm alleged Electricorp had objected 
automatically and without regard to merits. This was one of the reasons why 
Court of Appeal refused to out Statement Claim. This is to be 
contrasted With the situation in Oear's claim alleged that Telecom 
had scrutinised its advertising. 
automatically alleged breaches the 
it not allege Telecom had 
Trading Act. On the contrary, it 
appears Telecom complained about some of the advertising; tbat is, it did 
not complain without probable cause or in complete disregard the merits. 
Areeda and Hovenkamp that success petitioning creates a strong 
presumption that petitioning is legitimate. They only a "presumption!! 
order to recognise the possibilities of serious misuse of discovery or a wrongly-
principal case or possible conspiracy with the decision-maker.143 This 
seems correct. u ... ,-,v.,,, is an important factor a court to consider, but for the 
142 Supra, note 
143 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra, 140 at 28. 
reasons above, it should not be determinative. 
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success at an 
interlocutory 
defendant used 
is strong evidence that a suit is not a or 
it should not be as strong a 
factor as success in substantive bearing. of merit may not become 
apparent until the court has considered all the evidence. Conversely, lack of 
success at either the interlocutory or substantive does not indicate a sham 
or lack of reasonable argument. Many reasonable arguments lose. was the 
JJ..U·\.U..LJCF. m Lack success may be relevant but a court hearing the 
trade practices must its own of the objective merits of 
the predicate 
Single Suits: 
The next issue to consider is whether a single case can lead to liability. 
Cadbl.lll: only involved one suit but it was an Issue. The requirement of a 
pattern of lawsuits was derived from Justice 
Douglas was only giving of sham litigation. was not 
prescriptive. There are strong as to why New Zealand courts should 
hold that a single suit can amount to a breach of s. 36. The rationale as to why 
abuse of judicial deserves competition law attention applies to one suit 
as well as suits. A single, well-timed and carefully-pleaded case with 
appeals can a competitor a of money and time, even if it is 
frivolous. pattern of claims should not prerequisite but, rather, persuasive 
evidence of a Academic authority strongly supports thiS.l44 
144 See literature cited, supra, note 112. 
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Access-barring: 145 
requirement that a case bar a firm access to administrative or judicial 
processes was also derived from Justice example in ~~!.L!.!.l~!'..Ul.lr.l=!.!. 
The New Zealand courts should not adopt requirement It 
only LLAU."" ... '" sense where a firm seeks to enter a industry. This was the 
Denying the small access to 
administrative tribunals delayed their eotry to the market. argument 
not apply to courts. The dominant will want its rival to have "day in 
court" so it costs. Access-barring is relevant evidence in the context 
of a regulated industry but it not be a required condition. 
Objective or Subjective Tests: 
next issue is whether the tests should be objective or subjective. 
Commentators and recent United States favours an objective 
approach. 1<16 ~== and =~=-.>- support an objective Certainly, the 
took an objective view the reasonableness of the predicate suits. 
-==== seems to favour an objective abroach. It talks of "reasonable 
arguments", not of arguments tht.: defendant believed to be reasonable. It is 
extremely difficult to prove subjective purpose. Extrinsic evidence is rare unless 
'-J....; • ....!iJ • .--.. & HOVENKAMP, supra, note 140, at 21; Balmer, supra, 
note 8, at 4649; Myers, note 8, at 610-611; LJ.u. ....... 
~~~~~~~~~..,.. 80 CAL. REV" 1177 (1992). 
146 v """"" .......... =""'--"...:..=~=-.:~=~>!.l. 
Inc. 113 S. Ct. 1,920 (1993); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, note 
I at 22-23; Myers, supra, note 8, at 612-619; Hurwitz, supra, note 8, at 
93~99. 
one stumbles 
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a "smoking gun" or a 'whistle-blower". Similarly, it is unlikely 
that a court would believe that a dominant which presumably uses first-rate 
lawyers, could that objectively '-'""""'A"',,,,, claim was valid. 
Unethical Behaviour: 
As mentioned unethical behaviour remove Noerr immunity. 
This is because the first amendment not cover falsehoods. Unethical 
conduct, by itself, is ,not a good indicator of activity. Its presence does not 
mean the petitioner did not the requested result. It may in 
be evidence that it strongly desired the result Unethical conduct occurs 
meritorious as well as proceedings. Thus, Zealand courts should 
only consider conduct as when it occurs with other conduct. 
By itself it is too unreliable a guide. 
Re-Iitigation: 
mentioned above, some argue that allowing predatory litigation claims 
will result in of challenged 141 will an of 
However, re-litigation should not be a problem. It is not a significant 
problem in of process or cases. Also. the courts will 
have struck out many Other challenged suits will have gone to 
triaL Often the trial court will said that those were baseless or 
unreasonable. Relltigation cannot ill cases. 
147 Supra, note 31. 
1 
Privilege: 
possible brake on predatory litigation claims brought by plaintiffs is 
legal professional priviJege.148 Generally, a dominant will have top 
lawyers. These lawyers, presumably, will have advised the dominant firm 
its case is highly unlikely to succeed. Yet the dominant proceeds. This 
would be strong evidence of anti-competitive purposes and use of a dominant 
position. Only a dominant firm with pockets could afford to pay top 
lawyers to bring such claims. establish purpose and use a plaintiff would 
have to undertake extensive However, the very documents which 
establish purpose use are privileged. Thus, a plaintiff can only challenge 
those cases that are objectively unreasonable. Former Federal Trade 
Commissioner has referred the problem of professional privilege 
sham litigation c1aims.149 
Privilege raises interesting of the position of lawyers who bring 
obviously meritless claims. Have they been knowingly concerned in a breach of 
the Commerce Act? If they would be liable for prosecution for pecuniary 
penalties up.der s .. 80 and damages under s. 82. The issue beyond 
dissertatioo's scope, but there appears no reason why ss. 80 82 should not 
cover lawyers. 
148 I am grateful to Douglas White a.c. for alerting me to this 
149 Calvani, Nonprice Predation the Context of Regulatory and 
Adjudicatory Abuse CUTTING EDGE OF ANTITRUST. 
EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICES (American Association Section of 
Antitrust, Law Conference, Washington DC, October 5-6, 1989). 
Cost-justified Test: 
Judge Posner favours a cost-justified test. In ~~~!-" his Honour 
observed: "Many not wholly groundless would never sued on for their 
own. sake; stakes, discounted by the probability of winning be too low 
repay the investment litigatibn".151 
Yet some cases a plaintiff still The reason must 
be to rivals. Such '-" ..... ............., are Easterbrook 
embellished the ~~~ 
as follows: 
the expected value a judgement is $10,000.00 (say a 10 
cent chance of recovering $100,000.00) the case is not "groundless!!) 
yet if it costs $30,000.00 to litigate no rational plaintiff will do so 
unless anticipates some othe~ source of benefit. If the other 
oen.eJ][ is costs litigation will on a rival allowing an 
elevation of the market price, it may be treated as a shamjl,IS3 
A common criticism is test condemns harmless valid 
behaviour. Areeda Hovenkamp that it means a dominant may not 
be able to collect a debt a competitor as much debt collection is 
unprofitable. 1.54 firm does such debt collection to deter potential debtors 
from not paying. Calkins that test ignores that a firm may have good 
reasons for bringing a non-cast-justified suit. "A reasonable might bring a 
150 Supra, note 109. 
151 Id. at 472. 
152 814 F. 2d 358 (7th Cir. 1987). 
153 Id. at 372. 
AREEDA & HOVENKAIv1P, supra, 140, at 25. 
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trademark suit to establish the valiclity of its claim or to demonstrate 
resolve to enforce its rights even though that particular suit would not be 
profitable".lSs 
Judge acknowledges that non-
cost-justified litigation has benefi ts . .A...!..!~~~~L!.:I:::!d:!. only .u. ........ ,.l..LU..LL1 non-cost-
justified litigation where the benefit is costs litigation will impose on a rivaL 
plaintiff be only if the other benefit is the costs litigation will 
impose on a rival".156 If the other benefit IS, example, to establish a 
trademark's validity, is no sham. If other benefit is economically 
rational, there is no "'u ............. 
Areeda and Hovenkamp's example of debt collection is misplaced. 
debt collection will not form the basis of a predatory litigation case. A 
predator brings a sham suit its anti-competitive effect; for example, to delay 
entry into a market or to divert time resources or to rivals' 
costs. Debt collection will not do Thus~ a plaintiff could not establish that 
a debt-collecting dominant had an anti-competitive purpose, let had 
used its dominant position. 
Hurwitz objects, arguing that it is virtually impossible to forecast either 
a suit's potential rewards or its costs and he notes that 
legitimate strategies and psychological benefits.1S7 As mentioned above, 
not condemn litigation legitimate strategic 
155 Calkins, supra, note at 
156 Supra, note 152, at 327. 
Hurwitz, supra, note 8 at 107. 
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benefits. Hurwitz correctly notes that litigation may have psychological benefits. 
Many individuals seek vindication court, of the fact that it is not 
cost-justified. Such behaviour is economically irrational. While individuals act 
irrationally, dominant not. Litigation'S psychological benefits are 
irrelevant to a dominant 
Despite criticism the Grip-Pak test is relevant to a s. 36 
inquiry. It is an objective standard: what would a hypothetical, reasonable, 
rational firm do? It meets the "use" requirement. It would only be rational 
a firm to use capital reserves to such ... ",.,llJ..A .... 
The Grip-Pak test is also relevant in establishing proscribed purposes. 
Why would a firm bring a case if it is going to lose money? The answer must 
only to harm a competitor. 
The advantage of is that they offer 
workable tests. They are the way ensuring New .<:J"'Q..I.CJ'-'lU law does not 
U ........ VU,L ... a quagmire. 
Conclusion: 
Abuse of judicial and administrative should and does fall within 
the range of conduct subject to control under s. 36. Doubters should remember 
that it is tbose Ch.icago School scholars who have long proclaimed that the 
phenomenon of predatory pricing is so rare as not to be worthy of serious 
antitrust attention that have been at the forefront of alerting antitrust 
cOfr!IDunity to the dangers inherent the abuse of judicial and administrative 
It is significant that two of key cases which articulate workable 
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tests are Grip-Pak and ~~~~~~~ authored by Judges Posner and 
Easterbrook. Surely this demonstrates the topic is not "intellectual 
158 is directly applicable. However, one of concerns 
with predatory litigation is that it rivals' costs. Consequently, it is 
158 Bark believes that antitrust law influenced by political Ilonefficiency 
values is "intellectual mush" : Bark, Panel Discussion, Merger 
Enforcement and Practice, 50 ANTITRUST L.J., 233, 
CHAPTER XlII 
POSSIBLE-FUTURE APPLICATION OF THE RRC MODEL 
Introduction: 
Although only two U.S. Courts applied modell it is, as I argued 
In vrn, consistent with the leading Supreme case on 
monopolisationj .Q:Q,~~~~~ v Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.2 The U.S. 
courts may have to face issue.directly relation to computer software 
giant Microsoft. 
Federal Trade Como:rission investigating Microsoft for 
three years over alleged anticompetitive practices.3 It deadlocked twice 
whether to institute proceedings. The Justice Department now taken 
over the investigation. It is unknown whether it will institute PH)CeeQJLD 
However, one Microsoft's alleged violations is a classic RRC strategy. 
Microsoft computer manufacturers a to machine 
compatible with MS-DOS software programme. meant the LUU',",U.U",,,, 
1 v.:-=,"""-,,,_,"-===...o.=-==~=~ 
~~~.!:I.....!.:!.~. 814 F. 358 (7th Cir. 1987); 
767 F. Supp. 308 (D.D.C. 1991). 
2 472 (1985). 
3 F.T.C:s report is confidential. I relied on Le~ -=.J:""""""~=:':;" 
=~~= National Review (1994) and newspaper I have also 
benefited from conversations with Professor Robert Pitofsky of 
Georgetown University Law Centre. Professor Pitofsky is counsel for one 
of Microsoft's NoveU. 
were unavailable to· Microsoft's main 
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Novell, software programme, DR-
DOS. Microsoft on this, whether or not the machine used MS-DOS 
programme or not. 
had the effect many computer manufacturers not 
to offer DR-DOS to their customers. They could not afford to pay DR-DOS 
MS-DOS. 
is a exclusionary contract under RRC modeL The input 
market is computers. Microsoft paid the computer manufacturers exclude 
rivals' programmes. It did so by offering deep discounts. raised rivals' 
costs as they had to the computer manufacturers more to obtain access to 
computers. It is Real Foreclosure as Microsoft had apparently 
contracted with vast majority of manufacturers. It is also possibly Cartel 
Ringmaster and Frankenstein Monster scenarios. The computer manufacturers 
did not with Microsoft could form a cartel and increase the price for 
access their computers to Microsoft's rivals. From the newspaper reports, it 
seems clear that Microsoft's undoubtedly raised rivals' costs. They 
are exclusionary contracts as not every computer used Microsoft's 
Thus, Microsoft these cases was simply to exclude its 
The output market is computer software. It seems that Microsoft 
has power over price. Very few rivals constrain its conduct. It over 80 
cent of the market.4 There are no substitutes programme. It can prevent 
price falling. It thus, appears it breached RRe model has 
4 Times, Saturday, August 21 (1993). 
violated s. 2 of the Sherman 
This discussion is based on media reports. Justice Department will 
not information on current investigations. Thus, may 
infonnation which counters RRC model. Microsoft claim it is simply 
offering a package discount. These do not necessarily breach the laws.s 
However, it appears Microsoft has run counter to the model, despite 
protestations. If it did raise its costs and power over price, a court 
should able to infer an anticompetitive purpose. Should the Justice 
Department choose to institute proceedings the U.S. courts will have to deal and 
discuss the model. 
5 
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CHAPTER XIV 
EXCLUSIVE DEALING 
Introduction: 
Exclusive ....... :LLUJl;; is a paradigm Raising Rivals' Costs scenario. I shall 
apply the • .u ......... ..." to a New Zealand case: ~=.:!::~::......:::...~=.....=::!~= V ~~~~ 
II of chapter will examine economics behind 
exclusive dealing. It win discuss pro and effects. ill 
examines overseas case law. Part TV the model to ........,,"""""''''-''''''-''-~= 
and ll ... lU .... ' the model is useful. It argues that the Court used the 
model it have the same decision. Part V responds to of 
decision. It argues Court correctly decided the case. Thus, 
model is useful. Vl offers some conclusions. Although, ;::"";:;;:;="---=:::""':"..:::::,,1'-'= 
did not involve s. 36, it is important. It is best New L..J\.-, ....... 'lUU case 
the 
Economics of Exclusive Dealing: 
Exclusive dealing occurs wben one agrees to buy only another 
firm for contract's duration. In some contexts an exclusive dealing contract 
is known as a supply contract. A requirements contract is a of 
exclusive dealing contract. the buyer agrees to buy exclusively from the 
1 [1990] 2 NZLR 731. 
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seller and the seller agrees to supply all of buyer's needs the product. 
Exclusive dealing no effect on intrabrand competition. lntrabrand 
competition occurs between of same product. dealing 
..,....-r".,'TC interbrand competition. This is competition between manufacturers and 
of products. Exclusive can have both pro 
anticompetitive It is necessary to examine both: 
A Procompetitive Consequences: 
Suppliers to exclusive 'UV<,&,.L.L.UC"," contracts as they believe by using 
they can sell more of goods. following are economic reasons 
for and the of exclusive dealing. 
1. Stimulate distributors: 
By only dealing in one supplierls product, the distributor will promote that 
product more intensively effectively than if it numerous suppliers. 
Exclusive dealing secures the distributor's attention and effort to one brand. 
is most common reason put forward for exclusive dealing. The 
'distributor, in Professor Richard Steuer's words, becomes an advocate for the 
product rather than simply a conduit2 having distributors only 
product, a supplier is likely to sell more of product. 
Protection of a suppliers property rights: 
2 L. REV. 101, 
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Professor _"'ATTT""" Walker, in a "' .... J,JL.U,.U,r;u article, first brought reason 
to the antitrust attention? At virtually same time, ..., .... ",1' .. "",.. .... 
Marvel provided a analysis." The of the argument is as 
a supplier to sell as much of its product as possible. To do so, it provides 
the distributor .:11.1\ ..... -1.:1.1 serYlces. include: advertising, 
sales training, L.U(li.U.a,1'5\.-t.u\.-JJ.~ systems, start architectural site 
selection, merchandising plans, facilities to demonstrate the product 
design and sales service, repairs,S These' the 
distributor more effective in selling supplier's products. create 
more the distributor. They also cost. Generally, the charges 
the cost of services by them into the uv ..... "',r;.u.... price. 
However, can cause a if the distributor 
supplier's competitors. The may not supply seIVlces. 
price will not be as or if they will offer the 
distributor a supplier provides, may attract 
the' distributor's advantage of the 
services and persuades the to buy a substitute IS 
3 
4 
5 
or offers the distributor a margin. The does not 
distributor's reputation sales and the distributor's margin increases. 
70 (1979). 
J.L. & ECON. 1 (1982). 
at 127; Ornstein, ===..::..:I"---"'="""""~Iii--'i=~ 
~~~~=... 65 at 75 (1989) Antitrust Policy in 
~~~~~~~~~~~ 16 CONN L. REV., 969, 978-981 
Exclusive dealing protects the supplier's property and the 
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it 
provides, by preventing the distributor taking a free ride on the supplier's 
services investments. It distributors from using supplier's 
investments to promote supplier's products. Similarly. it prevents 
competitors who have not provided the services, the distributor and 
taking a ride. If competitors and distributors can free ride, the supplier is 
likely to provide these Indeed, a supplier will only so, in the 
absence exclusive dealing, if it is assured complete distributor loyalty. The 
seIVices attract customers, and exclusive dealing ultimately allows for 
consumption than normal. 
Commentators have recognised a number of qualifications to this 
hypothesis. relation to advertising; must be sufficient economies of 
scale the supplier to advertise, rather than distributor.6 It must be 
relatively easy and cheap for a distributor to encourage a customer to switch 
product.7 advertising must be general in nature not brand specific.s 
hypothesis only applies to shopping products; products for which 
customers shop around before buying.9 It is especially relevant for products in 
which are repeat purchases. customers will return to the distributor 
originally purcbased. The exclusive dealing belps the supplier a 
6 
7 Id. at 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. Steuer, supra, note at 
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return on the capital it spent to obtain the customer originally. 
Reputation another property right a supplier can protect through 
exclusive dealing. A supplier will invest and create a uniform reputation among 
distribu tors, it can capture the value of that reputation,lO It will not do so if 
its competitors can·free ride and share benefits of its investment. Professor 
Gregory notes exclusive dealing is not the only way of solving the 
problem and protecting a supplier's property rights. l1 An alternative is to 
cbarge supplier's competitors or the distributors for the benefits they 
receive.12 For example, supplier could .... u,.<.""-'-''V a percentage of aU sales 
revenue or a lump sum fee from the distributor for all brands the distributor 
sells which benefit the supplier's investment. The problem with this, is it is likely 
to lead to huge administrative problems. If the distributor pays 
a royalty system, it has the incentive to misreport sales. Such a system will also 
be very expensive to monitor. 
3. Encourage suppliers to invest in special services: 
Closely linked, if not idel)t1cal to the above reason, is the reason to 
encourage suppliers to provide special services. special services are outlined 
above. British Monopolies Commission, when it investigated petrol supply, 
10 Chard, supra note 6, at 45-53; Shishido-Topel, ~~~~~~~~ 
~~~~~~ (1984) (unpublisbed Ph.D. 
Angeles) 40-44), 
11 G. FRASCO, EXCLUSIVE DEALING, A COMPREHENSIVE ........ ""L .. , ...... 
STUDY 6-7 (1991). 
12 Id. at 
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found exclusive dealing between the oil companies and petrol stations had 
resulted in improvements in the layout of petrol stations, and the facilities the 
stations provided and the service they gave.13 Professor John Chard notes: 
"[A]rguably these improvements would not have been realised to same extent 
without capital investment the retail trade by oil LUIJ,QL.LU'J';) ••• and without the 
trading facilities and advice offered to retailers by the companies".14 
4. Reduce costs and business uncertainties: 
Exclusive dealing may reduce the costs of distribution for both suppliers 
and distributors protect them business uncertainties. is Exclusive 
dealing the supplier and distributor to engage in long-term planning. 
The distributor bas an assured source of supply. This is important in periods of 
fluctuating demand, as it helps eliminate the costs of selling and buying. 
Suppliers with an assured distributor can have smaller product runs. Another 
cost is that it decreases the of distributors the supplier to deal 
with. The U.S. Supreme Court in ~~~~~~~~~~~ v 
13' BRITISH MONOPOLIES COMMISSION, SUPPLY OF PETROL TO 
14 
RETAll.ERS IN UNITED KINGDOM 264 (1965). 
Chard, supra, note at 43-44. 
FRASCO, supra, note 11, at 6-7; Strasser, supra, note 5, at 977; 
Katta~ (1993) 
(ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Fundamentals Programme 
28); V. KORAH and W.A ROTHNIE, EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION 
AND COMPETITION RULES 29-30 (2d ed. 1992); Shishido-
Topel, supra note 10, at 37-39; E.T. SULLIVAN J.L. HARRISON, 
UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC 
IMPUCATIONS 178-179 (1988). 
16 U.S. 293 (1949). 
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rec:o,;oIllSC~C this. Justice Frankfurter noted exclusive dealing may assure a steady 
supply, give protection against increases in demand, enable long-term planning 
on the basis of known costs and obviate the expenses and storage, tbe quantity 
necessary, for a product baving a fluctuating demand. I7 Exclusive dealing can 
also lead to lower inpu t costs suppliers. Small buffer inventories are 
necessary and the can share them among themselves, These cost savings 
may well belp a new entrant into market. 18 
Exclusive dealing can also lead to exchange information. Not 
only between suppliers and distributors, but also, between the distributors 
themselves. problems and solutions a distributor encounters. may be used 
by all. The information is more likely to be exchanged, if it is not to be 
used to sell competitors' products. Similarly, a supplier is likely to provide 
management assistance if the distributor only sells products. In this way, 
entire distribution ,systems act as ooe and tbey become more efficient. The 
whole system can run more generally, and efficiently respond to supply and 
demand variatioDS. 19 Thus, exclusive dealing helps decrease the cost of moving 
a product from the supplier to the distributor to the consumer. 
S. Protect the product's quality and reputation: 
Exclusive dealing may ensure a supplier's products' quality and reputation. 
17 Id. at 306. 
18 AREEDA and L.A. KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 
PROBLEMS AND CASES 773-777 (4th ed. 1988). 
19 supra, note 5, at 972-974. 
366 
Cbard notes that a product's quality with its safety, durability, 
reliability.20 A product's quality may be diificult to inspect on purcbase. It may 
. . 
only be discernable after purchase, A supplier will consider tbat 
services are important in tbe product's quality, If a product goes wrong 
purchase, a customer h~ve difficulty in deciding who was at fault - the 
distributor or supplier. The distributor could cut back on pre and post sales 
of the product. the customer may blame the supplier. can 
the supplier's product's reputation and/or harm sales by other 
distributors. Thus, the suppUer could on exclusive dealing. enables 
the supplier to monitor the distributor and ensure the distributor services the 
product adequately. A distributor who has an exclusive 
- ...... ~1"1 contract and who 
is subject to being terminated if it provides inadequate servicing, may be induced 
to provide a greater supply of services. In its report on the LPG industry, the 
British Monopolies Commission found that exclusive dealing probably improved 
as it enabled suppliers to 'better control their distributors storage and 
handling of LPG cylinders. The cylinders' safety and reputation for safety 
were important to suppliers. Suppliers did Dot want their cylinders to be 
associated with cylinders rival suppliers, whose safety standards were not 
as bigh as their own.21 
Chard notes the following conditions are necessary for this hypothesis to 
20 Chard, supra, note 5, at 
21 BRITISH MONOPOLIES COMMISSION, SUPPLY OF LIQUIFIED 
PETROLEUM GAS, 147 (1981). 
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be valid and effective. 22 
1. The disnibutor must be able to influence a products' quality. 
2. The consumer must be able to perceive differences between different 
products, 
3. The cOllSumer cannot ascertain quality before or she buys. Also, 
brand names must belp consumer quality. 
4. It is more effective for the supplier's brand name to be used as a signal 
for quality than the distributor's. If consumers rely on distributors to 
quality, the supplier does not to control tbe distributor's 
behaviour. 
There are other ways in which exclusive can belp maintain quality. 
If a distributor 
suppliers part into 
many it may (by mistake or not) one 
safety.23 Chard 
inappropriate cylinders to 
suppliers product. This can decrease reputation and 
the example of LPG cylinder consumers fitting 
gas appliances. Suppliers could on their 
distributors undertaking strict operating procedures to prevent this. However, 
exclusive dealing is cheaper.24 Not only safety is at issue, but also reliability.2S 
pre and post sale services As mentioned above, a distributor may under-invest 
that affect qUality. A distributor may also ride on services a supplier 
the example of Raleigh Industries provides for another distributor. Chard 
Chard, supra, note at 46-47. 
23 rd. 47-48. 
Id. at 48. 
25 Id. at 48-50. 
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the investigation by the British Monopolies Commission in bicycles.26 
Raleigh claimed it used exclusive .......... ;u.uJlj; to protect investment in pre 
post sales services. These investments maintained its reputation quaEty. The 
Commission in relation to spare parts, is scope for confusion, 
and placing the spare part of one product into another with exclusive 27 
Exclusive dealing may decrease confusion and maintain the supplier's reputation. 
The whole distribution system if one supplier quality only 
person who may is distributor who lets it slip. 
6. The keeping of trade secrets: 
Steyer notes that exclusive dealing can help a supplier keep trade secrets 
and other confidential information from competitors. 28 
7. Prevention of opportunistic behaviour over specialised investments: 
Professors Benjamin Klein, David Crawford and Michael Alcman argue 
exclusive dealing prevents opportunistic behaviour by users pf specialised assets 
or investments.29 An investment .is specialised if value is highly specific to 
a particular firm. next best use is less than value to tbe particular firm. 
These specialised investments include: 
(a) machinery made for a particular firm's business, 
26 Id. at 49. 
Id. at 50-53. 
28 Steuer, supra, note 2, 130. 
29 
; FRASCO, supra, not~ 11, at 
(b) refining facilities 
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a raw material near extraction operations. 
fum specialised investments another The other 
threaten to contract with a third party, unless the finn has made this 
specialised investment accepts the value of the specialised investment at its next 
best use, or at a quantity just enough to cover variable costs (Le. its opportunity 
costs) - whichever is the greatest Exclusive dealing prevents this, and protects 
specialised investments. These specialised investments may also result in cost 
Klein et a1. the example of General Motors and Fisher.30 G.M. 
hired to make car bodies. Fisher had to G.M. specific car 
bodies. Once had invested, G.M. couid decrease its purchase price to 
opportunity costs in makihg car bodies. As the bodies were specific to 
G.M., this would be very low. To prevent this, fisher required G.M. to enter 
into an exclusive contract with it (i.e. buy its car bodies only from it). 
The exclusive dealing contract eliminated alternative, and prevented G.M. 
from buying bodies 
the bodies. 
anyone else if Fisher didn't lower its price once it made 
8. Alternative efficiency explanation: 
Doctor Lynn Shishido-Topel has developed an alternative explanation for 
exclusive dealing. Sbe claims her explanation shows how exclusive dealing 
enhances efficiency.31 She analyses exclusive dealing under the model of the 
30 Klein, Crawford & Alchlan. supra, note 29, at 309-310. 
31 Shishldo-Topel, supra, nOle 10, at 45-48. 
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supplier as principal and the distributor as the supplier's She says that in 
normal principal relationsbips, the principal is unable to monitor its 
efforts perfectly. principal hopes will act, so as to maximise the 
total income of the principal and agent. the principal cannot perfectly 
monitor the agent, the agent can provide less service than it contracted to 
provide. can occur more often, w hen the deals with more than one 
principal's product. mentioned above, the does it can affect 
principal's product quality. This affects the principal's and reputation. It 
would also seem to affect the agents' as well. Shishido-Topel the 
agent will find the skimping of beneficial, as principal cannot 
perfectly monitor iI, and it could spread the costs of it so acting over other 
agents. For example, an agent who skimps will decrease of the principal's 
product, but will still benefit, if other agents share the In of the 
principal's product. Product quality and consumption will fall below socially 
optimal monitoring and thus, means 
agents will more likely provide the at the socially optimal level and 
protect product quality. Shishido-Topel argues that paying an agent to provide 
the optimum level of is not as good as exclusive dealing. It is 
administratively expensive. She empirically tests her hypothesis by analyzing 
three cases, and finds her explanation was the reason for exclusive dealing in 
those cases.32 
32 ~~~~~~ 83 F.T.C. 
~~-=:::..!~~!......!.!..!.~~~ 50 104 7 (1954) and ~...:.!=:.!. v 
~~~~!!::.lL.!..~~~~ 334 U.S. 392 (1953). 
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9. Lower prices: 
As mentioned above, exclusive dealing can lead to improved efficiency in 
the distribution of products. This is a form of productive efficiency. The 
supplier chooses exclusive dealing because it allows cost savings and 
improvement of quality at a lower cost than would be the case without exclusive 
dealing. The supplier passes these on to consumers as lower prices. 
This is especially so with small towns with only one or few retail shops. 
Retailers in these small towns are monopolies and can charge consumers a 
monopoly To to enter exclusive dealing contracts, 
suppliers must offer these something extra. The something extra is 
lower prices. Economic theory su.ggests retailers will pass some these lower 
prices on to consumers.33 
10. Helping small suppliers: 
Exclusive dealing may help new market entrants become established. As 
mentioned above, exclusive ...,"" .... UJ'J'. can stimulate distributors to greater efforts 
in selling a supplier's product.34 is especially worthy when a new entrant 
faces established dealing can also to the preservation 
and deconcentration of markets.35 It may also stop concentration markets 
where large firms are expandi.ng. 
33 R.H. BORK, TIffi ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR 
WITH 307 (2d ed. 1993). 
34 AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra, note 18, at 
35 S.F. ROSS, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW 331 (1993). 
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Professor Stephen Ross gives the example of beer distribution in the U.S. 
and the Netherlands, as compared to the U.K and Germany.36 In the U.S. and 
the Netherlands, pubs sell all varieties of beers. In the U.K. and Germany pubs 
often sell only one brand of beer. A few major breweries dominate the U.S., 
while the Netherlands has only two. In the U.K and Germany, numerous 
breweries compete. The reason may be that in the U.K and Germany, where 
brewers have exclusive dealing contracts with pubs, the pubs compete on quality 
and promote brand loyalty. Whereas in the U.S. and Netherlands, the lack of 
exclusive dealing leads to price competition which large firms that have 
economies of scale and production or distribution can take advantage of. 
11. Greater consumer choice: 
It may seem paradoxical to argue that exclusive dealing leads to greater 
consumer choice. The argument runs as follows: 
To become .established a new supplier, who hopes to enter will 
have to develop its own distributors. Once it has done so, 
consumers will not only have a choice of products, but they will 
also have a choice of distributors. This leads, not only to 
increased supplier competition, but also increased distributor 
competition. Distributors will compete more fiercely if they only 
carry one brand.37 
36 Id. at 312. 
37 Director of Investigation and Research v Bombardier Ltd (1980) 53 CPR 
(2d).47 at 60-61. 
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B. Anticompetitive Effects: 
1. Foreclosure: 
The primary anticompetitive concern over exclusive d~aling is foreclosure. 
Exclusive dealing may foreclose the access of a supplier's rivals and potential 
to distributors. Thus> the rival suppliers cannot find distributors for their 
products. However, the trouble witb this argument is that every supply contract 
excludes competitors in the sense that competitors cannot carry out the 
transactions which the supply contract specifies.38 Not every exclusive dealing 
contract will lead to anticompetitive foreclosure. One must consider a number 
of factors to whether exclusive dealing effectively forecloses 
competitors.. 
(a) Alternative methods of suppliers distributing products:39 
This is the most important factor. For exclusive dealing to be 
anticompetitive, rival suppliers cannot have alternative methods of distributing 
their product, i.e. the elasticity of supply from alternative sources must be low 
(inelastic). If suppliers can distribute their products in other ways, the 
anticompetitive foreclosure of exclusive dealing decreases. supplier may be 
able to alternative methods of distribution in a number of ways. It can use 
distributors who have never sold the product before. It can establish new 
distributors. It can use new methods of distribution, such as mail drops or door-
38 Strasser, supra, note at 985. 
39 Steuer, supra, note 2, at 123-124. 
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to-door selling.40 
(b) Size of supplier. 
Exclusive dealing is more likely to lead to effective foreclosure if the 
supplier it, a large market share. The the share, more 
distributors it can tie into exclusive dealing. Professor Oliver Williamson 
believes exclusive dealing can only be anticompetitive in the case of structural 
dominance, or in a tight oligopoly.4! He defines structural dominance a 
as where the market share of the dominant firm is at least 60 per cent 
and market entry is not easy:u 
(c) Number and nature of distributors the exclusive dealing covers: 
The the number of distributors the exclusive dealing covers, the 
more likely foreclosure is to anticompetitive. is especially so, if the 
distributor is a monopolist. However. Steuer notes the simple percentage of 
distributors foreclosed is not an adequate means of assessing anti competitive 
effect.43 One has to measure the percentage of sales those distributors 
accounted for. That an exclusive dealing contract forecloses per cent of 
40 Id. at 
41 
1 AM. ECON, REV., 112,234-247 (1977). 
Steuer, supra, note at 117. 
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distributors does not. necessarily, mean that rival suppliers are foreclosed from 
reaching 25 cent of consumers. foreclosed distributors not have 
had per cent of sales. It may be more or Sales percentage alone is not 
enough. One has to take account of consumer loyalty to the distributor.44 
Some distributors have more consumer loyalty tban others. Consumers \ViII stay 
with these distributors they switch to another supplier's product via exclusive 
dealing. Thus, exclusive dealing is likely to foreclose these distributors. 
Closely related to loyalty is the effectiveness of the distributors 
foreclosed.45 Some distributors are more effective than others. If the supplier 
enters into an exclusive dealing contract with these, the distributors left for rival 
suppliers will be lower quality and less effective. Thus, foreclosure will be 
greater. 
One has to consider whether the distributor is a wholesaler or retailer.46 
Ret,ailers have more consumer loyalty wholesalers. Foreclosure will be 
more effective retailers are subject to exclusive dealing than wholesalers. 
(d) Prevalence of exclusive dealing in the market: 
dealing is more likely to lead to anticompetitive foreclosure, if 
the industry concerned has a trend to exclusive deaHng:n This is especially so, 
if supplier level is tightly concentrated and an suppliers use exclusive dealing. 
44 Id., at 118-119. 
45 Id., at 119. 
46 Id., at 118-120. 
47 Strasser, supra, note 5, at 985-986. 
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(e) Type of product: 
Economists divide products into shopping products and convenience 
products.48 With shopping products, consumers shop around before they buy. 
They compare brands and prices before buying. If a distributor has 
only one brand, consumers will look elsewhere before buying. Foreclosure of 
distributors is not likely to be effective if shopping products are involved. 
ouverueIlce products are products which consumers buy where they first 
find them, without comparing price or other brands. They do so, either because 
they are perishable or cheap. Excluslve dealing in these products is more likely 
to result anticompetitive exclusion. 
(I) Length of the exclusive dealing agreement:49 
The longer the exclusive dealing agreement, the more effective 
foreclosure· be. However, shan agreements can result in effective 
foreclosure if other suppliers no alternative ways of distributing their 
products.5o 
(g) Presence of economies of scale: 
Shishido-Topel has noted that: U[eJconomies of scale and distribution or 
supply together with rivals having sufficient to support outlets alone can 
allow exclusive dealing to become a relatively reasonable way of foreclosing 
48 Steuer, supra, note 2, at 121·123. 
49 Strasser, supra, note 5, at 985. 
50 Bok, SUP. cr. REV. 267, 272 (1961). 
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competi tors". 51 
Professor Scherer argued: 
"(t]he automobile industry the clearest example of this 
last case. are moderate of scale 
Established brands are able to have a good sized exclusive 
dealership even relatively smal1 towns the opportunity to 
sell a well accepted is attractive to would be 
Therefore, largest producers have first pick among candidates 
and can engage the most ones. in turn G.M. and 
a lasting product differentiation advantage, for auto buyers 
. flock; in disproportionate numbers to the authorised parts 
service in both and small cities. This may influence the car 
purchase decisions of mobile customers. Lack an first 
rate services network is one the reasons by 
Studebaker-Packard was to discontinue passenger 
automobile production, wily foreign cars have a difficult time 
penetrating the market why AM. and to a lesser 
Chrysler not found it easy to build up sustain sales 
volume stock. Before formal and informal pressures toward 
exclusive in automobiles could be eliminated and if a 
sufficient of dealers were willing to take on additional 
makes, growth of competition from smaller and foreign 
automobile producers would greatly stimulated".52 
The foreclosure effect will only long lasting there are substantial 
economies in production.53 not, rival suppUers can sen first larger 
If they are successful there, their product will then penetrate smaller 
towns. excluded suppliers may be able to the foreclosure effect due 
to economies of scale by banding advantage of scales 
C£LU..Ll...U,,,,, and selling their products together alternative outlets. 
Scherer's concern about the inability of foreign automobiles to enter the 
51 Shishido-Topel, supra, note 10, at 31. 
P.M. INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, 586 (2d 1980). 
53 B.P. PASHIGAN, TIffi DISTRIBUTION OF AUTOMOBILES: AN 
ANALYSIS FRANCmSE SYSTEM, 219 (1961). 
market has been well overtaken by the events of history 
the Japanese. 
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the success of 
Thus, many factors contribute to whether an exclusive dealing contract 
leads to for,eclosure. One has to analyse each exclusive dealing contract on a 
case by case basis. However, it seems exclusive dealing will never lead to truly 
effective foreclosure as: Foreclosure of distributors will lead to an increase in 
deII?-and for distributors which will attract new entrants. The presence of 
monopoly profits at distributor and/or supplier levels will similarly lead to new 
entrants. Some Chi~go School commentators believe exclusive dealing no 
anti competitive effects at all and that foreclosure is not worthy of concern. 
a supplier lacks market power, it has to offer the distributor something in return 
for the distributor agreeing not to handle rival suppliers> products. The 
something more, is likely to be that the supplier will suppJy product at a 
lower cost. 54 Distributors can transfer this to consumers at lower price. 
Everyone seems to agree with this, which is wby Professor Williamson says 
exclusive dealing is only harmful in the case of structural dominance or tight 
oligopoly. 
The Chicago School commentators argue that even if the supplier has 
market power) exclusive dealing presents no concern. The monopoly power (Le. 
the ability to charge supra competitive prices) a supplier has is limited. It can 
use it by asking more for its product or ....... ".LLlF., for something else. For example, 
an exclusive dealing agreement. Thus, a supplier can only exploit its market 
power to a certain degree. If a supplier demands exclusive dealing, it cannot be 
54 BORK, supra, note 33, at 307. 
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motivated simply by its desire to charge higher prices because it can charge 
profit maximising price by its direct use of market power.55 It asks for an 
exclusive dealing contract to achieve efficiencies and thus lead to sales. 
The in this argument is that a supplier can use exclusive dealing 
to engage in strategic behaviour. is behaviour, designed to decrease the 
attractiveness of a rival's products. Exclusive dealing can raise entry barriers by 
raising rivals' costs. 
2. Entry barriers and raising rivals' costs: 
dealing can entry barriers to rival and potential rival 
suppliers.56 The factors that are relevant in foreclosure effects, are 
relevant in assessing whether exclusive dealing raises entry barriers. While as 
mentioned above, exclusive dealing may not achieve truly effective foreclosure, 
it can raise entry barriers. It does so by raising rival's costs. It can force new 
entrants, at the supplier or distributor level, to compete at both levels, i.e. 
force new entrants to become verticaJ.ly integrated. This is likely to be 
prohibitively expensive. Indeed, it.was dissatisfaction with the simple foreclosure 
model that led Salop et al. to devise the RRC model. 
3. Reducing the demand rival suppliers and distributors face: 
argues that incumbent distributors and suppliers can use exclusive 
55 Thid. 
56 Strasser, supra, note 5, at 984-990. 
380 
dealing to reduce the demand for their rivals' products.57 This is 
anti competitive because, if a succeeds decreasing the demand for 
rivals' product, then the demand for the firm's product (in the absence of new 
entry) will increase, as well as capacity to earn profits. 
Frasco argues it can do tbis by its exclusive dealing contracts having 
staggered expiry dates. He uses two related models to sbow this. The 
model bas the following assumptions in the case of a potential entrant: 
(1) are a number of existing exclusive dealing contracts between 
upstream and producers. 
(2) exclusive dealing contracts different expiry dates. 
(3) Producing the product subject to exclusive dealing. entails a range of 
increasing returns to scale. 
(4) Entering the market at supplier and distributor level is prohibitively 
expensive. compared to entry at one leveL 
From assumptions one and two, a potential entrant only bas part of the 
market demand available when it chooses to enter. The structure of the model 
forces losses upon new entrants for a certain number of periods 
(corresponding to the expiration of the exclusive dealing clauses) after entry. 
The existing distributors and suppliers establish the expiry date of the exclusive 
dealing clauses so as to hinder entry, to whatever extent maximises own 
value.58 
Frasco, Exclusive Dealing and Entry Deterrence (1986) (unpublished 
working paper, Cornell University). 
58 Ibid. 
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In the second model, assumptions one, two and three remain, but four 
goes. Frasco shows that existing suppliers can give tbe existing distributors 
the incentive to stop from decreasing quantity of output even if entry at both 
supplier distributor were to occur. The existing suppliers do so by 
structuring the charge for their products to suppliers such as to leave distributors 
with a suitable low average variable cost. Suppliers do so by dividing the charge 
for the product into two components, one a relatively low per unit price and two 
a relatively high lump sum, Knowing tbat existing distributors will not decrease 
their output 'I...U",,",VLU 
Matthewson and Winter argue exclusive dealing can decrease demand in 
the case where the market can profitably support more than one brand of 
product, but where ODe brand is much more popuJar than others. If distributors 
have the choice of selling popular brand exclusively or selling all brands, the 
distributors may choose to do the former as they see it being more profitable. 
Thus, suppliers of the popular brand could use exclusive dealing as a way of 
keeping rival brands off the market, thus decreasing their demand.60 
4. Price Discrimination: 
Exclusive dealing may lead to price discrimination. Professor Lester 
Telser notes that: "[e]xclusive dealing may be a necessary adjunct of a price 
59 Frasco, Exclusive Dealing and Entry Deterrence: of 
Vertically Integrated Entry (1986) (unpublished working paper, Cornell 
University); Frasco, supra, note 11, at 24-25). 
60 G. Mathewson and R. Winter, Is Exclusive Dealing Anticompetitive? 
(1985) (unpublished working paper, University of Toronto). 
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discrimination scheme",61 
Some consumers value a product more than others and thus be 
prepared to pay a higber price for it. That product may have two uses. Its use 
in a competitive market, or it can be substituted a second product in a 
competitive supplier may therefore wish to charge a price above 
cost far use of the product in its first use, but below its marginal cost 
in its second use in the less competitive market. supplier 
amongst classes of consumer for the second use. This would not work 
if consumers could buy the first product from other sources, or if the supplier did 
not· bave a monopoly in this second market.62 Thus, exclusive dealing can 
exploit but not create market power. ~ether this is anticompetitive depends 
on how one views price discrimination.63 
Increased collusion: 
Commentators believe tbat exclusive dealing can lead to collusion at 
either supplier or distributor levels.64 They argue that widespread exclusive 
dealing amongst suppliers limits the number of distributors, which makes 
collusion easier because of the fewer numbers. numbers makes it 
61 L. Telser, ~~~~~~~, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 488, 
491 (1963). 
Shishido-Topel, supra, nOte 10, at 36. 
63 argues price discrimination may increase social output. Telser, 
supra, note 61, at 489. 
64 at 991; MacCrimmon and Sadanand, 
~="""""' ........... 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~illlli~OSGOODE 
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to detect cheating by lower prices. Strasser comments exclusive dealing alone, 
does not seem likely to establish a supplier cartel or interdependent pricing.6S 
Suppliers who . exclusive uv.:u.J..LLJ;; contracts with their distributors have a 
partial indirect influence over price. The supplier a wholesale price which 
can have some influence on the retail the distributor collusion 
is make more possible by two other characteristics of exclusive dealing: 
1. If a supplier increases its wholesale price, the distributor cannot easily 
switch to other suppliers of the product. 
dealing as a restraint can lead to fewer competitors, which 
can decrease the likelihood of price competition and making cheating 
more detectable. 
Strasser notes that characteristics are not overwhelming but they can 
increase the potentiaJ for exclusive by collusion.66 
Exclusive dealing and resale price managements together are more likely 
to help collusion. 67 Exclusive dealing makes it difficult for distributors to 
change suppliers. The resale maintenance lowers the probability of 
cutting by making it more easy to detect. Some commentators see the 
relationship between exclusive dealing and resale price maintenance as a quid 
pro quo one. Tpe suppliers current price competition in the 
distributor's market by price maintenance in return for providing a more 
65 Strasser, supra, notes, at 991. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Telser, ~~!.!:.!.l:!.!~..i!LIdb'd!.!J~.Y.!..!=:.!.iL.:!..!..2:J.!.!:...1.,.Q,M.-Ll~~ 3 J. & EeON. 
86, 97 
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secure market by exclusive dealing.fIB The resale price L .... UQ.ll'_ ...... prevents 
the distributors from price cutting to increase sales. This decreases the supplier's 
incentive to decrease wholesale price. Exclusive dealing prevents suppliers from 
trying to obtain special treatment from distributors over other distributors 
price cuts. The exclusive dealing also stops suppliers attracting 
distributors other suppliers via secret price cuts. The exclusive dealing 
thus, increases the probability of chearing.69 How great a threat this 
all is is questionable, as certain conditions have to apply for a durable cartel and 
it appears exclusive with price maintenance is the exceptional 
rather than the usual resale price situation.7o Telser argues: 
"[B]oth practices ate needed to make effective collusion among the suppliers",71 
6. Decreasing consumer choice: 
Exclusive arguably consumer choice by making 
comparison shopping more difficult. Consumers who wish to compare brands 
and see whether price differences are justified cannot make a considered 
68 B. Y AMEY, THE ECONOMICS OF PRICE 
69 
70 
MAINTENANCE 19-21 AND 343-353 (1954); Bowman, 
~~~~~~~~~~~!...U.l!~~~~~ 22 u. em. L. 
and 844-848 (1955). ShishJdo-Topel, supra, note 10, 
at 34-35. 
G.1. THE THEORY OF PRICE 230-236 (3d ed. 1966). 
71 Telser, supra, note 67, at 10. 
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",,,",L""J.u. as easily, if exclusive dealing exists.72 This more if the consumer 
bas only one distributor in or town. However, if the product is a 
shopping product, consumer is more likely to go into other centres where the 
choice is available. The in choice for small town consumers has to be 
traded off the exclusive dealing allowing lower priceS.'3 
7. Increased price for some consumers: 
Exclusive as mentioned above, to suppHers supplying special 
to distributors. These may initially increase the cost of the product 
However, they can lead to greater sales, which results in ultimately cheaper 
prices. However, not every consumer values these special 
Consumers who want product witbout these special services cannot buy it. 
dealing means tbe product comes with these special services or not at 
all. Bork argues that the: "{t]echnology distribution ." [does] not allow the 
preferences of both groups of customers to met, [i.e. those who value services 
and tbose who do notJ ... a manufacturer will choose to satisfy 
number.15 This is the efficient thing to do. 
largest 
supra, Note 5, at 992; Ahdar, -"~~~~~~~-".!£""--.!.....!.>l.!..!~ 
and Paykel Saga, NZULR I, 13 
73 See text accompanying notes 34-37 supra. 
74 
REV. 171, 
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Thus, exclusive dealing haS both pro and anticompetllive The 
general economic view is that its advantages outweigh the negatives and the 
anticompetitive only exist in certain conditions. I now turn to the 
overseas law on exclusive dealing. 
LEGAL TREATMENT: 
United States Law: 
statutes govern exclusive dealing the U.S, Section 3 of the 
Clayton prohibits exclusive dealing where such effect: "may to 
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in line of 
commerce" ,76 Section 3 only applies to "goods, wares, merchandise, machinery 
and supplies of other commodities",77 Section 1 of the Sherman Act'18 and 
Section 5 the Federal Trade Comm.ission Act?'9 cover exclusive ........................ ,1". which 
does not fall within the Clayton Act. The Shennan prohibits exclusive 
dealing when it trade. The Section 3 Section 1 standards are 
identical.!IO Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits exclusive 
dealing cOntracts if they are "unfair methods of competition", 
76 15 U.S.C. 14 (1982). 
77 Ibid. 
78 U.S.C 1 (1982), 
79 15 U.S.C 45 (1992). 
80 ROSS, supra, note 35, at 304; v 676 
2d 1291, 1302 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1009 (1982). 
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Exclusive dealing's legal fiistory has varied widely. Professor Milton 
Handler notes: law's treatment of exclusive arrangements has had 
a history marked by swings of pendulum from extreme positions 
both of legality and invalidity".IH 
Legal History: 
Initially u.nder both the Cornmon Law and the Sherman Act, courts 
viewed exclusive _~.,~ .. ", as benign.82 Congress enacted the Clay too Act and 
then the Commission ACI, part to counter this.8) The first key 
Court case was ~~~~~~~"'-I. v Magrane-Houston Co.84 
Standard manufactured pat~erns. Margrane-Houston ran a retail dry 
goods shop Boston. Standard contracted b Ma.rgrane to supply pattems on 
the condition Margrane inter did not selJ any other patterns. Standard 
controlled 40 per cent of 52,000 pattern in the U.S. Standard and 
three major competitors controlled 90 per of pattern Exclusive 
dealing contracts covered most Margrane breached the exclusive 
dealing contracts. Standard sued. The Supreme Court held contract 
breached s. 3 of the Clayton Act and the contracts were unenforceable. 
trust 
82 Handler, supra, note 81, at 425; Robinson, ~JoI..k!..2~.lclL.3~~~~Ud.....ll.!..!..X. 
Orderly Marketing of Goods. CORN. L. QTRLY. 254, 
A.D. ANTITR UST LAWS OF THE UNITED 
OF AMERICA 178 (1970). 
84 258 346 (1922). 
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Court found it relevant Standard controlled 40 cent of the 
It a market dominance standard, which prohibited relatively large firms 
from exclusive dealing. If they dld, it would to market foreclosure. 
Subsequent Courts however, upbeJd exclusive dealing if the market 
foreclosed was not sufficient to lessen competition.as also took into 
account other economic factors.86 Thus, the Courts employed a rule of reason 
approach and evaluated the competitive effects of exclusive uv£Ull.l~.81 
This changed in 
largest seller the western 
area (made up of five states) the U.S. It sold per of total petrol 
the area - ofwh1ch 6.7 cent was sold under exclusive dealing. It controlled 
cent of the retail Its leading competitors sold per cent 
of total petrol through service stations. These competitors also used exclusive 
dealing. Over 70 otper companies supplied balance of the petrol. u.s. 
Government challenged Standard's exclusive UI.-l1...LU.Jl)::, contracts under s. 3 
Clayton Act. issue was whether showing that a "substantial portionli of the 
market was affected breached s. 3, did tills mean that the exclusive 
dealing contract's "may be to substantially lessen competition".89 
v v 
Sinclair Refining Co. v 292 
2d 720 (7th Cir. 1923). 
86 Ibid. 
ROSS, supra, note 35, 312. 
88 377 U.S. 292. (1949). 
89 at 299. 
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essence, the issue was whether the'standard then applying to tying 
applied to exclusive dealing. Justice Frankfurter, the majority opinion~ noted 
that tying " ... serve hardly any purpose beyond suppression of 
competition",90 then tbat exclusive dealing could be economicaUy 
advantageous to both buyers and and thus, to consumers. He noted that 
tbis seems to require courts to exclusive dealing's competitive effects 
on a case by case basis. He then held that such an evaluation was beyond 
court's competence. He beld that s. 3 was satisfied "by proof that competition 
bas been substantially foreclosed in a substantial share level of commerce".91 
He concluded that Standard met this test. Commentators called this a 
quantitative substantiality test,92 It meant that exclusive dealing breached s. 3 
if a significant dollar value of sales had been foreclosed to competitors. Justice 
Jackson claiming the majority's test established a per se rule.93 He 
that an exclusive dealing clause which foreclosed 6.7 per cent of the 
market amounted a substantial share of the market. However, believed this 
alone did not breach s. 3. He believed courts can and should weigh the benefits 
to competition from exclusive dealing contracts against their detriments. 
pointed at the advantages of exclusive dealing in this case. These were the 
advantages that Justice Frankfurter bad identified.94 J~stice Douglas also 
90 Id. at 305. 
Id. at 3 
92 ROSS, supr~ note 35, at 312; Steuer, supra, note at 118. 
93 U.S. 293, 323. 
94 [d. at 306; see text accompanying notes 16-17 supra. 
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dissented on Jeffersonian grounds that invalidating the contracts would lead to 
more hannful alternatives, viz; the large firms entering retait by 
vertical integration and eliminating the small firms.95 
Commentators have severely criticised Justice Frankfurters opinion.96 
Not only was it contrary to precedent and s. 3's legislative rustory,97 but it also 
economics. Professors Thomas Krattenmaker and Steven Salop argue 
Justice Frankfurter disclaimed the relevance of only possible antitrust 
problem (the impact on competition), ignored a procompetitive explanation for 
the contracts (they were efficiency enbancing) and focused on a competitively 
neutral fact (the substantial amount of commerce involved).98 
As Justice Jackson noted, the majority opinion virtually imposed a se 
ban on exclusive dealing.99 A plaintiff only had to prove the exclusive dealing 
contract foreclosed it significant dollar volume to rival stock. Whether exclusive 
dealing affected rivals ability to compete was irrelevant. 
However, this changed 
Tampa was a public electric utility. Nashville was a coal company. Tampa 
contracted witb Nashville, for Nashville to supply all of its coal requirements for 
95 Id. at 320-321; Justice Douglas proved to correct; See SULLIVAN and 
HARRISON, supra note 15, at 18l. 
96· BOR~ supra, note 33, at 299-301; ROSS, note 35, at 312-3 
97 
98 
ROSS, supra, Dote at 313. 
99 377 U.S. 293, 323 (1949). 
100 365 U.S. 320 (1961). 
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20 Tampa could only buy Nashville Nashville only seU 
to others it bad requirements. Nashville stopped 
the requirements contract breached antitrust laws. 
Although the contract foreclosed $128 million of coal sales, the Supreme Court 
held that it breach s. 3 the Clayton The contract only foreclosed 0.77 
per market. However, Court did not 
on market It established a 
Clayton Act: 
test for assessing exclusive dealing 
s.3 of 
1. The Court must identify the relevant market to determine 
line commerce affected. 
The relevant geographic must identified. 
3. competition foreclosed by the exclusive dealing must constitute a 
substantial share relevant i.e., "the opportunities for other 
traders to enter into or remam lD market must be Significantly 
limited".lOl 
This' was not a statistical test of market share. The Court held 
the standard of foreclosure one had to analyse, "the relative strength 
of the parties, proportionate volume commerce involved in relation to the 
total volume of commerce involved in the market area the 
intermediate and future effects of 
market".l02 
agreement on 
By doing so, Court rejected the ~~~~.!:!. test 
101 Id. at 327 w 328. 
102 Id. at 329. 
competition in 
substitu ted 
commentators called qualitative substantiality test,103 In 
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..,~~,~~. the Court 
introduced a broad rule of reason enquiry. While it a list relevant 
factors to assess exclusive dealing contracts it provided no guide on how to 
them or link them witb anti competitive 
t the Supreme Court held the Trunpa 
st~dard did not apply to s. 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The F.T.C. 
ruled that Brown Shoe (then the U.S:s second largest shoe manufacturer) had 
entered into exclusive ..... "' ........... ,1", arrangements with 650 retail shoe shops in the 
U.S. Thls, the F.T.C. claimed, breached s. The Supreme Court affirmed, 
the had broad powers to prevent practices 'which conllict with the 
basic poliCies of the Sherman and Clayion Acts even though such practices may 
not actually violate these laws".106 
The next, and perhaps most important case is not an exclusive dealing 
case, viz; ==-"""'"" ......... '---"-'<....l'....:J~~ V G.r. E. Sylvania.l(fl involved territorial 
restrictions and location clauses. The facts are unimportant here. The Court 
rejected the ~~"'" doctrine, that vertical restraints are per se 
illegal. The Court held that nonprice vertical restraints could promote 
103 ROSS, supra, note at 3 Steuer supra, Dote at 118. 
104 
358 ANTITRUST LJ. 921, 923 
105 384 U.S. 316 (1966), 
106 Id. at 321. 
107 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
108 v 388 U.S. 365 (1967). 
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competition by efficiency. Vertical resrraints deserved careful 
on a case by case basis. Vertical could also competition. 
the Court had to balance the barms and benefits of each vertical restraint. 
It explicitly focused on what the economic purpose and of the challenged 
restraints were or were likely to be. It did so more rigorously than 
previously. Thus. the applied a broad rule of reason standard. The 
importance of ~-'-=== to dealing, is that lower courts now employ the 
Sylvania ruJe of reason to exclusive dealing. Some do not even quote 
109 
shows how important Sylvania has been. 
Beltone was a manufacturer of aids. It had exclusive dealing 
arrangements with 7-8 per cent of tbe U.S.'s bearing aid dealers. dealers 
accounted for 16 per cent of sales. The unanimous Trade Commission 
did not rely on the of outlets foreclosed in deciding - instead it 
undertook a full of reason enquiry. The Federal Trade Commission stated 
"a proper analysis of exclusive dealing arrangement sbould take into account, 
market definition, the amount of foreclosure in the relevant market, the duration 
of the contracts, t~e extent to which entry is deterred and the reasonable 
justification of any for the exclusivity". I1l 
It held exclusive dealing only breaches s. 5 of the Federal Trade 
109 text accompanying notes 176-193 supra. 
110 {1979- Transfer Binder} TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) para 21,934 
(FTC 1982). 
111 Id. at 22, 
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Commission if on balance there is a "probably on interbrand 
competition". U2 Federal Commission found no 
A minority Supreme Court revisited exclusive dealing 
.!....B.~L!..~~!:!:!...~~~~~ v Hyde. l13 This concerned a five-year exclusive 
contract between a hospital and a group anaestbesiologists. The majority 
viewed and decide~ the case as involving The "'VJJl"-l..1.l minority also 
treated it as exclusive dealing. O'Connor stated: 
30 
of 
"In determining whether an exclusive is unreasonable) the 
proper focus is on the structure of the market for the products or 
services in question -' of sellers and buyers the 
market, the volume business and ease with whicb 
buyers and can redirect their pu.rchases or to others. 
dealing is an unreasonable restraint on trade only 
a significant fraction of or sellers are frozen out of a 
market by dealing". 114 
The opinion concluded the exclusive ......... ,~ .... contracts, foreclosed 
cent of the were reasonable as they did not foreclose anyone 
Judge Richard Posner provided the next significant analysis of exclusive 
dealing Roland Machinery Company v ~~~~~u..!....!:.!:r2.t..~!>:.! 15 Dresser 
manufactured farm machinery. Roland was a large construction equipment 
in illinois. Dresser Roland entered into an exclusive dealing 
agreement. party could terminate the agreement on 90 days notice. 
lId. at 22,393. 
113 466 2 (1984). 
114 Id. at 
115 749 F. 380 (7th 1984). 
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Roland then agreed to sell products made by Komatsu, one Dresser's rivals. 
Komatsu was the second largest manufacturer construction equipment in the 
world. sought to end agreement with Roland. Roland sought and 
obtained an injunction at first instance. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed. While Judge Posner's comments on exclusive dealing were obiter, he 
announced a two-part test for exclusive dealing to breach s. 3 of the Clayton Act. 
plaintiffs must show: 
L Exclusive dealing actually foreclosed at least one significant competitor 
tbe relevant market. 
The probably (not certain) effect of the exclusion will be to raise prices 
above (and therefore decrease output below) the competitive level ... : 
"He must show in other words that anticompetitive effects (if any) of 
the exclusion outweigh any benefits to competition from this".116 
Judge Posner held the exclusive dealing here, did not breach s. 3. It was 
of short duration. Competitors in the relevant market could easily establish their 
own distributors. He emphasised the procompetitive effects of exclusive dealing. 
It leads distributors to promote each manufacturer's brand more vigorously, it 
lowers quality adjusted price aod it prevents distributors and rival manufacturers 
from riding on manufacturer's effort on brand promotion.1!7 
Thus, U.S. couns undertake a rule of reason analysis evaluating 
exclusive dealing. Once they have identified the relevant market, they examine 
a number of factors in detenruning the legality of the exclusive dealing. One 
116 Id. at 394. 
117 Id. at 394-395. 
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must emphasise U.S. courts undertake a full enquiry. No one the following 
factors by wiU determinative. 
1. The Percentage of Market Foreclosed: 
Historically, courts found exclusive dealing reasonable with market 
shares of than 20 per cenL llS As the percentage foreclosure share rises 
beyond 20-30 cent probability of courts finding violations 119 
courts are increasingly blessing market foreclosure of over 40 per 
cene120 Indeed, one court found no violation the defendant had an 80 
per cent market 121 
118 
119 See v 676 F. 2d 1291 (9th CiT. 1982) 
(long term foreclosure of 24 per cent of market illegal); However, since 
supra, note 113) courts are more willing to bless foreclosure 
of over 30 per cent, see 647 Supp. 743 (B.D. Mo. 
1986), (foredosure of 
120 See e.g., v 720 F. Supp. 1186 (W.D.N.C. 1988), 
(40 cent market share lawful), affd memo 912 463 (4th Cir. 
1990); v {1985-1986 Trade Cases}, (CCH), para 
66,701 (N.D. Ga. 1985), (foreclosure of 40 cent lawful); ~~~ 
Music v 689 Supp. 1501 (N.D.I. 1988), (48 per cent Market 
share up held); 1986 - I Trade 
Cases (CCH) para 67,047 Wis. 1986) (62 per cent 
prelimi.nary injunctions issued); Oltz v 656 
F. Supp. 760 (D. Mont. 1987) (84 per cent market share illegal), affd 861 
2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1988). 
~~~i..!..::::..!.!~~ 724 F. 2d ( Cir. 1983); 
=~.:....::.::~~~~~v Williams Natural Gas Co .. 955 F. 2d 641 (10th 
Cir. 1992) arguable may have involved a greater market share as may 
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Duration of Agreement: 
shorter the agreement, the more likely a court will find it 
122 The length an agrement is important as some courts will not 
invalidate contract as a whole, but will rather decrease its length. l2J Judge 
Posner has held that, "exclusive dealing clauses terminable in less than one year 
are presumptively lawful".I24 However, it is only a presumption. 
3. Ability to End an Agreement: 
Closely related to the agreement's dUI3tion, is the ability to end it easily. 
If the parties can end it without reason, on short notice, courts will likely hold 
that it is reasonable,l25 
have ~~-=~ v ~~'--""'-~!..!.!..!J~~~~ 658 2d 139 (3rd 
1981) . 
.-!....U.~~~~~::..=v 676 2d 1291 (9th Cir. 1982), (10 years 
unlawful), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1009 (1982); 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 848 F. 976,982 
(9th 1988)~ (six year lease upheld); Barry Wright Com. v 
Grinnell Corp., 724 F. 2d 277 (1st Cir. 1983), (Two year limit upheld); 
246 Supp. 464, 470-471 (E.D.N.Y. 1165), (one year 
upheld); v 633 F. Supp. 
386, 397 (D. DeL 1986) (exclusive dealing contract terminable on 180 
days' notice upheld). 
123 v 344 U.S. (1 (Supreme 
Court cut exclusive dealing contract's duration from Jive years to one). 
124 2d 380, 395 (7th 
~~~~~~-ll!.:!=.!J 749 2d 
125 v 308 F. 403, (5th Cir. 
1962), (uphel,d contract terminable without cause on six months notice); 
~~~~~~~~ 100 ET.C. 68 at 210 (1982), (dealer could 
terminate on thirty days notice). 
4. Nature of Purchaser: 
A distributor needs to show a greater level of foreclosure resulting from 
Uo.:..':u...LlJlt:. than a consumer does. 126 
5. of Entry: 
The it is to enter the market. the more likely courts are 
to upbold exclusive dealing. High entry barriers make it more likely than a court 
will invalidate. '27 
6. Presence of Alternative Distribution Channels: 
If alternative distribution channels and enable a supplier's 
competitors to reach the market, tbe courts are more likely to find the exclusive 
dealing reaSonable~l28 
7. Type of Product: 
Courts will most likely uphold exclusive dealing if it involves a shopping 
126 ~~U!:U.!.!:!.U~~~>Lt.V ~~~~ 823 2d 1215,1235-1236 (8th 
127 266 (1984); 101 F.T.C. 
~~~~~~~~ 100 F.T.C. 68, 204 (1982), 
128 v~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
2d 14 (9th Cir. 1990); ~~~~~~~~~~ 
370 F. Supp. 7ff2 (W.O. 
Supp. 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); ~~~~!.!.!.Ui~~ v ~~~"'"' 
F. 2d 1555} 1572-1573 (lIth 1991); Stitt Spark 'Plug Co. 840 
1253, 1258 (5th Cire. 1988). 
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product.129 
8. Use of Exclusive Dealing by Competitors: 
Courts may exclusive dealing favourably if a supplier's 
competitors use it. However, widespread use is not deterntinative.l30 
9. Actual Competitive Impact: 
Generally, courts require proof that exclusive dealing harmed 
competition before finding ex~lusive dealing unlawful.1l1 Courts have 
examined the link between the exclusive dealing contract and alleged 
antitrust harm.132 
129 V "-!.lL!~~~ 101 Supp. 856 (D. Minn. 1951). 
130 Tampa. U.S. 320, 344 (1961); Standard Oil 377 
314 (1949); but see also v ~1.,.L2J~~u!-~ll:L.:~ 
F. Supp. 275 (S.D.N.Y., 1983) (exclusive dealing may enhance 
interbrand competition when aU competing suppliers use it); ~~ 
~~~::!:::.:. v 681 Supp. 176 (S.D.N.Y., 1988); 
2d 737 (2nd Cir. 1989), (exclusive dealing lawful where other 
major competitors have similar five year contracts). 
131 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y., 1983) (exclusive dealing 
lawful in market with fierce interbrand competition); ~"4ll~'-'---.!~~ 
~~~-!:!.L~~~~~ 794 F. 1359 (9th Cit. 
1986); 796 F. 2d 
6 (10th Cir. 1986); v 852 F. 2d 1290 (9th Cir. 1988), 
(no evidence that competition barmed). 
132 v 816 2d 9 (1st 
1987), (no connection between agreement and antitrust harm); 
~~~~~~v 712 F. Supp. 170 (M.D. Ala. 1989). 
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10. Procompetitive Effects and Justifications: 
Courts will consider the justifications and procompetitive a 
defendant da.i.ms flow an exclusive dealing contract.133 
expressly consider any prevention of free claims. l34 
11. Seller's Market Power: 
Courts increasingly not invalidate exclusive unless a seller 
possesses market power. They do so, because a seller without market 
cannot cause any anticompetitive 135 
Canadian Law: 
Section 31.4(2) of the Combines Investigation Act used to govern 
exclusive dealing In 1985 the Canadian Legislature enacted tbe 
Competition Act. Section 77 of that Act now governs exclusive dealing. 
However, the two provisions are virtually identical. The first Canadian exclusive 
dealing decision was ~~~~~~~~~ v ~~=",-,=~.I36 This involved 
the Combines Investigation Act. Bombardier produced snowmobiles. It was the 
133 '""'-='~ 365 U.s. 320 (1961); ~""'"'-'=-=~~~~~ v ~~~~::.>!.> 
1215 (8tb Cir. 2d 380 (7th CiT. 1984). 
134 749 2d 380, 384·385 (7tb 720 F. 
Supp. 1196 (W.D.N.C. 1989); 2d 1417 (9th 
1990) (exclusive dealing, inter prevents free riding). 
311 (8th Cir. 1986); 
F. 1560 (lIth 
136 (1981) CPR (2d) 7 (RTPC). 
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only Canadian manufacturer. However, there were no tariffs on imports. The 
other manufacturers were and American companies. Bombardier had 
30 cent of all the North American sales, 60 per cent in Quebec and 40 
cent in Ontario. It into exclusive dealing contracts with its distributors. 
The distributors agreed not to carry Bombardier's rivals' products. The contracts 
lasted for a year. The Restrictive Trade Practices Commission upheld the 
exclusive The Commission held Bombardier was a major supplier. It 
stated that the essential question in determining whether Bombardier's exclusive 
dealing substantially lessened competition was whether Bombardier's rivals were 
able to find a sufficient number of dealers to market their prodUCt. 137 It held 
Bombardier's rivals could. It held entry into the retail market and therefore the 
exclusive dealing did not impede rivals. It held so because only relatively low 
numbers sales were necessary to maintain a snowmobile distributorship. 
Distributors could supplement this business by carrying complementary goods 
and services. There was also a considerable turnover of distributors. Most 
communities had more than one distributor. However, some communities only 
had a Bombardier distributor. Commission admitted that the easiest way 
for Bombardier'S rivals to enter these communities was to have Bombardier 
distributors carry their product or "dual".I38 It conceded that until 
Bombardier's rivals obtained their own distributors consumer was 
reduced. However, it held that once the rivals obtained their own distributors 
that consumer choice was greatly increased. Consumers then had a choice of 
137 Id. at 
138 Ibid. 
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product and distributors. Thus, exclusive dealing ultimately leads to an increased 
number of '-Iv''''-' .... , in an area and thus, actually increases competition.139 
Doctor Geoffrey Takach says this shows that the Commission recognises 
tbat some exclusive dealing situations, rather than merely not lessening 
competition, actually have the 'positive effect of it, 140 The 
Commission also held that it was easy for Bombardier's rivals to obtain their 
own distributors. 141 
The next. and thus far only, case is bL!~~~~~U!i~J.I.ll.Ji!:!.!~~~~ 
Nutra Sweet manufactured aspartame, a sweetener used 
in soft Canada authorised aspartame use in 1981. 1987, Nutra Sweet's 
patent expired. Nutra was responsible for all U.S. and Australian 
(where a patent still applied). it had 80 per cent of the market in Europe and 
95 per cent in Canada. It had 65 customers Canada - although five per 
of the customers purchased approximately 84 per cent. only other supplier 
was Tosoh, who bad five cent of the market. Tosob started production in 
1987t when the Nutra Sweet's patent expired. Nutra Sweet then entered into 
one year requirements contracts with its customers. Nutra Sweet bought some 
139 rd. at 
140 
141 Gideon Rosenbluth criticises tbe decision. 
142 
Rosenbluth, ~~~~~ 
(unpublished paper, 
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of its aspartame from a Japanese company called Aijinimo.to. Aijinimoto had 
agreed not to enter the North market until 1996. Nutra Sweet 
requirements contracts were subject to (inter alia) the foUowing conditions: A 
"meet or release" clause. required Nutra Sweet to release a customer from 
its contract if the customer received a more favourable offer which Nutra Sweet 
refused to meet. A "most favoured nation" clause. This guaranteed a customer 
"the lowest price paid by any customer for an equivalent volume".i43 When 
this happened, the customer received a rebate for at the 
year's end .. Nutra ,Sweet also supplied customers a discount (of to 40 per 
cent). if customers used the Nutra Sweet name on packaging and advertising. 
This meant customers had to pay subs~antially more if they did not qualify for 
the discount. In essence, Nutra Sweet offered a monetary incentive to use its 
aspartame. Competition Tribunal held Nutra Sweet had breached both the 
Section Deali.ng and Section 79. Abuse of a Dominant Position 
provisions of the Competition Act. Discussing Section 77 the Tribunal noted: 
"The exclusivity in [Nutra Sweet's] contracts, which includes both 
the clauses reflecting agreement to deal only or primarily in 
Nutra Sweet brand aspartame the financial inducements do 
so, impedes "toe-hold entry" into the market and inhibits the 
expansion of other firms in the market. Since exclusive use and 
supply clauses appear in virtually all of [Nutra Sweet's) 1989 
contracts thus cover over 90 per cent of the Canadian for 
aspartame, it clear that during currency of those contracts 
there is Httle room for entry by a new suppUer". 144 
The Tribunal held that the meet or release clauses dissuaded entry and 
that they discouraged rivals from submitting bids. It emphasised the fidelity 
143 Nutra Sweet .(1990) CPR (3d) 1, 66. 
144 Id. 48-49. 
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rebates associated with the use of the Nutra Sweet logO.145 It also considered 
the evidence of customers that they were reluctant to switch Tosoh go 
from Nutra Sweet and go to Tosoh. However, the Tribunal did not reconcile 
this with the fact that two of Nutra Sweet's customers, Cadbury Schweppes and 
Stafford Foods had switched to Tosoh. 
Again, tbe case seems to show a benign attitude to exclusive dealing. 
Nutra Sweet's market share was huge. It had the advantage of enonnous 
economies of scale and distribution of up to one third of the world's production. 
The discount and use of the Nutra logo were extremely relevant in finding 
a breach of Section Indeed, the Tribunal indicated that the contract's term 
might not be anticompetitive, were it not for the of the long term use of 
the logo on entry conditions in the future. l46 
Australia: 
Section 47 of the Trade Practices Act governs exclusive dealing. Section 
47(2)( d) prohibits the practice, where it the purpose or is likely to have the 
effect of substantially lessening competition. 
still represents the law in Australia. Ford held about per cent of the 
Australian market for new vehicle sales. It controlled sites accounting for 45 per 
cent of its total sales. It had exclusive dealing contracts with 14 per cent of its 
dealers. It applied to the Trade Practices Commission for authorisation of its 
145 [bid. 
146 Id. at 49-51. . 
147 (1977) FLR 65. 
405 
agreement. l48 The Trade Practices Commission denied authorisation. Ford 
applied for review to Trade Practices Tribunal. The Tribunal also denied 
authorisation. It held that foreclosure of per cent of impeded entry 
for Ford's current and potential rivals. It noted that 86 per cent of other dealers 
were not available to rivals, because many of them might unwilling to acquire 
another franchise. it also found the exclusive dealing lessened the degree 
competition between dealers. The Tribunal found that by eliminating the 
agreements, Ford would lose per cent of the market share. The Tribunal 
concluded the agreement thus, resuJted in the substantial of 
competition. It rejected Ford's procompetitive benefits of the agreements, viz; 
efficiency, the prevention of rural monopolies, the demonstration of 
relative between different distribution systems, dealer assistance, 
Increase Australian employment, product improvement and improved product 
service. The Tribunal held Ford did not prove these or show they flowed from 
the exclusive dealing arrangement. While accepting the exclusive dealing 
arrangement maximised Ford's sales, the Tribunal held this did not mean it 
benefitted competition. 149 Benefitting the strongest supplier was irrelevant in 
U'''''-'i.'li:>LU.,I; the on competition. The Tribunal found Ford's exclusive dealing 
contracts had anticompetitive effects, viz; constriction of dealer freedom and an 
elimination of side by selling. ISO 
148 A TP Commission Decisions June 1976-January 1977, 16, 563. 
149 (1977) 32 FLR 65 and 85. 
150 Id. at 86. 
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Commentators have severely criticised this decision.151 Because, Ford 
controlled sites accounting for 45 per cent of its sales, the exclusive dealing 
agreements only foreclosed 12 per cent of total market sales volume. How is 
this significant" It is certainly far below the foreclosure percentage counts have 
found detrimental in the U.S. and Canada. Why is a possible loss of 1-5 per cent 
a substantial lessening of competition? If it is, very little eXclusive dealing will 
esc~pe condemnation. The decision is delphic in its reasoning. As Shannon 
noted what did the tribunal mean by saying: 
"In reaching our conclusion that the lessening of competition 
resulted from the restriction is substantial, we have placed 
considerable weight on the significance of Ford in the motor 
vehicle industry. We would have arrived at the same conclusion 
without the experts giving any evidence of the loss of market share 
by Ford in the event of the restrictive provision being 
removed" .152 
As Shannon notes, in fact, the Tribunal failed to indicate any alternative 
basis on which it could have concluded the degree of lessening of competition 
was substantial.153 One must also wonder why the Tribunal found that 86 per 
cent of the non-Ford dealers were potentially unavailable to Ford's rivals. If 
Forti's rivals offered a superior product, which would mean more sales for 
dealers, the dealers should have been willing to shift. The Tribunal did not 
consider in any great detail how easy it was for Ford's rivals to establish new 
dealers. Presumably the number of dealers was not finite. 
151 D. SHANNON, FRANCHISING IN AUS1RAI1A A LEGAL GUIDE 
172-174 (1982). 
152 Id. at 174. 
153 Ibid. 
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However, as both Shannon and Doctor James Farmer, l54 have noted, 
perhaps the ooly explanation for the decision is bad lawyering. Ford called no 
economic evidence and lawyers thought up all economic arguments. 
Australian courts have also held exclusive dealing can breach s. 46 of the 
Act. To cOllStitute a breach, a firm with substantial market 
power must enter into such contracts with its distributors. The contracts must 
have a foreclosing effect by denying rivals access to those distributors. 
is illustrative. Here, Palmer Tube Mills (Palmer) requested the 
Trade Practices Commission to revoke a notification of some of Tubemakers 
exclusive contracts. Tubemakers had terminated its independent 
Queensland distributor, Steelmark (Qld) for purchasing tube from Palmer. 
The Commission found the market to be "small-diameter, thin-walled steel pipe 
and tubing in Australia".1S6 Tubemakers had 67.8 per cent of the market, 
Palmer two per cent, another Australian company (Hills), had 25.6 per cent, 
while imports accounted for rest. Given market shares, 
Conunission revoked Tubemaker's exclusive dealing contracts notification. The 
Commission held the exclusive dealing contracts raised Palmer's costs of entry 
into the market.157 Tubemakers, subsequently stopped its exclusive dealing, 
rather than face a trial. 
154 
155 A TP Commission Decision April 1988, 1. 
156 Id. at 8. 
157 Id. at 34. 
408 
~~~~",-="",",-,~~~~v involved (inter alia) exclusive 
dealing. CSR had 80 per cent the market for plasterboard in Western 
Australia. l,t stopped supplying one of its distributors, North Perth Plaster Works 
Ply Ltd. North Perth has started taking deliveries from one of CSR's rivals. 
After North Perth complained to the Trade Practices Commission, CSR admitted 
liability. French J. imposed a fine of $220,000. 
APPLICATION OF THE RRC MODEL TO FISHER AND PAYKEL: 
The best way of (1.;:)31;;.;'):;)!..LI15 whether RRC model is of any use, is to 
apply it to a decided case and see whether it offers any benefits over traditional 
analysis. An apposite New Zealand case is v ===::...:::..::;. 
~~~=.:..:..159 I propose to analyse tbis case using modeL It is a 
paradigm RRC case, as it involved an exclusive dealing contract. This is exactly 
the type of case Krattenmaker and Salop courts should analyse using the 
RRC model. 
Facts: 
Fisher and Paykel (F&P) is the leading manufacturer and distributor of 
whiteware New Zealand. By 1990 it was New Zealand's only whiteware 
manufacturer. The winds of the free market blew through New Zealand in the 
1980's and from 1987 the government exempted all AustraJian whiteware from 
import licensing and abolished tariffs. govemment abolished import licenses 
158 (1991) ATPR para 41-076. 
159 [1990] 2 NZLR 731. 
from whiteware from other 
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and reduced tariffs to 10 per cent by 1996. 
This led to increased competition in the market. F&P was still the 
major player with approximately 80 cent of tbe market. F&P had an 
exclusive dealing contract (EDC) over its which it had used for 40 years. 
The EDC required dealers not to stock or sell other manufacturers' whiteware. 
was terminable by either party on 90 days notice. F&P had 204 
franchised dealers who sold to 450 outlets. There were approximately 800-850 
New Zealand outlets which sold whiteware. In 1987 F&P applied to the 
Commerce Commission for an authorisation, which involved determining, inter 
alia, whether the EDC breached Section 27. In 1989, the Commission by a 
majority, held the EDC did. F&P appealed. Various parties joined the action. 
The High Court held the EDC did not breach Section 
Issue: 
The issue the case was "does between F&P and its retail 
dealer outlets have the effect of substantially lessening competition a market 
for the distribution and to retailers of white goodS?,..I60 AU parties agreed 
the market was New Zealand-wide. All the parties, the experts, the Commission 
and the High Court accepted that the could breach s. if [t F&P's 
rivals' costs, They disagreed whether it did. While the experts posed an RRC 
question, none expressly adopted Krattenmaker and Salop's model. 
160 Id. at 743. 
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Q: What RRC scenario was involved? 
1. Bottleneck: 
This requires the retailers not to be equally efficient, or some of the 
retailers to be more important or advantageous to manufacturers. Examples, 
would the only shop in town or .a well regarded chain of shops throughout 
country. H F&P purchased an exclusionary right (or into an EDC) from 
such retailers, this would leave rivals facing higher input prices thus, higher 
costs. This requires the demand of R&P's rivals to be large relative to the 
number of unrestrained sellers. It the unrestrained retailers to be 
unable to afford to expand their capabilities. It also high entry baniers 
to the retail market to prevent new retailers entering and meeting the rival's 
increased demand ~or quality retail space. 
2. Real Foreclosure: 
This requires F&P to have acquired an (or entered into an ED e) 
from such a large percentage of retailers tbat the market price for the supply of 
tbe remaining space is driven up, so rivals' costs. Again, this requires 
the demand of F&P's rivals to be large, relative to the number of unrestrained 
retailers. It requires the unrestrained retailers being unable to meet the rivals' 
demand. It requires high costs of expansion and high entry barriers to potential 
entrants to the retail market. 
411 
3. Cartel Ringmaster: 
This requires F&P, after baving purchased an (entered into an EDC) 
from a large percentage of 
unrestrained retailers to 
costs 
to orcbestrate a cartel among the remaining 
F&P's rivals. This leads F&P's 
thus, higber costs. This again F&P's 
rivals' demand for retail space to be large relative 10 tbe number of unrestrained 
retailers. It requires entry to the retail market ot be difficult, as cartel pricing 
would really attract new entrants. It requires the of rivals to be smaU, 
to make it likely tbat F&P could orchestrate a cartel. I61 
4. Frankenstein Monster: 
This requires to have acquired an (entered into an EDe) from 
a percentage of retailers, leaving the unrestrained retailers so concentrated, 
they could form a cartel and F&P's rivals cartel prices. Once again the 
rivals would have higher input costs and tbus, higher casts. again requires 
high barriers to prevent new· entrants attracted by tbe canel Again 
the number of unrestrained retailers must be small to make a cartel likely.162 
summarise the require the following conditions to be met 
before the rival's costs are raised: 
Bottleneck and Real Foreclosure will require: 
(a) The existi.ng unrestrained retailers being unable to meet 
increased demand for retail space. 
161 STIGLER, supra, note 69. 
1 Ibid. 
rivals' 
(b) The existing 
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retailers facing high costs of expansion to meet 
(a) 
the rivals' increased demand. 
Ringmaster and Frankenstein Monster 
The number of existing unrestrained 
likely. 
All four 
to small to make a cartel 
(a) Significant 
market. 
for potential entrants into the whiteware retail 
Q; What scenarios were involved in F&P? 
No one could possibly suggest that either the Ringmaster or 
Frankenstein Monster were involved. Counsel for the Commerce 
Commission and F&P's rivals did not. were more than 400 unrestrained 
retailers. it would ~ake a truly heroic effort by F&P to orchestrate such a 
cartel. Similarly the unrestrained would have to collude to an 
unprecedented to form a canel by themselves. Such a canel would fly 
apart extremely quickJy after fOrTnjng - if one was ever fonned. l63 The two 
scenarios that were possibly in play, were Bottleneck and Real Foreclosure. 
1. Bottleneck: 
It was alleged and a majority of the Commission agreed that there were 
prime positions for retail outlets and had tied up greater proportion of 
these. F&P's rivals' counsel described these as best quality or key retailers and 
163 Ibid. 
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also as chain or department stores. l64 
2. Real Foreclosure: 
Again, by virtue of baving EDCs with key and quality retailers, 
F&P had employed the foreclosure model. tying up 400-500 out 
of 800-850 outlets is foreclosure. 
Under RRC identifying a possible scenario is not enough to 
establish had its rivals' costs. One must. examine the input 
(here, wbiteware shop) market. 
two scenarios oilly rivals' costs if: 
(a) The existing) unrestrained retailers cannot meet rivals' increased 
demand for 
(b) unrestrained retailers cannot expand to meet the increased demand 
(i.e. it is prohibitively expensive for tbem to do so). 
(c) High entry exist in the retail whiteware market which prevents 
new retailers entering to meet increased demand. 
In short, demand in retail wbiteware market must be inelastic. 
The High Court found conditions were not met. 
did not use the model but discussed tbese factors. It held 
High Court 
supply of 
suitable retail space throughout New Zealand was relatively elastic. Existing 
retailers could expand their capacity relatively inexpensively by converting 
existing shop floor to selling whiteware. This meant 
already had the ability to meet F&P's increased demand. They could also 
164 [1990) 2 NZLR 731 741. 
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expand by building new retail relatively inexpensively. Entry barriers for 
new entrants were Dot high as it was also relatively inexpensive to enter the 
retail whiteware market. It was also for restrained F&P to 
their exclusive dealing agreements and switch allegiance to 
rivals. Thus, under the RRC model, R&P's rivals could not establish the first 
limb of Krattenmaker and Salop's test The exclusive dealing contracts did not 
significantly and substantially rivals' costs. This conclusion depends upon 
it being relatively inexpensive for nvals to expand and for new entrants to enter. 
(This requires empirical testing.) majority of the Commerce Commission 
thought differently,l65 It expressly found the EDC significantly raised F&P's 
rivals' costs of distribution. Why .difference? One can only 
Professor KJein's (one F&P's expert view who noted: 
"I believe the majority of the Commission failed to appreciate the 
Paykel exclusive dealing arrangement had Dot the 
of creating commercially insurmountable entry barriers to 
competing whiteware suppliers by preventing them from obtaining 
adequate distribution of their products".!66 
with 
A court applying model would stop It would not consider 
whether F&P had power to price above the competitive level. The case is silent 
on whether F&P could charge supra competitively. If a court were to analyse 
the second limb, it would examine the output market and consider the following: 
(a) The extent of competition from F&P's rivals. 
165 Id. at 743. 
166 
71 (R. Ahdar ed. 1991). 
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(b) The effect of potential rivals, Le. whether supracompetitive pricing would 
attract new entrants . 
. this, a court would consider whether there are high entry 
to the output market It appears there were not, that tbere was 
no import licensing and that Australian imports faced no tariff barriers and 
nonAustralian were only facing temporary tariffs. Indeed, F&P's rivals 
success at entering the market shows tbe barriers were not insurmountably high. 
Thus, R&P's rivals would not meet the limb of RRC test. 
It is ironic Professor Klein who employed an RRC-like did 
not consider the second He thought the exclusive dealing contract did not 
raise R&P's rivals' - but did a showing of market power. 
However said: "Exclusive dealing arrangements have anticompetitive effects 
only if they lead to tbe exclusion of rivals by prohibitively raising rivals' costs of 
the critical input".167 Presumably, if rivals' costs were raised prohibitively, 
market power would flow from that. 
alternative perspective the case: 
One must 
bolus into the 
that one cannot impose U.S. antitrust theories bolus 
Act. As the High Court noted Union Shipping 
..........,.=.,<...-== V ~~~~~= ...... it is the task New Zealand Courts to 
interpret the Commerce Act. It is not a matter of importing common law 
doctrine".l68 
The Court of Appeal In v 
167 at 70. 
168 [1990) 2 NZLR 662 at 705. 
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~~~~.I.I; commented: "It is a dangerous method of statutory interpretation 
to substitute words which a legislature has not in fact chosen",169 
~~L.....!~~~~ appears to have been argued the context that 
Baxter and KJein laid down, viz; The exclusive dealing contract would 
only breacb s, 27 ifit "prohibitively raised rivals' C05t5".170 Section 27 not only 
prohibits conduct which prevents competition but also conduct which hinders it. 
Preventing "suggests stopping potential competition from occurring",17l whereas 
hindering that it is "making it more difficult to occur".1n The 
inclusion of hindering in tbe phrase lessening of competition widens s. 27's 
ambit. There are some types of anticompetitive conduct where a plaintiff may 
have little difficulty in establishing a hlndering of competition, but where he or 
may have some difficulty in establishing an actual lessening of competition 
in any quantitative sense. emphasises that a plaintiff must 
expressly identify and plead a hindering of competition if he or she intends to 
rely on the hindering limb. It appears rivals' counsel did not expressly 
identify and plead a hindering. 
Although, F&P's exclusive dealing contract did not prohibitively raise 
F&P's rivals' costs by creating "insurmountable entry ,174 it did make 
169 [1992] 3 429 at 434. 
170 Klein, supra, note 166, at 70. 
171 Tennants (Lanchasbire) Ltd v ~"'--'-'~~~~~ [1917] AC 495,5 
Ibid. 
~-""-''-'-'''-o:..u...>.~-=~~U:::.'!:u v Television New Zealand Ltd, Auckland CP 
No 929/91, Temm 1. Judgement 18 December 1992 at 16-17. 
174 Klein, supra, note 166, at 70. 
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it more difficult for new entrants to enter the market and for the rivals to 
expand their capacity. It made it more difficult for rivals to compete. 
Arguably could well amount to a and thus, a breach of s. 27. 
above interpretation of s. does not affect the validity of 
RRC model to assess how F&P's exclusive dealing clause could have raised 
rivals' costs. However, it means Krattenmaker and Salop's second test of market 
power is unnecessary under s. 27. Section especially when a plaintiff alleges 
a hindering of competition. requires less than a market power test. Thus, under 
s. 27 a court would impose liability on the defendant who simply raised rivals' 
costs. ability to supracompetitively is 
Efficiency Defence: 
Finally, if the High Court had held the exclusive dealing contract raised 
costs and allowed F&P to price supracompetitive!y, Krattenmaker and 
Salop's model would possibly allow an efficiency court would consider 
whether exclusive dealing clause prevented riding 
a court would consider whether preventing these justified exclusive 
dealing contracts. The High Court considered efficiency justifications in 
determining whether the exclusive dealing clause breached s. 27. 
RRC model, a court only considers efficiency justifications after the two limbs 
of the model are met. 
Summary of RRe to Fisher and Paykel: 
A court using an RRC model would not condemn F&P's exclusive dealing 
418 
contract. first limb is not met as the exclusive dealing contract did not 
substantially rivals' costs. The model seems a useful 
analytical tool and provides a conerent econom.ic analysis of exclusive dealing. 
The model considers everything the High Court, using traditional did. 
The High Court has been indirectly criticised for inter alia not providing 
adequate principals which courts could fonow when analysing 
exclusive dealing. 175 Arguably the RRC model provides such principles and 
a strong economic underpi.nning case. 176 The case shows model is 
not tbe simple two~stage test Krattenmaker and Salop Each of the two 
stages has several independent The weakness of the test is that it does not 
sufficiently take account Courts balance the pro and 
anticompetitive effects exclusive dealing under s. playa large 
part this. However, under the RRC model they are only considered at the 
end. However, had the High Court decided the case under s. 36, it not 
have considered 
It appears New Zealand courts could usefully employ the model in 
analysing exclusive dealing. However, as. 27 case may not require a plaintiff to 
show the exclusive ing clause gives the predator market power. 
RESPONSE TO F&P'S CRITICS 
175' Farmer, Competition Law, RECENT LAW 203, (1990). 
176 Hampton, BU1TERWORTHS 
COMMERCIAL LAW IN NEW ZEALAND 635, 766 (A Borrowdale 
and 1. eds. 1992), 
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Com,mentators - notably Professor Warren Peogilley177 and Rex 
Ahdar17S have severely criticised ~"""'-'="'---!!~~~<.!.. Their criticisms are many 
but perhaps may be condensed as saying that the decision, in tbeir view, was oot 
only outside the mainstream of law and economics on exclusive dealing) but 
outside the river basin. I disagree. Not only, in my opinion, was ""-"'=-'---'= 
"""""J-="'"'- perfectly consistent with overseas authority, but it also represents well 
reasoned contemporary economic thinking on The RRC 
model finds nothing wrong with ~='---=~"""'""=. If the decision was wrong, the 
model is flawed. 
Professor Pengilley: 
"Professor PengiUey's criticisms are many. He first says that Professor 
Baxter's submissions on U law were misleading as they were "not related to 
the factual context of the cases involved".l79 argues in some cases that the 
Baxter conc1usions as su bmi tted cannot be drawn at all. l80 Before this, be 
makes the obvious point that a principle in one case cannot be applied to 
another, unless there are factual similarities in of the cases. 181 I agree 
177 
paper 
at second annual workshop of the Competition Law and 
itute of New Zealand, Wellington. Park Royal Hotel, 11 August 
178 Ahdar, supra, note 72. 
179 PengiJley, supra, note 177, .at 59. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Id. at 55-56. 
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However, as mentioned above, the U.S. law, 
cited, bas significantly 
F&P had a market share of between 
states that: "If exclusive dealing were to 
'-'L.lJ"' .... J","" .... in by a company with such a it 
as 
Fisher & PaykeL 182 
PengiUey 
the U.S. when 
be thought that at 
one American case holding and involving a company with a vaguely similar 
to that of F&P might have to be found",l83 One must 
However, Professor 
refer to su'ch cases - but 
COrp.lS4 involved the 
is correct in stating Professor Baxter did not 
mentioned above, """'""''''-''-.L--!.~~ 
a share of 80 per cent, yet 
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld requirements contract. 
concerned a natural gas 
pipeline serving the 
the plaintiffs alleged the 
of Appeals 
plaintiffs. 
182 Id. at 59. 
183 Ibid. 
company that controlled the only 
a group of local municipal gas utilities. 
was an essential facility. The Tenth 
defendant's full requirements contract with 
courts have upheld exclusive dealing by 
184 724 F. 2d (1st Cir. 198?). 
185, 955 F. 2d 641 (10th Cir. 1992). 
with over 40 per cent market share. 186 
........, ........ -=~= v involved exclusive licensing 
contracts between the defendant baseball card seller every major 
basebalJ player. defendant had ! the for baseball cards with 
bubblegum. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the contracts, as the 
plaintiff had alternative outlets for-its Competitive licences were available 
for cards sold without nonconfeclionery goods and competitors could sign 
league players. 
cases where defendant held a market share similar to F&P can 
e as i Iy dis ti nguishe d. 0 I tz V ""-'--"-"'~""'-'~"""''-'='~'--L''''''''''~= involved the 
hospital ente into exclusive ali contracts for The 
plaintiff was an anaesthetist who was excluded. The hospital had 84 per cent of 
hospital admissions the area. The Court struck down the exclusive dealing 
contract, as the hospital was the only source of anaesthesia services in 
the market. It is for F&P's rivals to find retailers than it was for Oltz 
to find a new hospital. 
Professor Pengilley, then accuses Professor Baxter having 
misrepresented 189 He says Professor Baxter is when 
he "Standard slopped just short of ruli exclusive deali was illegal per 
186 See, supra, notes 120 and 121. 
187 F. 2d 139 (3rd Cir. 1981). 
188 656 Supp. 760 (D. Mont. 1987), afrd 861 2d 1440 (9th 1988). 
189 Pengilley, note 177, at 61 
.190 Professor Pengilley then quotes Justice 
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of possible 
benefits of exclusive dealing. He says ''It is difficult to characterise such 
observations as stopping" just short of ruling exclusive dealing ." illegal per 
se. 191 
Pengilley has not fully quoted Professor Baxter's statement on the case. 
Professor Baxter actually said stopped just short of ruling that 
exclusive arrangements ... were unJawful se whenever a substantial dollar 
volume commerce was 192 This is entirely correct. Altbough 
Justice Frankfurter noted exclusive dealing have competitive effects he 
they were too for courts to assess. 193 Thus, exclusive dealing is illegal 
by proof that competition has foreclosed in a substantial of the line 
of the commerce affected. Once a plaintiff had established that, tbe 
procompetitive effects of were In Standard Justice 
Frankfurter found the requirements contracts which foreclosed 6.7 cent of 
the defined market affected a substantial of If that is not a 
virtual per se rule· nothing is. noted above Justice Jackson, in his dissent, 
accused tbe majority of establishing a se rule,l94 NonChicago School 
commentators have the same. l95 
190 Ibid. 
191 Id. at 
192 Statement of Professor Baxter to High Court of New Zealand at 14. 
1 supra, note 91. 
194 See, supra, note 
ROSS, supra, note at 3 
Pengilley then says Professor Baxter 
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'""'-"'"~= by failing to 
mention that only a 0.77 per cent market was involved. He states 
Professor Baxter implies that exclusive dealing is virtually legal in all 
circumstances when comments in relation to that the Court held: "a 
20-year-contract involving millions dollars of commerce was Dot 
objectionable.196 Here again, Pengilley does not fully quote Professor Baxter. 
Professor Baxter actually said "the Court upheld a 20-year exclusive supply 
affecting hundreds of millions of dollars on the ground that the 
manufacturers rivals were not, given the circumstances, significantly 
disadvantagedll• l97 Professor Baxter specifically states tbe market 
circumstances", hardly says gives carte blanche to exclusive dealing. 
Pengilley then chides Professor Baxter for not quoting ~~~~~~ 
which Pengilley claims, represents current law and is relevant 
to and which could possibly run counter to the validity of 
F&P's ties. 199 With is inapplicable to F&P. Indeed it is 
hard to imagine a more distinguishable case. 
Twin City sold food, drinks and other items, under concession contracts, 
to spectators sports stadiums. It controlled per cent of concession 
franchises throughout the United States. Finley owned a professional baseball 
team which had contracted with Twin City for its '"'V"""","""" ... ,'u term 
196 Pengilley, supra, note at 
197 Baxter, supra, note 192, at 
198 676 2d 1291 (9th 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S; 1009 (1982). 
199 Pengilley, supra, note 177, 'at 62-63 and 79. 
of agreement was ten years. It was possible 
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they cpuld last a hundred 
years, as some contracts provided that if Twin City did not earn a stipulated 
minimum return, then the length of the contract would be automatically 
extended.2OO The contracts also had, "follow the clauses, so that if 
the team moved cities or changed owners, Twin City's concession contracts 
would continue. Twin also coercively induced teams to enter these 
contracts by large, long term loans at favourable interest rates and/or 
cash All factors - not only 24 per cent market share - led the 
Court to strike down the contracts. The exclusivity of the contracts was not at 
issue. The contracfs duration and means Twin City induced such 
duration were the primary concern. The Court did not expressly address 
exc~usivity, It said the exclusive nature of Twin City's rights to concessions 
at a particular amount or facility was not the subject of antitrust enquiry in this 
case. Indeed, in a footnote the expressly stated "we no judgement 
as to the propriety of the exclusive nature franchise agreement",201 
Indeed, the Court did not suggest a team was required to have two or more 
concessionaires. It condemned the contract's length as being unreasonable, as 
they far exceeded the time needed to recapture Twin City's investments the 
contract202 
F&P's contracts, on the other hand, were 30 days - not 10 to 100 years. 
There was no evidence of F &P lucrative inducements for its distributors 
200 676 2d 1291, 1296 (9th 1982). 
201 Id. at 1304. 
202 at 1304. 
to with If distributors moved or sold, F&P's contracts did not have 
to continue, with respect there was nothing sinister in Professor Baxter's 
not referring to condemnation of an exclusive 
dealing contract when defendant had cent of the market may well be 
the high water mark of to ..... " ....... ,," dealing.203 Pengilley also criticises 
Professor Baxter's opinion of u.s. law that short tenn exclusivity is always or 
nearly always legal.204 He no case law in which a court struck 
down an exclusive clause of similar length to F&P's. The only case I 
could find a court enjoined contracts of equivalent length was v 
where the Court enjoined requirements contract 
a percentage of the though they only lasted 30 years to one year. 
However, this case predates Roland Machinery.206 
Pengilley accuses the "'-""=.:.....:o::"-"'-~= High of "legalistic and 
somewhat naive,,207 believing a dealer could terminate 
without penalty. He that no director had ever tenninated 
as showing the enormous difficulties distributor has switching. The 
response to this must be, that was undoubtedly true before import tariffs 
were removed, it 'is not true now. Who were distributors to tum to 
203 to find a U.S. case after ]982 where a court had condemned 
dealing with such a low market. 
Pengilley, note 177, at 61. 
205 1 Trade (CCH) paras 641 and 
without publisbed opinion 758 F. 2d 654 (6th 
206 749 F. 380 (7th Cir. 1984). 
207 Pengilley) supra note at 
704 (W.D. Ky 1983),affd 
1984). 
previously? The only {emalives were nSlve I 111at is no 
can tween such companies as Hoover and Simpson. 
Indeed since the High Court decision dealers ed in significant 
'" 
numbers from 
Pengilley criticises Professor Baxter for understating the 
anticompetitive effects of dealing. Professor Baxter says there are only 
two circumstances where anticompetitive effects of exclusive deali can occur. 
One is when a company with monopoly power buys up or substantially all 
distribution .... <..tI'J ..... ~Jty. second is when a parry with monopoly power huys up 
more distribution capacity than it ly needs.2.O') !ley Professor 
Baxter for not citing any authority for ·lha1.210 Professor view is that 
there are no anticompetitive effect.s from exclusive dealing unless a new entrant 
is put (Q inordinant expense in obtaini new au IS. Contrary 10 Pengilley, 
is economic support for Professor Baxter's view. two grounds for 
exclusive dealing's anticompetitive nature are the RRC model's, bottleneck and 
real foreclosure scenarios. Ba.xter's inordinant expense criteria is merely another 
way of saYl raising rivals' costs. Recent U.S. law, including the Department 
of Justice's vertical restraints idelines is perfectly consistent with Professor 
Baxter's submissions.:!11 As, arguably, is Professor Williamson when states 
208 SUNDAY MES, MARCH 1993 P 17. 
209 r. supra. note} al 17. 
2tD Pengilley, supra, nOle at 67. 
211 U.S. Department of Justice Venical Restraint Guide!ines (Jan. 23 1985) 
para 3.2. 
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exclusive is only worthy competition law concern when indulged in by 
a structural monopolist a market where entry is difficult.212 
As I have argued above, a court applying the raising rivals' costs model 
would not have round that Fisher and Paykel had indulged in anticompetitive 
behaviour. It would find so without considering F&P's efficiency justification. 
PengiUey argues that had the High Court properly considered U.S. law, 
it would have a different result.213 With respect, I The 
Court found the following factors relevant in deciding:214 
(1) Despite F&P having a large market share and significant market power, 
the market was competitive. 
(2) dealing can procompeti tive. 
(3) exclusive dealing did not significantly foreclose retailers. 
(4) The exclusive dealing clause was of short duration, and easiJy terminable. 
U.S. Courts have found all these factors relevant in upholding exclusive 
dealing.2ls 
PengiUey's criticism of Professor Baxter in quoting 1S 
puzzUng.216 ~"-'-""= revolutionalised the U.S. Courts _____ ,..., of nonprice 
vertical restraints. That it did not involve exclusive dealing, does not decrease 
importance. Indeed, it certainly and ~~"",. 
212 Wil1iamson, supra, notes 41 and 42. 
213 Pengilley, supra, note 177, at 63. 
214 [1990] 2 NZLR 731 at 767. 
Seet supra, notes 
216 Pengilley, supra, note 177, at 65. 
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Indeed, many cases now no longer refer to these decisions and simply undertake 
a rule of reason 
Pengilley also 
based on ~~~. 
tbe High Court for not following 217 
However, this criticism depends on being good law. For the reasons 
mentioned above, I submit it is not. As the High Court noted, the case is also 
distinguishable, as site applied to per cent of Ford's dealers, there were 
import barriers to entry, and cars cost more then whiteware, making it more 
financiaHy difficult to enter the dealership market.218 Indeed, with the 
of hindsight, one must wonder whether F&P's rival's counsel made a tactical 
error in so heavily relying on 
Rex Adhar: 
Abdar IS even more critical of the Fisher & Paykel decision than 
PengHley. He the decision may be the beginning of the emasculation of 
the New Zealand antitrust. 219 While Ahdar makes many of the same criticisms 
as Dr Pengilley . he does not have a framework or method to his His 
article is more a polemic against the victory of the forces of darkness as 
represented by the Chicago School. However, I shall comment on some of his 
regards the decision as being inconsistent with overseas jurisdiction. 
I have already argued it is Dot inconsistent with law. the High 
Id. at 91-94. 
218 [1990) 2 NZLR 1 at 762. 
219 Ahdar, supra, note 72, at 
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for not quoting as recent Supreme Court authority on exclusive 
dealing.220 He seems to imply that and are mutually 
exclusive. Justice O'Connor "Exclusive dealing is an unreasonable restraint 
on trade only a significant fraction of buyers or are frozen out of 
a market by the exclusive dealing" 221 This is consistent with ........,.~'-""'''--''-~=. 
Dilly a minority of the Supreme Court discussed the case as an exclusive dealing 
one. The majority regarded it as involving tying. Given that, the High Court 
had reason not to quote ~=. 
~"-"-,-"""-,,,,,,,-,,-~~contains no evidence that its rivals were frozen out of the 
market. the Higb Court Doted, they could obtain alternative channels of 
distribution cheaply. Indeed Fisher & Paykel's rival's success in decreasing 
& Paykel's market share despite the exclusive dealing shows they were not 
out.22Z 
Ahdar also quoted Canadian la~ and seems to imply that a Canadian 
Court would decide ~='-"""'-"'-";,z.== differently. case law 
this. case is immediately distinguishable. Fisher 
not the world's largest manufacturer. It did not have economies of 
not support 
Paykel was 
up to 
a third of the world's production. It did nDt offer substantial discounts to its 
suppliers. It had no meet or rele~e or most favoured nation clauses. No one 
claimed Fisher & Paykel coerced its distributors to sign_ Fisher & Paykel's 
220 ld. at 44. 
1 466 U.S. 2, 45 (1984). 
See, supra, note 208. 
223 Abdar, supra, note at 25-26. 
exclusive ......... ,"-ULj'''''' gre:eIILeOtS were 
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the length of Nutra Sweet's. 
Ahdar neglects to mention the Tribunal noted that had Nutra , .. , ...... , not offered 
the rebates required long use its logo) then the exclusive dealing 
agreement might not have anticompetitive.224 
He significantly to mention which is more similar to 
The Commission's test is remarkably similar to the "'-=~-=. 
snowmobile market is remarkably similar to 
entering the whiteware market, in that it is easy. Both Bombardier and Fisher 
& Paykel face competition from internationally rivals. Neither had the 
protection of import tariffs. As in ~""-="'--'"""-~~:!.!.> the Co1IlIITission in 
Bombardier recognised exclusive dealing procompeti tive 
Ahdar like, Pengilley, argues Ford is consistent with overseas 
authority.225 For reasons set out above, I disagree. 
also quotes la~ and seems to imply that this is relevant 
in the Fisher Paykel case. Witb respect, I disagree. Much of the litigation 
under European law involves applications exemption. The European 
Commission, in a has heJd that provided the turnover of the parties to the 
exclusive dealing, including companies connected with them, does not exceed 200 
million ECU's and the market within the corrunon market, or a substantial 
part of it, is below 5 per cent, then article 8S(1) does not apply.227 this does 
224 See, supra, note 145. 
Abdar, supra, note 72 at 
226 Id. at 23-25. 
227 "Notice on agreements of minor importance" [1986] 0.1. 1/2. 
not apply company 
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to apply for ao exemption. This is a far lower 
threshold than anywhere 
criticised the Commission's 
the world. Commentators have extensively 
Their basic criticism is that the Law 
of Competition in relation to vertical restraints does not have a rule of 
reason?28 Pro and anticompetitive effects are not assessed as fully as they are 
in other jurisdictions. The market shares which Ahdar to his European 
examples shows this is true. One must also note that in the cases Ahdar quotes 
were allegations that the supplier induced the contracts by offering 
monetary and discounts. Fisher and Paykel did not. 
Ahdar's weakness is to assume exclusive with a 75-85 cent 
market share automat means the exclusive 
tbe outdated ~~~ .................... =~ thinking. It is 
by formulae or on the basis of line drawing. 
is bad. This appears to 
simple deciding of cases 
He also claims that Fisher & Paykel may have facilitated a dealer's 
cartel.229 Fisher & Paykel dealers formed themselves into a dealers' support 
association and supported Fisber & Paykel's bid for authorisation. This 
association presumably helped maintain a cartel for & Paykel's whiteware 
He as evidence "an informal survey of four Fisher & Paykel 
228 
Ahdar, supra, note 72, at 1 L 
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dealers in Dunedin".230 found these practised de facto resale price 
maintenance. 
With respect, such a survey shows and proves nothing. However, his point 
is theoretically possible. However, recent economic analysis suggests that his 
proposed cartel no anticompetitive threat. 
Professor Wesley Liebeler argues that such intrabrand cartels do not 
output and therefore do not t antitrust concern.231 He argues " ... 
they do not operate to market share directly beyond the level already 
held by the supplier of the particular brand of product involved",232 He argues 
that a monopoly supplier will charge the maximum price it can obtain for its 
profits, i.e. it will reduce output to the profit maximising quantity. If it retailers 
for a cartel they Will not be able to reduce output any further. All that 
happen is the distribution of monopoly profits will change, viz; the retailers will 
take more. 
Price to consumers will not change, Such cartels may form to alleviate 
problems and increase efficiency or they may a blatant price filing 
cartel. Liebeler courts cannot dis( ish them, so should not forbid 
argument only applies to reseller cartels which involve the 
230 Id. at footnote 
231 W. Liebeler, 30 U ,C.LA. Law 
Rev., 1 (1982). 
232 Id, at 5. 
Ibid. 
supplier.234 appears to 
Paykel dealer's cartel. 
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the case with Ahdar's postulated Fisher 
criticises High Court's concept of competition.ill He implies 
that the High Coun has adopted efficiency as a sole meaning of competition, 
adopted Chicago School thinking. claims that is inappropriate. Efficiency 
is but one of the goals of competitive Jaw. innovation the diffusion of 
concentrated power-are others. The Commerce Act stated goal is promotion 
competition. Chicagoans' efforts to change the objective have been foiled.236 
However, one can strongly argue efficiency is the Commerce Act's goal. I have 
so argued in Cbapter I of this dissertation. 
Ahdar congratulates I Coun for rejecting Fisher & Paykel's free rider 
argument.237 notes that bad they been relevant Fisher & Paykel would 
have used tbem for brown goods in Australia. Commissioner Vautier 
minority decision tbe Commerce Commission exclusive dealing contracts 
were unnecessary for brown goods as most were imported and Fisher & Paykel 
did not design them.2:38 Another reason may be that Fisher & Paykel's 
distributors did not want them. exclusive dealing contJacts were agreements 
between & Paykel and its and Paykel did not coerce 
Its dealers voluntarily agreed to them. may not wanted them 
234 [bid. 
Ahdar, note 72, at 42-43. 
236 Id. at 43. 
237 at 4647. 
238 (1990) 2 NZBLC (Corn) at 104, 451. 
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for brown goods. However, all this is speculation as there was no evidence on 
that point., As to, why Fisher & Paykel not have exclusive dealing in 
Australia, perhaps the answer is, that with a precedent like what lawyer 
would recommend exclusive dealing. 
Despite American having held that prevention of free riding is a 
valid concern and must be taken into account in assessing arrangements 
courts do not automatically accept rider Perhaps best 
example this is v ~~~ 
Basketball Association.239 This involved an NBA limiting the number of 
games which could be shown on a super station from 25 to 20. The NBA 
offered three rider explanations for the rule. Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals these rider explanations and found them inadequate.240 
Undoubtedly Ahdar would approve of this. The author of this decision? Judge 
Easterbrook. 
CONCLUSION: 
Louise Longdin, a case note accuses the High Court being under the 
tight yoke of the Chicago School Model Market Behaviour?Al If means 
deciding cases under s. on basis of demonstrable rather than on 
formulated line drawing based on market and basing competition law 
239 961 F. 2d 667 (7th Cir. 1992). 
240 rd. at 675. 
241 
policy on market considerations; applying contemporary economic analysis on 
overseas case law, she is correct. Long may yoke remain tight 
The model's critics are correct in saying it does not 
anything substantially new to antitrust analysis. All the factors a court takes into 
account under the RRC model are taken into account by c<;"mrts deciding cases 
on the of previous case law. However, the RRC model offers a more 
coherent and tightly structured method of analysis. weakness s. 27 is that 
it does not account of Efficiencies are vital to 
assessing the of an anti competitive They not under 
s.36. If a dominant firm claims its purpose for exclusive dealing was to obtain 
a court could use the RRC model to assess whether the dominant 
firm gained power over price. so, it is likely it had an anticompetitive 
and exclusive dealing was unnecessarily restrictive. This shows how the model 
is useful in s. 36. A dominant firm that practises exclusive dealing will always 
claim its purpose was to efficiency. If, however, the exclusive dealing 
to the dominant firm power over price consumers have suffered. 
Courts could infer an anticompetitive purpose. If consumers in the 
of higher prices courts should model shows when they 
should should any claimed efficiency by a dominant 
firm in such a case. 
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CHAPTER XV 
CONCLUSION 
Strategic non price predation merits antitrust concern. Dominant firms 
can in it, to detriment of consumer welfare. The RRC model 
demonstrates how. Its most important feature is showing how a dominant firm 
can gain power over price, and prevent price falling. Although price may 
stay the same after a dominant firm's action, consumers suffer as wouJd 
fallen even further. This insight shows that predation is not irrational. A 
predator can pay its conduct from the revenue it saves by preventing prices 
falling. It is in a predator's interests to prevent price falling. Thus, the RRC 
model is relevant to any New Zealand court considering a predation claim under 
s. 36. The concept of price from falling is particularly relevant in 
price squeezes and refusals to supply rivals. It helps show how such 
conduct can harm consumer wetfare. The model is of no use in assessing 
refusals to supply nonrivals. Such conduct does not raise rivals' costs. 
The model is consistent with couns' interpretation of s. 36. In many cases 
if a dominant firm gains power over price, courts should infer an anticompetitive 
purpose. They should do so over any dominant finn's purported efficiency 
justification. However, the model is not a A dominant conduct 
which gives it power over price may actually consumers. I 
argued product innovation and advertising are two such instances. condemn 
such behaviour using RRC model would ultimately chill and deter beneficial 
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practices. In cases such as capacity and hiring, the RRC theory 
is However; it should not the sole determinant. A court should assess 
this conduct RRC theory together with other factors. itself the 
theory could condemn much beneficial and competitively neutral behaviour. In 
relation to of judicial and administrative processes the theory shows how 
it can anticompetitive. It is a useful insight to <:l:lJ"'I;;;"''''I actions. The 
RRC particularly well exclusive deal should assess 
exclusive dealing under the model The theory is likely to become more 
common in antitrust cases. II IS relevant to s. 
The model is not unduly complex courts to employ. It uses economic 
theory. That can be'no criticism. Professor Paul Long notes: "Antitrust 
litigation not only needs economic analysis, antitrust litigation is becoming 
economic analysis".' Thurgood's complaint about judges 
unaccustomed to "rambling In the wilds of economk theory"2 can not be valid 
in 1994. Indeed, it is wrong in relation to New Zealand where economists can 
sit as members of the High COLIrt when hearing Commerce claims. 
In many R model achieves the same result as conventional 
antitrust. That is no criticism. The ty of the model is (hat it provides an 
economic underpinni to the cases. It also provides something extra for couns 
to consider. theory is not simply "old wine in new . It is a blend of 
old and new ne in new bottles. New Zealand courts could profitably drink 
2 For 
(M 
origi 
I J.). 
see V -'-"'.j~~=.w. 405 U.S, 596, n. 93 ( 
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from theory when .... VU""HU'w' s. 36 cases. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
ABA ANTITRUST SECTION: NO. 18 NON 
UNDER 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT (1991). 
ABA ANTITRUST 
ed.1992) 
ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS (3d 
I, (1993) 
ADAMS W. & L. , ANTITRUST ECONOMICS ON TRIAL; A 
DIALOGUE ON THE NEW LAISSEZ-FAIRE, (1993). 
Ahdar, 
NZULR 1, (1991). 
AREEDA P.& H.HOVENKAMP, ANTI LAW (1990) 
AREEDA P. & D , ANTITRUST LAW 78 (1978) 
439 
P. and L.A. KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS PROBLEMS TEXT 
CASES (4th 88) . 
& Turner, 
88 HARV.L.REV., 697 
(1975) 
ARMANTONO D. ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY ANATOMY OF A POLICY 
FAILURE 40 (1981) 
Austin, 8 
ANTITRUST L.J. 895 (1990). 
Bailey, 
71 AM. ECON. REV., 178 (1981). 
440 
Baker, 
58 ANTITRUST L.J. 645, (1989). 
Bain, 
(1954). 
Balmer, 29 BUFFALO 
L. REV., 3 9 I ( 19 8 0) . 
~~~aL~~~~_~3 ANTITRUST L.J. 397 (1984) 
BAUMOL, W.J. ZAR 7 R I CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE 
THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (198) 
Baumol, Markets; 
72 AM. ECON. REV., 1 (1982). 
(1981) . 
Baxter, Reflections Upon Professor Williamson's Comments, 
27 LOUIS U.L.J. 315, (1983). 
R.& D. KASSERMAN, ANTITRUST ECONOMI (1985) • 
Blake & Jones, 
65 COLUM.L. REV. 422 (1965) 
Bok, .CT. REV. 267 (1961) 
, R'J THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH 
( , 1993). 
Bork, 
9 J.L. & ECON., 7 ( 66). 
441 
I Bowan, and Jones, 
3 COLUM.L. REV. 363, (1965). 
50 
ANTITRUST L.J. 233 (1980). 
Bark, 1977 SUP. CT. 
REV. 17 1, ( 1978) . 
BORK R., THE ANTITRUST 156 (1978). 
Bowman, 
22 U. CHI.L. REV. 825 (1955). 
Brennan, 33 Ant 
1. 95 (1988). 
MONOPOLIES OF Q FlED 
PETROLEUM GAS, 147 (1981). 
BROZEN Y. CONCENTRATION, MERCERS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1982). 
Brazen, 
14 J.L. & ECON, 315, (1971). 
Policy, 
PROCEED! I 131, (1993). 
115 in COMPETITION LAW 
AND POLICY IN NEW ZEALAND (Adhar ed. 1991). 
L.J. 
361, ( 88). 
442 
calkins, 6 
Antitrust L.J. 65 (1987). 
Calvanii Norpr the of Requlatory 
and udicatory Abuse in THE CUTTING EDGE OF ANTITRUST. 
EXLUSIONARY 
Antitrust, Law 
1989) . 
Calvani & Averitt, 
As ion S 
, Washington DC, October 5-6, 
J. ANTITRUST L.& ECaN., No 2 (1986). 
Carstensen, 
ColI 
87 COLUMB.L. REV., 1625 (1987). 
16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV., 487 (1983). 
MARKETING 
,,1986). 
Rec. 275 (1991). 
Comanor & I III, 
74 AM. EeaN. REV 372 (1984). 
Comanor and 
75 AM. ECaN, REV. 539 (1985). 
Cornanor , 
98 HARV.L. 
983, (1985). 
1 ATPR. 
443 
S., COMPETITION LAW AND IN AUSTRALIA (1990) 
Cost 
66 MICH. L. REV., 333 (1967). 
De Long, 
12 SW.U.L. REV. 298 (1980). 
Demsetz , 
6 J. L. & ECON I' 1 ( 3) • 
72 AM. ECON. REV., 45, 49, 
(1982) 
Dixit, 
Eaton & 
EeON. 721, (1980). 
Easterbrook, 
U.CHI.L. REV 263 (1981). 
Easterbrook, 
DAME L.REV 972 
Easterbrook, 
86) . 
53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135 (1984) 
GEO. L.J. 305 (1987). 
Easterbrook, 
ANTITRUST L.J. I 99, (1993). 
EDUCATION REV., 3, (1989). 
48 
61 NOTRE 
76 
61 
1 
444 
Easte 
(1984) . 
63 . L. REV. I 1 
Easterbrook, on Ordover & Willig STRATEGY 
PREDATION AND ANTITRUST ANALYSYS, 416, 417 (S.Salop 
1981) 
CAL. L. REV, 1177 (1992). 
Elizi 
(1990) . 
Farmer, RECENT LAW REV, 203 (1990). 
Farmer, 
I, 5 
358, (1984). 
Fischel, 
45 U. CHI.L. REV. 80 (1982). 
F 
RAND J. 
93 J.POL. ECON., 410 (1985). 
Fox, 
61 NOTRE DAME L. REV., 981 (1986). 
80 
20 
445 
FOx, 
CORNELL L. • I 1140 ( 1) • 
., 1714 
(1986). 
FRASCO G., EXCLUSIVE 
(1991) « 
, A COMPREHENSIVE CASE STUDY 
Frasco G., 
(unpubl 
& 
Deal and 
working , Cornell 
17 J. ECON. 366 (Autumn 1986). 
(1984) . 
& lwig, 
Deterrence (1986) 
ity) • 
~~~~~~~~~~ REVIEW OF ECONOMICS STUDIES, 52 
(1986) . 
Gi 
STRATEGY, PREDATION AND ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 205 (S. Salop 
. 1981). 
& Newberry, 
, 72 AM. ECON. REV., 514 (1982) 
66 
LAW AND 
IN NEW Z ................ D 179, ( r ed. 1991). 
446 
Hampton, in 
COMMERCIAL LAW IN NEW ZEALAND 35 (A. Borrowdale J. 
Farrar . 1992). 
er & De Sevo, 
6 CARDOZO L. REV., (1984). 
(1966). 
Hanks & Williams, 
9 ECLR 53 (1988). 
Hay, 58 Antit L.J. 913 (1990). 
Hay, 58 ANTITRUST L.J., 913 (1990). 
(S. Sal ed. 1981). 
HEYDON.D. PRACTICES LAW, Vol, 1., para 5.40. 
11 & Weston, 
seminar paper 
(1993) • 
HOFSTADTER, 
the PARANOID STYLE IN 
(1965), 
in 
POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 119 
I HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION, Chaper 9 
(R. S and R. Willig • 1989). 
Hotell 39 ECON.J. 41 (1929). 
Hovenkamp, 
213 (1985). 
Hovenkampi 
(1987) . 
84 Mich. L. 
HOVENKAMP H. ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW (1985). 
Hovenkamp, 
GEO. WASH. L. Rev j 1 (1982). 
Hovenkampi 57 U. CHI. L. 
REV . f 63 I ( 199 0) • 
Hurwitz/ 
(1985). 
Z & Kovacic, 
35 VAND. L. REV. I 63, (1982). 
Jorde & 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (1989). 
& Klevor 
89 
447 
I Extension of Power Leverage I 85 
. L . REV. I 5 15 ( 1985) . 
ein, 
448 
ein, Crawford & Alchian, 
Zl t J.L. & ECON.297 (1978) 
Klein, 
in 
IN NEW ZEALAND 65, (R • 1991). 
Korah, 
Int'l L.& Bus" 320, (1981). 
Krattenmaker & Salop, 
(1986). 
Krattenmaker & Salop, 11 
1 29 (1987). 
(1986) . 
Krattenmaker & lop, 
Ant L.J. 71 (1987). 
Krattenmaker, Lande & Salop, 
76 Geo. L. J. 241 (1987). 
& Wilson, 27 
J. ECON. THEORY, 253 (1982). 
Lande, 
HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982). 
449 
Lande I 
ANT L. J. 193 (1 J). 
Liebeler, AEI REG J., 34, 38 (Nos, 
J Ex 4 198). 
Liebeler \<1. JO 
U . C. L. A. Law Rev. I 1 (1982). 
Li tein. 56 
AM. ECON. REV. REV. 392 (1966). 
Liebenstein, 
AM. ECON. REV. 203 (1978). 
in, 
(1990) 12 ECLR 189. 
Lapatka & Godek, 
(1992) • 
MCCLOSKEY D., THE APPLIED THEORY OF PRICE (1982) 
MacCr n and Sa 
Exclusive Dealing, OSGOODE HALL L.J. 709, 
(1989) . 
McGEE J. I IN DE Of INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION (1971) " 
McGee, (N.J.) 
Case, 1 J.L. & Econ. 137 (1968). 
MCMahon, 
450 
Mahinka, 
3 58 
ANTITRUST L.J. 921 (1989). 
MARKHAM J., IN THE RAYON INDUSTRY (1952). 
I MICROECONOMICS: THEORY & 
1982) . 
Markovits, 
REV. 8 4 1 ( 197 5) . 
( 4th 
A 
(1984) . 
to 
Marvel, 25 J.L. & EeON1 (1982). 
1, 8 REVIEW OF 
127 (1993). 
Mathewson G. and R. wi I Is Exclusive Del 
Anticompetit ? (1985) (unpublished working 
university of ). 
Milgraorn & 
27 J.ECON. THEORY 280 (1982). 
NEALE A.D., THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE 
AMERICA 178 (1970). 
Ull~~~L 69 CORNELL L. REV., 1305, (1984) 
Note, 
Doctrine, 83 COLUM. L. REV~ 441 (1983). 
ORGANISATION, 
STATES OF 
451 
23 
VUWLR 191 (1993). 
November, 
paper VUWLR, ( 2) . 
0' n , 1 CCL J 64 (1993). 
Ordover & 
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION 537-96 
(R. ensee & R. Willig . 198). 
Ordover & Will 
91 YALE L.J. 81 (1981). 
Ordover, Saloner & lop, 
80 Am. Econ. Rev.127 (1990). 
Ordover, & llig, 
Reply, 83 COLUM. L REV., 1150 (1983). 
o & Willig, 
in STRATEGY PREDATION AND ANTITRUST 
ANALYSIS 300 (5. Sal . 1981). 
Bull, 65 (1989). 
PASHIGAN B.P., THE BITION AUTOMOBI AN ECONOMIC 
IS OF I SYSTEM, 219 (1961). 
PATHAT, 
452 
Patterson, 
Pengill 
Naivety? at the second annual workshop of 
the Law and Pol Institute of New Zealand, 
lington, Pa Royal Hotel, 11 August 1991. 
Special Report, ATPR (1989). 
Pengilley, 
Pengilley, 
P fsky, 127 U. PA. L. 
REV., 1051 (1979). 
M' I COMPETITIVE IES: TECHNIQUES ANALYSING 
INDUSTRI AND COMPETITORS, (19S0). 
R. ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976). 
Posner, 127 U. 
PA. L., REV. 925 (1979). 
REV.6 (1983) 
PORTER M. COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATI (1990) . 
Posner, 
(1977) • 
POSNER R. & F. 
870 (1981). 
Posner and 
HARV. L. 'f 937 
453 
45 U.CHI.L. REV.1 
, ANTITRUST CASES AND MATERIALS, 
94 
Posner,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~_v3 J. 
POL. ECON., 801 (1975). 
Prescott & 
8 J. 
Rasmusen, Ramseyer & 
REV • I 113 7 ( 1991) . 
Robinson, 
.378 ( 77). 
1 
45 CORN. L. QTRLY , 254/ ( 60). 
Rosenbluth, 
(unpublished paper, 
1981) . 
RoSS, 
( i 1992) . 
81 AM. EeON. 
ANTITRUST, 4 
. S. F., PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW 331 ( 93). 
s 
& Scheffman, 
. 19 (1987). 
36 J.lndus • 
17 J. REPRINTS FOR ANTITRUST L. & EeON., No 2 
(1987) . 
454 
56 
An 
, 17. J. REPRINTS FOR ANTITRUST L. No. 
2. (1987). 
Salop and seheffman, 
Rev. 267, (1983). 
Sal 
. J. ECON. 141 (1979). 
Scheffrnan, 
73 Am Eeon. 
10 
Theory 
to Antitrust, 37 ANTI BULL., 187 (1992). 
SCHERER F. INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE (2d , 1980). 
F., INNOVATION 
PERSPECTIVES (1984). 
GROWTH: 
S , Antitrust , Efficiency and 
REV. 998, (1987). 
I 
89 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1976). 
REV. ( 901 ) ( 1976) . 
REV. 998, ( 1987) . 
s 
9 BELL J. ECON. 305. 
I 62 N.Y.U. L. 
A Comment t 
89 HARV. L. 
62 N.Y.U.L. 
455 
J., CAN CAPITALISM SURVIVE? 24 (1978). 
SCHUMPETER J. CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND , (1942). 
er & 61 
'S L.J" 1 (1993). 
127 U.P.A. L. REV., 1076 (1979). 
SHANNON. D. FRANCHISING IN A LEGAL GUIDE (1982). 
Shi 
Shepherd, 
L. 
(1984) (unpubl 
of Cali ia (LoS Angeles 40-44). 
REV. 572 ( 84). 
74 AM. EeON. 
S 83 COLUMD. L. REV. 
1121, (1983). 
8 BELL J. EeON., 534 (1977). 
10 
J. EeON. 1 (1979). 
Spence, 17 J. 
REDPRINTS ANTITRUST L. ECON., 51 (1981). 
ivack & Ellis, 
S 69 CORNELL L. 
REV. 101 , ( 198 3) . 
456 
STIGLER G., THE THEROY OF PRICE (3d ed. 1966) 
STIGLER G., THE ORGANISATION OF INDUSTRY 67 (1968). 
st 66 AM. REV. 
213 (1976). 
STIGLER G., THE THEORY (3rd • 1966). 
16 CONN L. ., 969 (1984). 
SULLIVAN E., THE ECONOMY OF SHERMAN ACT, THE 
FIRST ONE HUNDRED YEARS (1990). 
1 S6 
L.J., 361 (1987). 
SULLIVAN L. HANDBOOK OF LAW OF III (1977). 
SULLIVAN E.T. AND J.L. HARRISON, ANT 
AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS (19BB). 
Swanson D. I 
1-64 86) (unpublished Ph.D. 
Harvard University). 
(1983-84) • 
99 J. L. 7 
ECON. I 259 (1966). 
ser L., 36 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 488 I (1963). 
Telser, 
EeON. 86 
Tharp, 
60) . 
84 NW. U.L. REV. 321 (1989). 
Thompson, 
THUROW L., THE ZERO-SUM (1980) . 
ces Corom ion. 
Bankground .1990) . 
U.S. Department of ce Vertical Restra 
(Jan, 23 1985) para 3.2. 
457 
3 J. L. 7 
A 
Gu ines 
Roy, ON COMMERCIAL LAW, 36.07(3) 
VAUTIER , BAXT , CER AND BUSINESS COMPETITION -
AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 103 (1990). 
Vogelenz 
(1978). 
Walker, 
(1979) . 
Weiss, 
Werden, 
127 U.PA. L. REV., 1104 (1979). 
U.S. Department 
Policy Office, 84-11 (1984). 
61, 
53 70 
, Economic 
458 
White, 
in VIDEO 
MEDIA COMPETITION: REGULATION ECONOMICS AND TECHNOLOGY 338 
(Noam ed. 1985). 
williamson, 
82 Q.J. ECON. t 85, (1968). 
Williamson, 
87 
Williamson, 
U.L.J. 289, (1983). 
Williamson, 
127 U.PA.L. REV. 953 (1979). 
Williamson, 
Williamson, 
125 U.PA. L. rev. 699 (1977). 
Will 
WILLIAMSON O. I MARKETS AND 
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (9175). 
WILLIAMSON O. THE ECONOMIC 
(1985) . 
YAMEY B. THE ECONOMICS OF 
ANALYSIS AND 
OF CAPITALISM 
CE MAINTENANCE (1968). 
